The Inevitability of the “Chinese Positing” for the “Ukrainian Crisis”: An Analysis of Publications on Ukraine in Media from the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan

Українською читайте тут.

Detector Media analyzed what the media from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, and Taiwan are writing about Ukraine and Russian aggression.

Declaratively, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintains neutrality regarding the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” urging all parties to adhere to international law and advocating for a “just peace.” In 2023, China took on the role of mediator for peace in Ukraine. In February 2023, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs published 12 points on “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis.” By late May 2024, Brazil joined the initiative. The number of points was reduced to six. At the UN General Assembly in late September 2024, the PRC and Brazil announced the creation of the Friends for Peace platform based on these six points. Ukraine is not a member of this platform. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the Friends for Peace initiative for violating the principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”

Simultaneously, alongside these “peace initiatives,” the PRC exports goods to Russia that can be used in Russian weapon systems. China has not joined the sanctions imposed by other countries against Russia following its military aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, China continues to purchase Russian oil, one of Russia’s key exports.

The study aimed to analyze Chinese-language publications to determine how the PRC authorities explain their peace efforts and concurrent support for Russia, the aggressor state, to Chinese-speaking audiences.

The focus of the study: what is written about Ukraine in Chinese-language internet media from mainland China (PRC), as well as from Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Research hypotheses:

The research utilized data provided by the Currents API service. The developer plan of Currents API allows access to media publications in 15 languages over a three-month period. Search queries for this study included the terms “烏克蘭” and “乌克兰,” the traditional and simplified Chinese characters for “Ukraine”. The traditional script is used in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, while the simplified script is used in mainland China and Singapore.

Publications covering the six-month period from June 1 to November 30, 2024, were collected. The analysis focused on publications from websites operating in the PRC, as well as those based in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since Currents API only marked publications by language and did not categorize them by country, territory, or region, manual categorization was performed using top-level web domains. For sites with domain names ending in generic extensions like .com or .org, audience verification was carried out using open sources and site descriptions regarding jurisdiction. When preparing the final list of publications, we excluded Chinese-language sites from other countries: USA, France, Germany, etc. Messages from the websites of Chinese oppositionists or communities abroad were also excluded. Websites associated with communities banned in China, such as the Falun Gong religious movement, which are run by Chinese-language media abroad, were also excluded. The final list of sites is 82. The number of analyzed publications is 4,082.

The number and selection of analyzed media are the limitations of the study. However, the publications available for analysis are included in the lists of the most popular media in the examined nations, jurisdictions, or territories. This enables an evaluation of how the Chinese government shapes Ukraine’s image for domestic media consumers. The study of media operating in Taiwan and Hong Kong allows for a comparison of news presentations in mainland China with those in two other jurisdictions that also use the Chinese script. Each of these jurisdictions has a different relationship with the Chinese government. 

Taiwan is de facto sovereign from the PRC, with its own legislative, executive, and judicial branches, over which the PRC formally has no influence. In contrast, Hong Kong ceased to be a British colony in 1997 and returned to the PRC as a Special Administrative Region. It has its own currency, and its economic system is market-based. The legal and judicial systems of the region originate from the Anglo-Saxon law tradition. Cantonese and English are the official languages in Hong Kong. However, the PRC exerts influence over the governance of Hong Kong, notably through the appointment of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by the Premier of the PRC

Visualization of the structure of messages and analyzed sources. Detector Media based on Currents API data on publications in online media from June 1 to November 30, 2024

After extracting the publications, we applied machine translation to both the texts and their headlines into English. For this, we used the qwen2.5 large language model (LLM) with three billion parameters. This is the smallest version of the model that managed to perform translations at a level comparable to publicly available machine translation tools like Google Translate and DeepL Translate. The qwen2.5 model was created by Chinese developers at Alibaba Cloud. We utilized the unquantized version of the model to ensure the highest possible accuracy. Parameters affecting the diversity of the model’s responses were left unchanged.

The decision to use a Chinese large language model for translation was driven by the need to mitigate another limitation of the study — lack of proficiency in the Chinese language and constraints in interpreting machine-translated publications. Chinese tools may be better equipped to convey the content of publications, taking into account the particularities of state control over media that exist in the Chinese media market. Additionally, Chinese language models are more likely to have been trained on local Chinese-language data. This approach helps address the fact that the majority of analyzed publications are news articles or reports aimed at a general audience. Consequently, the language is predominantly used in its literal sense, with expert opinions presented as they are and minimal use of figurative expressions.

The qwen2.5 model was also employed for preliminary processing of publication sentiment regarding Ukraine, publication topics, source mentions, and other aspects essential to the study. The results generated by qwen2.5 were validated by analysts from the Detector Media Research Center.

One of the main headlines in June was the G7 summit in Italy. At the summit, G7 countries agreed to provide Ukraine with a $50 billion loan, to be repaid using proceeds from frozen Russian assets. Hong Kong media covered the event, quoting European politicians. Their news reports used language that implicitly recognized Russia as the aggressor in the conflict, such as the term “Russian invasion.”

In contrast, media from mainland China displayed greater pro-Russian bias. While their articles were written in a neutral news style, headlines frequently included anti-American messaging, and the texts often gave significantly more space to statements by Russian officials than to those of Ukrainian or European counterparts.

For instance, on June 13, one of China’s largest state-controlled media outlets, China News, published an article titled “The United States Pushes Europe into the Fire.” The analytical piece discussed the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine. It claimed that the U.S. was pressuring Europe to agree to the transfer of these funds. Indeed, some European states were skeptical of such actions on behalf of the United States, fearing that setting a precedent for asset confiscation could undermine investor trust and harm the stability of the euro. However, the Chinese publication argued that Washington was forcing the EU to take all the associated risks upon itself.

Later in the same article, the focus shifted from aiding Ukraine to openly discrediting the United States. The authors claimed that the U.S. was allegedly scaring Europe with the “Russian threat” to promote the idea of a “military Schengen zone” — a system for the free movement of allied troops and military equipment across Europe. According to the publication, such actions “harm the sovereignty and security of individual states and drag neutral countries into the conflict.”

Trends in publications in Chinese-language online media mentioning Ukraine from June 1 to November 30, 2024. Detector Media based on Currents API data

Taiwanese media demonstrated a stronger inclination to identify Russia as the aggressor in their news content. For example, United Daily News published an article with the neutral headline, “The Russia-Ukraine War Causes Significant Carbon Dioxide Pollution,” while the Taiwanese information platform NewTalk News used a headline directly blaming Russia: “Russian Attack on Ukraine Causes Pollution.”

Another major theme in June was the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. Ahead of the event, mainland China’s China News published an article on Putin’s proposal for peace talks, which included the condition of a full withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. The article heavily emphasized the Kremlin’s position, quoting Putin, Peskov, and Zakharova extensively, while Ukraine’s stance was mentioned only briefly. As a result, readers could get the impression that Ukraine was unwilling to seek peace, while Russia appeared to be pursuing a compromise to end the war.

In contrast, Taiwanese media were critical of Putin’s ultimatum, framing Russia’s “peace proposal” as an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine’s efforts to end the war. Another perspective on Putin’s actions was shared by United Daily News, which argued that such moves by the Kremlin aimed to divide the international community, as “some parties might be tempted by the idea of an immediate ceasefire.”

In July, the most prominent topic in both Taiwanese and Hong Kong media was a Russian large-scale missile attack that hit Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital, Ohmatdyt. The Taiwanese information platform described the attack on the children’s hospital as a “complete disregard for human dignity,” citing a spokesperson from Taiwan’s Presidential Office. Meanwhile, Chinese state media covered the tragedy by including statements from Russia’s Ministry of Defense, which denied attacking civilian targets in Ukraine. As a result, Chinese media refrained from providing a clear assessment of the events, instead creating an atmosphere of uncertainty, which indirectly supported Russian narratives.

The NATO Summit held on July 10 became the most prominent topic in Chinese media. The summit addressed security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, the war in Ukraine, and the growing ties between Russia and China. The declaration published after the summit described China’s activities as “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security,” citing “malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation.” In response, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party published an article describing the NATO declaration as “filled with Cold War mentality and warlike statements.” On July 10, China News released an even more critical piece, labeling NATO as a “tool for controlling other countries” and accusing it of attempts to “marginalize Russia through control over European states.”

Hong Kong media covered the NATO summit less extensively, with most publications focusing on a slip of the tongue by U.S. President Joe Biden, who mistakenly referred to Putin as the president of Ukraine during a speech. Taiwanese media, on the other hand, emphasized reports about increasing aid to Ukraine and the inevitability of Ukraine’s NATO membership.

In August, Ukraine’s offensive operation in Russia’s Kursk region dominated news headlines. Taiwanese media used positive evaluations, such as “Ukraine has achieved good results.” The Taiwanese outlet ETtoday published an article about the offensive, beginning with a recap of the war’s context: “In early 2022, Putin invaded Ukraine and bombed hospitals and homes, and women and children were subjected to violence and torture.” This framing clearly identified Russia as the aggressor state.

Chinese outlets, however, adopted a more restrained approach, reporting on the Kursk offensive in a “neutral” news format. In response to Ukraine’s actions, Chinese media cited the “three principles” proposed by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “no expansion of hostilities, no escalation, and a ban on ‘fueling the fire’ (use of chemical weapons or attacks on nuclear facilities).” Such details reflect China’s “neutral” stance, which omits Russia’s role as the aggressor. Without additional context, readers could misinterpret these principles and view Ukraine as the instigator.

The pro-Russian bias of Chinese state media was also evident in the frequent quoting of Russian officials and reports about civilian casualties in Kursk. There was a proliferation of pro-Russian narratives, such as “Ukraine’s disruption of ceasefire talks as a result of the Kursk operation,” and quotations from Russian sources (e.g., RIA Novosti) made without fact-checking.

In early September, Taiwanese and Hong Kong media reported on reshuffles in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, including the resignation of Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. Hong Kong media contextualized these developments with updates on the current state of the war, emphasizing that it was the Russian army that invaded Ukraine. In addition to citing international outlets like BBC and Reuters, Hong Kong media also referenced Ukrainian sources such as Ukrainska Pravda.

In September, Taiwanese and Hong Kong media (e.g., cmmedia.com.tw, ETtoday, mingpao.com) published a series of reports on Russian missile strikes targeting Poltava and Lviv. On September 3, the day of the Poltava attack, Chinese sources (CCTV News, Chinanews) in the dataset primarily focused on political reshuffles in the Ukrainian government, including the appointment of Andrii Sybiha as Ukraine’s new Foreign Minister on September 5. The Chinese state-controlled Xinhua News Agency, in its coverage of the missile attack on the Poltava Communications Institute, employed terms like “the Russia-Ukraine crisis” and neutral-passive phrasing such as “a military academy was attacked” and “the attack caused significant casualties.” The same agency also reported on the unsuccessful tests of Russia’s Sarmat missile and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s participation in the UN Security Council’s special meeting on Ukraine on September 24.

Hong Kong media (e.g., mingpao.com) covered the upcoming Beijing Xiangshan Forum on security issues and discussions on the Russia-Ukraine war and security in the Asia-Pacific region raised at the forum on September 12. Meanwhile, on September 5, Chinese media outlet Chinanews reported on the potential U.S. transfer of and approval for Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles, citing Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

In September, Taiwanese media also covered the meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu about strengthening military cooperation amidst the “moderate success” of Russian counterattacks in the Kursk region. They shared statements from Republican vice-presidential candidate J.D. Vance, who claimed that “China will eventually take military action against Taiwan.” Additionally, the media reported on a prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine in mid-September, mediated by the United Arab Emirates.

Regarding Zelenskyy’s late September visit to the U.S. and his speech at the UN General Assembly, Taiwanese media described the trip as fruitful, noting that Ukraine would soon receive new air-to-ground missiles for F-16 aircraft. Mainland Chinese media (Chinanews) and Hong Kong outlets (etnet.com.hk) only covered official actions of state representatives, such as the aforementioned speech by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the UN General Assembly, where he called for de-escalation in Ukraine, a negotiated peace, and a ceasefire. 

However, calls for a “halt to the supply of weapons to the battlefield” could be interpreted as advocating for the cessation of Western arms supplies to Ukraine. Wang Yi also criticized the “unilateral application of sanctions” [against Russia], claiming they were unjustified even amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine “crisis.”

Illustrative infographic of the most common messages about Ukraine in mainland China’s media

In October, Taiwanese media (e.g., newtalk.tw, ETtoday) reported on Russia’s deployment of North Korean soldiers to combat zones, quoting statements by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte. They also covered news about approvals by the Netherlands and Denmark for deep strikes on Russia using F-16 aircraft from these countries. Taiwanese media predominantly conveyed favorable perspectives toward Ukraine in their coverage.

Hong Kong media focused on Zelenskyy’s presentation of his victory plan to EU leaders, while mainland Chinese media concentrated on U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to Germany and discussions about the “Ukraine crisis” with Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Toward the end of the month, Hong Kong media highlighted Chinese President Xi Jinping’s participation in the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, and his efforts to “resolve the Ukraine crisis as soon as possible.” Taiwanese media, meanwhile, published confirmations from the U.S. and NATO of intelligence reports from Ukraine and South Korea regarding the training and deployment of North Korean soldiers to combat zones.

In early November, reports in Taiwanese media focused on the death of a Taiwanese volunteer on the battlefield in Ukraine. Wu Zhongda (子吳忠達) was identified by local media as the second Chinese volunteer to have died fighting on Ukraine’s side. Taiwanese outlets also shared statements by South Korean and EU officials condemning the deployment of North Korean soldiers to the war against Ukraine. On November 11, publications peaked concerning two key news stories: the first phone conversation between Putin and Trump since Trump’s election as U.S. president and reports about a 50,000-strong joint force of Russian and North Korean soldiers preparing to counterattack Ukrainian positions in the Kursk region.

Alongside Western media, Taiwanese outlets speculated about Trump’s policy on supporting Ukraine and whether financial and military aid would indeed be cut. They also expressed concern over Taiwan’s future under Trump’s second term, questioning how stable and predictable the new administration’s policy toward Taiwan would be.

Tax increases, the need to ramp up weapons purchases from the U.S., and labor shortages were identified as challenges for Taiwan in a column by Lu Deyun, former secretary to the country’s Minister of National Defense, published in ETtoday.

In mid-November, Taiwanese media reported on intense fighting in the Donetsk region as well as on the Kupiansk and Zaporizhzhia frontlines. They also highlighted Ukraine’s demands for guarantees from the new U.S. administration, stating that Ukraine would not accept territorial losses without a clear peace plan.

In late November, the volume of publications about Ukraine in Chinese-language media reached its peak for the entire study period (June–November 2024). This surge was driven by several key events: a phone call between German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Vladimir Putin, statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy regarding expectations from Donald Trump, reports about potential candidates for the U.S. State Department’s Special Representative on Ukraine, and a medium-range ballistic missile strike on Dnipro.

An additional spike in publications was linked to intensified Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and the Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles to strike military targets within Russian territory.

On the same day (November 19), mainland Chinese media widely covered statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, emphasizing the need to focus efforts on a peaceful resolution of the “crisis” [as Chinese media refer to Russia’s war against Ukraine].

On the 1,000th day of the full-scale invasion, mainland Chinese media outlet Chinanews provided an extensive overview of the situation in Ukraine, stating that “the crisis is deeply bogged down, and the situation in Ukraine is inseparable from US military assistance.” Regarding the lifting of restrictions on long-range missile strikes on Russian territory, the outlet quoted Russian propaganda source RIA Novosti and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

In summary, the approaches to covering news about Ukraine differ significantly across Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and mainland Chinese media. Official state-controlled sources in mainland China primarily cite statements from Russian military and political leadership. Such publications also include rhetoric emphasizing confrontation between China and the West, particularly the U.S.

In contrast, Taiwanese media offered more definitive assessments and language that clearly labeled Russia as the aggressor state, avoiding the ambiguity and abstract peacekeeping expressions typical of statements by PRC officials.

Mentions of China, Chinese media, or officials appear in 40.2% of the analyzed news publications about Ukraine. The largest share of these mentions is in publications from the PRC, where China is referenced in 86.4% of cases — 476 out of 551 publications. Among these, Chinese media served as the source for 438 publications.

In the analyzed dataset, media outlets from the PRC, particularly those funded by the Chinese government, were most often cited as sources. PRC media acted as the original source in 919 instances, accounting for 22.5% of all publications. Among them, the state-run news agency China News Service was the source in 203 cases, Xinhua News Agency in 164 cases, and the Chinese international broadcaster CCTV in six.

It is evident that correspondents from China News Service or Xinhua were not always present at the events they reported on. Instead, these agencies often relied on other media as sources. However, analyzed outlets — particularly in the PRC — preferred to cite domestic state media and only rarely primary sources. When PRC media referenced foreign news sources, they used generalized terms like “foreign media,” “American media,” or “Ukrainian media.” Unlike media in Taiwan, specific names of foreign outlets were rarely mentioned in PRC publications. Reuters was mentioned three times, and CNN, Bloomberg, and Agence France-Presse were each mentioned twice.

Like media from the Global South and the West, PRC news outlets amplify Russia’s position on the necessity of a peace agreement that considers the “situation on the ground.” This implies leaving Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories under Russian control. PRC media refer to Russian aggression against Ukraine as the “Ukrainian crisis,” a term used 101 times in the analyzed publications.

In the PRC information space, reports about China’s plans for peace in Ukraine began circulating in May and early June 2024, emphasizing the “six points” that, according to Chinese and Brazilian diplomats, could help “cool the situation.”

“Preventing the proliferation of fire, escalation of hostilities, and a ceasefire by all parties. Also, to call on all parties to commit to dialogue and negotiations. Intensify humanitarian assistance. Oppose the use of nuclear weapons and attacks on nuclear power plants, support the stability of the global industrial supply chain, etc.,” stated a June 6 news report by China’s state media, China News.

The analyzed media suggest that the PRC does not accept approaches to peace in Ukraine other than those the country has itself proposed. This vision of the conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine is set forth in the “six points” advocated by China and Brazil, which largely consist of broad generalizations. To establish a peace agreement addressing Russian aggression against Ukraine, these points would need to be supplemented with specifics. The “six points” include calls for de-escalating hostilities without broadening the battlefield or provoking further conflict. China and Brazil emphasize dialogue and negotiations as the sole viable solution to the “Ukrainian crisis” and support the idea of an international peace conference “recognized by both Russia and Ukraine.” The points also stress the need to enhance humanitarian aid, protect civilians, and avoid attacks on civilians or civilian infrastructure. Additionally, they oppose the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and support efforts to prevent a nuclear crisis. The parties also reject the division of the world into “isolated political or economic groups” and call for international cooperation “in energy, currency, finance, trade, and critical infrastructure… to ensure the stability of global supply chains.”

China and Brazil’s adherence to the “six points” rather than Ukraine’s ten-point “peace formula,” which the Ukrainian government presented as a plan for establishing peace at the time, was cited as a reason for China’s non-participation in the Global Peace Summit held on June 15–16, 2024, in Switzerland. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the “six points” had received a “positive response from more than 110 countries worldwide.” This list first appeared in May 2024, while the dates and location of the Global Peace Summit were announced no later than April 10.

The content of the “peace formula” was announced in November 2022 by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. This “formula” includes priorities similar to the “six points,” but with a specific call for the de-occupation of Ukrainian territory. Additionally, the Ukrainian “peace formula” calls for ensuring the security of strategic facilities (nuclear power plants, ports, borders), the release of prisoners, reparations for damages, and accountability for war crimes. It also addresses the mitigation of environmental damage caused by the war, as well as food and energy security, and proposes the creation of international mechanisms to guarantee Ukraine’s territorial integrity and prevent future conflicts. The ultimate goal of the plan is the complete cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops, and the signing of an agreement that establishes a peaceful resolution to the conflict on Ukraine’s terms.

In the analyzed publications from Chinese media, the summit was referred to as the “Swiss Peace Summit” rather than the “Global Peace Summit,” as it was called in Ukraine, or the “Summit on Peace in Ukraine,” as described on the website of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. On June 14, during a briefing by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spokesperson Lin Jian was asked to comment on China’s stance toward the Global Peace Summit.

Lin Jian stated that China “supports all efforts to achieve peace” and that its position regarding the “Swiss Peace Conference” is “honest, fair, and open.” He called for sincere negotiations involving all parties.

“The six-point consensus proposed by China and Pakistan has received positive feedback from more than 100 countries, reflecting the general expectations of the international community and representing the largest common denominator in the modern world. We welcome more countries to support and join the six-point consensus,” said Lin Jian.

After the creation of the Friends for Peace platform based on the “six points,” the results of its work have yet to be made public.

The work of the participants of the Global Peace Summit culminated in a communiqué, which was immediately signed by representatives of 80 countries and four intergovernmental organizations. The communiqué consists of three points. The first states that nuclear power plants must operate under safe and secure conditions and “including Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, must operate safely and securely under full sovereign control of Ukraine and in line with IAEA principles and under its supervision.” The second point highlights the importance of free navigation in the Black and Azov Seas for global food security. The third point of the communiqué declares that all prisoners of war must be exchanged, and deported and unlawfully detained individuals must be returned to Ukraine.

In China, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who, along with the Brazilian President’s Chief Advisor on International Policy Celso Amorim, leads the Friends for Peace platform, is the main official cited in Chinese media reports about Ukraine. In publications from Chinese media, Ukraine and Wang Yi were mentioned 33 times, and in the overall dataset, 104 times. This could illustrate the limited efforts of Chinese authorities to promote their vision of resolving the war in Ukraine to a domestic audience. Most mentions of Wang Yi and Ukraine in Chinese media also referenced Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, followed by Andrii Sybiha and other Ukrainian diplomats. Wang Yi’s statements at the UN General Assembly, where the Friends for Peace platform was presented, and during the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, were also frequently quoted.

Chinese media reports mentioning Wang Yi in Ukraine would be categorized as “protocol news” — complimentary news pieces or reports conveying the official stance, most commonly based on materials from government press services. A typical quote from Political Bureau member Wang Yi often includes a reference to Xi Jinping. For example, in news about Wang Yi’s meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko during the BRICS Summit, it was reported: “Wang Yi stated that under the leadership of President Xi Jinping and President Putin, China-Russia relations maintain a healthy development dynamic.”

Another quote from Wang Yi’s participation in the UN General Assembly reads: “Wang Yi noted that China’s position on the Ukrainian crisis is consistent, with the most authoritative statement being the ‘four principles’ proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. China has always advocated for the peaceful resolution of disputes.”

Wang Yi is also quoted in Hong Kong. On September 25, etnet.com.hk reported that Wang Yi attended a high-level meeting of the UN Security Council on Ukraine. According to the Hong Kong media, he stated: “The more weapons are delivered to the battlefield, the harder it will be to achieve the goal of a ceasefire. All sides must reject the confrontational mentality of the Cold War, play a constructive role in de-escalation, and create the necessary conditions for a quick ceasefire and end to the war.”

If this approach is implemented, Ukraine will hardly be able to count on support from its partners.

Xi Jinping ranks second among individuals mentioned in Chinese media publications about Ukraine, appearing 26 times. Overall, Xi Jinping is mentioned in 90 publications in the dataset, with the majority of these being quotes from his speeches made by others.

Xi Jinping also references the Friends for Peace platform. However, in statements about the platform, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the leader of the People’s Republic of China also addresses other armed conflicts. For example, a news report from the Chinese state-controlled media outlet China News based on Xi Jinping’s speech at the G20 summit on November 18 stated:

“In accordance with the principles of ‘no proliferation from the battlefield, no escalation of hostilities and no fire from all sides’, the G20 should help to cool the crisis in Ukraine and seek a political solution. China and Brazil, along with countries from the Global South, have created a group of “friends for peace” on the Ukraine crisis to bring together more voices of peace supporters.”

The news report further notes that hostilities in Gaza have caused severe suffering and that it is time to urgently promote a ceasefire between the parties. Hostilities must stop, support should be provided to ease the humanitarian crisis and facilitate post-conflict reconstruction, and the existence of two states — Israel and Palestine — has no alternative.

At the G20 Summit, Xi Jinping met with French President Emmanuel Macron, stating that “China expects the conflict to be mitigated, does not want the crisis to deepen and the hostilities to escalate, and will continue to play its constructive role to stop the hostilities.”

In the analyzed dataset from mainland China, all publications quoting Xi Jinping are derived from his speeches and statements, without criticism. However, Hong Kong media occasionally publish criticisms of the Chinese leader.

“Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, as rarely seen before, publicly accused China of helping Russia block the participation of other countries in the peace summit. He also said that some of the Russian army’s weapons came from China,” reported the Hong Kong online outlet Ming Pao on June 14.

Hong Kong media also use generalizations such as “Ukrainian media” or “British media.” However, they comparatively more often reference sources from other countries in their news about Ukraine and less frequently rely on state-controlled Chinese media. For instance, in the Hong Kong dataset, there are only two mentions of Xinhua — the most popular Chinese state-funded outlet in the dataset from Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the most frequently mentioned non-Chinese media outlet in Hong Kong publications, Reuters, appears 11 times. In contrast, it is mentioned only three times in the Chinese media included in the dataset.

The freedom to use various sources in Hong Kong media also results in a higher frequency of mentions of Russian sources or officials compared to Ukrainian, European, or American ones. Among the mainland Chinese publications, Russian officials and media were cited in 13 out of 551 publications, or 2.3%. Ukrainian sources appeared in 15 publications, accounting for 2.7%. In contrast, in Hong Kong media, Russian officials and media were cited as primary sources in 9% of cases — 65 out of 720 publications — while Ukrainian sources accounted for 4.3% or 31 publications.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was the most frequently cited figure in Hong Kong’s coverage of Ukraine, his statements serving as news hooks in at least 21 instances. In six cases, the primary source was the Russian Ministry of Defense. In comparison, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s statements were the basis for only seven publications, and statements of Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for five.

In Taiwanese media, foreign outlets such as Reuters, Agence France-Presse, CNN, Bloomberg, The New York Times, or AFP are sources for nearly 23% of publications. In contrast, sources from mainland China appear in only 1.8% of Taiwanese publications. Ukrainian sources slightly outnumber Russian ones, accounting for 0.4% more mentions.

Statements from Volodymyr Zelenskyy and publications by the Presidential Office of Ukraine are sources for at least 21 news items in Taiwan. Among Ukrainian media, the most frequently cited are the English-language Kyiv Independent (at least eight publications), the English version of RBC-Ukraine (three mentions), and Ukrainska Pravda (two mentions). Suspilne Ukraine, TSN, and Kyiv Post are each cited once. In other cases, the sources for Taiwanese media news are Ukrainian government bodies and defense forces: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press services of military branches, or Defense Forces brigades.

The structure of sources of publications about Ukraine in Taiwan from June 1 to November 30, 2024. Detector Media based on Currents API data

Among Russian news sources for Taiwanese media, the most prominent figure is Vladimir Putin, whose statements prompted 13 news publications. Reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense led to seven publications. Among the Russian media outlets or propagandists specifically named by Taiwanese news outlets — when terms like “Russian media,” “Russian news agencies,” or “Russian sources” were not used — were the Russian propaganda outlets Tsargrad, RT, and TASS.

Media from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan exhibit different approaches to covering events related to Russia’s war against Ukraine, influenced by the distinct political contexts of these territories. Mainland Chinese media display a noticeable pro-Russian bias in their publications. This is reflected in frequent quotations of Russian speakers and the promotion of anti-American narratives, often citing official documents of the Communist Party of China. A striking contrast is evident between the rhetoric of Chinese leaders, such as Xi Jinping, who publicly advocate for adherence to international law, and the content published by Chinese state media. State-funded Chinese media adopt a seemingly neutral stance in reporting events in Ukraine, especially when addressing incidents involving Russian war crimes or reputational damages. For example, tragedies such as the shelling of the Okhmatdyt hospital are reported with Russian denials or framed in a way that creates uncertainty.

Hong Kong media, although under the influence of the PRC, retain some degree of editorial independence. They are less likely to quote Chinese state sources and more frequently reference Western media and Ukrainian speakers. However, Hong Kong publications, like those in mainland China, tend to refer to Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine as the “Ukrainian crisis” and rarely label Russia as an aggressor.

Taiwanese media adopt the most Ukraine-friendly position in their coverage of events in Ukraine. Their publications typically describe Russia as an aggressor state. Taiwanese outlets also rely heavily on Western and Ukrainian sources, avoiding vague or abstract terms such as “foreign media,” which are commonly used in Chinese mainland news.

Chinese state-run media, unlike Russian propaganda, do not explicitly call for territorial concessions or changes in Ukraine’s political regime or leadership. However, their approach to conflict coverage shows traces of reliance on Russian media as a primary source of information about events in Ukraine. This is evidenced by their preference for Russian sources, while Ukrainian speakers and media are less frequently used as primary sources.

Despite China’s standing as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and one of the world’s most influential nations, its peace initiatives — such as the “six points” and the Friends for Peace platform based on them — appear more as attempts to draw attention to China’s potential as a mediator than as genuine proposals for resolving the conflict. The credibility of the number of parties that have expressed “positive feedback” to China’s peace initiatives is undermined by the lack of firmness and consistency in statements from Chinese officials supporting respect for the UN Charter, which includes the principle of territorial integrity of the UN member states.

Contributors: Andriy Pylypenko, Arseniy Subarion, Kostiantyn Zadyraka, Oleksiy Pivtorak, Oleksandr Siedin

Subscribe to our newsletter, published every two weeks, to stay updated on key materials from the Detector Media Research Center.

Main page illustration and infographic by Nataliya Lobach