What the United News Marathon and Suspilne’s First Channel broadcast looked like on April 15–16, 2026 — summary

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Coverage of the week’s main topics; representation of parliamentary factions and groups in guest studios; instances of political PR, as well as Russian narratives and toxic media figures in the telethon; and violations of the core standards of information journalism—in brief.

The United News telethon was launched on February 24, 2022. Detector Media began monitoring it on March 21 of the same year using this methodology. In January this year, Detector Media refined and expanded this methodology in response to comments and suggestions from the editorial teams participating in the telethon. The author of the monitoring is Ihor Kulyas, a media trainer and the creator of Detector Media’s core monitoring methodology. 

From March 2022 to September 2024, the monitoring focused on recording and analyzing broadcast schedules of different channels, the main content produced by editorial teams (reports, live feeds, studio discussions), violations of journalism standards, instances of political PR, representation of parliamentary factions and groups, Russian narratives and toxic media figures, and topics ignored by the telethon.

On May 21, 2024, Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel left the telethon and began independent 24/7 broadcasting. This change is not fundamental for monitoring purposes. The work of Suspilne’s news editorial team continues to be evaluated as before, using the same methodology as before the telethon. 

Since October 2024, the monitoring format has changed. It now focuses on analyzing coverage of major socially significant topics in the telethon and — for comparison — on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel. It tracks how key daily and weekly topics are covered, representation of MPs from different factions, instances of political PR, and the presence of toxic media figures and Russian narratives.

Summaries of monitoring reports are available here, and the full versions of reports are available here.

On April 15–16, the most intense fighting again took place in the Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Huliaipole directions of the front. In the Sumy region, the enemy attempted to create a “buffer zone.” In the national telethon, the channels collectively devoted the most attention to the Pokrovsk direction, while the other two high-intensity areas received little coverage. In the broadcasts of Suspilne’s Pershyi channel during the reporting days, overall too little attention was paid to the front. The North Slobozhanskyi direction was discussed the most, while the situation in the most active frontline areas received limited coverage.

A massive enemy attack on Ukraine on April 16 resulted in a large number of civilian casualties and injuries in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Odesa. Events in Kyiv and Dnipro were covered more promptly and in greater detail by Suspilne’s Pershyi channel, while events in Odesa were covered more promptly by the national telethon.

In foreign policy coverage, the main topics were the war between the United States and Israel against Iran, the U.S. reinstating sanctions on Russian oil, another meeting of the Ramstein Contact Group, and President Zelenskyy’s major tour of European partner countries. Suspilne’s Pershyi channel devoted more attention to expert analysis of these topics than the telethon. Meanwhile, the telethon provided strong on-the-ground reporting of Zelenskyy’s trip.

There were no major domestic political events during the reporting period.

During these days, the telethon featured the highest number of serious violations of the standards of accuracy and the separation of facts from opinions. There were also violations of the timeliness standard. Similarly, in the broadcasts of Suspilne’s Pershyi channel, the most frequent violations concerned accuracy and the separation of facts from opinions.

During the week of April 13–19, the telethon’s “MP guest studios” mostly featured representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction. However, this time, for the first time (excluding the period when the public broadcaster Suspilne was still a participant in the telethon), a representative of the opposition European Solidarity faction appeared on air. In the broadcasts of Suspilne’s Pershyi channel that week, representation of ruling and opposition factions in discussion studios was fully balanced.

Over the two analyzed days, there was only one instance of political PR in the telethon—on the Inter channel. There were no instances of political PR in the broadcasts of Suspilne’s Pershyi channel during these days.

SITUATION ACROSS DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE FRONT:

During the reporting days, the highest number of clashes again occurred in the Pokrovsk direction of the front (36 and 32 combat engagements per day, respectively). The intensity of fighting also remained high in the Kostiantynivka direction (14 and 25 engagements), while it decreased noticeably in the Huliaipole direction (12 and 10 engagements per day). In all other areas of the front, the number of clashes did not exceed 8 per day. Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi stated that Russian forces had intensified their offensive along the entire front, while Ukraine’s Armed Forces were engaged in active defense (although the overall number of clashes was far from the highest since the beginning of the year). On April 15, there was discussion of the enemy’s attempts to create a “buffer zone” in the Sumy region; on April 16, DeepState recorded some Russian advances near the state border in the same area.

In the national telethon, the channels collectively devoted the most attention to the most active Pokrovsk direction (with the situation discussed with 7 guests). The other two high-intensity directions received little attention: there was only one discussion of the Kostiantynivka direction, while the Huliaipole direction was mentioned only in brief summaries. At the same time, the situation in the clearly less active South Slobozhanskyi direction was discussed with 5 guests; the also less active Oleksandrivka direction was covered in a report and discussed with 3 guests. During these days, the situation at the front was most often discussed with spokespersons of various Defense Forces units (9 times), and 8 times with active-duty soldiers; experts were invited 4 times. Over these two days, there were only two frontline reports—a package and a live broadcast—on the ICTV and STB channels.

In the broadcasts of Suspilne’s Pershyi channel during the reporting days, the front was most frequently discussed with guests in relation to the North Slobozhanskyi direction (4 times), due to the enemy’s attempts to establish a “buffer zone” there. The most active directions received limited attention: only 2 guests discussed the Pokrovsk direction, only 1 discussed Huliaipole, and the Kostiantynivka direction was mentioned only in brief summaries. Most often, the front was discussed with active-duty soldiers (8 times); only one spokesperson of a Defense Forces unit and 3 experts were invited. Overall, the channel devoted little attention to the front during these days—only 12 guests in total (an average of 6 per day), and no frontline reports were produced at all. This trend of decreasing attention to the front has now continued for four consecutive weeks.

CONSEQUENCES OF ENEMY SHELLING AND BOMBING OF CIVILIAN OBJECTS:

The most devastating enemy air attacks against civilians occurred on April 16. As a result of a massive combined missile and drone strike, 4 people were killed and 60 injured in Kyiv; in Dnipro, 5 people were killed and 27 injured; and in Odesa, 9 people were killed, with another 27 injured. Events in Kyiv and Dnipro were covered significantly more promptly and in greater detail by Suspilne’s Pershyi channel than by the national telethon—both through live reports from its own correspondents at the strike sites and hospitals and by involving spokespersons and responsible officials in studio discussions. Events in Odesa, however, were covered more promptly by the telethon, while Suspilne’s Pershyi channel, for some reason, did not provide live coverage from the city. At the same time, the specifics of that day’s attack on Ukraine were analyzed in detail with experts on Suspilne’s Pershyi channel.

UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBAL POLITICS:

During the two reporting days, foreign policy coverage remained primarily focused on the war between the United States and Israel against Iran. Against the backdrop of the oil crisis caused by the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz, news about the U.S. reinstating sanctions on Russian oil was particularly important for Ukraine. On April 15, another meeting of the Ramstein Contact Group took place, where Ukraine was represented for the first time by Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. During these same days, President Zelenskyy was on a major tour of European partner countries, with visits to Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands on April 15–16.

Overall, Suspilne’s Pershyi channel devoted significantly more attention to key foreign policy topics than the telethon participants. All major issues were discussed with a broad range of competent experts. In the telethon, some topics were covered rather formally; only the war with Iran received somewhat more in-depth expert discussion. Other topics were addressed in single conversations with their “usual” experts. The Ramstein meeting was not analyzed at all, with coverage limited to brief news segments and isolated soundbites. However, the telethon devoted more attention in terms of on-the-ground reporting to the president’s trip: the 1+1 channel sent its own correspondent, who produced reports both for her channel and for other telethon participants. Suspilne’s Pershyi channel did not organize live reports this time, limiting itself to live broadcasts of key events.

Telethon:

On the 1+1 channel, the most frequent serious violations of the accuracy (credibility) standard involved unverified information from the internet. Many facts were also presented without citing sources. Most serious violations of the accuracy (precision) standard consisted of mismatches between visuals and narration in news packages. The majority of serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions were emotional judgments by journalists in news reporting. The most common violations of accessibility were the use of terms unclear to part of the audience.

On ICTV and STB, many serious violations of the credibility standard involved generalized, vague pseudo-references to sources, abstract attributions, and presenting facts without citing sources. All serious violations of the precision standard were mismatches between visuals and narration in news packages and live segments. The most frequent—and overall extremely numerous—violations of the separation of facts from opinions were purely emotional judgments by journalists.

On the Inter channel, the most common serious violations of the credibility standard were generalized, vague pseudo-references to the authorship of subjective opinions. All serious violations of the precision standard were mismatches between visuals and narration in news packages and review segments. The most frequent—and overall extremely numerous—violations of the separation of facts from opinions were emotional judgments by journalists in news and in the news segments of guest studios. There were also many unattributed statements by guest studio hosts. All serious violations of the completeness standard involved insufficient presentation of experts’ credentials. All serious violations of accessibility were due to the use of terms unclear to part of the audience. There were also serious violations of the timeliness standard.

On the We Are Ukraine channel, the most frequent serious violations of the credibility standard were abstract pseudo-references. Numerous facts were presented without citing sources. Most serious violations of the precision standard were mismatches between visuals and narration in news packages. The most common violations of the separation of facts from opinions were emotional judgments by journalists in news reporting. The main violation of the completeness standard was the absence of natural sound in many news packages.

Suspilne’s Pershyi channel:

The most frequent serious violations of the credibility standard were purely abstract pseudo-references. The most common violations of the separation of facts from opinions were unnecessary attribution markers and attention-enhancing phrasing in news reporting. All serious violations of the completeness standard involved insufficient presentation of experts’ credentials.

MPs in the Telethon:

During the reporting week, Members of Parliament were invited to the telethon 9 times (compared to just 7 invitations the previous week). A total of 7 representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction appeared on air (accounting for nearly 78% of all “MP studio” segments). There was also one representative of the Holos faction (Roman Kostenko was invited to ICTV/STB as the secretary of the Verkhovna Rada’s security committee).

However, this week marked an unprecedented event: for the first time in the history of the telethon (excluding the periods when Suspilne’s Pershyi channel was still part of it), a representative of the European Solidarity faction was interviewed on air. Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, head of the Verkhovna Rada’s European Integration Committee, appeared on the 1+1 channel. However, this segment was produced by the Rada TV channel under the title “Exclusive” (one of those rare cases when an “exclusive” really was, in its own way, exclusive).

The only opposition faction not represented in the telethon during the reporting week was Batkivshchyna. As usual, the Inter and We Are Ukraine channels featured only MPs from the ruling faction.

The Office of the President was represented in the telethon in a notably limited way this week. Only once did an OP adviser, Serhii Leshchenko, appear on air (for 8 minutes on the We Are Ukraine channel).

MPs on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel:

During the week, MPs were invited to the public broadcaster’s эфир relatively infrequently—only 19 times (compared to 33 the previous week). Representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction were invited 9 times, while representatives of the parliamentary opposition were invited a total of 10 times (Batkivshchyna representatives appeared 4 times, while Holos and European Solidarity representatives appeared 3 times each). In discussion-based guest studios, the balance between representatives of the government and the opposition was fully maintained.

However, in “expert” studio segments, MPs’ factional affiliation was unnecessarily mentioned three times: Yevheniia Kravchuk’s affiliation with Servant of the People (she appeared as a PACE observer at the Hungarian elections; her faction was not indicated in the on-screen caption or initial introduction, but the host unnecessarily mentioned it in the transition from the interview); Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze’s affiliation with European Solidarity (she was invited as the head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on EU Integration); and Nina Yuzhanina’s affiliation with European Solidarity (she was invited as a member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Finance, Tax, and Customs Policy).

Over the two analyzed days, there was only one instance of political PR in the telethon. On April 16, the Inter channel aired a PR-style segment about the activities of the President of Ukraine’s Foundation for the Support of Education, Science, and Sports (which, it turns out, does exist). In addition to the usual positively charged language, the segment featured as many as three soundbites from Olha Budnyk, advisor and commissioner to the President on issues related to this foundation.

No instances of political PR were recorded in the broadcasts of Suspilne’s Pershyi channel during the reporting days.

No Russian propaganda narratives or toxic media figures were identified in the broadcasts of either the telethon or Suspilne’s Pershyi channel during the reporting period.