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In late January 2023, an article by investigative journalist Yuriy Nikolov appeared on the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia website about the “golden eggs” — an analysis of contracts concluded by the Ministry of Defense to provide food for units of the Armed Forces stationed far from the frontline. It turned out that the products were being purchased at inflated prices.
The publication in Dzerkalo Tyzhnia broke the unspoken moratorium on journalistic investigations of corruption within the country, which had been in place since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Back then, the majority of independent journalists urgently switched to documenting and investigating war crimes committed by Russians. Many journalists joined the ranks of the Armed Forces, and for nearly a year, independent media systematically refrained from investigating the work of the government, including its top echelons.
A year passed, and it became clear that the war was here for the long haul. As Anna Babinets, editor and founder of Slidstvo.info, commented to Detector Media, it was time to take a look at “how we manage our own country.” Specifically, how the government manages during times when financial, human, and other resources are limited and Ukraine is largely dependent on external aid. The effectiveness of using these limited resources became a very pertinent issue.
The publication of Nikolov’s investigation caused a major scandal. The prices of the products were lowered, and then (at least chronologically, though possibly as a consequence), the Minister of Defense, Oleksiy Reznikov, quietly resigned.
In the second year of the war, investigative journalists conducted many high-profile investigations, including about people from the President’s Office, their wealth, connections, media advisors, deputies, etc. All of them gather tens, hundreds of thousands of views.
Threats and Harassment
The reaction to these numerous investigations appeared — and was almost predictable: first in anonymous Telegram channels, then in fake news media, and later on some YouTube channels, numerous posts and articles appeared attempting to discredit journalists who are critical of the government or conduct investigations regarding its representatives.
One of the first such cases of harassment was a campaign against the chief editor of Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, Yulia Mostova, political observer, host of Espreso and Radio Liberty, Vitaliy Portnikov, and editor-in-chief of Detector Media, Nataliya Lyhachova. All three participated in a discussion at the National Media Talk in mid-October 2023. During her speech, Mostova said that at the off-record meeting of the media with the President, which took place after the publication of the investigation about the Ministry of Defense’s procurement, Zelenskyy asked journalists “to remain silent about corruption until the victory.” She also mentioned that before publishing Nikolov’s investigation, they tried, considering the full-scale war, to reach out to the authorities non-publicly with signals about corruption. However, there was no response from the government.
Vitaliy Portnikov, in the same conversation, accused the government of implementing not military but political censorship — specifically, referring to the United News Telemarathon, which is dominated by pro-presidential politicians, as well as representatives of the President’s Office itself. Political censorship can also be mentioned in the context of the sudden disconnection from digital broadcasting at the beginning of the big war of channels associated with former president Petro Poroshenko and his followers — Channel 5, Espreso, and Priamyi. The only one who provided reasons for turning off these channels was again a representative of the President’s Office, Mykhailo Podoliak, who explained the decision with the excessive “narcissism” of the channels’ owner.
Nataliya Lyhachova criticized the government for the telethon, too, as well as for the government’s indulgence towards anonymous Telegram channels, which often spread disinformation and unverified information but tend to be very loyal to the government and harass its political opponents or just critical experts. She also called out the use of “black spin doctors”, specifically naming the founders of the Islandiya YouTube channel, Volodymyr Petrov and Serhiy Ivanov.
In response to these critical remarks from media figures, a series of videos appeared on the Islandiya channel, where political technologist Volodymyr Petrov and host Serhiy Ivanov didn’t hesitate to insult those who dared to criticize the government’s actions. They accused them of lying, resorted to ad hominem arguments, and even threatened to “deal with” the media representatives and “punish them.”
Later, anonymous Telegram channels Dzhoker, Trukha, Batalion Monako joined Islandiya, launching a fake story claiming that Detector Media allegedly bought services from a Russian company (which is not true, and the editorial board has repeatedly clarified this). Journalist of Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, Inna Vedernikova, for asking a critical question to the President at a press conference, was later dubbed a “Hrytsenko’s speculator,” and Mostova and her family were repeatedly accused of being involved in corruption. Also, anonymous Telegram channels launched a fake story claiming that Detector Media, along with opposition MP Viktoriya Siumar, were involved in “information campaigns” against the President and so on. Pro-Russian blogger Anatoliy Shariy began harassing the director of IMI, Oksana Romaniuk, accusing her of receiving money for his “discreditation” from a drug cartel.
Throughout the fall of 2023, there were also information campaigns against anti-corruption activists and pressure on them, especially on the team of AntAC headed by Vitaliy Shabunin, as well as on Oleksandr Lemenov from the StateWatch organization and activist Mykhailo Zhernakov, among others. Both Lemenov and Zhernakov were featured in a number of publications, including Zakon I Biznes, which is associated with Andriy Portnov, in articles that had signs of being sponsored. They were called “draft dodgers” and claimed to be “hiding” from the enlistment offices. Indeed, enlistment office employees did visit both of them, but no summonses were delivered. Despite this, harassment of the activists continued both in well-known media and in anonymous Telegram channels — both activists are involved in monitoring the work of state bodies, including the Ministry of Defense, ARMA, the reputation of judges, and judicial reform. Both activists link the wave of publications to their activities, particularly to the fact that both criticized one of the deputies of the head of the President’s Office, Oleh Tatarov. The AntAC team also faced informational attacks, in particular, anonymous Telegram channels spread posts claiming that Vitaliy Shabunin supposedly did not serve in the Armed Forces. The latter also links the information campaign against himself to Tatarov.
And this was just the beginning.
Physical Provocations and Surveillance
At the beginning of 2024, the campaign to discredit independent media reached an unprecedented scale, which, as journalists noted, had not been seen since the presidency of Yanukovych. The editorial board of Kyiv Independent spoke out about the “undue interest” from law enforcement towards their work. Anonymous Telegram channels targeted the chief editor of Ukrainska Pravda, Sevhil Musayeva, hinting at her “insufficient patriotism” and “excessive spending”. The campaign also targeted the investor of Ukrainska Pravda, Czech entrepreneur Tomáš Fiala, accusing him of supposedly having a company that operates in Crimea. He asserts that none of the businesses associated with him operate on the peninsula and that the campaign against him is politically motivated. In November of the previous year, Ukrainska Pravda journalist Mykhailo Tkach was attacked during filming. However, the most prominent incidents were the attack on the apartment of journalist Yuriy Nikolov and the surveillance of the investigative team of Bihus.Info.
On January 14th, unknown individuals attempted to break into Nikolov’s apartment, where he was not present at the time. The attackers frightened the journalist’s mother and neighbors, covering his door with papers bearing offensive inscriptions, calling him a “traitor” and “draft dodger”. Almost simultaneously with the attack, the anonymous Russian-speaking Telegram channel Kartochnyi Ofis (linked to people from the President’s Office) published a video of the perpetrators’ actions, supporting these provocations and explaining them as supposedly “delivering a summons” by people who “returned from the frontline.” Even from the video, it was clear that the individuals who visited Nikolov’s apartment were not enlistment office employees. A network of anonymous Telegram channels loyal to the government, including Vertikal and Dzhoker, spread provocative posts about Nikolov and his work. The police deliberated for several days whether to open a criminal case regarding the attack, but eventually did so and even identified the attackers. This unexpected activity by law enforcement was likely linked to the media uproar caused by another case of pressure on journalists. A case that could not be dismissed as the actions of “unknown concerned citizens” and is hardly justifiable as “freedom of speech,” which anonymous Telegram channels hide behind while spreading lies about journalists.
On January 16th, the obscure garbage dump website Narodna Pravda posted a video composed of wiretapped phone conversations of Bihus.Info employees and video footage recorded with hidden cameras during the editorial team’s corporate party. During the party, as later admitted by project leader Denys Bihus, videographers used drugs — and, importantly, consumption itself is not a crime, unlike illegal surveillance and wiretapping. Even if we assume that the phone tapping was part of an unknown but official investigation, leaking pre-trial investigation data is also a crime. As Denys Bihus explained, even a superficial analysis of the video posted on Narodna Pravda (now both the “news” on the site and even the YouTube channel where the video was published is inaccessible) makes it clear that the team was under surveillance for a long time, automatically making this case the first in this chronology. But it was leaked at the very moment when other media are also experiencing systematic pressure. Moreover, assumptions that the attack on the investigative team was a result of someone’s reckless behavior now seem almost impossible — as journalists discovered, dozens of people were involved in conducting this “special operation.” It’s unlikely that any aggrieved person of interest mentioned in Bihus.Info’s investigations could order surveillance on such a scale without the assistance of law enforcement agencies.
These last two incidents prompted public statements from both the media community, including the Media Movement, the Commission on Journalistic Ethics, and government representatives. Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, the head of the Committee on Freedom of Speech, sent a parliamentary inquiry to the Security Service of Ukraine demanding an investigation into these illegal actions; the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy also plans to take action. The Security Service of Ukraine officially announced that it is already investigating the circumstances of the illegal wiretapping and video recording of journalists from the Bihus.Info project. The next day, the National Police reported a registered report from the editorial office about obstruction of journalistic activity and invasion of privacy (four cases in total). Eventually, even the President was compelled to make two statements — in one, he briefly informed law enforcement during a meeting that “any pressure on journalists is unacceptable”; in another, responding to a question in a Channel 4 interview, he stated that the Security Service should investigate and identify those who are persecuting journalists. All these statements have had almost no impact on what is happening on the Telegram channels loyal to the government — they continue to harass Nikolov, almost admitting their involvement in the organization of provocations, and along with the persons of interest from Bihus.Info’s investigations, particularly MP Mykola Tyshchenko, spread slander against the project’s journalists, calling them “drug addicts” and hinting at their “corruptibility”.
Conclusions
Almost no journalists or media experts doubt that all these cases aim to discredit independent media to undermine public trust and intimidate the journalists themselves to reduce their activity. And even if they are not connected by a single customer, according to the Institute of Mass Information director, Oksana Romaniuk, they are connected by impunity, a sense that journalists can be pressured without consequence. At the same time, another opinion exists: that this is a special operation, approved and well-planned by those who aimed to stop the criticism of the authorities and the investigation of their activities “until victory.”
It is not just about those who executed it “on the ground” but also those who supported it in the media, including a series of anonymous Telegram channels — Dzhoker, Vertikal, Kartochnyi Ofis, Vsevidyashchee Oko, etc. They, like the Petrov-Ivanov team, have been repeatedly associated with the President’s Office — but sources from Babel assert that at least Dzhoker and the Petrov-Ivanov team are no longer connected with the President’s Office, but just trying to create such an impression in the audience. Meanwhile, Detector Media’s sources link Dzhoker, Kartochnyi Ofis, and Vertikal with members of the Sluha Narodu party or people working in the President’s Office. Daria Zarivna, the senior advisor to the head of the President’s Office, Andriy Yermak, denied any connections of the President’s Office with the network of anonymous Telegram channels in a comment to Radio Liberty, “I can definitely say: do not associate this anonymous Telegram channel or any other with the President’s Office. It is not true”.
Journalists, meanwhile, are quite skeptical about the prospects of investigations into these cases of pressure, given their previous experience. They also agree on one point: it’s unlikely that specific words or specific investigations were the cause of these numerous instances of pressure on the media. It is more of a “recognition” of their overall achievements. However, they all note that, in addition to the internal tension that this series of attacks on independent media creates within society, it also damages Ukraine’s image internationally. Indeed, following the publicity, Reporters Without Borders called for an investigation into the attack on Nikolov and reported being “alarmed by the series of attempts to intimidate investigative journalists”; Human Rights Watch made a statement, and Reuters reported on cases of attacks and surveillance. During January, several foreign media published articles about “a series of attacks and smear campaigns targeting prominent Ukrainian journalists [casting] a shadow over Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s record on safeguarding media freedom.” (Financial Times), and French Le Monde writes about “acts of intimidation against media representatives specializing in corruption cases, undermining the efforts of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government to implement reforms for increasing transparency, which the European Union expects”. Expectedly, Russian propaganda also uses the statements and publications in foreign media to promote the narrative of “Zelenskyy’s authoritarianism” and “the absence of freedom of speech” in Ukraine. It also spreads the message about an imaginary conflict between “Soros followers” (the label it applies to all journalists) and the government, even threatening a third Maidan.
Given the success of Russian propaganda in the West, there is no doubt that the pressure on independent media in Ukraine will be used repeatedly by Russian propaganda. After all, it’s a substantial argument to try to reduce support for Ukraine among Western voters and the politicians dependent on them for decisions regarding aid to our country. Moreover, as Nataliya Lyhachova writes, the atmosphere of distrust and tension in society, the intimidation and harassment of journalists and anti-corruption activists, create the perfect environment for provocations by Russian special services.
At the same time, in some sense, the audacity of surveillance cases and physical provocations against investigative journalists and activists played against the beneficiaries of this campaign. The reputation of the investigators cannot be influenced in this way; on the contrary, it demonstrates their effectiveness and independence. The media community united in the face of the unprecedented scale of attacks on colleagues. It’s rather the reputation of the government, both inside and outside the country, that suffers. One can only hope that the cases will be properly investigated and the perpetrators punished.
However, the question regarding the “media support” of these provocations and attacks, that is, the activities of anonymous Telegram channels, remains open. In the absence of legal regulation of their activities, their anonymity, and the opacity of their ownership, it becomes virtually impossible to prove the falsity of their accusations against independent media in court. This could indeed compromise the reputation of independent journalists and anti-corruption activists in the eyes of society. Who benefits from this during a full-scale war in which Ukraine is entirely dependent on Western aid, for whom freedom of speech and the fight against corruption are important markers of genuine democracy and the necessity of its support? Yuriy Nikolov says that it benefits the enemies of Ukraine. Without specifying where these enemies are located – within the country or beyond its borders.
