YouTube projects became the primary means of maintaining public visibility after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine for two dozen former hosts of the "Novyny" and "Nash" holding channels, as well as over 140 of their regular guest commentators.
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Introduction
After the ban on Russian state-controlled and Kremlin-affiliated TV channels in Ukraine in 2014, Moscow has tried to preserve and strengthen its informational influence. The primary tool of this influence became news (informational) channels, which were launched (or purchased and relaunched) by pro-Russian politicians between 2014 and 2019.
First and foremost, this refers to Viktor Medvedchuk's media group. Although the formal owners of these channels were other individuals (in the last years before their closure, they were owned by Medvedchuk's business and political partner Taras Kozak), the direct influence of Putin's crony on the media holding was beyond doubt. Medvedchuk did not hide his exclusive connections in the Kremlin, with publicized meetings during the Russian-Ukrainian war in Moscow with top officials, while Putin only spoke favorably of Medvedchuk. The Kremlin continues to rely on him.
By 2019, three TV channels — 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK — were de facto under Medvedchuk's control and consolidated into a single media holding called "Novyny" (News). These channels primarily served the interests of the wing of the "Opposition Platform — For Life" controlled by Medvedchuk — a party formed in 2018 as a result of the merger of the "Opposition Bloc," led by Yuriy Boyko, the "For Life" party of Vadym Rabinovich, and the "Ukrainian Choice" movement under Viktor Medvedchuk's leadership. According to US researchers James Druckman, Matthew Levendusky, and Audrey McClain, these channels can be considered party media, meaning media affiliated with a specific political force, promoting its agenda and serving its political goals.
In 2018, the "Nash" TV channel appeared, founded by former NewsOne owner Yevhen Murayev, the leader of the newly formed political party "Nashi" (Ours). This political force did not develop into a full-fledged party and had no success in elections. The agenda of the Nash channel and the faces it promoted differed from those on Medvedchuk's channels.
On February 2, 2021, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved the National Security and Defense Council's (NSDC) decision to impose economic sanctions on Medvedchuk's formal channel owner, MP Taras Kozak, as well as the channels 112 Ukraine, ZIK, and NewsOne, which he owned. On February 11, 2022, the NSDC also imposed sanctions against the Nash channel. Although the history of these media outlets did not end here, continuing until February 2022, their influence on society significantly diminished.
These media outlets, although formally owned by Ukrainian citizens, consistently promoted Russian propaganda narratives under the guise of inflaming internal political contradictions. At the same time, it was practically impossible to hold them accountable, close them, or restrict their activities under the then-existing legislation. Attempts to do so faced resistance from Ukrainian politicians, international organizations, and even Ukrainian journalistic organizations. In their defense, Medvedchuk and Murayev's channels attempted to position themselves not as pro-Russian but as allegedly independent or opposition voices while portraying the fight against Kremlin disinformation and propaganda as censorship and political pressure.
Amid the war, the Ukrainian government was forced to respond in an unconventional way to hybrid threats by applying economic sanctions against these Ukrainian channels. These extrajudicial sanctions were an extraordinary action for a democratic country. However, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union also imposed similar sanctions on Russian and Medvedchuk-affiliated media. Furthermore, after the closure of Medvedchuk's and Murayev's channels, the level of freedom of speech, according to the Freedom of Speech Index by Reporters Without Borders, increased in Ukraine, proving the accusations of censorship and political pressure unfounded.
According to the last preserved versions of the websites of 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, ZIK, and Nash, close to the date when the sanctions were imposed, as well as publications by Ukrainian media watchdogs — Detector Media (DM) and the Institute of Mass Information — 67 hosts were working on these channels at the time the sanctions were imposed. By the end of August 2024, 34 continue to work in the media, engage with the media as experts or communication specialists, or run their own media projects, particularly on YouTube. 23 have ceased to be public figures. Five more have changed their field of work or emigrated. This information may contain errors as it is based on open sources. Corrections may have occurred after each publication, serving as proof of these data, but they are not accounted for in this study due to a lack of public information.
The hypothesis of this research is the assumption that former hosts of sanctioned channels who join YouTube channels or run their own media projects continue to exist as an integrated network whose participants have adapted to the labor market. They continue to spread Russian propaganda narratives on this platform.
Therefore, the subject of our analysis will not be to prove or disprove the fact of hidden coordination of the relevant channels' work with Russia. That is, even in cases where Russian propaganda narratives are found in the relevant media, based on the research sources, we cannot determine whether these narratives are spread by the hosts based on their subjective intentions or as part of subversive work coordinated by Russia. Hosts may spread pro-Russian narratives without direct instructions from Russia, for example, to maintain a connection with their loyal audience, which they may later use for political or commercial interests or based on their personal beliefs. In such cases, the hosts indirectly participate in the Russian propaganda narratives. At the same time, Russia can instrumentally use social media channels with pro-Ukrainian content to accumulate an audience for future information attacks or to exacerbate contradictions in Ukrainian society. Regardless of the speakers' subjective motives, there is a public interest in verifying whether there is a network of media agents in the information environment that fragmentally or consistently spreads narratives favorable to the Kremlin.
Special attention is paid to the hosts who, after the full-scale invasion, moved to Russia and Belarus and openly cooperated with the state media of hostile countries and with Viktor Medvedchuk. This refers to three employees of Medvedchuk's channels: Denys Zharkykh, Diana Panchenko, and Nadiia Sass. These journalists operate in a fundamentally different informational context; a separate chapter will be dedicated to them. Meanwhile, their informational activity will be tested under the same hypothesis.
To test the hypothesis, Detector Media aims to answer two research questions.
First, we need to determine whether the informational activity of former hosts of sanctioned TV channels has signs of a network. To do this, we will analyze both individual and collective YouTube projects of these channel hosts to identify the commonality of visits by the same experts. We will create a matrix showing guest appearances and host collaborations on each other’s channels.
Second, we will review the content of the relevant channels for spreading Russian propaganda narratives.
The Russian propaganda machine is constantly adapting to new historical and informational conditions. For example, before the full-scale invasion, one of the key narratives of Russian propaganda was the promotion of the Minsk agreements in the Russian interpretation, which envisaged legitimizing Moscow-controlled political entities in Donbas within Ukraine's legal framework before transferring control over the corresponding section of the Russian-Ukrainian border to Kyiv, i.e., before the actual liberation of these territories. This narrative was one of the most popular on Medvedchuk’s and Murayev’s channels. During the full-scale war, one of the main tasks of Russian propaganda is, for example, to disrupt the mobilization process in Ukraine. Key Moscow-controlled information resources work on discrediting mobilization efforts.
To assess the narratives presented by the hosts and experts of the analyzed YouTube projects for Russian propaganda, the Media Detector Research Center team identified eight markers of Russian propaganda characteristic of pro-Russian propaganda resources after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
We divided these markers into two groups. The markers of the first group include the promotion of narratives that pose an existential threat to the preservation of Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, democracy, and territorial integrity in the context of the full-scale invasion. We believe that promoting these narratives cannot be part of Ukraine's democratic, pluralistic political culture, as their implementation, in reality, would pose a threat to the destruction of this culture.
Markers of the first group:
- Discrediting the process of mobilization in Ukraine;
- The systematic discrediting of Ukraine's support from its partners;
- Non-recognition of President Zelenskyy and the Verkhovna Rada as legitimate;
- Promotion of the idea that Ukraine is a failed state;
- Calls for negotiations on Russia’s terms or for territorial concessions to Russia;
- Non-recognition of Russian war crimes or shifting the responsibility for the war and its victims to Ukraine and Western countries.
Markers of the second group are the theses that may be justified or typical for a pluralistic information field, especially for Ukrainian political opposition. However, excessive emphasis on these theses, combined with the markers of the first group, may indicate a tendency for hosts or experts to spread pro-Russian views.
Markers of the second group:
- Discrediting security guarantees from the West, including Ukraine's integration into NATO;
- Systematic anti-Western sentiment, discrediting modern Western culture, reforms, and values.
Methodology and logic of examining the work of former hosts of TV channels sanctioned by the NSDC
The search for information about the fate of the hosts after the imposition of sanctions following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine was based on analyzing information from open sources and posts on social media of former hosts. Based on these sources, we identified a list of media projects hosted by former TV hosts who remained in the media. The LetsData company downloaded publications from selected media for further analysis.
The work with sources consisted of the following stages:
Identification of the initial list of hosts. The web archive preserved pages from the TV channels shortly before or immediately after the sanctions were imposed on these channels. These served as the basis for creating the initial list of hosts. According to data from the web archive, 25 hosts worked at 112 Ukraine, 18 on NewsOne, 19 on ZIK, and 12 on Nash. It’s important to note that the attribution of hosts to individual Medvedchuk channels is conditional: between 2019 and 2021, these channels were closely integrated, with hosts frequently moving between them. After the sanctions were imposed, the three teams merged into one — the satellite and online channel "First Independent."
Verification of whether the hosts mentioned on archived versions of the websites remained employed before sanctions were imposed on the channels. For 112 Ukraine, some individuals listed as hosts in the archived website closest to the sanctions had already worked at other media outlets for some time. For instance, Volodymyr Poluyev and Hanna Stepanyets switched to the Nash channel in October 2020, and by August 2021, they moved to Ukraine 24. Yuriy Bibyk worked for Ukraine 24 starting in November 2021. At the beginning of 2021, the channel was also left by Oleksiy Ananov, Anastasia Medvedchuk, Natalia Shulim, Tetyana Khmelnytska, and Olena Morozova. Some hosts discussed in this research and still publicly active were never listed as hosts on the channels' websites. Among them are blogger Dmytro Spivak and political expert Vadym Karasiov. These channels also practiced positioning politicians or propagandists who regularly appeared on air as "permanent guests" rather than hosts. This way, the channels removed responsibility for the guests' statements. 112 Ukraine used one such trick with Vadym Rabinovych. Two programs aired with his participation: "Khto Komu Rabinovych" (Who Needs Rabinovych) and "Rozmovy za Zhyttya z Rabinovychem" (Conversations for Life with Rabinovych). The logo for the second program was designed so that the phrase "For Life," which coincided with the name of Rabinovych's party, was much larger than the rest of the text.
Another situation is when hosts are not listed on the website as hosts of programs. This happened with Ruslan Kotsaba, who hosted the "I Think" program on NewsOne.
It is also possible that the list of presenters on the website did not include some of those who hosted the programs. This happened with Ruslan Kotsaba, who hosted the "I Think So" program on NewsOne.
Sources for verifying whether the hosts worked on the channels at the time of the sanctions are publications by Detector Media and the Institute of Mass Information. These organizations publish reviews of projects and media products involving Ukrainian media professionals. Additional sources included posts on the hosts' social media pages and in online media.
First Independent as another level of verification of former hosts. We applied another level of verification of the willingness to spread pro-Russian views in the media: comparing the list of hosts from previous steps with those of the First Independent channel hosts. This channel was launched by the managers and some employees of 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK. This channel lasted for one day on television. On February 26, 2021, it was also sanctioned. After that, the First Independent continued to broadcast online, surviving several blocks until February 2022.
Photocollage used for one day to promote the First Independent YouTube channel, launched on February 26, 2021, by managers and employees of Medvedchuk's TV channels. Source: Ukraine Moloda
In the collage, from left to right:
Bottom left part: Diana Panchenko, Pavlo Kuzheev.
Middle left part: Roman Gah, Lana Shevchuk, Tetyana Bud (presumably).
Top left part: Stanislav Lystopad, Kateryna Romanyuk, unidentified, Alyona Zinchenko, Eduard Hlyoza, Tamara Horetska (presumably).
Bottom right part: Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Vasyl Apasov.
Middle right part: Viktoriya Panchenko, Oleksandr Shelest, Nadiia Sass.
Top right part: Olena Kyryk, Petro Maga, Yuliia Koltak, Vitaliy Dykyy, Vadym Yaroshenko, Hanna Mozharovska (presumably).
The number of programs on the air of First Independent, and hence the number of hosts of this channel, was naturally smaller than on Medvedchuk's three channels. During its operation, the team of First Independent hosts and the list of programs changed. For example, in the summer of 2021, the program "Suslov and Kush: Economic Conversations" aired there. Its regular participants were Eduard Hlyoza, the former head of the State Commission for the Regulation of Financial Services Markets of Ukraine, Viktor Suslov, the 43rd candidate on the election list of the Opposition Platform — For Life, and economic expert Oleksandr Kush. Ruslan Kotsaba also hosted the program "Evening Tale with Ruslan Kotsaba." These lists of hosts confirmed the consistency of hosts and experts in promoting the pro-Russian agenda.
Emigration for Unhindered Spread of Russian Propaganda
Of the six former hosts who emigrated, four are spreading Russian propaganda. These are Denys Zharkykh, Diana Panchenko, Nadiia Sass, and Ruslan Kotsaba. Almost nothing is known about the fate of the remaining two.
Zharkykh has been a political commentator on Medvedchuk's platforms at least since 2015 when he led the pro-Russian movement "Ukrainian Choice." In 2017, on the anti-Ukrainian News Front channel, Zharkykh claimed that Ukrainization was a psychological pressure technique meant to divide the people. In 2020, he wrote that Ukraine was "shooting Russian speakers" in Donbas. When 112 Ukraine came under Medvedchuk's control, Zharkykh began hosting his own program, "In Essence," on the channel. In almost every episode, the themes of Ukraine's dependence, Europe's unwillingness to help, and the importance of restoring friendship with Russia were strongly emphasized. Promoting Medvedchuk was one of the tasks of the program. After the full-scale invasion, Zharkykh left Ukraine and joined Medvedchuk's exiled team.
In July 2023, Medvedchuk registered his political project, "Another Ukraine," as a public organization in Russia. Zharkykh became the head of the executive committee, and Medvedchuk became the head of the council. According to the investigation of the "Schemes" program, 13 people joined the project, 12 of whom have Ukrainian citizenship. Some participants were also involved in criminal proceedings in Ukraine on charges of separatism and state treason.
In May 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine exposed an underground cell of the "Another Ukraine" political project in Kyiv. The agent group engaged in information subversion against Ukraine, spreading video content discrediting the Defense Forces and calling on Ukrainians to lay down their arms and surrender to the occupiers. The finished media products were sent for approval to the curator, Denys Zharkykh, who gave permission to distribute anti-Ukrainian content.
"Another Ukraine" has a channel on the "Rutube" platform. The organization has slightly over 160 subscribers there, and its videos receive a few to several dozen views. Such outreach levels suggest that the project, despite its claims of being a "government in exile," lacks demand. Among the hosts of this channel are former Ukrainian hosts Oleh Yasinskyy ("Think with Oleg Yasinskyy") and Yan Taksyur ("Other Meanings").
Diana Panchenko left for occupied Donetsk after February 24, 2022, and continues to work for Russia. In 2023, the Security Service of Ukraine charged her with state treason. Panchenko runs a Russian-language Telegram channel, YouTube, Instagram, and an English-language blog on the social network X (formerly Twitter), which is banned in Russia. There, Panchenko calls herself an expert in domestic politics, history, geopolitics, economics, historical memory, religion, information policy, etc. She mostly repeats pro-Russian narratives she previously voiced on Medvedchuk's channels, including stories about "external governance," the Ukrainian government executing the will of Western supervisors, the brotherhood between Ukrainians and Russians, the West "using" Ukraine in its fight against Russia, discrediting Ukraine's pro-Western course, and accusing the Ukrainian government of "not wanting peace" on the Kremlin’s terms. After moving to Russia, Panchenko started writing "na Ukraine" instead of "v Ukraine" (a language shift reflecting the Russian narrative about Ukraine's subordination).
Former host of Medvedchuk's channels and wife of Oleh Voloshyn, an ex-MP from the Opposition Platform — For Life party and Medvedchuk’s ally, Nadiia Sass, moved to Belarus on February 13, 2022. On the Belarusian state channel STV, she hosts the program "SASS is Authorized to Declare," continuing to serve as a mouthpiece for Kremlin and hostile narratives.
In Belarus, the guests and experts and the topics raised by Sass remained almost unchanged. Medvedchuk's associate, the now-deceased Ilya Kyva, appeared there, warning of the invasion of "Nazis in Ukraine." The host's husband, Oleg Voloshyn, speaks about the past achievements of Ukraine's now-banned Opposition Platform — For Life faction. On Sass's program, Viktor Medvedchuk announced his return to politics, launching the "Another Ukraine" project and stating his intention to "demonopolize President Zelenskyy's right to represent Ukraine on the international stage." He also mentioned the need to overthrow Zelenskyy's "criminal regime" and restore friendship with Russia. Political scientists who were once experts on propagandist TV channels in Ukraine, including state treason suspect Oleksandr Lazarev, also appear there. These experts predict the collapse of the West, Western values, Western markets, President Zelenskyy, and Ukraine. Every episode of Sass's program features Belarusian officials and supporters of the regime, a Russian expert, and obligatory lengthy quotes and fragments from the speeches of the "wise leader" of the Belarusian people, as Sass calls Lukashenko.
Ruslan Kotsaba hosted the program "I Think" on NewsOne. In this program, current informational topics were discussed, but Kotsaba did this alone, without guests. Among the narratives that echoed Russian propaganda and were voiced by Kotsaba in "I Think" were: "The government in Ukraine is fascist," "Ukraine is not sovereign — the US State Department controls everything," and that the Revolution of Dignity was "organized by oligarchs."
In January 2023, Kotsaba was supposed to appear in court in the city of Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk region, in a case where the propagandist was accused of state treason. However, his lawyer, Svitlana Novytska, filed a motion to postpone the trial because Kotsaba was abroad. Kotsaba later reported that he had legally traveled to the United States, accompanying his disabled mother.
At that time, Kotsaba was running a YouTube channel, which is now unavailable, and a Telegram channel. The Telegram channel is still active but has only 3,900 subscribers. Lately, Kotsaba mostly reposts others' content there, including posts from Oleksandr Dubinsky, a member of Ukraine's parliament suspected of state treason, and another MP who illegally left Ukraine, Artem Dmytruk.
In exile, Kotsaba gives interviews to pro-Russian bloggers and records video addresses. In one of these video addresses, published on January 15, 2024, Kotsaba urged Ukrainian service members to abandon their positions:
"I urge all of you to prioritize saving lives by any legal or illegal methods in the eyes of the state. There's nothing more valuable than human life. Once again, I say: fraternizing in the trenches, desertion, SVC, unauthorized leave, surrendering — all of these are acceptable."
Thus, Kotsaba continues to promote Russian propaganda. As before his emigration, his main theme remains "pacifism," which, in Kotsaba's understanding, means "simply stop defending ourselves."
Nadiia Sass, Ruslan Kotsaba, and Diana Panchenko also contributed to Viktor Medvedchuk's platform for spreading Russian propaganda, Golos.eu. This platform is a collection of posts from pro-Russian propaganda mouthpieces in the form of blogs. These posts are often republications of pro-Russian propagandists from other platforms.
Those who stayed to work in the media in Ukraine
The largest employer for former hosts of sanctioned TV channels is the state channel "Rada." In 2022 — the first half of 2024, at least Olha Nemtseva, Olha Butko, Nazar Dovgyy, Vadym Gerasymovych, and Bohdan Pilenko worked there. Vadym Gerasymovych, besides working for state media, also hosts shows on the YouTube channels Politeka Online and Ukrlife. TV. Artem Nikiforov and Oleksandr Rolduhin briefly hosted programs on the Rada channel but then disappeared from the public space.
Among those working with state institutions, it is also worth mentioning Yuliia Koltak from NewsOne, who is now the press secretary for the head of the Odesa Regional Military Administration, Oleh Kiper. Additionally, Tetyana Khmelnytska serves as a strategic communications advisor to the State Bureau of Investigation.
Another popular place of employment for former hosts of channels sanctioned by the NSDC is the channel "Novyny. Live." It is part of the influence orbit of MP and businessman Vadym Stolar, who was a member of the faction of the now-banned Opposition Platform — For Life until March 15, 2022, and later joined the parliamentary group "Restoration of Ukraine." Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Vadym Yaroshenko, Tetiana Bud, Sofiya Pivnyak, Lana Shevchuk, and Serhii Hulyuk have been working or have worked at Novyny. Live.
Lana Shevchuk, Vasyl Apasov, Vadym Karasyov, and Yaroslava Maslova recently posted video content on the YouTube channel "Vyshka." This channel was most likely renamed from the YouTube channel of the sanctioned TV channel Nash at the initiative of Maks Nazarov. However, after the channel was blocked in Ukraine, it lost its audience and was put on hold.
Another workplace for former hosts of the Medvedchuk-Kozak TV channels is the YouTube channel "Politeka Online." Interviews are conducted there by Eduard Hlyoza, Vadym Herasymovych, and Anastasia Husaryeva.
Olena Kyryk, Anhelina Pychyk, Yuliia Lytvynenko, and Vita Yevtushyna release interviews on the YouTube channel "Now" (Сейчас), which is run by Rostyslav Bunyak, a former manager of the media group owned by oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.
Vitaliy Dykyy, Olena Kyryk, and Yuliia Lytvynenko, as reported by Detector Media in October 2021, were involved in the media project "Independent" (Независимые). The host there also included Tetiana Terekhova, the daughter of MP Andriy Derkach, who is under US sanctions. In August 2021, Lytvynenko became a host on the Pryamyy channel, which politicians from the European Solidarity party control.
Videos from former employees of the Nash channel, Maks Nazarov and Yaroslava Maslova, were aired on the YouTube channel "Da eto tak." This YouTube channel, which was blocked in Ukraine in April 2024, stopped posting new videos as of early August.
Petro Maga works on the media project Ukraine World News, which launched in early 2023. In May 2024, employees of the State Bureau of Investigations and the National Police arrested the owner of this channel, Vitaliy Kropachov, on suspicion of causing the state financial damages in coal industry frauds totaling two billion hryvnias.
Eduard Hlyoza, Alyona Zinchenko, Anhelina Pychyk, Inha Mezeria, Vadym Karasiov, Vasyl Apasov, Dmytro Spivak, Oleksiy Kushch, Oleksandr Shelest, and Vitaliy Dykyy all have their own YouTube channels or media projects. These projects vary significantly in the nature of the narratives and invited guests. For example, Inha Mezeria interviews politicians such as Oles' Doniy, journalist Roman Tsymbaliuk, and military expert Yigal Levin, who are not known for promoting hostile narratives. However, there are also broadcasts with Oleksiy Arestovych, Yuriy Romanenko, or Ruslan Bortnik, whose statements sometimes align with Russian propaganda.
Oleksiy Kushch does not specifically create videos for his YouTube channel but republishes his interviews and comments for other outlets. Judging by his YouTube channel, most of his expertise is sought by hosts of the channels Novyny. Live or Politeka Online, as well as by journalists of the TSN program aired on 1+1 or the Russian-language foreign broadcasting channel "FreeDom." Since May, Kushch has published articles analyzing state finances and economic policy in "Dzerkalo Tyzhnya."
Among the experts regularly invited to broadcasts by Vitaliy Dykyy are Mykhailo Chaplyha, Ihor Mosiychuk, and Andriy Yermolayev. Some of the ex-media figures mentioned in this cluster appear as guests on each other's broadcasts and as commentators on the channels "Vyshka" and Politeka Online or participate in the broadcasts of the Novyny. Live channel. For example, Apasov interviews Dykyy and Dykyy interviews Apasov. You can also see Spivak and Karasiov on Dykyy's channel, suggesting the hypothesis of a closed "ecosystem" of former hosts of sanctioned TV channels and their experts. Sometimes, former hosts become "experts" and give interviews to others.
Symbiosis of Hosts and Experts
The tradition of Medvedchuk's and Murayev's channels involved forming a regular pool of guests and commentators. Some of them continued appearing on these channels even after sanctions were imposed. Many of these speakers appeared on talk shows and informational broadcasts several times weekly.
One of the main hypotheses of the research was that the same guests and experts who used to appear on Medvedchuk's and Murayev's sanctioned channels continue to visit the former hosts' independent or new media projects. In other words, there is a kind of "symbiosis" in terms of the issues or topics the hosts and their guests discuss based on a particular informational occasion and the circular sharing of guests, topics, and hosts.
During the research, 146 experts who commented on the news in new media projects of 17 former hosts of sanctioned TV channels were identified in the selected videos. The sample included interviews, programs, and videos on YouTube channels that were created or reformatted mostly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The most frequent appearances were made by Andriy Vihirinsky, who commented on various topics for nine former hosts of sanctioned channels.
Andriy Yermolayev interviewed eight hosts three or more times. Dmytro Spivak, Ruslan Bortnyk, Sviatoslav Piskun, and Oleh Starikov appeared with seven hosts. Some of these experts, such as former Prosecutor General Sviatoslav Piskun or former Human Rights Ombudsman's representative Mykhailo Chaplyha, are former government officials. All of the experts listed here, along with most of the 141 guests of the broadcasts, are commentators willing to engage with any proposed informational occasion and topic: from events in Washington to economic or social issues to matters on the frontlines. Despite their previous positions, these guests comment on current news in their broadcasts following the same scheme used by the Medvedchuk and Murayev channels. Hosts' questions, mostly repeating current news headlines, serve to fill pauses in the guests' monologues, granting them their regular "half-hour of fame." Rarely do the hosts ask clarifying questions or challenge the guest. More often, they allow the guests to fully express themselves on one topic before switching to another, managing to cover 4–6 current news topics in a relatively short broadcast (an average of 20–30 minutes).
A few of these experts also appear on the "Unified News" TV marathon. Like the hosts they visit, these experts have few other places where they can maintain their public presence. Thus, regular visits by the same experts to the same hosts serve as a way for both former hosts and their experts to maintain visibility.
In support of the thesis of mutually beneficial cooperation between former hosts and commentators, it is also noteworthy that commentators from our list are invited less frequently to new media projects such as Novyny. Live than to YouTube projects. Programming schedules constrain TV channels, the presence of guest editors, and management influence over decision-making. In contrast, YouTube projects are less influenced by format and reputation, both by the invited guest and the host.
Do the former hosts of sanctioned TV channels, who work for the Ukrainian audience and their experts, spread Russian propaganda?
Markers of Russian narratives after the full-scale invasion
Most of the former hosts of sanctioned channels who continue to work in Ukraine's information field do not openly express pro-Russian views in the context of the primary markers of Russian propaganda we selected. At the same time, they occasionally serve as a background for guests to voice such narratives in their broadcasts, rarely engaging in fact-checking or rebuttals. Alternatively, they work on projects where these narratives are regularly voiced in parallel broadcasts. Given the closed information bubble of YouTube projects, some former hosts of sanctioned channels indirectly participate in spreading Russian propaganda narratives. Below, we will present notable quotes and fragments from broadcasts where pro-Russian narratives are voiced in the context of our selected markers.
- Discrediting the mobilization process in Ukraine. This is one of the primary markers. It refers not to criticizing specific aspects of the organization of mobilization but to promoting the illegality or uselessness of mobilization as such. A partial or complete disruption of the mobilization process amid the full-scale aggression against Ukraine would result in the inability to effectively resist the aggression, leading to further occupation of Ukrainian territories or the end of Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state.
Read also: "Defense of Ukraine is a punishment": Russian propaganda's reaction to mobilization in Ukraine
Former hosts of Medvedchuk's and Murayev's TV channels, who now run YouTube channels oriented toward a Ukrainian audience and invite Ukrainian political experts, most often focus on cases of alleged illegal detentions during mobilization. This means they criticize specific aspects of mobilization rather than the draft itself.
"Breaking people's arms, beating them, bruising them, throwing them into a cell for 3–4 hours, keeping them in the TCC without food or water… Well, listen, what are you doing to your own people? We are not Russians; we are Ukrainians and a humane nation. Why are you turning us into cattle?" said Sviatoslav Piskun in an interview with Vadym Karasiov on February 10, 2024.
However, sometimes, the hosts do not argue with experts who manipulate the discussion, ignoring the legality and necessity of general mobilization to resist Russian aggression. For example, on April 19, 2023, Sofiya Pivnyak on Novyny.LIVE did not counter expert Rostyslav Kravets for saying:
"Anyone can leave Ukraine, any man, just having a foreign passport. Everything else that the State Border Guard Service comes up with… these are just their fantasies. Article 33 of the Constitution of Ukraine clearly states that, yes, citizens' rights to movement can indeed be restricted. However, this restriction can only be established by law. As of today, there is no such law prohibiting men aged 18 to 60 from leaving during martial law… I think that after the victory, all these inspectors and the heads of the State Border Guard Service will be held accountable."
Clickable headlines spreading Russian propaganda narratives are also popular. Below is a screenshot of a broadcast by Vadym Herasymovych with former MP of the Radical Party of Ukraine Ihor Mosiychuk (who was also a frequent guest on Medvedchuk's channels), aired on Ukrlife TV. The headline contains the phrase "Mobilization madness." Videos with such phrases in the headlines were further spread on social media, spreading the narrative to an audience not watching the videos.
2. Systematic discrediting of Ukraine's support from partners, particularly international financial institutions, in particular international financial institutions. This is one of the primary markers. According to The Kiel Institute, which monitors Western aid to Ukraine, from late January 2022 to June 2024, the European Union and individual European countries committed approximately $207 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The United States committed roughly another $109 billion. Economic assistance also includes grant and loan support through international financial organizations, including the IMF.
Military support is coordinated through the Ramstein format, involving about 50 countries. This aid is crucial to Ukraine’s ability to resist aggression. Russian propaganda seeks to instill distrust in Western partners among Ukrainians and distrust of Ukraine among Western communities. This serves to provoke discord among allies in resisting Moscow's aggression.
Some of the hosts and experts whose publications we reviewed on YouTube attempted to instill negative attitudes toward certain Western countries, accusing them of allegedly selfish and imperialist intentions toward Ukraine. They spread narratives that the West profits from the war by developing its military-industrial complex, supplying weapons to Ukraine, and upgrading its military equipment. They also claimed that Ukraine’s partners were supplying outdated military equipment and "weakening Russia’s military power at the cost of Ukrainian lives."
An example of a quote "exposing the hidden plans of Ukraine’s partners" was given by Mykhailo Chaplyha on August 18, 2024, on Politeka Online. In an interview with Vadym Herasymovych, when asked about the goals of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' "Kursk operation," Chaplyha said:
"Britain has its own interest, the Northern Black Sea region, and even if everything burns down outside, roughly speaking, the Kherson and Mykolaiv regions, or towards Kursk, Britain couldn’t care less. What interests Britain is the region of Moldova, Transnistria, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and perhaps Kherson. That’s what interests them. Plus, they are interested in the Black Sea waters in that region and Ochakiv with control of Crimea. If they need to burn all of Europe for that, they will."
But Ihor Mosiychuk, on the same Politeka Online on July 25, 2024, told Herasymovych how the West is weakening Russia using Ukraine as a proxy:
"They [the West — DM’s note] are playing their game. They are trying to heat up the Russian Federation this way, weaken it, and have their own interests in this. The worst thing in this situation is that we, Ukrainians, our people, are being used as coal in this fire. They absolutely don't care about the losses suffered by the armed forces of Ukraine. If they cared, the weapons supply would have been completed."
Herasymovych agreed, adding that if the West cared about Ukrainians, "at the very least, we would be hearing a completely different rhetoric."
On August 21, 2023, Inha Mezeria nodded to the words of Yuriy Romanenko:
"The West is just dumping its old military junk on Ukraine. The sooner European countries give up their F-16s, the sooner they’ll buy the latest and more expensive F-35s from the Americans. This allows them to start up the military-industrial complex, create jobs, and make a lot of money."
Inha Mezeria also reposted this interview from Politeka Online on her own YouTube channel.
3. Discrediting Western security guarantees, particularly Ukraine's integration into NATO. This is classified as a second-group marker. Russia’s aggression has demonstrated the impracticality of Ukraine’s "multi-vector" geopolitical course. Only assistance and security guarantees from countries comparable to Russia in military potential can help Ukraine repel the current Russian aggression and prevent a repeat in the future. Therefore, Ukraine has no real alternative but to seek security guarantees from Western countries, either through NATO or through bilateral agreements with NATO member states.
Security agreements from NATO member states may be criticized for their weakness or unreliability, and NATO's policies may also be criticized for their ineffectiveness regarding Ukraine or mistakes in other aspects. Such criticism is legitimate and is part of expert discussions or media coverage of NATO's support for Ukraine. However, when criticism of NATO or Western support is combined with indirect suggestions to return to Moscow's sphere of influence, it serves Ukraine's subjugation.
The hosts and experts on the analyzed YouTube channels construct the narrative that Ukraine will never be accepted into NATO.
"Ukraine has a land border with Russia. What can Ukraine say to Russia in terms of security? What? No US will ever admit Ukraine into NATO under no president! Never, damn it, I'll hit my forehead, never and no way! For one simple reason, it's historically impossible. In no prospects, neither partially nor wholly! Was Lithuania not enough for you? Will Washington not be enough this year?!" — said Mykhailo Chaplyha on August 24, 2024, to Vadym Herasymovych on Politeka Online. By mentioning Lithuania and Washington, Chaplyha likely referred to the NATO summits held in Vilnius and Washington in 2023 and 2024, respectively.
Vadym Yaroshenko on Novyny. Live said about NATO's Article 5 on collective defense that it is "like a Mercedes that a friend bought but doesn't want to show off, and it turns out he doesn't even have a license." He gathered a group of people "who don't believe in NATO's Article 5," addressing Ruslan Bortnyk during the broadcast.
4. Systematic anti-Western sentiment that discredits modern Western culture, reforms, and values. This marker is also classified as a second-group marker. Criticism of certain cultural practices in public discourse is a natural manifestation of pluralistic democratic culture. However, the constant general discrediting of all Western culture and ethics while simultaneously promoting the need for Ukraine to change its international orientation away from the West is a marker of Russian agitational propaganda.
The most frequent target of criticism on the analyzed YouTube channels was the (in)tolerance toward the LGBT community as the main difference between Russia and the West. For example, in an interview with Oleksandr Shelest in February 2023, the Russian "political philosopher" Pavlo Schelin said that Russian ideology is also Western because "Russia spent 30 years integrating into the West." Like in the European Union, its foundation is consumption and material well-being. However, according to the expert, the EU and Russia differ in that Russia is more conservative in matters of "gender and sexuality."
"We face an existential threat to the Ukrainian nation. We must think about that. But instead, we focus on gender. And now they want to send women to the front," said Ihor Mosiychuk in an interview on April 16, 2024. Host Oleksandr Shelest nodded in agreement for another two minutes before wrapping up the interview.
In this and similar cases, gender equality or LGBT rights were portrayed as threats to the survival of the Ukrainian nation.
5. Non-recognition of President Zelenskyy and the Verkhovna Rada as legitimate. Undermining trust in Ukraine’s state institutions weakens the country’s ability to resist the Kremlin’s aggressive plans to subjugate Ukraine. Since 2023, agitprop has been using a new reason to promote this narrative — the postponement of elections in Ukraine due to the inability to hold them democratically during the full-scale Russian aggression.
Among the videos analyzed during the research, former MP Ihor Mosiychuk, in an interview with Vitaliy Dykyy, promoted the theme of non-recognition of the Ukrainian president’s legitimacy, saying:
"They have usurped power. In 13 days, the president’s legitimacy will end. The President's Office has no status at all; it's an unclear body. I think that changes in the government will definitely happen by the 21st. Because after that, the legitimacy of the people the president nominated will also be questioned. When our Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes statements about Putin's illegitimacy, they should look in the mirror. They will use this against you. In Russia, elections were formally held. Zelenskyy’s illegitimacy is not his personal problem; it’s our country’s problem. They will use this. They are already saying: ‘Who are we supposed to negotiate with — he’s illegitimate.’ Later, so-called partners will start playing this card when they need to squeeze someone by the balls."
In comments for another former Medvedchuk channel host, Oleksandr Shelest, Mosiychuk repeated similar theses:
"We are on the brink, and our government is leading us to absolute desacralization and delegitimization of power. They can say what they want to me; they can threaten retribution against constitutional lawyers; they can intimidate anyone they want and promise to kill — they are already writing about it openly. But this won’t make Zelenskyy legitimate after May 20, and that will be a problem. Everyone already understands this; enemies are saying it, neutral countries are saying it, and countries they call allies or partners, whatever term you prefer, are saying it. Everyone is talking about this, and it may be too late when this discussion turns into action."
A notable aspect is the repetition and emphasis on the argument that "everyone is talking about this." While this topic was pushed mainly by Russian agitational propaganda, seeking someone who, in the Kremlin’s opinion, could have enough "authority to negotiate" instead of Zelenskyy, they are interfering in Ukraine’s domestic political contexts and interpreting Ukraine’s Constitution to suit their own narratives.
6. Promoting the idea that Ukraine is a "failed state," particularly due to systemic corruption, division among the ruling elites, and the artificial nature of its creation. This is another key marker of Russian propaganda. It serves the same purpose as promoting the idea of the illegitimacy of Ukraine's sovereignty. However, the "relevance of Ukraine's existence" as a state is questioned in this case. According to the propagandists, Ukraine never had stable sovereignty or was "artificially constructed" from fragments of other states or empires. This propaganda aims to devalue the defense of Ukraine against aggression by devaluing the key features of its statehood and institutions. The main themes promoted by the propagandists include accusations of the loss of sovereignty, corruption among government officials, and excessive Western influence on Ukraine’s personnel and economy. The most frequently used words are: "default," "debt," "corruption," "colony."
The hosts or guests on the analyzed YouTube channels complain that the Ukrainian government has "lost control" of the situation in the country. Before the full-scale Russian invasion, the emphasis was on the government’s inability to ensure basic state functions, such as border protection, public safety, and economic stability.
"In fact, in August, Ukraine made an unprecedented legislative decision allowing the non-repayment of debts under default conditions. Fitch declared Ukraine in default. And this is on top of previous defaults, including the default of Ukrautodor. I won't even mention other state enterprises, which are essentially private but officially are not. I won't even mention the debts of local councils, self-governments, etc. At the same time, the total national debt exceeds $150 billion, and there is no real GDP in Ukraine," commented former representative of the Human Rights Ombudsman, Chaplyha, on Politeka Online on August 18, 2024. Vadym Herasymovych nodded affirmatively to the theses about Ukraine's "non-functioning economy" and the inability to repay state debts.
This marker also includes the narrative of the "external governance" of Ukraine by the "collective West," "Anglo-Saxons," the US, etc.
"Since 2014, Ukraine has been ruled by Western ambassadors and consuls! They appoint ministers — ‘sorosyata,' 'pigs,' and 'others.' Power (in Ukraine) has always relied on the paradigm of dependence on someone else," responded Vadym Karasiov to a question by Maks Nazarov on the YouTube project "Da eto tak" regarding Joe Biden's decision not to run in the 2024 US presidential election.
Nazarov’s question, to which Mosiychuk responded in a video released on July 22, 2024, was:
"Ukrainian politicians have always harmed themselves with their sycophancy, thus losing bipartisan support in the US Now many Ukrainian diplomats and lobbyists are rushing to Washington to lobby among Republicans and Trump's circle for the continuation, not the end, of the war and further arms supplies to Ukraine."
Following international news or concerns about events abroad is also presented as a "sign of a colony." Ihor Mosiychuk said this to Vadym Herasymovych on Politeka Online on July 25, 2024. They discussed "how the West uses Ukraine."
"Dear friends, how long will we listen to what others tell us? How long will we not live according to our national interest? Look at how closely Ukrainian society follows US elections, and everyone thinks these elections will decide Ukraine's fate," said Ihor Mosiychuk.
"Well, look, regarding the fateful nature of US elections, that was the case in 2016, that was the case in 2020," responded Vadym Herasymovych.
Mosiychuk replied: "That is a sign of a colony. Unfortunately, it is a sign of a colony. And we need to acknowledge this."
A subtype of the "failed state" narrative is the theme of "high-level corruption," which allegedly worsened during Russia's full-scale invasion and the control of certain influence groups over Ukraine's political life and economy. Another aspect is the perceived failure of institutions created to fight corruption.
"Indeed, we have created many agencies: the Bureau of Economic Security, SAP, NABU, and the Anti-Corruption Court, which we have talked about for a long time, saying they would solve all problems. But in the end, we cannot handle it ourselves, so Western partners are involved, providing their 'overseers' and experts," said Alyona Zinchenko to expert Yuriy Konovalchuk on the YouTube channel PolitExpert on August 31, 2023.
The narrative of Ukraine as a "failed state," whose elites, despite the war, cannot stop engaging in corruption, is aimed at undermining trust in Ukraine’s state and its institutions, as well as forming a negative image of the country in the eyes of its citizens and the international community.
7. Calls for negotiations on Russian terms or territorial concessions to Russia. This point belongs to one of the core markers. Promoting Russian conditions to end the war effectively means promoting Russian dictation in the aggressive war. Calls to accept Russian conditions as a starting point for negotiations can be a hidden call for Ukraine's capitulation. Over the past year, rhetorical references to the "Istanbul Agreements" of 2022 have become popular, portraying them as a "missed opportunity for an acceptable peace for Ukraine." The 2022 proposal by Russia included unilateral disarmament without any security guarantees, acknowledgment of territorial losses, restrictions on Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy, and renunciation of legal and economic claims against the aggressor, including the lifting of sanctions. Now, propaganda insists that with each day Ukraine refuses Moscow's ultimatums, the conditions for future peace will supposedly worsen. Russian agitprop often combines threats, including nuclear ones, with peace proposals.
A broadcast of Maks Nazarov’s YouTube project "Da eto tak" from July 22, 2024, discussed Ukraine's foreign policy in connection with the US elections:
Vadym Karasiov: "There is an understanding. The further we go, the worse it will be. The conditions will be worse."
Maks Nazarov: "Well, doesn't the Ukrainian government understand this, or do they?"
Vadym Karasiov: "Well, there's an understanding. Anyone who can do simple math or multiply two by two understands perfectly. There was Minsk-1, Minsk-2, then war, then Istanbul-1, now Istanbul-2, call it what you will. But there's an understanding."
A broadcast on Politeka Online from August 24, 2024, where host Vadym Herasymovych discussed with expert Mykhailo Chaplyha the possible outcomes of the war:
Mykhailo Chaplyha: "Kuleba said that victory would be considered the impossibility of Russia repeating its aggression against Ukraine. You understand that his words can be interpreted in two ways. The impossibility of Russia repeating aggression against Ukraine is possible: a) if Ukraine becomes part of Russia, like the Ukrainian SSR in the USSR 2.0 (Russia), then no one will attack anyone, of course. The second option is for Ukraine to annex the Kuril Islands. Maybe you know a third option?"
Vadym Herasymovych: "It seems this is one of those cases where a third option doesn’t exist."
In the same broadcast:
Mykhailo Chaplyha: "Negotiations are possible, but only in the case of direct talks between the US and Russia, no other way… What kind of negotiations? About integral security. That's what Russia is talking about."
A broadcast on Ukrlife.tv from July 22, 2024, where Vadym Herasymovych discussed with Dmytro Spivak a statement by Boris Johnson about possible peace in Ukraine after a conversation between the former British Prime Minister and Donald Trump:
Dmytro Spivak: "Comrade Johnson, weren't you in April 2022, when Putin offered to withdraw his troops to [the borders] on February 24, and according to David Arakhamia, leader of the 'Servant of the People' faction, you, Comrade Johnson, said not to sign anything: 'Let's just fight,' you told Ukrainians. And we'll supposedly help you with everything. And so, Ukraine has been fighting for more than two years, and you've practically done nothing to help us, immediately resigned and lost any interest. And today, you are offering a diametrically opposite position. So, maybe, over these two years, hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions of displaced people, destroyed economy, energy, and so on could have been avoided."
Calls for territorial concessions are an integral part of the marker of calls for negotiations on Russian terms, which ultimately assume Ukraine’s acceptance of the annexation of its territories. Due to the Kremlin’s desire to legitimize its territorial seizures and devalue Ukraine’s goal of reclaiming them, calls for territorial concessions can be highlighted as a separate category for analysis with corresponding examples.
Vitaliy Dykyy, in a conversation with Eduard Hlyoza on his YouTube channel about the inevitable territorial concessions of Ukraine as one of the conditions for ending the war:
"I recently conducted an interview. I spoke with Datsyuk, Serhiy. Also an interesting man, a political philosopher. And he also openly said that we need to rebuild what's left. To approach this rationally, to create a [new] state. And preserve what appears cannot be united."
Eduard Hlyoza, Politeka channel’s host, held a conversation with Vadym Karasyov about concessions to Russia and Ukraine to end the war:
Hlyoza: "'Kyiv will not bend to the ultimatums from Putin, we will not give up a single inch of land' — and when I hear that, I think it's all pompous nonsense because, at the same time as 'we won't give up a single inch of land,' in reality, we've already lost 25% of our territories. We need to face reality, accept the problem, and start solving it."
Karasiov: "You can, of course, say we won’t give up any land, but on the front, you’re surrendering it. You need to recognize the harsh reality and take responsibility."
8. Denial of Russian war crimes or shifting responsibility for the war and its victims onto Ukraine and Western states. This is a core marker. Russian propaganda justifies its aggression by blaming Ukraine and the West for provoking it while arguing that the continuation of the war is due to the unwillingness of the West and Ukraine to accept Moscow's ultimatums, essentially capitulating. This allows Russia to absolve itself of responsibility for the war. While criticizing Kyiv's or Western politicians' underestimation of security threats from Moscow before the full-scale invasion is permissible within democratic discourse, ignoring the decisive role of the aggressor in starting and continuing the war is a clear marker of Russian propaganda.
Similarly, with the idea of peace negotiations on Moscow's terms, broadcasts featuring former guests and employees of Medvedchuk and Murayev's channels reveal instances of denying Russian war crimes or rejecting the role of international law in holding Russia accountable. We observed attempts to dilute the responsibility for the war, which is an unprovoked military aggression and, therefore, a crime in itself. Responsibility for the war is sometimes linked to Ukraine's Western partners or the Ukrainian leadership.
For example, Mykhailo Chaplyha, in an interview with Sofiya Pivnyak, made the following statement about the new tribunal in The Hague regarding Russian war crimes:
"It's about nothing. The Netherlands is ready to open another tribunal. Well, good for them. But then they'll have elections in their parliament, and things will change a bit. What is the Netherlands anyway — they are a small country that survives by essentially being an offshore haven for all the dirty money in Europe. And when an offshore haven for dirty money in Europe starts lecturing..."
Conclusions
After Russia's full-scale invasion, the final closure of sanctioned channels, Yevhen Murayev’s escape, and Viktor Medvedchuk's arrest, some hosts and experts from his channels ended up in Russia and began working for Kremlin propaganda aimed at Russian or Belarusian audiences. However, most former hosts of pro-Russian TV channels who remained in the media continue to work for the Ukrainian audience. The largest audiences for former hosts of Medvedchuk and Murayev's channels are on YouTube. New media projects and personal channels on this platform have become a way for at least 19 of them to maintain a presence in the media space. Some began hosting personal YouTube channels, while others grouped into collective media projects on YouTube, such as Politeka Online and Ukrlife.tv, Novyny.Live, Seychas, PolitExpert, and others.
The main genre of personal or group YouTube publications is interviews with experts discussing current events. The main lure for views is clickbait headlines.
Some hosts, like Dmytro Spivak, Vadym Karasiov, and Vitaliy Dykyy, often serve as experts for other former colleagues. Like the rest of the experts, they migrate between YouTube channels. Former hosts and experts provide informational support to one another. The commonality of experts is another sign of continued connections between former employees of Medvedchuk's channels.
Besides the experts from Medvedchuk's channels, Ukrainian military personnel and Russian opposition figures, who are also invited to the Unified News telethon or FreeDom TV channel, appear on these YouTube channels. On state media and YouTube channels, they generally hold pro-Ukrainian positions. However, from some experts on the analyzed YouTube channels who are not invited to the telethon, such as Ihor Mosiychuk, Mykhailo Chaplyha, Dmytro Spivak, and Vadym Karasiov, one can regularly hear narratives aligned with Russian propaganda. These experts, who voice pro-Russian theses, frequently become interlocutors for most analyzed hosts.
Hosts like Vitaliy Dykyy, Eduard Hlyoza, Vadym Herasymovych, Vasyl Apasov, Maks Nazarov, Oleksandr Shelest, and Sofiya Pivnyak often remain silent or agree rather than challenge experts who downplay support from partners, predict the collapse of Ukraine's economy, energy sector, or state. The silent agreement with such narratives and the invitation of speakers who voice them cast a pro-Russian shadow over these media projects and the people who work there.
Thus, it can be said that the former hosts of sanctioned channels continue to collaborate as a network on the YouTube platform. This network spreads Russian propaganda narratives in a fragmented and indirect manner, most often in the form of passive acceptance of these narratives from frequent guests on their individual or collective projects.
The most frequent narratives from these guests include discrediting Ukraine's support from partners, discrediting security guarantees from the West, and more subtly promoting the idea of negotiations on Russian terms. Also common were efforts to blur the responsibility for the war, particularly by shifting it onto the West and the Ukrainian government. In addition, the claim of the general incapacity of Ukrainian state institutions, especially due to systemic corruption, was widespread. Some of the videos containing these narratives garnered hundreds of thousands of views.
Four of the six hosts who emigrated regularly spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda.
Update:
A reader of "Detector Media" noted that Anastasia Marchenko is a presenter on "Apostrophe TV." On the first infographic in this report, she was among those who have ceased to appear in public. Specifically, Anastasia Marchenko hosted the morning broadcast on "Apostrophe TV" on 30 September 2024, the day this report was published.
Main page illustration and infographics credits: Natalia Lobach
