What the United News Marathon and Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel broadcast looked like on May 4–5, 2026 — summary

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Coverage of the week’s main topics; representation of parliamentary factions and groups in guest studios; instances of political PR, as well as Russian narratives and toxic media figures in the telethon; and violations of the core standards of information journalism—in brief.

The United News telethon was launched on February 24, 2022. Detector Media began monitoring it on March 21 of the same year using this methodology. In January this year, Detector Media refined and expanded this methodology in response to comments and suggestions from the editorial teams participating in the telethon. The author of the monitoring is Ihor Kulyas, a media trainer and the creator of Detector Media’s core monitoring methodology. 

From March 2022 to September 2024, the monitoring focused on recording and analyzing broadcast schedules of different channels, the main content produced by editorial teams (reports, live feeds, studio discussions), violations of journalism standards, instances of political PR, representation of parliamentary factions and groups, Russian narratives and toxic media figures, and topics ignored by the telethon.

On May 21, 2024, Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel left the telethon and began independent 24/7 broadcasting. This change is not fundamental for monitoring purposes. The work of Suspilne’s news editorial team continues to be evaluated as before, using the same methodology as before the telethon. 

Since October 2024, the monitoring format has changed. It now focuses on analyzing coverage of major socially significant topics in the telethon and — for comparison — on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel. It tracks how key daily and weekly topics are covered, representation of MPs from different factions, instances of political PR, and the presence of toxic media figures and Russian narratives.

Summaries of monitoring reports are available here, and the full versions of reports are available here.

May 4–5 saw the highest intensity of fighting on the Pokrovsk, Huliaipole, and Kostiantynivka sections of the front. However, the channels participating in the national telethon collectively devoted the most attention to the less active Kupiansk and Oleksandrivka directions. On the reporting days, Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel focused primarily on the Pokrovsk and Oleksandrivka directions.

During the reporting period, the enemy carried out numerous aerial attacks against civilians, causing high numbers of deaths and injuries: on May 4 in Merefa, Kharkiv Oblast, and on May 5 in Poltava Oblast, Kramatorsk, and Zaporizhzhia. All of these events were covered promptly and comprehensively by Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel through live reports from its correspondents on the ground. In contrast, the telethon’s correspondents only reached Merefa and Zaporizhzhia.

Over the two reporting days, the most widely discussed topics were the issue of a temporary ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia in connection with the enemy’s Victory Day parade in Moscow, and President Zelenskyy’s in-person participation in the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan. Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel provided more in-depth expert analysis of both topics than the telethon. The telethon, however, covered the Yerevan summit through live field reports.

In domestic politics, the most significant topic—the release of new fragments of the “Mindich Tapes” and the parliamentary temporary investigative commission’s review of issues related to Sense Bank, which was mentioned in the recordings—was covered only by Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel. Telethon participants completely ignored the topic during these days.

During the reporting period, the telethon recorded the highest number of serious violations of the standards of accuracy and the separation of facts from opinions. Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel also most frequently violated these same standards during these days.

Throughout the week of May 4–10, the telethon’s “parliamentary” guest studios featured mostly representatives of the Servant of the People party. Representatives of the opposition factions Batkivshchyna and European Solidarity were not invited. On Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, representation of both governing and opposition factions in discussion studios was generally balanced.

Over the two analyzed days, there were 10 instances of political PR in the telethon. No such instances were recorded on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel.

During the reporting days, the Pokrovsk direction again saw the highest number of combat engagements (24 and 50 clashes per day, respectively). Fighting also remained intense in the Huliaipole direction (29 and 24 clashes; on May 4, this direction actually saw more fighting than Pokrovsk). The Kostiantynivka direction remained third in intensity (16 and 14 clashes per day), followed by Oleksandrivka (7 and 14) and Pivdenno-Slobozhanskyi (4 and 12 clashes per day). Combat intensity on all other directions was significantly lower. On May 4, “Madyar” stated that for the fifth consecutive month, enemy forces had been losing more personnel than they had been recruiting, which made enemy losses at the front a significant topic of discussion in broadcasts.

Across the telethon, channels collectively devoted the most attention, for some reason, to the far less active Kupiansk direction (four guest discussions) and the Oleksandrivka direction (one field report, one live segment, and two discussions). Less attention was given to the most active directions. The channels 1+1 and We Are Ukraine devoted the most airtime to frontline coverage. Most often, the telethon discussed the front with active-duty soldiers (12 times), invited spokespersons from various Defense Forces units six times, and military experts three times. The most active field reporters during these days were those from ICTV/STB, who delivered two live reports and two field packages. 1+1 aired one live segment and one package, while Inter aired one package.

On Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, the most discussed directions were Pokrovsk and Oleksandrivka (three discussions each). Two discussions each were devoted to the less active Pivdenno-Slobozhanskyi and Orikhiv directions. The more active Huliaipole and Kostiantynivka directions received only one guest studio discussion each. Most often, frontline developments were discussed with spokespersons from Defense Forces units (eight times), military experts were invited four times, and active-duty soldiers only three times. Once again, no frontline field reports were produced during the reporting days.

During the reporting period, the enemy carried out numerous aerial attacks on civilians, causing many deaths and injuries. On May 4, a missile strike on Merefa, Kharkiv Oblast, killed seven people and injured 19 (as of that day). The following day, four people were killed and 37 injured in a missile-and-drone strike on Poltava Oblast. That same day, six people were killed and 10 injured in shelling in Kramatorsk, while another 12 people were killed and 37 injured in a guided aerial bomb attack in Zaporizhzhia.

All of these events were covered as quickly and comprehensively as possible by Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel through live reports from its correspondents at the sites of the attacks. In the telethon, correspondents reached only Merefa (a report on ICTV/STB) and Zaporizhzhia (live reports on We Are Ukraine). The remaining events were covered in short formats using third-party footage. Some events were addressed through interviews with officials and spokespersons.

In my view, these two days clearly demonstrated the significant qualitative advantage of Suspilne Pershyi Channel’s correspondent network over the combined correspondent resources of the telethon participants.

Over the two reporting days, the most discussed topic on both the telethon and Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel was the issue of a temporary ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia, linked to the enemy’s Victory Day parade in Moscow.

On most telethon channels, the topic was analyzed by the usual in-house experts, with We Are Ukraine dedicating the most attention to expert commentary. ICTV/STB discussed the issue with Roman Kostenko, Secretary of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security.

On Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, the topic was discussed over both days with a wide range of experts with different specializations.

Another important event for Ukraine was President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s in-person participation in the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan, where he also held a series of important meetings with leaders of various countries, including the prime ministers of Armenia, Slovakia, and Georgia.

The telethon covered these events through live reports by an ICTV correspondent, although the correspondent mostly shared personal assessments, conclusions, and impressions, with relatively few factual details. ICTV/STB also aired an exclusive interview with President Zelenskyy.

Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel did not send correspondents to the summit but instead broadcast the key moments live. Its expert analysis of the significance of these events was considerably more substantial than that of the telethon.

In domestic politics, the most important topic—the publication of new fragments of the “Mindich Tapes” and the parliamentary temporary investigative commission’s review of issues related to Sense Bank, mentioned in the recordings—was covered only by Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel (discussed in the relevant section of this report).

Telethon participants completely ignored the topic during these days. They addressed it only later in a personal program hosted by 1+1 presenter Nataliia Moseichuk, where the issue was discussed with experts loyal to the authorities.

1+1: The most serious violations of the accuracy standard were generalized vague pseudo-attributions for subjective opinions. Many facts were also presented without citing sources. The most serious violations of precision involved mismatches between visuals and voiceover in pre-recorded news packages. The most serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions involved journalists’ emotional judgments in news reporting. All serious violations of completeness involved inadequate presentation of experts’ qualifications. 

ICTV/STB: The most serious violations of the accuracy standard were purely abstract pseudo-attributions. All serious violations of precision involved mismatches between visuals and text in pre-recorded packages and live reports. The most frequent—and overwhelmingly numerous—violations of the separation of facts from opinions were purely emotional evaluations by journalists in news reports. There were also too many unnecessary emphasis and attribution markers. Most violations of completeness involved failure to answer the classic reporting question: “Where?” All violations of accessibility involved journalists using words that may be unclear to part of the audience.

Inter: The most serious violations of the accuracy standard were generalized vague pseudo-attributions for subjective opinions. There were also many vague pseudo-attributions regarding factual information sources. Most violations of precision involved mismatches between visuals and text in pre-recorded packages and in visual “illustrations” accompanying guest interviews. The most serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions were journalists’ emotional assessments in news and in guest studio news segments. There were also many journalist conclusions. Most accessibility violations involved the use of words that may be unclear to part of the audience.

We Are Ukraine: The most serious violations of the accuracy standard were purely abstract pseudo-attributions. All precision violations involved mismatches between visuals and text in pre-recorded packages and review segments. The most serious—and very numerous—violations of the separation of facts from opinions were purely emotional judgments by journalists in news and in guest studio news segments. There were also too many subjective reflections by journalists in news reporting. Most completeness violations involved insufficient presentation of experts’ qualifications. Many videos were shown without natural sound. There were also numerous accessibility violations due to the use of words unclear to part of the audience. One timeliness violation was also recorded: a report on an event that had occurred more than a day before airtime was presented as news.

The most serious violations of the accuracy standard were purely abstract pseudo-attributions. There were also many generalized vague pseudo-attributions to sources of factual information. All serious precision violations involved mismatches between visuals and text in pre-recorded packages and in visual “illustrations” accompanying guest discussions. The most frequent—and again numerous—violations of the separation of facts from opinions were emotional evaluations by journalists in news reports and in guest studio news segments. The most common accessibility violations involved showing screenshots and adapted screenshots that were impossible to read on a television screen.

During the reporting week, MPs were invited to the telethon six times (compared with nine the previous week). Of these, five were representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction (more than 83% of all parliamentary guest appearances), and one was a representative of Holos (Roman Kostenko, invited by ICTV/STB in his capacity as Secretary of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense, and Intelligence).

Representatives of the two other opposition factions—Batkivshchyna and European Solidarity—were not invited.

The Office of the President was represented three times by adviser Mykhailo Podolyak (appearing on 1+1, Inter, and We Are Ukraine for a combined 66 minutes). Another adviser, Serhii Leshchenko, appeared twice on Inter and We Are Ukraine (18 minutes total). Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Iryna Mudra had 13 minutes on 1+1. Presidential Commissioner for the President’s Fund for Support of Education, Science, and Sports, Olha Budnyk, had 9 minutes on Inter. Sanctions Commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk had 12 minutes on We Are Ukraine.

In total, the Office of the President received 1 hour and 58 minutes of airtime during the reporting week.

During the same week, Suspilne invited MPs 28 times (compared with 30 the previous week).

Representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction were invited 13 times, while parliamentary opposition representatives appeared a combined 10 times (Holos and European Solidarity representatives appeared four times each, and Batkivshchyna representatives twice).

Additionally, a representative of the Dovira parliamentary group (Pavlo Bakunets) appeared twice, and independent MP Oksana Savchuk also appeared twice.

In most discussion studios, the balance between government and opposition representatives was clearly maintained.

On May 8, Vasyl Mokan of Servant of the People was opposed by Pavlo Bakunets of Dovira in a discussion about funding salary increases for military personnel. Bakunets appeared more in his capacity as a member of the parliamentary Budget Committee. While he did serve as an opposing voice, it would arguably have been more logical to invite a representative from one of the truly opposition factions serving on the same committee.

Additionally, Hryhorii Mamka, a representative of Platform for Life and Peace (formerly Opposition Platform–For Life), appeared on the program New Countdown. The topic was the Mindich Tapes, and Mr. Mamka was invited partly because his name appeared in the recordings.

The most frequent guest—appearing three times—was Serhii Kozyr of Servant of the People, each time in a different capacity: as a member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Energy and Housing Services, as co-founder of the NGO IDPs of Ukraine, and as a representative of the ruling faction in a discussion studio.

Appearing twice each were Pavlo Bakunets, Nina Yuzhanina (European Solidarity), Oleh Dunda (Servant of the People), and independent MP Oksana Savchuk. All other MPs appeared once.

Over the two analyzed days, there were 10 instances of political PR in the telethon—five each on ICTV/STB and We Are Ukraine.

The most frequent beneficiaries of positive political PR were Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. No negative political PR was recorded.

No instances of political PR were observed on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel during the reporting period.

No Russian propaganda narratives were identified in either the telethon or Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel during the reporting period.

However, Inter’s news broadcasts on May 4 and 5 were hosted by a toxic presenter associated with the channel.