What the United News Marathon and Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel broadcast looked like on August 5–6, 2026—summary

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Coverage of the week’s main topics; representation of parliamentary factions and groups in guest studios; instances of political PR, as well as Russian narratives and toxic media figures in the telethon; and violations of the core standards of information journalism—in brief.

The United News telethon was launched on February 24, 2022. Detector Media began monitoring it on March 21 of the same year using this methodology. In January this year, Detector Media refined and expanded this methodology in response to comments and suggestions from the editorial teams participating in the telethon. The author of the monitoring is Ihor Kulyas, a media trainer and the creator of Detector Media’s core monitoring methodology. 

From March 2022 to September 2024, the monitoring focused on recording and analyzing broadcast schedules of different channels, the main content produced by editorial teams (reports, live feeds, studio discussions), violations of journalism standards, instances of political PR, representation of parliamentary factions and groups, Russian narratives and toxic media figures, and topics ignored by the telethon.

On May 21, 2024, Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel left the telethon and began independent 24/7 broadcasting. This change is not fundamental for monitoring purposes. The work of Suspilne’s news editorial team continues to be evaluated as before, using the same methodology as before the telethon. 

Since October 2024, the monitoring format has changed. It now focuses on analyzing coverage of major socially significant topics in the telethon and — for comparison — on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel. It tracks how key daily and weekly topics are covered, representation of MPs from different factions, instances of political PR, and the presence of toxic media figures and Russian narratives. Read more about the new monitoring format here.

Starting in 2026, the Rada channel is no longer broadcasting as part of the national telethon.

On August 5–6, the most active areas were the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka directions. The South Slobozhanskyi, Sloviansk, Lyman and Huliaipole directions followed in terms of intensity of hostilities. On the telethon, the front received less attention on the days under review than usual; in total, the channels devoted the most attention to the Kupiansk direction, which was not the most active. On Pershyi Channel, the front received relatively little attention overall on the days under review, with the most attention devoted to the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk directions.

The telethon and Pershyi Channel covered the aftermath of the enemy’s massive ballistic missile attack on Kyiv and the region on August 5 in reports with approximately the same level of completeness, while Pershyi Channel was more prompt. Pershyi Channel was also more thorough in its expert discussion of the possible consequences of the enemy’s systematic destruction of civilian logistics in Ukraine. The following day, Pershyi Channel covered the enemy’s attacks on civilians that resulted in significant casualties and injuries in reports much more extensively than the telethon.

On the telethon, the We Are Ukraine channel provided the most thorough analysis of the issue of possibilities for supplying anti-ballistic missiles and granting Ukraine a license to produce them. On Pershyi Channel, the topic also received sufficient attention in expert discussions.

In domestic political coverage, the court hearing on choosing a preventive measure for former Deputy Prime Minister and former Ambassador to the United States Stefanishyna was covered very briefly on the telethon, without any studio discussions. Pershyi Channel provided reports from the court on both days and organized a detailed expert discussion of the topic. Some important domestic political topics were covered only by Pershyi Channel.

On the days under review, the telethon had the most gross violations of the standards of accuracy and separation of facts from opinions. There were also violations of the standard of timeliness. On Pershyi Channel during these days, the most frequent gross violations also concerned the standards of accuracy and separation of facts from opinions.

Over the two weeks (July 27 — August 9), the “deputy” guest studios of the telethon featured exclusively representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction. Deputies from opposition factions were not invited to the telethon. On Pershyi Channel during these weeks, the balance in favor of the ruling faction was violated once in the discussion studio.

During August 5–6, there were 32 instances of political promotion on the telethon. On Pershyi Channel of Suspilne, there was one instance of political promotion during the days under review.

THE SITUATION IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF THE FRONT:

On the days under review, the most active directions were Pokrovsk (29 and 26 combat engagements per day) and Kostiantynivka (29 and 25, respectively). The South Slobozhanskyi (12 and 20 combat engagements per day), Sloviansk (14 and 16), Lyman (14 and 8), and Huliaipole (11 and 19) directions followed in terms of intensity of hostilities. The intensity of fighting was lower in other directions; only in the Kupiansk direction did the number of combat engagements exceed ten per day on one of these days.

On the telethon, on the days under review, the channels collectively devoted the most attention to the Kupiansk direction, which was not the most active (4 discussions with guests), while 3 discussions each were devoted to the South Slobozhanskyi and Orikhiv directions of the front. Of all the most active directions of the front, only the Kostiantynivka direction received more attention (a report was made from there and it was discussed with two guests). Little attention was devoted to all other directions (including the most active Pokrovsk direction). Overall, the front received less attention on these days than usual, especially on Inter. The situation at the front was most often discussed with spokespersons of various military units (9 times), frontline military personnel were invited 6 times, and experts 2 times. Four reports were made from the front on these days (two on ICTV and STB, and one each on 1+1 and We Are Ukraine).

On Pershyi Channel of Suspilne, the front received relatively little attention overall on the days under review, and the news broadcasts did not mention the front at all. The most attention was devoted to the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk directions, which were not the most active on these days (there was a report from each, as well as two discussions with guests). Two discussions each were devoted to the most active Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka directions. The Kupiansk and Lyman directions were mentioned only in brief frontline updates. In guest studios, the front was most often discussed with frontline military personnel (8 times), and an expert was invited once. One report from the front was produced.

CONSEQUENCES OF ENEMY SHELLING AND BOMBING OF CIVILIAN FACILITIES:

On August 5, as a result of the enemy’s massive attack on Kyiv and the region, air defense failed to shoot down any of the enemy’s 24 ballistic missiles. As a result, 17 people were killed and another 44 were injured. A distinctive feature of this attack was the mass destruction of large logistics centers containing goods belonging to numerous retail chains, both food and non-food. In terms of the scope of reporting, the aftermath of the attack was covered approximately equally on the telethon and Pershyi Channel of Suspilne.

At the same time, the Suspilne broadcaster’s newsroom acted noticeably more promptly than the newsrooms of the telethon participants — live reports began with the first news broadcast at 7 a.m., while the first live reports on the telethon were only at 9 a.m. In discussion-based studios, Pershyi Channel of Suspilne covered the events much more thoroughly, both in terms of involving newsmakers and spokespersons and in expert discussion of the possible (and varied) consequences of the enemy’s systematic destruction of civilian logistics in Ukraine. On the telethon, the We Are Ukraine newsroom provided the most thorough expert analysis. Meanwhile, the numerous enemy attacks on civilians with significant casualties and injuries on June 6 (in Sumy, Balakliia, Lozova, Pavlohrad, and Kherson and its suburbs) were covered by Pershyi Channel of Suspilne in reports much more extensively, through live reports and reports by its own correspondents from the sites of enemy strikes, than by the newsrooms participating in the telethon, which in most cases limited themselves to brief oral reports, supplemented at best with photos and videos from other sources.

UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD POLITICS:

On the days under review, the most important foreign policy topic for Ukraine was statements, including those by U.S. President Trump, as well as publications by international media concerning the possibility of supplying Ukraine with anti-ballistic missiles and granting Ukraine a license to produce them. Expert discussion of this topic on the telethon was most thorough on We Are Ukraine. On Pershyi Channel of Suspilne, the topic also received sufficient attention in expert discussions.

DOMESTIC POLITICS:

The only important domestic political topic during the two days under review that was covered both on the telethon and on Pershyi Channel of Suspilne was the court hearing on choosing a preventive measure for former Deputy Prime Minister and former Ambassador to the United States Olha Stefanishyna. On the telethon, the topic was covered only in reports (with no expert or discussion-based coverage) and was mostly very brief, in the format of a package with soundbites exclusively from Stefanishyna; SAPO prosecutors were not given the floor. A live report from the court was carried out only on August 6 and only on 1+1. By contrast, Pershyi Channel of Suspilne provided reports from the court on both days (including broadcasts and live reports by correspondents) and organized a detailed expert discussion of the topic.

Some important domestic political topics were covered only by Pershyi Channel of Suspilne, while the telethon ignored them. In particular, viewers of the telethon did not learn during these days that protests against Fedorov’s dismissal were continuing. Nor did they learn about the results of two sociological studies — by KIIS and SOCIS — concerning people’s trust in politicians and the electoral ratings of these politicians. All of this was available only to viewers of Pershyi Channel of Suspilne. And one more telling detail, in my view: during the days under review, the telethon aired a whole wave of classic “parquet” PR materials about various meetings held by President Zelenskyy with newly appointed officials (Prime Minister Koretskyi, NSDC Secretary Klymenko, Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service Umierov, and even Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Kim). As usual, none of this contained any real news (“emphasized the importance,” “gave relevant instructions” — these are not news), but it presumably created for viewers the illusion of the president and his newly appointed officials being “actively at work” against the backdrop of the political crisis and the severe consequences of enemy air attacks.

Topics and events that were not mentioned on the telethon but were mentioned on Pershyi Channel of Suspilne

Not reported either on the telethon or on Pershyi Channel of Suspilne:

Telethon:

On 1+1, the largest number of gross violations of the accuracy standard involved presenting facts without any references to sources. Most gross violations of the standard of precision involved discrepancies between the visuals and the text in news packages. All gross violations of the standard of separating facts from opinions consisted of emotional assessments by journalists in news reports. All gross violations of the standard of accessibility of information presentation involved the use of words that were incomprehensible to some members of the audience. In the morning news broadcasts, most reports were untimely news from the previous day.

On ICTV and STB, the largest number (and, overall, an extremely high number) of gross violations of the accuracy standard consisted of purely abstract pseudo-references. There were also many generalized, vague pseudo-references to the authorship of subjective opinions. Many facts were also presented without any references to sources. Most gross violations of the standard of precision involved discrepancies between the visuals and the text in news packages. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of separating facts from opinions (and, overall, an extremely high number) consisted of purely emotional assessments by journalists in news reports. All gross violations of the standard of accessibility of information presentation involved the use of words and abbreviations that were incomprehensible to some members of the audience.

On Inter, the largest number of gross violations of the accuracy standard consisted of purely abstract pseudo-references. Many facts were presented without references to sources. All gross violations of the standard of precision involved discrepancies between the visuals and the text in news packages. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of separating facts from opinions consisted of emotional assessments by journalists in news reports and news elements in guest studios. There were also many subjective judgments by journalists. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of accessibility of information presentation involved the use of words and abbreviations that were incomprehensible to some members of the audience.

On We Are Ukraine, the largest number of gross violations of the accuracy standard consisted of purely abstract pseudo-references. There were also many instances of facts being reported without references to sources. All gross violations of the standard of precision involved discrepancies between the visuals and the text in news packages. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of separating facts from opinions consisted of purely emotional assessments by journalists in news reports. There were also many unnecessary markers of attribution and attention emphasis in news reports. Journalists also made many assumptions. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of completeness of information involved insufficient presentation of experts’ qualifications. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of accessibility of information presentation involved the use of words that were incomprehensible to some members of the audience.

Pershyi Channel of Suspilne

The largest number of gross violations of the accuracy standard consisted of purely abstract pseudo-references. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of separating facts from opinions involved unnecessary attribution markers in news reports. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of completeness of information involved insufficient presentation of experts’ qualifications. The largest number of gross violations of the standard of accessibility of information presentation involved the use of words that were incomprehensible to some members of the audience.

Members of parliament on the telethon:

Members of parliament were invited to the telethon 12 times during the two weeks under review (there were 13 invitations for MPs during the previous two weeks). During the two weeks under review, exclusively representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction appeared on air (100% of all “parliamentary” studios). MPs from all three opposition factions — Batkivshchyna, Holos, and European Solidarity — were not invited to the telethon. During the period under review, Servant of the People MP Oleksii Leonov appeared five times on three different channels. All other MPs appeared on the telethon once each.

The Office of the President was represented on the telethon four times during these two weeks by OP adviser Serhii Leshchenko (twice on Inter and twice on We Are Ukraine, with a total of 48 minutes of airtime). Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk appeared three times (twice on 1+1 and once on We Are Ukraine, with a total of 1 hour and 20 minutes of airtime). OP adviser Mykhailo Podoliak had 16 minutes of airtime on We Are Ukraine. On 1+1, Deputy Head of the OP Ihor Zhovkva had another 8 minutes, while presidential adviser Serhii Bezkrеstnov had 12 minutes on We Are Ukraine. Overall, during the two weeks, the Office of the President had 2 hours and 44 minutes of airtime on the telethon (again, more than members of parliament).

Members of parliament on Pershyi Channel of Suspilne:

On the Suspilne broadcaster, members of parliament appeared 34 times during the two weeks under review (there had been 68 MP guests during the previous two weeks). This time, representation of the ruling Servant of the People faction was disproportionately high — 22 guests (although these were mostly “expert” studios, where Servant of the People MPs appeared as representatives of relevant parliamentary committees). Representatives of the three opposition factions appeared on air a total of 15 times (7 times these were representatives of European Solidarity, and 4 times each representatives of Holos and Batkivshchyna). On one more occasion, European Solidarity MP Oleh Syniutka did not join a discussion studio with Servant of the People MP Bohdan Kytsak. Overall, the balance between the government and opposition was maintained in most parliamentary discussion studios, with one exception: on July 27, the protests over Fedorov’s dismissal were discussed only with ruling-faction MP Bohdan Kytsak for some reason, while no opposition representative was invited, and the hosts said nothing about the balance.

During the two weeks, Servant of the People MP Serhii Nahorniak appeared on the channel three times; his fellow faction members Bohdan Kytsak, Oleksandr Fediienko, Serhii Kozyr and Yurii Kamelchuk appeared twice each, as did Oleksii Kucherenko of Batkivshchyna, Yuliia Sirko of Holos, and Nina Yuzhanina and Oleh Syniutka of European Solidarity. All other MPs appeared on the channel once each.

During the two days analyzed, there were 32 instances of political promotion on the telethon: 14 of them on ICTV and STB, 14 on We Are Ukraine, and another 5 on Inter. There were no instances of political promotion on 1+1. The biggest beneficiaries of positive promotion were Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi (19 positive mentions on three channels), President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (11 mentions on two channels), and NSDC Secretary Ihor Klymenko (5 mentions on two channels). There was no negative promotion on the days under review.

On Pershyi Channel of Suspilne, there was one instance of political promotion — a “parquet” report about a meeting held by President Zelenskyy that contained no actual news.

There were no Russian propaganda narratives or toxic media personalities on the telethon or Pershyi Channel of Suspilne during the days under review.