Pro-Russian, Partisan, Sanctioned: How Russia Parasitized Ukrainian Television

A brief history of how Viktor Medvedchuk came to own, and then lost ownership of, Ukrainian TV channels.

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Introduction

The media landscape of independent Ukraine is increasingly becoming a subject of study for both Ukrainian and foreign scholars, who examine various aspects of it: the development of media during the democratization process, the oligarchization of Ukrainian media, state and financial censorship, journalistic resistance movements against these phenomena, the struggle for the establishment of Public Broadcasting, and the impact of the war with Russia on media operations.

Our research represents one of the few attempts to delineate the pro-Russian segment of Ukraine’s media landscape from 2014 to 2022, particularly focusing on the emergence, operation, and eventual banning of media that became targets of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) sanctions. These media outlets can be classified as partisan, given their affiliations with specific political forces, their promotion of favorable agendas, and their role in advancing these political goals. Although a number of internet sources were also sanctioned, our focus is on television channels. Firstly, the synergy between media empires and political party activities amplified their influence on viewers and voters. Secondly, despite the rapid growth of social media and websites as information sources, television remained the most effective medium for mobilizing loyal voters and shaping a core group of voters. Thirdly, television was still the main source of information for older age groups, characterized by lower levels of media literacy and less critical engagement with what they heard, along with a lack of ability to verify TV information through independent sources, thereby creating a fertile ground for Russian propaganda.

This study presents the political context in which pro-Russian media operated from 2014 to 2022, the characteristics of partisan media operations, the transformation of certain media assets into a “media empire,” key toxic narratives and examples of their instrumentalization before the full-scale invasion, as well as an analysis of the government’s response to hybrid challenges posed by pro-Russian media.

According to the NSDC, the economic sanctions introduced just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine were part of preparations to counter the enemy. Hence, in this analysis, we examine Ukraine’s ban on pro-Russian media as a part of the information war against Russia and a response to hybrid threats. We reference several theoretical concepts and approaches, including:

Our research covers aspects such as the political environment that enabled the rise of pro-Russian media in Ukraine; the capture of the media space by pro-Russian politicians and the development of a network of partisan media as a well-crafted political technology, utilizing these media as an administrative resource; and the sanctions imposed on media assets as a response to the hybrid threats of information warfare.

In the second part of our study, we will examine the activities of the key figures behind the sanctioned media during Russia’s full-scale invasion: whether they continued to work for propaganda outlets despite the bans, which of them managed to shed their toxic image and pivot their careers to other media or sectors, and how the full-scale invasion affected their work (whether they relocated to Russia or Belarus and continued to work for Moscow’s interests, kept spreading Russian narratives to the domestic audience in Ukraine, changed their line of work, disappeared from public view, or began working for legitimate Ukrainian media, etc.).

General Overview of Ukraine’s Media Environment

The modern media landscape of Ukraine began taking shape in the 1990s. Since then, the government and civil society have had only three decades to establish effective norms for media regulation. During the 1990s, Western media owners accumulated a significant presence in the media markets of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. However, Ukraine’s experience diverged from that of Central and Eastern European countries, as it lacked similar levels of foreign investment (those investments that did occur were mostly from Russia). Instead, there was a struggle between the government and oligarchs for monopolizing control over the media space.

After the dissolution of the USSR, the history of the Ukrainian media landscape is conventionally divided into several stages. Tetiana Nikitina suggests the following periodization. The first stage — 1991-1994 — was the phase of so-called “pluralism by default,” a term coined by Romanian researcher Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. During this period, following the regime change, the system moved away from old authoritarian norms without replacing them, leading to a media environment characterized by pluralism of views and freedom of speech in the early years of independence. The second stage — 1995-1998 — was marked by the oligarchization of the media; as media outlets struggled financially, they increasingly attracted oligarchic capital, resulting in what became known as “oligarchic pluralism,” where media primarily represented the interests of their owners. The third period, 1999-2004, was characterized by the establishment of state control over the media, coinciding with Leonid Kuchma’s second presidential term, which saw a rollback of freedom of speech, pressure on the media, and the spread of “temnyky” [government directives to media on what topics to cover and in what way]. 

In 2005-2010, during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, state censorship was replaced by “financial censorship.” Ukrainian media were classified as “partly free” by Freedom House, but conditions for their economic independence were never established, nor were fair rules created. As a result, media outlets still depended on their owners, who used them as tools to further their political interests. Although there was a relative improvement in freedom of speech, this progress was partially reversed between 2010 and 2014, when Viktor Yanukovych came to power and state control over the media returned. This control was characterized by censorship, self-censorship, and the presence of taboo topics. Pressure on journalists increased, and media watchdogs warned of restrictions on press freedom imposed by the government.

The next phase of media development began in 2014, when a series of legal innovations were introduced in response to Russia’s occupation of part of the Ukrainian territories, transforming Ukraine’s media landscape. Firstly, broadcasting of Russian TV channels was discontinued. Secondly, the state control that had been reinstated in previous years disappeared. Between 2014 and 2016, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting banned nearly 80 Russian channels. In 2017, Russian social networks and websites such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Yandex, and Mail.ru were blocked by presidential decree (Decree No. 133/2017).

Despite the ban on Russian media and the end of state censorship following the Revolution of Dignity, experts observed a decline in journalistic quality and a disregard for professional standards in Ukrainian media. Nataliya Lyhachova, for instance, notes that the annexation of Crimea and parts of Donbas had a significant impact on the journalistic community, blurring the lines between journalism and activism and altered the “objectivity” optics. Additionally, Ukrainian journalists faced challenges in covering the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and its broader context. Self-censorship emerged, driven by a desire not to harm Ukraine’s national interests or play into Russian propaganda. Following Euromaidan, political dictates over the media either disappeared or weakened significantly, but oligarchs and their political allies retained influence over the editorial policies of media dependent on them.

Moreover, oligarchic media outlets tended to report on the government with relative loyalty, as was the case during Yanukovych’s presidency. Media owners used these outlets as tools to pursue political and business objectives. In this period was characterized by the creation of new media outlets — particularly informational TV channels — intended from the outset as instruments of influence in the political process, with no real prospects as viable media businesses. An example of this is Rinat Akhmetov’s new channel Ukraine 24. As a result, autonomy or political neutrality was not characteristic of the most popular private media outlets. At the same time, a notable achievement of that period was the establishment of Public Broadcasting, pushed for by civil society. The struggle for its creation had begun during Yushchenko’s presidency and was finally realized under sustained public pressure.

A situation arose in which centralized government control over the media disappeared, leaving the country’s media landscape filled with outlets owned by various individuals and organizations, each presenting events from different perspectives. While this may seem to suggest a form of pluralism, in reality, the editorial policies of many of these outlets were dictated by the interests of their owners and their affiliated political parties. This led to a distorted form of pluralism, where political groups that owned or influenced the media were disproportionately represented in political discourse. Similar trends are observed in Western democracies, especially those experiencing socio-political crises. However, the impact of such trends is more severe in countries like Ukraine, where fewer sufficiently robust authoritative institutions exist to act as a system of checks and balances.

Nevertheless, even this kind of diversity of viewpoints could be seen as an advantage. Although it did not equate to true freedom of speech, and only offered a “plurality of dependencies,” it still allowed Ukrainian audiences to compare different viewpoints presented by oligarchic media and draw their own conclusions.

Democracy is unthinkable without free media and freedom of expression. However, the mere existence of media is not inherently indicative of democracy. It is not the media themselves that make democracies free, but rather the norms and regulations that govern them, and the adherence to those norms. In Ukraine’s media landscape, a situation emerged where so-called “parasites of journalism” operated — media actors that existed within Ukraine’s media system but operated in the interest of another state. In response to this hybrid threat (to state interests, societal stability, and resilience against information attacks), the government took several hybrid measures. These included imposing sanctions on media owners and freezing their assets, including their media holdings. The sanctioned media tried to position themselves as independent or opposition outlets, labeling government actions as censorship, repression, and undemocratic political competition. They managed to temporarily garner support from some international and Ukrainian organizations. However, the broader media community largely understood the reasons behind such measures and did not condemn the closure of TV channels that were working in Russia’s interests.

As mentioned earlier, after 2014, Ukraine gradually reduced Russian influence in its media space by banning Russian TV channels and social networks. As Russia’s ability to directly inject narratives into Ukraine’s media space diminished after 2014, the Kremlin resorted to influencing Ukrainian channels and publications. For a time, Russia was forced to rely on pro-Russian sources in Ukraine, controlled by politicians from pro-Russian political parties or fugitive associates of Viktor Yanukovych, such as Vesti.ua and Strana.ua, both founded by the pro-Russian media and civic figure Ihor Huzhva. In television, the most pro-Russian stance during the early years following the Revolution of Dignity was taken by the TV channel Inter, which was linked to Viktor Yanukovych’s allies Serhiy Lyovochkin and Dmytro Firtash. To a lesser extent, the Ukraine channel, directly owned by another key Yanukovych ally — Rinat Akhmetov — also maintained a moderate pro-Russian position, though over time it softened this stance without fully abandoning it. Russia continued attempting to influence the domestic agenda and public opinion in Ukraine, employing several tactics simultaneously to achieve a detrimental synergistic effect on the country.

Following 2014, the occupation of Crimea and parts of Donbas became the most effective and visible means through which Russia shaped both Ukraine’s internal and external policies, though it was far from the only method. Researchers Ihor Hurak and Paul D’Anieri identify six tactics used by Russia to influence the choices available to Ukrainian leaders, as well as the decisions they made: coercion using energy resources, control over Ukraine’s maritime access, granting Russian passports and citizenship to Ukrainian citizens, instrumentalization of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to promote Russian-Ukrainian unity, and influencing elections while promoting the pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk.

The synergy of these Russian tactics was particularly evident before the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. Specifically, when analyzing Medvedchuk’s role within this system, it is important to focus on his partisan media empire, which acted as a mouthpiece for anti-Ukrainian propaganda and ensured political visibility and media presence for his political faction.

The Return of Viktor Medvedchuk to Politics

Viktor Medvedchuk had not held any high-ranking positions in the Ukrainian government since January 2005, when he served as the head of the Administration of Ukraine’s second President, Leonid Kuchma, during the latter part of his second term. At that time, Kuchma was under both domestic and international pressure due to the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze. In the media, Medvedchuk earned a reputation as an influential and cynical grey eminence, giving out instructions to produce temnyky to control media content. In 2004, Vladimir Putin became the godfather of Medvedchuk’s daughter, while the wife of Dmitry Medvedev — who was then the head of Putin’s administration and would later serve as Russia’s Prime Minister and President — became her godmother. From that point on, Medvedchuk made no effort to conceal his exclusive connections in Moscow, and Putin publicly expressed a notable fondness for him.

Following the Orange Revolution, Medvedchuk, along with his Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), which had been one of the ruling parties under Kuchma, quickly lost both formal and informal influence over Ukrainian politics. Medvedchuk attempted to return to the big league politics in the 2006 parliamentary elections with the Ne Tak! bloc, but the bloc garnered only 1.01% of the vote, failing to enter parliament. Journalists also noted a second major attempt by Medvedchuk to re-enter political decision-making in 2009. It was speculated that Medvedchuk played a key role in moderating negotiations and preparing an agreement for a broad coalition between Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and then-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This agreement included substantial changes to Ukraine’s Constitution. The negotiations were leaked to the media, which ultimately led to the coalition failing.

Medvedchuk’s next opportunity to return to politics was presented by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Medvedchuk appeared at peace talks in June 2014; to this day, it remains unclear who authorized him to participate and under what mandate. The Russian Ambassador to Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov, stated that Viktor Medvedchuk and Nestor Shufrych participated in a meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group at the behest of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. At the same time, Valeriy Chaly, then Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, insisted that the only official representative of Ukraine at the negotiations in Donetsk was Leonid Kuchma. A representative of the militants informed the OSCE special monitoring mission that Medvedchuk was appointed to represent the “DPR” and “LPR” groups at the negotiations. Putin welcomed Medvedchuk’s presence at the talks, which his spokesperson announced. Later, Ukrainian authorities admitted that Medvedchuk had been appointed by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) as a special representative on humanitarian issues related to the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In February 2018, Poroshenko defended the appointment of Medvedchuk, justifying it by the need to achieve effective results in the exchange of prisoners, which, as he claimed, justified certain moral compromises. Later that year, the Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada from Poroshenko’s party shifted the responsibility for Medvedchuk’s appointment to then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Allegedly, it was Merkel, who, following Putin’s suggestion during a phone conversation with Poroshenko, recommended Medvedchuk for the negotiations.

Thus, Medvedchuk’s status in the negotiation process turned out to be paradoxical. Publicly, everyone tried to distance themselves from him, while Medvedchuk himself fully leveraged his new role.

In addition to the mandate as a negotiator, Medvedchuk obtained exclusive business privileges for himself in both Russia and Ukraine. On February 27, 2014, Medvedchuk’s wife, Oksana Marchenko, along with Natalia Lavrenyuk, the partner of Medvedchuk’s close associate Taras Kozak, acquired a stake in the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery from Russian businessman Sergey Kislov for a nominal fee. This acquisition began generating tens of millions of dollars in annual dividends for the families of Medvedchuk and Kozak. The oil products from the refinery were supplied to the occupied Crimea, the United States, and, according to the NSDC, to Russian-occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The oil assets of Medvedchuk’s and Kozak’s wives in Russia continued to grow.

In Ukraine, according to investigative journalists from the Skhemy project, with the support of the SBU and the Ministry of Economic Development, and in coordination with actions by the Russian authorities, structures associated with Medvedchuk took over the market for importing Russian liquefied gas into Ukraine, making Medvedchuk a monopolist. During this time, entities connected to Medvedchuk also exclusively used the Ukrainian segment of the Samara-West oil pipeline to supply diesel fuel from Russia and Belarus to Ukraine. Thus, amid the Russia-Ukraine war, Medvedchuk began accumulating significant financial resources in both Russia and Ukraine.

In addition to business privileges, Medvedchuk also enjoyed other preferential treatment. On October 25, 2015, Ukraine terminated direct air connections with Russia. However, these restrictions did not apply to Medvedchuk’s private flights. He retained similar flight privileges within Ukraine during the COVID-19 pandemic, even under President Zelenskyy, despite a government decree that banned passenger transportation.

Medvedchuk used his involvement in prisoner exchange negotiations to shape his image as a person capable of achieving “peaceful goals” where the Ukrainian authorities could not. Although he was officially delegated to the negotiation process by a Ukrainian state body, he often publicly denied the reality of Russian aggression. He emphasized that he was accepted and listened to in Moscow, promoted his “peace plans” coordinated with Moscow, and shifted the responsibility for the war onto Ukraine. By 2016-2017, observers were already discussing Medvedchuk’s potential return to parliament and his considerable prospects in the competition for political power. 

At the same time, cooperation with Medvedchuk was a constant source of criticism and pointed questions directed at Petro Poroshenko’s team. At the end of 2018, Medvedchuk officially ceased participating in the Minsk negotiations, and, now in the role of an opposition figure, he entered the political fight for the electoral legacy of the Party of Regions, which had been crushed during the Revolution of Dignity.

The Struggle for Yanukovych’s Legacy

The Party of Regions was a diverse coalition of political and business forces from its inception. Its first head in 2001 was Mykola Azarov, then the Head of the State Tax Administration. In 2002, under the leadership of Volodymyr Semynozhenko, the party joined the pro-government bloc “For United Ukraine!” In April 2003, Viktor Yanukovych, then Prime Minister, took over as leader of the Party of Regions. After the 2007 parliamentary elections, two major rival factions emerged within the party and around Yanukovych’s circle. Alongside the party’s main donor and Ukraine’s wealthiest man, Donetsk businessman Rinat Akhmetov, new financial resources were developing through businessman Dmytro Firtash’s role as an intermediary in the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. At that time, journalists began to distinguish between two clans within the party — the “Donetsk clan” and the “gas clan.”

The Donetsk clan included natives of the Donetsk region and close allies of Akhmetov: Borys Kolesnikov, Oleksandr Vilkul, Vadym Novynskyi, and the Klyuyev brothers. The group’s main media asset was the TV channel Ukraine, owned by Akhmetov. Meanwhile, the gas clan, alongside Firtash, included Yuriy Boyko and Serhiy Lyovochkin. In 2007, Firtash became a shareholder of the channel Inter, around which a media group began to form; it was later revealed that his partner in this venture was Lyovochkin. On February 2, 2013, Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi sold (at least officially) his controlling stake in the Inter Media Group to Firtash and Lyovochkin. In 2015, they announced that they had bought out the channel’s stake from the Russian state television company. Nevertheless, the ownership of this media group remained opaque, leading to speculation, including suspicions of continued Russian and Khoroshkovskyi’s influence.

During this time, the TV channels, and later the media groups Ukraine and Inter, competed for dominance with the 1+1 TV channel (which later also became a media group), where Ihor Kolomoisky became the majority shareholder in 2010. A fourth significant media player in the television market was Viktor Pinchuk’s group (since 2009 known as StarLight Media). In the early 2010s, the combined audience share of these four holdings exceeded 75%.

The rivalry between the “Donetsk” and the “gas” clans within the party often became public. For instance, in 2009, Akhmetov’s newspaper Segodnya even announced an alleged planned expulsion of Lyovochkin and Boyko from the party. However, the groups ultimately remained united: in Ukraine’s political-electoral field, which was almost evenly split between pro-Western national-democratic forces and those oriented toward rapprochement with Russia, including the Party of Regions, their alliance brought more advantages. Only a united Party of Regions could aspire to power or at least guarantee itself the position of the largest opposition force.

After the Revolution of Dignity, pro-Russian politicians discarded the Party of Regions brand, tarnished by its association with Yanukovych, but maintained their alliance, attempting to win over the former supporters of this political force. The Opposition Bloc, created from the remnants of the Party of Regions, received 9.43% of the vote in a multi-mandate constituency in the 2014 parliamentary elections. The primary stakeholders in this new brand — Akhmetov and Firtash — split their influence evenly within the political force. For instance, the nominal co-heads of the faction were Oleksandr Vilkul, representing the Akhmetov-Donetsk wing, and Yuriy Boyko, from the Firtash-gas wing. This 50-50 split, without a decisive stakeholder, planted a time bomb under the future of the project.

As the new electoral cycle approached in 2019, the party had to determine its format of participation, primarily the presidential candidate, which also meant solidifying leadership on one side or the other. Both co-heads, Vilkul and Boyko, vied for the candidacy. Pro-Russian forces managed to bring their party and faction out of marginal status, and thus the stakes were higher. Journalists and sociologists in 2018 speculated that the chosen leader had a real chance of advancing to the second round of the presidential election, though with little chance of victory. Under favorable circumstances, there were also hopes of securing a position in a renewed coalition government, and, in the best-case scenario, even aspiring to premiership.

Thus, the party was evenly divided between the respective factions. To outmaneuver competitors in the fight for the electoral legacy of the Party of Regions in case of a split, an additional leverage, an ally with extra influence and media resources, was needed. This third partner — allegedly suggested by the Kremlin — turned out to be Viktor Medvedchuk.

In the fall of 2018, the “gas clan” took a risk and decided to split. On November 9, Yuriy Boyko, then co-chair of the Opposition Bloc, signed an agreement with Vadym Rabinovych, another prominent member of the Opposition Bloc faction and the leader of the recently formed For Life party, to establish the Opposition Platform — For Life (OPFL) as a broad opposition movement. In July 2018, Viktor Medvedchuk’s Ukrainian Choice movement had joined the For Life party. On that same day, Boyko announced that the platform was also created to nominate a single presidential candidate for the 2019 election. By November 16, the newly formed OPFL council had unanimously nominated Boyko as their candidate for the presidency.

“Our association… will represent the interests of the residents of the Southeast, the Russian-speaking population, and all those who understand the necessity of a fundamental change in the current government’s policies in the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections,” Medvedchuk commented on the nomination at the time.

Akhmetov’s group unsurprisingly protested. On November 20, the Opposition Bloc faction expelled Yuriy Boyko and Serhiy Lyovochkin from their ranks. At that time, Boyko was the co-chair of the faction, while Lyovochkin was the deputy head.

From that point onward, the pre-election rivalry between the Opposition Bloc and the Opposition Platform — For Life (OPFL) began: internal party competition transformed into an inter-party conflict. The fight for the former voters of the Party of Regions — and thus, the status of the leading pro-Russian force — became perhaps even more important to both sides than the goal of winning the elections and gaining power.

Medvedchuk ensured that the OPFL splinter group received Moscow’s support; however, by 2018, Firtash and Lyovochkin also had a significant advantage: media resources. During this period, Medvedchuk began rapidly strengthening and consolidating his own media assets, which were formally owned by proxies or close allies. In the coming years, these media outlets would not only bolster Medvedchuk’s political weight and that of his party but also amplify Russia’s influence on Ukraine’s domestic political situation and agenda.

One of the key tasks for Medvedchuk’s media pool was to boost his own authority in the eyes of Ukrainian voters. During the 2019 presidential and parliamentary campaigns, Medvedchuk facilitated Boyko’s visits to Moscow to meet with senior officials who promised to negotiate peace and cheap gas for Ukrainian consumers if OPFL came to power. With a negative trust rating, Medvedchuk could not realistically run in the presidential election, and on the OPFL electoral list, he was third behind Boyko and Rabinovych (his close ally and the formal owner of the media holding, Taras Kozak, rounded out the top ten). While the Inter Group focused on promoting Boyko during the campaigns, Medvedchuk’s channels emphasized the OPFL brand, Medvedchuk himself, or several key party figures backed by his inner circle.

Without direct support from Moscow, the Opposition Bloc adopted a less radical rhetoric during the campaign, criticizing their former allies for being overly pro-Russian. Specifically, Yevhen Murayev — a former regional politician from Kharkiv, co-owner of the NewsOne channel, and former partner of Rabinovych in the For Life party — who had joined the bloc with his political project Nashi (Ours) — accused Boyko and Medvedchuk of doing trips to Moscow to “pay homage”.

The minimum goal of outperforming their former allies was achieved with flying colors. In the first round of the presidential elections on March 31, 2019, Boyko finished fourth with 11.67% of the vote, while Vilkul received only 4.15%. In the parliamentary elections on July 21, 2019, the newly formed Opposition Platform — For Life, led by Boyko, took second place with 13.05%, trailing only the presidential party Servant of the People. The Opposition Bloc garnered only 3.03% and failed to enter parliament. Thus, with Medvedchuk’s backing, the “gas clan” outperformed the “Donetsk clan” threefold, solidifying their position as the largest opposition force in the Verkhovna Rada.

Radicalization of the Pro-Russian Opposition Ahead of Sanctions

At the beginning of 2019, the year of the upcoming presidential elections, Viktor Medvedchuk proposed a plan for ending the war that was allegedly agreed upon in “Donetsk, Luhansk, and Moscow.” This plan became the starting point for the electoral campaign of the Opposition Platform — For Life (OPFL) party and its presidential candidate, Yuriy Boyko. The campaign for an agreed-upon peace was reinforced by Boyko and Medvedchuk’s visits to Moscow: first in March 2019, ahead of the presidential election, and again in June 2019, before the parliamentary elections. During these visits, they met with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the head of the Russian company Gazprom, Alexey Miller, to discuss improving relations between Ukraine and Russia. Essentially, during an ongoing war, these parliamentarians were openly conducting separate negotiations with the aggressor, bypassing the state. Although Medvedchuk’s plan largely aligned with Russia’s demands, it was portrayed in his controlled media as a mutually beneficial path to peace, one allegedly hindered only by Kyiv’s intransigence.

During his election campaign and at the beginning of his term, Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared his readiness to restart peace negotiations with Moscow, a stance that Russia might have perceived as a willingness to make concessions. At the same time, Zelenskyy’s team rejected the possibility of forming a coalition with the Opposition Platform — For Life and promised to remove Medvedchuk from mediating the negotiations. Medvedchuk, however, appeared to dismiss Zelensky’s pre-election rhetoric, asserting that removing him from the negotiations was impossible and expressing hope for cooperation with Zelenskyy’s party in the parliament, if not in a coalition, then pragmatically on certain issues. If his plan was implemented, Medvedchuk promised Ukraine cheap Russian gas, multi-billion-dollar injections into the economy from Russian sources, and the return of the occupied part of Donbas, naturally, on Russian terms, which would likely block Ukraine’s path to the EU and NATO. As a goodwill gesture to initiate dialogue, Medvedchuk suggested the possibility of negotiating the release of the 24 Ukrainian sailors captured by Russia in the Kerch Strait in November 2018. According to him, a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk could be achieved within “six to eight months.”

However, after being elected president, Zelenskyy refused to include Medvedchuk in the negotiation process, including those concerning prisoner exchanges. During the first few months of the parliamentary majority’s work, the tone of public statements and media coverage on Medvedchuk’s channels, when referring to Zelenskyy and his party, shifted from “hope for constructive cooperation” to one of disappointment and criticism. For instance, NewsOne featured publications accusing Volodymyr Zelenskyy, much like they had previously accused Poroshenko, of failing to end the fighting and fulfill the commitments of the Minsk Agreements or the Steinmeier Formula.

The definitive radicalization of Medvedchuk’s media and spokespersons’ views on Zelenskyy occurred after the Normandy Four summit in Paris in December 2019. This was the first personal meeting between Zelenskyy and Putin, held behind closed doors, where they discussed issues such as the withdrawal of forces in eastern Ukraine, prisoner exchanges, and Russian gas supplies. However, there was no breakthrough. Russia was unwilling to back down from its demands, which involved undermining Ukrainian sovereignty by reintegrating the Russian-occupied part of Donbas into Ukraine’s political structure, and the newly1 elected President Zelenskyy was not prepared to meet these demands.

From that point on, Medvedchuk’s media channels launched a massive propaganda campaign against the Ukrainian government, which coincided with the broader efforts of the Kremlin to destabilize Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities gradually increased rhetorical and legal pressure on the pro-Russian opposition and the channels under their control.

How Pro-Russian Politicians Seized Ukraine’s Media Space

Most of the individuals commonly referred to as oligarchs in Ukraine did not found the media outlets they own or owned until recently. In the 1990s and 2000s, oligarchs gradually acquired and established control over these media assets, consolidating media groups to influence different audiences.

This was also the case with the media outlets that, in the years leading up to the full-scale invasion, ensured Russian influence in Ukraine’s information space. Viktor Medvedchuk’s media group was primarily composed of three information TV channels — 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK — which were combined in the summer of 2019 into the Novyny media holding group (“News”), formally owned by Taras Kozak, an MP from OPFL and Medvedchuk’s business partner. In 2018, Yevhen Murayev, who had formed his own Nashi party after breaking away from Vadym Rabinovych’s political movement, launched the Nash TV channel (“Ours”). Most of the informational TV channels of that time were created with the involvement of, or at least based on concepts developed by, Russian citizen Alexei Semenov and his team.

The 112 Ukraine TV channel was launched in November 2013. Shortly before, its general director Andriy Podshchypkov announced the acquisition of five regional broadcasting companies that had received broadcasting licenses in 2011 with the help of the then government: Novyi Format TV, Partner TV, Ariadna TV, TV Vybir, and Lider TV. These companies covered almost the entire territory of Ukraine. On November 5, 2013, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine re-registered their licenses under the name 112 Ukraine. The channel’s official launch followed on November 26, 2013. From the channel’s inception, there were rumors in media circles that it was controlled by those close to then-President Viktor Yanukovych, particularly the Minister of Internal Affairs, Vitaliy Zakharchenko. Podshchypkov denied this, emphasizing, “My channel belongs to me.”

Although in the first years after the Revolution of Dignity, the channel did not have a clearly expressed political stance, rumors of its ties to pro-Russian groups persisted. In 2016, Andriy Podshchypkov applied for political asylum in Belgium due to “pressure in Ukraine.” In 2018, the channel’s leadership and ownership changed. The official owner became Eduard Katz, a German citizen who, according to journalists from the Skhemy project, was involved in the used car business. The channel’s general producer was Artem Marchevskyi, associated with Medvedchuk’s Ukrainian Choice project. After that, mentions of Medvedchuk on the channel increased significantly. In December 2018, Taras Kozak, deputy head of “Ukrainian Choice” and Medvedchuk’s partner, officially bought the channel from Katz.

The informational channel NewsOne was initially established in 2005. Its first owner was media manager Rudolf Kirnos, but later it passed into the hands of businessman and politician Vadym Rabinovych, although the channel did not play a significant role in the media space until 2014. In 2014, the channel was bought out by constituency MP Yevhen Murayev bought the channel; after this, Oleksiy Semenov’s team relaunched NewsOne, attracting prominent hosts, and the channel began to increase its ratings.

In 2016, Murayev placed his faith on aligning himself with the For Life project and cooperating with Vadym Rabinovych. After this party merged with Medvedchuk’s Ukrainian Choice in 2018, Murayev left the project and formed the Nashi party. Around that time, NewsOne initially came under the control of former Yanukovych associate Andriy Portnov, and later, in October 2018, was acquired by Taras Kozak. Murayev then created a new channel — Nash.

This TV channel was launched on the basis of a niche channel called Maxi-TV, which previously catered to a female audience. The legal entity behind Maxi-TV was the company Nasha Praha. In the fall of 2018, a Cypriot company, Demosena Investments LTD, became the owner of Nasha Praha, and the ultimate beneficial owner was Volodymyr Murayev, Yevhen Murayev’s father. Starting in November of that year, Maxi-TV was replaced by the broadcast of Nash, with the participation of former NewsOne employees. The new channel was headed by Tygran Martyrosyan, who had previously been a host and executive producer at NewsOne.

Relations between Medvedchuk’s group and Murayev significantly deteriorated, and their projects began to compete within the same electoral niche. Murayev publicly criticized Medvedchuk and his allies; in 2018, Russia imposed sanctions on Murayev, which both Zelenskyy’s President’s Office and Murayev himself later attributed to the fallout with Medvedchuk.

In response, Yevheniy Murayev formed an alliance with the Akhmetov-aligned Opposition Bloc and ran on their party list during the 2019 parliamentary elections. During this time, Murayev’s channel Nash collaborated with Ukraine 24, where Murayev frequently appeared as a guest. The two channels even shared the same studio for certain shows. In 2021, the Ukrainska Pravda online newspaper, citing sources close to Vadym Novynskyi, reported that an oligarch linked to Akhmetov was financing Nash and negotiating its purchase from Murayev. However, Murayev denied these claims. Regarding OPFL and Medvedchuk, Murayev expressed a bleak outlook:

“He destroyed the Opposition Bloc, and now he’s sinking OPFL. How often did you see Boyko on 112 Ukraine or NewsOne? Obviously, Medvedchuk tried to swallow Boyko’s ratings and lead OPFL. It didn’t work out.”

The ZIK TV channel was created in 2010 on the foundation of the Lviv-based channel UT-Zakhid. Starting in 2014, ZIK expanded its operations, becoming a national broadcaster in 2017, expanding coverage across the country. From its inception until 2019, the channel was owned by Lviv businessman Petro Dyminskyi. In the summer of 2019, ZIK was purchased by Taras Kozak, after which the general director Ihor Turkevych, along with several journalists and hosts, quit the channel. After buying ZIK, Kozak announced the creation of the Novyny Media Holding, which also included 112 Ukraine and NewsOne, purchased earlier.

None of the acquisitions of these TV channels were approved by the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU), although, according to Ahiya Zahrebelska, co-founder of the Antitrust League organization, the AMCU should have assessed the threats to market competition arising from the concentration of media assets in a single pair of hands. Additionally, an investigation by the Anti-Corruption Action Center (ANTAC) found that the purchases of the TV channels were financed by the Cypriot company Turul Investments, linked to other offshore companies and Medvedchuk’s oil business in Russia.

After uniting the channels into a single media holding, the outlets, which were already similar in their concepts and programming, became even more integrated: they shared hosts and projects, and together promoted the same messages and figures, creating a unified narrative. The head of the holding became Yehor Benkendorf, who had previously held key positions at Inter and 112 Ukraine and was the head of the National Television Company of Ukraine from 2010 to 2013, during Yanukovych’s presidency.

On September 20, 2018, a petition was created on the website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to cease operations of 112 Ukraine and NewsOne. Within ten days, the petition had garnered the required 25,000 signatures for further consideration. The author of the petition, Artur Pereverzev, referred to 112 Ukraine and NewsOne as “Kremlin’s information assets in Ukraine” that “actively broadcast the ‘Russian world’ ideology within the country.”

In October 2018, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a resolution to appeal to the National Security and Defense Council to initiate sanctions against seven companies that held the licenses under which 112 Ukraine and NewsOne broadcasted. However, this resolution had no immediate practical effect.

In February 2021, economic sanctions against Taras Kozak and his television channels were introduced by the NSDC, resulting in the suspension of their broadcasts. In the wake of these sanctions on Medvedchuk’s media pool, Murayev’s Nash gained the most in terms of audience growth.

Immediately after the sanctions were imposed, employees of the sanctioned channels founded a new company — TOV Mediakholdynh Novyny (Novyny Media Holding). One hundred people contributed 1 hryvnia each to the company’s charter capital, including TV presenters Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Diana Panchenko, and Ruslan Kotsaba. The company was led by Viktor Frolov, with Benkendorf as the authorized representative. The new company quickly acquired the Pershyi Nezalezhnyi (First Independent) TV channel, which had been officially established in 2019 but had not fully started its operations until it was sold to the employees of the closed channels (according Detector Media’s sources, the channel had been created for future sale). On February 26, 2021, just one hour after Pershyi Nezalezhnyi began broadcasting, the channel’s team declared that its satellite transmission was being blocked. Thereafter, the channel continued to broadcast online.

In November 2021, a long-time ally of Medvedchuk, OPFL MP Nestor Shufrych, announced that he had become the majority shareholder of Pershyi Nezalezhnyi and the satellite channel UkrLive, in order to provide the Novyny Media Holding with access to satellite broadcasting. The previous owners of UkrLive, who sold the channel to Shufrych, were members of the Narodnyi Kontrol (People’s Control) party, Andriy Kisera and Andriy Mysyk, who were close to media manager and politician Dmytro Dobrodomov. However, in December 2021, new sanctions were imposed, and the broadcasting of UkrLive on the Astra satellite was halted. In early February 2022, YouTube channels that streamed Medvedchuk’s content were also banned.

In June 2021, Yevhen Murayev — likely in an attempt to reduce the risk of sanctions against his channel — announced that he was handing over the management of the TV channel to the staff and would cease involvement in media management. “We are on the threshold of very unpleasant events. And if we do not understand that we need to change this together within the framework of national dialogue and civil peace, we are in for very grim consequences,” Murayev stated at the time. During this period, the new director general of the channel became media manager and political strategist Volodymyr Hranovskyi, who had previously worked in Yanukovych’s campaign during the 2004 elections and was involved in creating the notorious concept that divided Ukrainians into “three sorts.” If this move provided any benefit, it was short-lived — sanctions were eventually imposed just two weeks before the full-scale invasion.

Partisan Media: Their Methods and Objectives

In recent decades, one of the most significant shifts in the politics of many countries has been the strengthening role of partisan media. Partisan media eschews objectivity in favor of promoting a particular viewpoint, with the aim of polarizing the electorate and swaying it to one side. Viewers who share the network’s partisan identity (e.g., a Republican watching Fox News or a Democrat watching MSNBC) are likely to perceive the source as reliable, and its content will resonate with their values and ideological beliefs. As a result, such viewers tend to align their thinking (partisan-consistent) with the direction promoted by the partisan media they consume.

In addition to partisan media theory, the agenda-setting theory is also pertinent in the context of our study. This theory suggests that media does not dictate what people should think but rather what they should think about. By focusing on specific issues and narratives, partisan media can shape public perception and determine topics for public discussion. This selective emphasis helps consolidate an audience around particular viewpoints that benefit certain ideologies and political forces.

We believe that the explanatory potential of agenda-setting theory can be significantly enhanced by the selective exposure theory. Generally, people are inclined to choose media that align with their ideological beliefs and political orientations. However, there is also a counterargument: viewers do not necessarily seek out a comforting “information bubble” and may engage with news that causes cognitive dissonance. Nevertheless, when it comes to partisan media consumption, the first tendency seems more prevalent: in order to retain viewers, partisan media often attempt to resonate with at least part of the viewer’s ideological beliefs and match their political worldview.

For instance, a viewer might have had concerns or skepticism about Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course. Encountering a pro-Russian channel, this viewer would find “confirmation” of their concerns, as key messages about Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic direction on these channels were full of Euroskepticism and anti-Western rhetoric. They framed Ukraine as merely a raw material appendage to Europe, a sales market and supplier of cheap labor, or claimed that NATO would turn Ukraine into a battlefield and open a front against Russia there, or that the U.S. would use Ukraine to test its weapons. This kind of content reassures the viewer that their views are not marginalized, and that skepticism about the Euro-Atlantic course is present in the public discourse. Additionally, partisan media directly provides a solution: there is a political force that will protect your interests, and all you need to do is support the party that owns this media outlet (such as the OPFL or Nashi).

Although the TV channels owned by Medvedchuk (until February 2021) and Murayev (from February 2021) were among the top five most popular news channels in Ukraine, their combined audience share never exceeded 7–8% and never approached the ratings of market leaders like Kolomoisky’s 1+1, Firtash-Lyovochkin’s Inter, or Akhmetov’s Ukraine. However, the relatively low ratings of partisan news channels compared to general-interest channels should not be misleading regarding their actual influence. Partisan channels offered news and political talk shows throughout the day, thereby allowing them to steadily accumulate a loyal audience. Meanwhile, general-interest channels would attract viewers interested in political content only during a few daily news bulletins and usually one weekly political talk show. Medvedchuk and Murayev’s channels also generated a huge number of news topics, including pseudo-news, often revolving around statements by politicians or (pseudo)experts. According to a 2020 study, Medvedchuk’s channels were the source of most of the pro-Russian disinformation that monitoring teams found in the media space, involving thousands of publications that were subsequently shared by hundreds of online outlets and social media pages.

When these TV channels came under Medvedchuk’s control, they did not immediately start operating openly in Russia’s interests. In 2018, the news content of NewsOne and 112 Ukraine was relatively balanced, and guests from various political parties and representatives of the current government were often invited to participate. It appears that this approach was used to covertly accumulate an audience without alienating it at the outset. Over time, however, pro-Russian narratives began to be more actively woven into the channels’ content.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s team took a considerable amount of time to either understand or acknowledge Medvedchuk and Murayev’s channels as agents of Russian influence. For example, NewsOne anchor Diana Panchenko was invited to a press conference marking Zelenskyy’s first anniversary as president. Additionally, members of the Servant of the People party continued to appear on these channels, sometimes finding themselves in very uncomfortable situations, such as spontaneous negotiations with representatives of the Russian occupation authorities live on air. It later became known that there was an agreement within the ruling party’s faction to boycott Medvedchuk’s channels, though not everyone adhered to it; this cooperation only ceased after sanctions were imposed.

Manipulations Employed by Medvedchuk’s Television Channels:

Emphasizing Negativity. Broadcasts deliberately focused mainly on the negative trends in Ukrainian life, such as declining living standards amid the war and the shortcomings of reforms aimed at European integration, while avoiding positive news. There was a tendency to exaggerate the adverse consequences of government mistakes and engage in personal attacks against certain politicians.

Ignoring Inconvenient Topics and Figures. For example, Medvedchuk’s channels almost entirely avoided coverage of Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Yuliya Tymoshenko during the presidential election campaign.

Portraying Russia in a Neutral or Positive Light. The Kremlin’s policies and Russia’s territorial ambitions were depicted as acceptable, suggesting they were provoked by Kyiv’s ineptitude. Often, the broadcasts emphasized that Russia was ahead of Ukraine and even some Western countries by a variety of metrics.

Unbalanced Guest Composition. The lists of guests on talk shows were curated to ensure that pro-Ukrainian voices were in the clear minority and were given fewer opportunities to speak.

“Marginalizing the Other”. Pro-Ukrainian guests were often eccentric, allowing the audience to be biased against them. They were often representatives of nationalist organizations who expressed “radical” positions that could be conveniently marginalized and mocked, making the representatives from the OPFL appear measured and restrained, and their pro-Russian stance more justifiable. For instance, the pro-Ukrainian stance on these channels was occasionally represented by former members of parliament from Svoboda, such as Ihor Miroshnychenko, Yuriy Levchenko, and Yuriy Bublyk.

Key Propaganda Messages:

Here are a few examples of broadcasts that, in our opinion, clearly convey the rhetoric of Medvedchuk’s TV channels:

UkrLive broadcast of December 27, 2021, hosted by Diana Panchenko, Oleh Voloshyn, MP from OPFL, who fled to Belarus with his wife Nadiya Sass at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, says that Ukrainians should appreciate Putin’s approach.

Oleh Voloshyn: I see a lot of common sense in reaching an agreement with Russia. This will help to radically reduce gas and oil prices, unblock industrial chains, and unblock transit.

Diana Panchenko: Does Russia still want to talk to us?

Oleh Voloshyn: Yes! So far, the last patriot of Ukraine in Russia is Putin himself. He is the only person who still believes... There is this concept that we are one people. We should be glad that he thinks so. Because if he did not think so, he would treat us as an enemy state.

Pershyi Nezalezhnyi broadcast of September 26, 2021, Andriy Lesyk, deputy of the Kharkiv City Council from OPFL, on resuming the purchase of Russian energy.

Andriy Lesyk: There is only one way out — to buy gas directly from the Russian Federation. Use Viktor Medvedchuk’s communication and the 25% discount he agreed on back in 2019... People are [forced] to travel to work abroad to pay for utilities.

UkrLive broadcast of January 15, 2022, with studio guests discussing the possibility of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. A snippet with a commentary by “political and military expert” Yuriy Dudkin, a suspect in a high treason case.

Yuriy Dudkin: Everyone is shouting in unison - you can hear the drums of war. It seems that they are practicing sadomasochism. They want to...

Diana Panchenko: In the meantime, the Senate rejects the bill on sanctions.

Yuriy Dudkin: But that’s not the point. They are waiting for Russia to attack. They have been waiting for this for eight years. But what is most interesting is that Ukraine is not ready for this. And they will not fight themselves, they will not defend Ukraine. Even if they accept Ukraine into NATO. This is clear as day.

Street Struggle

When discussing the media landscape and partisan media, it is impossible to ignore the paramilitary wing of the OPFL party — namely, the Patriots for Life. This organization positioned itself as a “nationwide movement to fight fascism,” but according to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), it “specialized in criminal activities and provocations aimed at destabilizing the situation in the country.” Created and led in 2020 by Illia Kyva — a former government politician who had shifted allegiance to Medvedchuk — Patriots for Life declared a “war on everyone who espoused Nazi values.” In practice, however, the group’s activities primarily involved drug trafficking, providing security for pro-Russian rallies and politicians, and engaging in clashes with far-right groups. The gang’s mission was to stage provocations during public gatherings in order to destabilize the socio-political environment in Ukraine.

While this organization purported to fight against fascism, its so-called “anti-fascism” had nothing in common with genuine grassroots leftist movements. If it had any ideology at all, it was effectively based on right-wing tenets (Russian nationalism), rather than internationalism or anti-capitalism.

Patriots for Life were frequently involved in clashes with far-right organizations, particularly with the National Corps, which regularly tried to oppose OPFL, blocked offices of firms owned by party members, and picketed the offices of party-affiliated media. After sanctions were imposed on Medvedchuk’s TV channels in February 2021, several hundred members of Patriots for Life arrived in Kyiv. The National Corps claimed that their activists discovered a “militant base” in Kyiv, where, according to their statements, the Opposition Platform — For Life party had “gathered mercenaries to carry out provocations in the capital under the guise of protests in support of Medvedchuk’s channels, which had been closed by the NSDC.” When the police arrived at the Kyiv base of the Patriots, they found various types of weapons and live grenades.

It can be inferred that the political force was trying to “compete for the streets,” where the advantage at that time lay with pro-Ukrainian organizations. The Patriots not only provided security for Medvedchuk’s TV channels but also created striking newsworthy moments for the channel’s employees — such as brawls with right-wing activists — and provided statements for the media, with Kyva being one of the main regulars on these broadcasts.

Sanctions and the Decline of Medvedchuk’s Media Empire

Discussions about closing pro-Russian Ukrainian channels date back to 2014, in the context of lustration. Supporters of lustration argued that shutting down media promoting the interests of the Party of Regions and/or Russia was an appropriate response to the ongoing information war waged by the Kremlin. On the other hand, opponents referenced principles of pluralism and freedom of speech. At that time, however, the rhetoric of media outlets still under the control of former members of the Party of Regions and their allied business groups shifted to a more pro-Ukrainian stance, causing their propagandist past to be somewhat forgotten.

As the presidential and parliamentary elections approached, the overtly anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Medvedchuk’s media outlets and other pro-Russian platforms intensified, bringing the idea of shutting down or restricting these media back into public discussion. Since there was no legal basis for disconnecting these formally Ukrainian media outlets, economic sanctions became the chosen tool.

The Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions” was adopted back in 2014, allowing for the imposition of sanctions “against a foreign state, a foreign legal entity, a legal entity controlled by a foreign legal entity or a non-resident individual, foreigners, stateless persons, and entities engaged in terrorist activities.” Initially, sanctions were applied to collaborationists and Russian military, political, and cultural figures who were beyond the reach of Ukrainian justice. Several European politicians and journalists were also included in the sanctions list for legitimizing the annexation of Crimea and the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” in the Donbas. By 2021, more than 4,000 individuals had been put under sanctions by the NSDC, mostly Ukrainian and Russian citizens.

The first attempt to introduce sanctions against Medvedchuk’s channels was made by the Verkhovna Rada in 2018, passing a recommendation to the NSDC to impose them. At that time, this concerned the 112 and NewsOne channels (ZIK had not yet become part of Medvedchuk’s media pool). The response to this proposal came during the new administration: the NSDC found no grounds for imposing sanctions. However, the idea of economic sanctions eventually found its use under Zelenskyy’s administration a year and a half later.

On February 2, 2021, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved the NSDC’s decision to impose sanctions on Taras Kozak, as well as on the television channels 112, ZIK, and NewsOne. This was the first time the president used sanctions against pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians who were within the reach of Ukrainian law enforcement. Given the bureaucratic and corrupt nature of the judicial system, resolving these issues in court would have taken many years (as shown by the example of the “semi-banned” Communist Party of Ukraine, whose removal from the political field for its anti-Ukrainian nature took from 2015 to 2022). Sanctions made it possible to avoid turning the closure of these channels into a protracted legal battle, during which the owners of partisan channels could continue to exploit the themes of alleged suppression of free speech, selective justice, and departure from democratic principles. Instead, sanctions allowed for an effective and swift cessation of anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

In the year leading up to the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian authorities’ efforts to reduce the influence of pro-Russian forces and their affiliated media were more intense than ever. At that time, representatives of Ukraine’s second-largest parliamentary party, Opposition Platform — For Life, were under sanctions from three different countries. In August 2021, Russia imposed sanctions on OPFL MPs Yuliya and Serhiy Lyovochkins. Journalists and politicians speculated that Medvedchuk himself was behind this as part of an internal struggle for influence within OPFL. In January 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on OPFL MPs Oleh Voloshyn and Taras Kozak. While the sanctions imposed by Russia and the United States seem legally straightforward, as they targeted foreign citizens considered a threat to national interests (or the interests of allied nations), Ukraine’s sanctions stood out because they were also applied to its own citizens.

After the sanctions were imposed, OPFL, which had consistently occupied high positions in opinion polls, trailing only the leading Servant of the People party, lost nearly half of its support. According to social surveys, OPFL’s rating stood at around 20% in January 2021, which fell to 8% by April 2021. It then slightly rose to 11% in August 2021, remaining in that range: 8% in October 2021, 10% in December 2021, and 11% in January 2022. It can be inferred that one of the main reasons for this loss of support was the cessation of operations of Medvedchuk’s channels.

According to contemporary audience measurement studies, although a noticeable segment of viewers from these channels transitioned to the Nash channel, there was no significant audience migration — the public largely accepted the shutdown of Medvedchuk’s channels without much distress.

Medvedchuk fought to maintain his media presence. Within just a few weeks, his media team reorganized into a formally “independent” initiative, acquiring and relaunching the Pershyi Nezalezhnyi channel using the technical infrastructure of the Novyny Media Holding. The channel’s satellite broadcast was blocked on the first evening of its relaunch, forcing them to broadcast online, where it proved difficult to reach perhaps the most crucial segment of the pro-Russian electorate — older people.

In September 2021, Nestor Shufrych took it upon himself to save the Novyny Media Holding’s team from marginalization and obscurity. He acquired 60% of the shares in Pershyi Nezalezhnyi and purchased a satellite channel with a license for UkrLive (not to be confused with Liudmyla Nemyria’s video project UkrLife, which in 2024 came fully under the ownership of Maarif Aliyev). Shufrych was ready to continue the fight, insisting that the project was independent and had the right to broadcast. However, on December 28, 2021, the NSDC imposed sanctions on UkrLive as well, forcing the project back to YouTube.

In May 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office signed a note of suspicion against Medvedchuk and Kozak for high treason and the attempted plundering of national resources in Ukrainian Crimea. Additionally, the SBU reported searches in the office of the OPFL party and at two of Medvedchuk’s residences. According to media reports, Medvedchuk’s security attempted to obstruct the law enforcement officers in every way possible. By that time, Taras Kozak had fled to Belarus, and Medvedchuk was placed under round-the-clock house arrest by the court.

The remnants of Medvedchuk’s media empire in Ukraine finally ceased to exist with the onset of the full-scale invasion. As of February 24, 2022, Medvedchuk was under house arrest in Ukraine on charges of high treason, but he escaped after the full-scale war began. Medvedchuk was considered one of the candidates for the role of “steward of Ukraine” and anticipated that if Kyiv fell, he would take power in a new puppet administration. After this plan failed, efforts were made to transport Medvedchuk to safety in the Russian-controlled territory of Transnistria, but Ukrainian law enforcement thwarted the attempt. Since the spring of 2022, he had been in custody, and in September of the same year, Putin’s protégé was exchanged for the defenders of the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol and delivered to Russia.

Currently, Medvedchuk resides in Russia and leads a new project called Another Ukraine (Drugaya Ukraina). As for his channels, the government has confiscated their equipment.

Another Partisan Outlet: Murayev, the Nash Channel, and the Nashi Party

After sanctions were imposed on Medvedchuk’s channels, Yevhen Murayev’s Nash remained the most prominent unsanctioned pro-Russian television channel in Ukraine’s television landscape. (Several other projects broadcasting online or via satellite had negligible ratings and are not worth discussing.) As the only pro-Russian channel not banned, Nash came under intense scrutiny from the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting as well as from activists. On several occasions, nationalist-leaning activists picketed Nash, demanding that the NSDC and President Zelenskyy also shut down this channel.

Following the closure of Medvedchuk’s channels, Nash became the second most popular news channel in Ukraine. In the summer of 2021, Murayev announced that he was handing over the channel’s management to its employees.

“We have nothing to do with Russian money. Personally, I have been under Russian sanctions at Medvedchuk’s initiative for two years now. Simply because I categorically did not support his joining the For Life party. I realized that the centrism that I had laid out as the core ideology would be violated. Because this person can dress in sheep’s clothing, but it is obvious what he is. I understood that the party would be marginalized, become “untouchable” [toxic], and at the same time “funnel” a large number of votes, in particular, from my Kharkiv and the entire Southeast,” Murayev said shortly after Medvedchuk’s channels were shut down.

It can be inferred that Murayev hoped to attract not only Medvedchuk’s media audience but also his voters. With the start of the new political season in September 2021, Murayev’s Nashi party appeared in sociological survey questionnaires. The only publicly known members of the Nashi party were Murayev himself and Oleksandr Dolzhenkov, the head of the party’s political council. This party remained largely virtual, making little noise in the 2020 local elections and securing just three mandates in a local council in the Odesa region.

The party and channel brands were not only similar in name but were closely tied in their marketing strategy. With the start of the political season in fall 2021, Yevhen Murayev announced his political strategy called the “Formula of the Country.” In September, billboards and banners featuring Murayev, the Nash channel’s logo against a backdrop of a map of Ukraine, and the slogan “This is Our Land,” inviting people to discuss the “new formula for the country,” began to appear. Advertisements for the new channel project could be seen in Kyiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Volyn, Bukovyna, Ivano-Frankivsk regions, and at Independence Square in Kyiv. Thus, it could be said that in the fall of 2021, Murayev launched a sort of election campaign, visiting numerous cities in the south and east of the country. He met with key industrial representatives and local political figures. Nash launched a new show titled “This is Our Land” to co-opt the electorate in regions that traditionally voted for the OPFL.

During this show, Murayev presented his views on the internal political and geostrategic challenges Ukraine would face and proposed solutions. As usual, he criticized the imprudent approach to cooperation with international creditors and the increasing dependence on Western countries. He asserted that the United States and the United Kingdom, more than anyone else, were interested in the continuation of the war in the Donbas, and that the U.S., the UK, and Australia were obstructing “Eurasian unification.” Instead, he advocated for Ukraine to declare a non-aligned and neutral status, and for a strong decentralization that would grant each region a special status — a concept reminiscent of federalization. He also advocated the idea of creating a unified economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, with Ukraine positioned as a key geopolitical leader.

The rhetoric of the guests and hosts on Nash echoed the toxic messages of Medvedchuk’s media empire, albeit in a somewhat toned-down fashion. First, the recent example of how the Ukrainian government responds to hybrid threats from propaganda outlets within the information war against Russia was fresh in everyone’s minds. Second, the relatively milder rhetoric could help attract a broader range of voters, not just the most radical ones. Nonetheless, the channel regularly voiced arguments that were aimed at discrediting Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF, NATO, and Western partners. Constant criticism was also directed at Ukraine’s Euro-integration path and the reforms aimed at closer alignment with the EU. The channel also called for the implementation of the Minsk agreements on Russia’s terms (legitimization of Moscow-controlled political entities in the Donbas in the Ukrainian legal framework before the transfer of control over the relevant section of the Russian-Ukrainian border to Kyiv, i.e. before the actual de-occupation of these territories).

The channel also did not hesitate to accuse the Ukrainian authorities — whether during Poroshenko’s or Zelenskyy’s tenure — of violent “Ukrainianization” of the service, culture, and education sectors. They complained about the authorities’ unwillingness to “hear the Donbas,” as well as the regions that traditionally voted for pro-Russian forces. All this was coupled with conspiracy theories about biolabs and secret NATO military bases, portrayed as evidence that Ukrainian “compradors” had sold out to “Western curators” and blindly followed their directives.

Although Murayev and Medvedchuk did not cooperate in the political arena, in its final year of operation, the Nash channel provided a platform to a significant number of political commentators who also frequented Medvedchuk’s channels. These speakers often voiced the same messages both on Nash and on Medvedchuk’s Pershyi Nezalezhnyi, which continued its existence on YouTube. These messages closely resembled the rhetoric of the Kremlin and its media outlets. Unlike Medvedchuk’s channels, however, Nash more frequently invited guests with opposing views — those known to be pro-Ukrainian (such as patriotic activists, experts, representatives of the current government, and figures from the Euromaidan era). In this way, the channel attempted to create an impression of balance and impartiality in its selection of guests. However, these pro-Ukrainian speakers were often countered by guests holding pro-Russian positions, ensuring that the owner’s favored messages were repeated several times and presented as convincingly as possible.

On Murayev’s channel, they employed the proven tactic of the “marginalized other,” inviting representatives from the patriotic side to express positions that were more right-leaning and radical than the median view. This approach made the talk shows more provocative and confrontational, creating a false impression that there were only two polar extremes: the radically pro-Ukrainian side (which might seem alien and off-putting to voters in the east or south of Ukraine) and the pro-Russian side (which, by contrast, appeared more reasonable against the discredited, radical pro-Ukrainian stance). This channel policy remained in place until the last days before the full-scale invasion.

These efforts bore fruit. The rating of the Nashi party fluctuated between 4.1% and 5.7% (among those who had decided) from October 2021 to February 2022, while Murayev’s own rating in many polls nearly equaled that of his main competitor in the same political niche, Yuriy Boyko (Murayev had 5.1%, compared to Boyko’s 6.9% among all respondents).

In January 2022, the British Foreign Office made a statement that the Kremlin was considering Murayev as the head of a future collaborationist government after a full-scale invasion and the overthrow of legitimate Ukrainian authorities. Two weeks before the full-scale invasion, on February 11, 2022, the National Security and Defense Council imposed sanctions against the Nash channel. For a while, the channel operated exclusively on YouTube but eventually ceased all operations in the first days of the full-scale war.

According to investigative journalism reports, after the full-scale invasion began, Murayev fled Ukraine and went to Vienna. In July 2023, the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office announced a suspicion of high treason against him. The YouTube channel Nash, which had over a million subscribers, remained under the control of host Max Nazarov, who repurposed it for his own online project — the channel “Da, Eto Tak” (“Yes, It’s So”). However, in April 2024, YouTube blocked both “Vyshka” (another project by a former Medvedchuk host, Lana Shevchenko) and “Da Eto Tak” by Max Nazarov.

Here are a few examples of broadcasts that, in our opinion, vividly convey the rhetoric of the Nash channel:

Broadcast on Nash from September 9, 2021. Former MP Olena Bondarenko: Ukraine is not actually at war with Russia.

Olena Bondarenko: Let’s declare war on Russia first.

Olha Veremiy: I will say here that it has not been announced.

Olena Bondarenko: We are at war with someone who did not show up for this war, and it is impossible to prove the presence of regular troops, as we are constantly told, because there is no evidence. And unfortunately, there is evidence that our own armed forces, on whose behalf Khomchak said something, [are carrying out] shelling.

Broadcast on Nash from December 21, 2021. Murayev on why Ukraine cannot avoid fulfilling the Minsk Agreements (on Russian terms).

Yevhen Murayev: Our government cannot understand one simple thing. Even if you give us 33 cluster options, it will still be 13 points of the Minsk agreements.

Anhelina Pychyk: Yeah.

Yevhen Murayev: Because the whole world agrees with this. This is an approved international document. Because Russia will not do otherwise. Otherwise, the whole world will say that they have surrendered the Donbas, which they were helping.

Broadcast on Nash from December 26, 2021. Murayev on how Ukraine conducts NATO exercises and how NATO weapons are present on Ukrainian territory, making it a legitimate target for Russia:

Yevhen Murayev: Russia has no right to call Ukraine its sphere of influence, but Russia does not say so. If NATO weapons are deployed on the territory of Ukraine, Ukraine will move from a neutral country to a threat in Russia’s eyes. A threat that is on the border with Russia. The answer will be symmetrical... If we are a country that has not received a guarantee of NATO’s collective security, but we train NATO troops here and deploy weapons that will strengthen the NATO bloc, then Russian weapons will be aimed at us.

Conclusions

The toxicity of Russian television propaganda and the adequacy of Ukrainian countermeasures are evidenced by the fact that in 2022, even before the start of the full-scale war, European Union countries began restricting the broadcast of Russian television channels on their territories, following Ukraine’s lead. It was Ukraine that initiated this move: the Ukrainian National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting submitted a corresponding request to the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities. The first to be banned were Russia Today and Sputnik, which targeted European audiences specifically. The sixth package of sanctions included a ban on the broadcasting of RTR Planeta, Russia 24, and TVTs, while the ninth package shut down NTV Mir, Russia-1, REN TV, and Pervyi Kanal.

The toxicity of Viktor Medvedchuk’s persona and the justification for the sanctions that Ukraine imposed on his media group are further supported by the fact that, in the spring of 2024, the European Union imposed sanctions against him, his media associate Artem Marchevskyi, and the Voice of Europe media project. Prior to that, the EU Council agreed on a complete ban on broadcasting four Russian propaganda media outlets, among them a media entity owned by Medvedchuk. Notably, after the closure of these channels, Ukraine’s position in the press freedom ranking improved rather than declined.

Political forces used their partisan media to serve their own interests. Therefore, the media resources of party bosses like Medvedchuk and Murayev should be seen as an unscrupolous journalistic resource which they used not so much for “dialogue” with the voters, but as means for consolidating and mobilizing their voting bases. Channels of Medvedchuk’s media pool were heavily frequented by his party associates, while opposing opinions were disproportionately represented and deliberately marginalized. Figures from the OPFL, its regional branches, and affiliated organizations like Patriots for Life were overrepresented in the broadcasts of these channels. Murayev’s channel followed similar practices, airing the political travel blog “Tut Nasha Zemlya” (This Is Our Land), in which the leader of the Nashi party essentially traveled around constituencies mobilizing voters, aided by the channel’s hosts.

The critical danger posed by these channels did not stem from the breach of journalistic standards for the sake of the bosses’ partisan interests, but rather from their consistent promotion of Russian propaganda narratives. These channels furthered the interests of a state with which Ukraine was effectively at war — a state that systematically ignored international law, including fundamental human rights. Meanwhile, shutting down propaganda aimed at harming Ukraine was challenging within a legal framework, as democratic principles in Ukrainian legislation protected freedom of speech and lacked tools to restrict hostile propaganda. This created hybrid threats that Ukrainian authorities had to respond to swiftly and in unorthodox ways. During Russia’s full-scale invasion, the risks to Ukraine’s informational security grew even more acute, necessitating continuous monitoring of hostile disinformation dynamics. This research is part of that ongoing effort.

Journalists from sanctioned channels can be loosely divided into several categories. The first category includes those who fled to Russia or Belarus with the start of the full-scale invasion and continue to cooperate with Viktor Medvedchuk. The second includes those who stayed in Ukraine but continue to spread narratives favorable to the Kremlin. The third category comprises those who have completely disappeared from the media field. The fourth includes those working in more or less public spheres (including in Ukrainian state media and communications) but who have ceased disseminating Russian narratives. Our main research interest lies in the first two categories, and in our next report, we will provide a detailed analysis of their new media projects, assess how coordinated their toxic rhetoric remains, and evaluate whether journalists from sanctioned channels are still working against Ukrainian interests, along with the potential risks they pose.

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Main page illustration by Nataliya Lobach