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Detector Media Research Centre
On February 20, 2014, Russia began its invasion of Crimea. At the end of that winter, the Russians launched an operation to seize the peninsula, first by deploying troops, establishing control over the government authorities, blockading Ukrainian military units, creating information pressure, and making illegitimate legal decisions. This aggression was followed by an armed occupation that continues to this day. Then Russia, in violation of international law, annexed Crimea, which it has been trying to legitimize in every way conceivable.
During the occupation, about 70,000 people left Crimea, and more than 700,000 civilians and soldiers moved there from Russia. Since 2014, more than 5,000 human rights violations have been recorded on the peninsula, mostly involving Crimean Tatars. According to human rights activists, after 2014, Crimea has become "a model of Russian colonization activities." Yevhen Bondarenko, head of the Information Support Department of the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, suggests that the period of cognitive deoccupation of Crimea may take 10 to 20 years.
Ukraine has stated that it all started with Crimea and will end with it - the peninsula must be liberated from occupation. Kyiv is making every effort to liberate Crimea, which includes cognitive deoccupation. In this study, we demonstrate how Russia tried to create an artificial barrier between Crimea and mainland Ukraine ahead of 2014, analyze the propaganda strategies of the occupation of the peninsula, changes in its media landscape, the positioning of Crimean Tatars in Russian media, and the challenges of returning Crimea to Ukraine's control.
Crimea: A Post-Soviet Story of Blurring Borders
The presence of clearly defined borders is a hallmark of modern states because pre-modern state formations did not have fixed boundaries. But according to Putin, just like in the Middle Ages, Russia's borders "do not end anywhere." Moscow clearly demonstrated this maxim in the 1990s in Moldova, in 2008 in Georgia, and in 2014 in Ukraine. It all started with the peninsula, which Russia sought to turn into its own "island of Crimea." However, preparations for the seizure of the peninsula had been underway almost from the moment Ukraine gained its independence.
In the 1990s, the specters of autonomy haunted Ukraine - Galician (Galician Assembly), Transcarpathian (Society of Subcarpathian Rusyns), and Eastern Ukrainian (International Movement of Donbas) - but they were more political maneuvers by local elites trying to interact with the central government in this way than real threats of federalization. Crimea was perhaps the only problematic region in this regard in the 1990s. Moreover, the Kremlin was fueling local separatism. In the early 1990s, Moscow began to question the legitimacy of the 1954 incorporation of Crimea into Ukraine, discussed the "special status" of Sevastopol, and even then, Russian State Duma members spoke of the need for a referendum and the transformation of Crimea into a separate state.
In 1992, in violation of Ukrainian law, Crimean deputies approved the "Constitution of the Republic of Crimea," which introduced the post of president of Crimea and approved the peninsula's accession to Ukraine as an independent autonomous state. State institutions were formally subordinated to Kyiv, but in practice, Crimea elected pro-Russian politician Yuriy Meshkov as president, while local authorities were increasingly populated by Russians lobbying for Moscow's interests. Kyiv rebuffed Crimean separatism only in 1995, abolishing illegal Kremlin-lobbied autonomy and the very post of "president," and Meshkov was forced to leave for Moscow. At the same time, Russia attempted to challenge Ukraine's claim to the peninsula twice (in 1993 and 1996) in the OSCE, but without success.
However, it has not abandoned its attempts to maintain its influence on the situation in Crimea, primarily through the Black Sea Fleet. After the collapse of the USSR, the fleet came under Ukrainian control, but after several years of negotiations, more than 80% of the ships were transferred to the Russian Navy, with the remainder going to Ukraine. The intergovernmental agreement on the status and conditions of the Black Sea Fleet's stay on the territory of Ukraine would be used by Moscow more than once to its advantage. The Kremlin would build housing, kindergartens, and schools for Black Sea Fleet officers and their families, open Houses of Moscow, a branch of Moscow State University, and the then-mayor of the Russian capital, Yuri Luzhkov, called Sevastopol "the eleventh district of Moscow."
Reacting to the systemic territorial encroachment by its northern neighbor, Ukraine began considering a long-term strategy of security guarantees instead of just sporadic retaliatory steps. In 2001, Ukraine adopted the State Program of Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO for 2001-2004.
It took Ukraine more than a decade to reach an agreement with Russia regarding the border that had already been legally established since the Soviet Union. In January 2003, which, incidentally, was the year of Russia in Ukraine, the parties signed the Treaty on the Ukrainian-Russian border, but the same year Moscow began to put pressure on Kyiv to delimit (i.e., actually change) the border in the Kerch Strait. Russia realized that the division of the Azov Sea would mean that Ukraine would get 60 percent of it, which, in turn, would mean a redistribution of gas and oil fields. Therefore, in 2003, Russia began building a dam in the Kerch Strait from the Taman Peninsula to the Ukrainian island of Tuzla to prove that Tuzla was not a Ukrainian island but a "Russian spit." This provoked a strong reaction from Ukraine, and the dam was not completed.
In 2011, Meshkov returned to Crimea from Moscow with the intention of re-entering politics and reviving the abolished 1992 "Crimean Constitution," but the SBU promptly deported him to Russia for threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
In 2011-2012, the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate recorded the first telltale signs that Russia was capable of seizing Ukrainian military facilities by force. It was then that Russia started training and equipping illegal armed groups in Crimea, seized Ukrainian navigation equipment, and began assembling special brigades that underwent intensive training in January 2014.
On February 20, 2014, Russia launched an armed occupation of Ukrainian Crimea, taking advantage of the Euromaidan events, the weakening of the central government, and Ukraine's announcement of its European integration course. On March 16, it held a pseudo-referendum on the status of Crimea. On March 25, the last military unit to fly the Ukrainian flag in Crimea, the Ukrainian Navy's Cherkasy minesweeper, was seized. Since then, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol have been occupied by the Russian armed forces.
Both before and after the seizure of Crimea, the Russian propaganda machine did its best to lend legitimacy to Moscow's intentions and justify military actions on the peninsula: "Banderites" pose a threat to Crimea, NATO will seize the Black Sea Fleet bases, Kyiv will begin a ruthless de-Russification of the peninsula, and so on. Thus, the need for annexation was justified in the context of the rivalry between the Atlantic bloc led by the United States and the Eurasian bloc led by Russia. Under the influence of years of propaganda, some Crimean residents supported the second option in the face of this dichotomy.
The occupation resulted in the transfer of the media infrastructure to Russia, as well as a wave of repression against Ukrainian media and journalists, dozens of whom were forced to leave the peninsula. Under the guise of combating "extremist activities," the Russians unleashed their repression machinery upon Ukrainian media and media outlets on the peninsula, prosecuting them for spurious calls for separatism, harassing them administratively, as well as physically assaulting them. The lack of an adequate legal framework, digital security, as well as censorship, and the deliberate suppression of any alternative points of view created the conditions for the informational annexation of the peninsula. This also contributed to the rise of citizen journalism in Crimea.
Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian propaganda has referred to the Crimean peninsula as an exclusively "Russian" region. Russia has consistently used certain narratives and strategies during the occupation of Ukrainian territories, but in the case of Crimea and, for example, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, it has employed different approaches. The "Crimean model" involved asserting a historical connection to the territory by labeling the occupied areas as "primordially Russian lands." In contrast, the "Donbas model" presented these regions as "independent republics" with Russian-speaking populations that do not recognize Kyiv's authority and are neither part of Ukraine nor Russia. The population of the puppet entities in the seized parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions was identified as the "Donbas people," distinct from Russians and Ukrainians. For propaganda purposes, these "unique citizens" were not full-fledged Russians, which eventually led to complaints about unequal treatment. It is worth noting that after the beginning of the full-scale invasion and occupation of new territories, Russia quickly implemented the "Crimean model", in contrast to the previous approach observed in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The Image of Crimea in Russian Propaganda since 2014
After the political turbulence of the 1990s provoked by the collapse of the USSR and until the events of Euromaidan in 2014, Russia's territorial claims to Crimea were marginalized as a topic among Russian political elites. The mayor of Moscow from 1992 to 2010, Yuri Luzhkov, was perhaps the only high-ranking Russian official who regularly spoke publicly about the need to annex Crimea. However, Luzhkov's statements were so shocking in the context of the rhetoric of the Russian establishment that official Kyiv sometimes ignored them altogether. It was only in 2008 after relations between Kyiv and Moscow cooled (in particular because of the gas wars), that the Ukrainian Security Service declared Luzhkov persona non grata. Even then, official Moscow distanced itself from Luzhkov's statements. In the same year, Putin himself said that Russia had long recognized Crimea as Ukraine, and he called any talk about Moscow's alleged claims to the peninsula provocative. For Russia, then, good relations with the West and Ukraine were more important than the historical revisionism that Putin and his propaganda are now resorting to.
Everything changed in 2014: Russian propaganda has been consistently portraying Crimea as an integral part of Russia, using various tactics to legitimize the annexation and influence public opinion both domestically and abroad.
Russian propaganda formulated two key arguments to justify the 2014 annexation. The positive argument was an attempt to present Crimea as an organic, inseparable cultural part of Russia that had historically been unjustly alienated. The role of Crimea was suddenly sacralized for Russia. The peninsula, for example, has become a key place in the event of the Baptism of Rus. "For Russia, Crimea, ancient Korsun, Chersonesos, and Sevastopol are of great civilizational and sacred significance, just as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem is for those who profess Islam and Judaism. And this is how we will treat it from now on and forever," Putin said. Russian propaganda appeals to Crimea's historical ties with Russia, to the common heritage, cultural significance, and presence of ethnic Russians in the region. References to historical events, such as the Crimean War or the Soviet era, are used to justify Russia's claims to Crimea.
The second argument was based on the principle of "proof by contradiction" and proclaimed Russia as "the savior of the threatened people of Crimea after Euromaidan", the annexation as a way to protect Crimea from Kyiv's repression, and at a later stage, from a war like the one allegedly unleashed by Kyiv in the east of Ukraine. Russia has invoked the protection of the Russian-speaking population to justify its military intervention or support for separatist movements. The Kremlin had tested this scenario in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. In reality, Russia's actions in these regions are motivated solely by political interests and a desire to influence neighboring countries, not by a genuine concern for the rights of Russian-speaking communities.
While the first argument appealed to positive emotions and proclaimed the historical desirability of "returning Crimea to its Russian home," the second argument was used to intimidate the Crimean population with horrific consequences if it were to remain part of Ukraine. This argument rejected the possibility of Crimea remaining under Ukraine's control on pre-2014 terms. Referring to the Euromaidan as a "violent, American-organized, Nazi coup" allowed the annexation to be presented only as a response to an emergency. It was argued that the pre-2014 status quo no longer existed because of the fundamentally different, hostile situation in Kyiv after Euromaidan. This argument also enabled Russia to appeal to the principle of self-determination of peoples enshrined in international law, which propaganda still uses to justify violations of the international legal principle of preserving the territorial integrity of states.
These two arguments worked together to form a false dilemma - a propaganda tactic in which propagandists offer only two options to choose from, one of which is obviously more desirable. In fact, the ballot of the so-called referendum on March 16, 2014, did not provide an option to maintain the status quo. On March 6, 2014, ten days before the referendum was held, the wording of the ballot questions was finally approved. Referendum participants were offered to choose only one of two options: "Are you in favor of the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation?" or "Are you in favor of the restoration of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?" Although the second option could be interpreted as an alternative to joining Russia, the 1992 Crimean Constitution, adopted in violation of Ukrainian law, granted the Crimean parliament decisive rights, and the Crimean parliament formally declared independence from Ukraine on March 11 and even declared the possibility of joining Russia. Thus, the essence of the second option was obscured, but ultimately, support for this option did not exclude the implementation of the first.
Russian propaganda also uses arguments about economic and social development, claiming that the annexation brought prosperity to the region. Kremlin-controlled media strongly emphasize the construction of new roads, bridges, airports, ports, and utility infrastructure. The propagandists call the Crimean Bridge perhaps the greatest symbol of economic development and integration of Crimea, and they also take pride in the new airport in Simferopol, the Tavrida highway, the construction of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral and a mosque in Simferopol, and so forth. Propagandists point to increased investment by the Russian government and Russian businesses in Crimea after its annexation, particularly in tourism, industry, agriculture, and energy. Russian propaganda often emphasizes the restoration of social stability and rising living standards, comparing this to the political turmoil and "impoverishment" of Ukraine. For example, five years after the annexation, news about how life in Crimea is improving was the most popular among all Russian news stories that mentioned the peninsula (33%). The trend about Crimea's "prosperity" ran parallel to reports about Ukraine's "decline," and the propaganda machine demonized Ukraine in every way possible. In particular, they exploited the water issue, which is a painful one for Crimeans, when the Ukrainian authorities blocked the North Crimean Canal.
According to a study by the Institute of Mass Information, the more time passes since the occupation of Crimea, the less Ukraine is present in the peninsula's informational space. Ukrainian news almost never makes it to the Crimean media, and those that do are either related to the region's border with Ukraine or only distort the image of Ukraine in the eyes of the audience. In the Crimean media, less than 10% of the total number of news items related to Ukraine were devoted to the topic of the peninsula's deoccupation. It is worth noting that the propagandists claimed that the liberation of Crimea was being driven by the United States, as well as spread "horror stories" about Kyiv's alleged reprisals for Ukrainians who held Russian passports in the temporarily occupied territories.
Humanitarian Policy Toward Crimea: Recognizing Mistakes, Countering Rights Violations, and Preparing for Reintegration
Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk are among the regions where the number of people who consider Ukrainian to be their native language has decreased since Ukraine's independence. "In Crimea, the share of people who consider Ukrainian to be their native language has dropped from 13.7% to 10.1%," writes Olena Hazizova, head of the Ukrainian Studies Department at the Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. At the same time, Russian has held the status of the language of interethnic communication by inertia since the Soviet era. According to the Razumkov Center, in 2008, 81.3% of Crimeans recognized Russian as their native language, while 60.1% were ethnic Russians. 9.4% considered the Crimean Tatar language their native language, and the share of Crimean Tatars on the peninsula was 9.1%. And 6.4% considered Ukrainian to be their native language, compared to 24.9% of ethnic Ukrainians. The dominance of the Russian language was achieved through the predominance of Russian schools and media:
"Out of 583 schools operating in Crimea in 2014, only 7 were teaching in Ukrainian, and out of 23.4% of ethnic Ukrainian students, only 0.7% were studying in the official language. As for the Ukrainian press, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea published the newspaper "Krymska Svitlytsia" with three supplements (total circulation of 3 thousand copies)... At the same time, the total circulation of Russian-language publications was 3 million copies. They were fully funded from the budget of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," Ms. Hazizova stated.
The Russian occupation of Crimea was marked by the demonization of Ukraine and the promotion of the idea that the main sources of unrest on the peninsula are national minorities. The Crimean media, which covered the events in Russian from a pro-Russian perspective, called the Revolution of Dignity, just as the Russian media did, a "coup d'etat"; the government led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a "junta," and so forth.
The work of government agencies and civil society after the occupation of Crimea focused on documenting Russian crimes, preparing for the reintegration of Crimea, debunking myths about Ukraine, Crimea, Crimean Tatars, and NATO, and correcting past mistakes. For example, CrimeaSOS, one of the first civil society initiatives to emerge in response to the threat of Crimea's annexation, initially tried to provide timely and verified information about the situation in Crimea in February 2014. But later, according to the organization's website, CrimeaSOS expanded its activities into the humanitarian sphere to "highlight the illegality of the occupation of Crimea and Russia's repressive policy towards Crimeans, maintain the peninsula's ties with mainland Ukraine, and consolidate Ukrainian society by protecting the rights, freedoms, and interests of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other people affected by the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine and Crimea."
The work of Ukrainian government agencies has a similar human rights and humanitarian focus. Among them, the one that has the greatest focus on Crimea is the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Since 2000, it has been responsible for monitoring the observance of Ukrainian laws in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and producing analytical reports on the state of affairs in Crimea for the Verkhovna Rada. Since August 2021, the Presidential Mission in Crimea has also been coordinating the activities of the Crimean Platform. The Platform's tasks include coordinating international pressure on Russia, protecting those affected by the occupation, and creating an expert network that analyzes the challenges of the occupation and prepares analytical documents for other sectors of the Platform.
Another direction of the humanitarian policy towards Crimea is the revival of the rights and culture of the ethnic groups living in Crimea and communicating the truth about the role of the Soviet Union in the history of these peoples and Crimea in general. One of the legislative acts in this area is the law "On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine." It guarantees that ethnic groups who do not have the opportunity to form national governments outside of Ukraine have the right to develop national institutions. Such ethnic groups, in particular, are the Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks. The indigenous peoples of Ukraine have the right to observe, revive, and develop their spiritual, religious, and cultural traditions and customs, their own media, and educational institutions.
The protection and restoration of the rights of the indigenous peoples of Crimea, decommunization, and the communication of historical facts were supposed to take place gradually and in the absence of occupation, but the annexation of Crimea dramatically accelerated these processes. The activities of non-governmental, governmental, and international initiatives in the field of the protection of human rights and cultural heritage of Crimea suggest that at the time of the deoccupation of Crimea, participants in the reintegration process will have action plans and resources to achieve them, covering security, education, culture, information space, and tourism. The deoccupation process will require significant resources and personnel. For example, according to Tamila Tasheva, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, more than 20,000 school teachers and about 8,000 preschool teachers need to be trained to work in the deoccupied Crimea after its liberation. As for civil servants, according to Tamila Tasheva, after the deoccupation of Crimea, 50 thousand of them will be needed to work on the peninsula.
Detector Media will publish a separate detailed article on Ukraine's state policy towards Crimea later.
"Crimean Crisis": How Foreign Media and the International Community Reacted to the Annexation of Crimea
The international community condemned the "referendum" in Crimea. On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine", which states that "the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol".
The UN Resolution also called on "all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status".
Since 2014, the UN General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions on the human rights situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and additionally on the issue of militarization of the occupied peninsula. The latest document on human rights in Crimea and the rest of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 19, 2023. Also, since 2014, Ukraine, the EU, the US, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, and other countries have imposed sanctions on Russian legal entities and citizens. These sanctions are in effect until the de-occupation of Crimea, and the sanctions lists are constantly updated and supplemented.
The struggle for the deoccupation of Crimea (as well as parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions) continues not only on the battlefield, in international organizations or courts, but also in the media, history textbooks, and on maps.
The denial of the fact of the Russian occupation of Crimea on maps has caused numerous scandals. For example, some international companies that produce cartographic products worldwide have labeled Crimea (and some continue to do so) as "Russian territory" or "contested territory" but not as part of Ukraine within the internationally recognized 1991 borders.
During the Tokyo Summer Olympics in July 2021, for instance, the map published on the competition's official website showed Crimea as separate from mainland Ukraine. And in November 2023, even the European Parliament published a map of EU trade agreements, where Crimea was not marked as Ukrainian territory. The map was later removed from both the EP website and social media.
The problem with the spread of Russian propaganda about Crimea on world maps and globes was raised by Mykola Holubey, a member of the Ukrainian Geographical Society, who launched the project "Stop Mapaganda! Information Deoccupation of Ukraine" project in 2013. He collects examples of cartographic violations in the products of such companies as National Geographic, ADAC, DUMONT, Columbus, Stiefel, and others. In May 2023, a petition was published on the website of the President of Ukraine with a list of companies from the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and bookstore chains that sell map products with "Russian" Crimea. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry usually responds to such violations, but the problem persists.
This "uncertainty" is found beyond just maps. In the Western and global media, the events of February-March 2014 (and beyond) in Crimea were generally referred to as the "Crimean crisis." Examples of this include the BBC, Euronews, Euractiv, NBC news, Time, China Daily, and The Guardian. The term "Crimean crisis" blurs the essence of what was happening on the peninsula at the time: it does not include Russia's role in the act of aggression against Ukraine. Indeed, overall, the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war (until February 24, 2022) were described in the international media as a "crisis in Ukraine."
The world was equally uncertain about the occupation of Crimea in 2014. Ten years ago, international leaders did not take radical steps to curb Russian aggression on Ukrainian territory. It was only a few years after the annexation of the peninsula that some Western politicians realized that the position on Crimea was unacceptable at the time. In July 2020, a report by the UK Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security was approved to identify Russia's political, economic, and information influence on the United Kingdom. The document stated, "It is not clear to the Committee whether HMG [Her Majesty's Government] and our allies have yet found an effective way to respond to the pace of Russian decision-making. This has severely undermined the West’s ability to respond effectively to Russian aggressions in the past – for example, the annexation of Crimea in 2014.."
In an interview with Radio Liberty in October 2023, the Speaker of the Lower House of the Czech Parliament, Markéta Pekarová Adamová, said that the democratic world's weak position on the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 was a mistake, "I have to say that now I believe that we definitely made the wrong decision not to put pressure on Russia, because our response was insufficient. And I am almost sure that now, not only me but also other leaders are well aware that it was a mistake."
China takes a starkly different stance. Back during the presidency of pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014), Ukraine and China negotiated a series of economic projects, most of which concerned the development of Crimea. Chinese President Hu Jintao began his June 2011 visit to Ukraine with a trip to Crimea. In early December 2013, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in Beijing, as well as a joint declaration by Ukraine and China to further deepen strategic partnership relations. The agreement still defines the areas of cooperation between the two countries.
The implementation of plans for Chinese investment in Ukraine (including in Crimea) was hindered by Russian aggression. However, after 2014, trade between Ukraine and China grew, and China was Ukraine's main trading partner.
After Russia's occupation of Crimea, China supported Ukraine's territorial integrity, but at the same time, did not condemn the annexation of the peninsula. Beijing's Solomonic judgment remains in effect. Obviously, China's position on Crimea is influenced by the relationship between Beijing and Moscow. China and Russia have a common anti-Western foreign policy, actively trade with each other, conduct military exercises, and are members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).
Officially, China calls the Russian-Ukrainian war the "Ukrainian crisis." On February 24, 2023, on the anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis," which contains only general and vague wording: rejection of the Cold War mentality, respect for the sovereignty of all countries, ceasefire, start of peace talks, resolving the humanitarian crisis, protection of civilians and prisoners of war, ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, reducing strategic risks, guarantees for the export of grain, rejection of unilateral sanctions, ensuring the stability of production and supply chains, and assistance in post-war reconstruction.
Beijing's position has largely remained unchanged during the full-scale invasion, but there have been occasional controversies. For example, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye said in an interview with the French TV channel LCI in April 2023 that the countries of the former USSR "do not have an effective status in international law, as there is no international agreement that would specify their status as a sovereign country." The diplomat also said that Crimea's belonging to Ukraine "depends on how you perceive the problem", as "historically, Crimea was Russian from the very beginning; during the Soviet period, Khrushchev transferred Crimea to Ukraine".
Lu Shaye's words drew criticism from high-ranking officials in Ukraine and the West. In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry deleted the transcript of the interview with LCI on WeChat and subsequently reaffirmed its official position on Ukraine. On April 24, 2023, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said, "China respects the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all countries and upholds the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with these countries."
Later, in June 2023, Chinese Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong said in an interview with Al Jazeera that China was ready to support Ukraine's return to its 1991 borders. "I don't see why not," the diplomat said.
"Legalizing the Occupation"
Since Crimea's annexation, the invaders have been continuously trying to prove that Crimea as a part of Russia is a fait accompli that the entire world recognizes. This was done, among other things, through organized visits of both Russian and foreign delegations to the peninsula. These included both political, cultural, and sports figures.
A visit to the occupied Crimea has become a certain marker of being pro-Russian for Western politicians, as such a trip is impossible without the approval of the occupation "administration" of Crimea. For example, in 2017, the Crimea in the Current International Context "international symposium" was attended by Hayk Babukhanyan, a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, Pinka Dimitrova Doikova, mayor of Hisarya (Bulgaria), Andreas Maurer, chairman of the left-wing faction of the parliament of Quakenbrück (Germany), head and co-founder of the Freunde Der Krim (Friends of Crimea) German association, Dmitry Medoyev, "Minister of Foreign Affairs" of unrecognized South Ossetia, Stefano Valdegamberi, member of the Regional Council of Veneto (Italy), and a member of the People's Assembly (Syria). At one time, members of the right-wing German party Alternative for Germany even used diplomatic passports to enter the occupied Crimea.
Foreign cultural figures also visited the occupied Crimea to participate in festivals and events. Among them were singers, directors, and instrumentalists from the UK, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and France. The Black Sea News reported that in September 2017 alone, 37 foreign citizens violated the regulations on the occupied territory, i.e., visited Crimea without going through Ukrainian checkpoints in the Kherson region. For comparison, according to The Gray Zone. Occupied Crimea: Sanctions Violations in 2017. Monitoring Results study by the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, 206 foreign citizens (except Russians) from 53 countries illegally visited the occupied territory between August 2017 and January 2018. 45 of them had been to the occupied Crimea before.
It is worth mentioning the performances of Goran Bregović, a Serbian composer, and Yuliya Samoilova, a Russian who was later chosen to represent Russia at the Eurovision Song Contest 2017, which was held in Kyiv. The Security Service of Ukraine then banned Samoilova from entering Ukraine, which made it impossible for her to participate in the contest. Propagandists tried to use all these visits for their own ends.
They did the same with comments by foreign "experts" about the fate of Crimea. This also includes news reports from abroad, such as a 2014 story on a major German news program about how residents of occupied Crimea are allegedly "afraid of being Ukrainianized by the new rulers of Kyiv." Propagandists tried to bring this report back to life by presenting it as a fresh one. Former Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei Marga also claimed in September 2022 that Crimea actually belonged to Russia. "We are in an absolutely exceptional situation, and I say with all responsibility that Ukraine is within unnatural borders. It has to give up territories to Hungary (Zakarpattia), Poland (Galicia), Romania (Bukovyna), and Russia (the Donbas and Crimea). These are the territories of other countries," Andrei Marga said. Recently, Polish President Andrzej Duda expressed his uncertainty about whether Ukraine will be able to return Crimea. American officials, politicians, and "analysts" are also commenting on the Crimean issue. Especially in conjunction with the debate over migration policy and the direction of financial assistance to Ukraine. For example, U.S. Congressman Jim Jordan said in October 2023 that he did not understand the purpose of U.S. aid to Ukraine because the United States "cannot return Crimea, which has been in Russia for ten years." The argument about "ethnic Russians" in Crimea is also echoed by US presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Russia publishes all these statements on its platforms, creating the false impression that such opinions are widespread.
Russia's Occupation Policy Against Crimean Tatars
In order to justify its colonialist and violent actions against the Crimean Tatars since the illegal annexation in 2014, the Russian authorities have been portraying them as marginalized "religious extremists." They persecute them on ethnic and religious grounds, suspect them of sympathizing with Ukraine, in order to, if not repeat the Stalinist genocidal deportation, then at least push them out of the public space as representatives of Crimea or simply deprive them of their voice.
The image of Crimean Tatars in the Russian media is characterized by prejudice and stereotypes, with propaganda inciting distrust and hostility toward them. They are often portrayed as a threat to Russia's security and stability, branded as "extremists," "religious fanatics," "Nazi collaborators," "Tatar Banderites," and even as those responsible for the collapse of the USSR. The Russian media and social media segment also create an image of Crimean Tatars as a small and insignificant minority in Crimea, downplaying their historical and cultural significance. The same image was used to justify Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, when "little green men" (Russian military personnel) claimed to be protecting ethnic Russians on the peninsula from "radicals." At the same time, Russian media reported that Crimean Tatars were opposed to the Ukrainian government and supported separatist movements on the peninsula. Groundless accusations of collaboration during World War II were also made against the entire ethnic group.
As the Russian authorities have been harshly persecuting members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization, which operates in Ukraine without legal restrictions, since 2014, the Russian media have been regularly reporting on their arrests, trials, and sentences. The publications report on the alleged unreliability, danger, and radical views of the accused. The Russians justify the ill-treatment of these prisoners by their "extremism". According to pro-Russian anonymous Telegram channels, Crimean Tatars cooperate with Ukrainian special services, conduct subversive activities, lay mines, point out targets to the Defense Forces, and participate in sabotage. Members of the Crimean Tatar volunteer battalion named after Noman Çelebicihan, which was branded a "terrorist organization" in Russia in the summer of 2022, are regularly accused by Russian agitprop of extremist views and participation in the food and energy blockades of Crimea. Moreover, the Crimean Tatars are allegedly constantly being radicalized as a result of "information and psychological operations from abroad," and ethnic criminal groups have begun to appear in Crimea. Russian special services see a threat in the ability of Crimean Tatars to organize independently, create volunteer units, or organize blockades.
In the broader context of Russia's "Crimean narrative," the media positioning of Crimean Tatars, including the story of their deportation, is intended to legitimize the illegal annexation of Crimea. The main goal of this narrative is to deprive Crimean Tatars of their political power and future. The ultimate goal is the assimilation of Crimean Tatars into Russian society and the abandonment of their ethnic identity in favor of a Russian one.
Ukrainian human rights organizations, media, and authorities systematically record violations of the rights of Crimean Tatars, both in the field of human rights and in terms of legal regulations. The occupation authorities conduct unlawful detentions, searches, abductions, and "family repression" (detention solely for association or kinship with a political prisoner). The rights to freedom of speech, conscience, and religion, freedom of assembly and association, and the right to a fair trial are being massively restricted.
Tamila Tasheva, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, says that as of 2023, there are 180 political prisoners-citizens of Ukraine in Crimea who were arrested by Russians on the Crimean peninsula or taken from the newly occupied territories (for example, the left bank of the Kherson region). Among them are 116 Crimean Tatars. Tasheva also points out that the occupation authorities and the so-called local "courts" consider flying the Crimean Tatar flag in Crimea to constitute extremism.
Also, since the annexation of Crimea, the population of the occupied Crimean peninsula has been gradually replaced largely by representatives of the military and various law enforcement agencies of Russia. The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union has published data on the illegal resettlement of Russians in occupied Crimea. Since 2014, some 800,000 Russians have arrived on the peninsula (100,000 more than the Ukrainian government estimates), while up to 100,000 Ukrainians have left the occupied peninsula. Russia is implementing a long-term strategy of replacing the local population of the peninsula with its own citizens, including by mobilizing residents of the occupied Crimea.
The Crimea SOS NGO and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People called the mobilization in Crimea announced by Vladimir Putin in the fall of 2022 forced, emphasizing that Crimean Tatars significantly outnumbered other residents of the peninsula in the mobilization lists and in some settlements, up to 90% of Crimean Tatars were included in the mobilization lists. Alim Aliyev, Deputy Director General of the Ukrainian Institute and co-founder of Crimea SOS, said, "The Russians are trying to send Crimean Tatars to fight against their relatives who are now in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. To send them to war against their own country, because most Crimean Tatars have pro-Ukrainian views, despite being forced to obtain a Russian 'ausweis', or passport." According to Eskender Bariyev, the head of the Crimean Tatar Resource Center, the situation with mobilization in the occupied territories of Ukraine will worsen after the Russian presidential elections in mid-March.
This is hardly the first time that Crimean Tatars have experienced occupation and exile from their homeland. While the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people is now back to operating in exile, most Crimean Tatars dream of returning to their homeland. Arsen Zhumadilov, a public and political activist and serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, argues that this topic should be considered right now, "How Crimea will live immediately after deoccupation and how to take into account the rights of Crimean Tatars is an open question. But I am sure that it should not be pushed somewhere to the margins with rhetoric that is not relevant now."
Cognitive Deoccupation of Crimea
According to the Opora civil network, Russia has blocked about a thousand Ukrainian online resources, including a dozen websites of Ukrainian government agencies. This hampers Ukraine's ability to convey reliable information to Crimean residents. However, it is important to continue to maintain a dialog with Crimeans living under occupation, and to do so, we have to use all information platforms available under occupation.
Existing strategies and information policy. Since the spring of 2014, civil society and the government have developed several documents that contain provisions on strategic actions for the deoccupation of Crimea. Apart from creating a common framework for the coordination of society after the deoccupation of Crimea, such strategies serve to communicate the government's plans and address the fears of residents of the occupied territories of Ukraine. For example, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Tamila Tasheva, refers to such strategies in articles and blog posts, explaining to those who remained in the occupied territories that during the deoccupation, human rights will not be violated, the Russian language will not be banned, and those who speak Russian will not be punished.
One of the first such documents was from the Maidan of Foreign Affairs NGO. The complete Strategy for the Deoccupation of Crimea document was published on the organization's website in January 2015. This document called Russia's economic exhaustion due to sanctions, support for pro-Ukrainian Crimeans, increased international pressure on Russia, and reforms of the state apparatus in Ukraine as the key prerequisites for the return of Crimea.
Several other documents have emerged in the years since, containing similar statements and either general strategies or more niche ones. The second category includes, for example, the Strategy for the Restoration of Crimea published in August 2023 on the website of the Presidential Mission in Crimea. It refers to the development of infrastructure, industry, and tourism in Crimea after liberation from occupation. More general is the Strategy for the Deoccupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, which was put into effect by Volodymyr Zelenskyy on March 24, 2021, by Decree of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. Since then, a number of changes have been made to the action plan for its implementation. The most recent changes were made in April 2023. However, the essence of the strategy remains the same: condemnation of the occupation of Crimea and human rights violations, and outlining the principles that the government adheres to in the process of deoccupying Crimea in key areas: humanitarian, environmental, human rights, media freedom, security policy, etc.
According to this strategy, Ukraine's information policy on the temporarily occupied territory aims to provide access to objective information, cover the situation in this territory, and ensure an open dialogue. Ukraine also fights disinformation and cooperates with international partners to ensure the wide dissemination of objective information. Ukraine's information policy also aims to provide access to objective and timely information for people in the temporarily occupied territories. It implements a policy aimed at objective and reliable media coverage of the situation in the temporarily occupied territories. Ukraine is also developing information channels for people living in the temporarily occupied territory based on the use of the latest digital communication tools, television, and radio broadcasting. This allows for broad access to current social and political events in Ukraine and the world.
Ukraine also keeps in touch with people in the temporarily occupied territory using modern information technologies. This allows residents to interact with the government, express their views, and receive the necessary information. In addition, Ukraine is fighting the spread of disinformation about the temporarily occupied territory.
Recommendations. The Ukrainian government's media strategy for Crimea should take into account several key points. Internal instability and public discontent are the first steps towards the cognitive deoccupation of the peninsula. Therefore, it is important to direct efforts to deepen the level of distrust of the occupation authorities among the local population. Discontent among the peninsula's residents exists, and it is necessary to use this sentiment correctly to turn the situation in Ukraine's favor.
Since the occupiers largely monopolize the local media landscape, and Russia keeps Crimeans in a sterile information environment, it is imperative to encourage them to seek alternative sources of news and information. This step can increase the level of distrust of the occupation authorities, as its criminal intentions will be exposed. In addition, when implementing a multi-level information policy on Crimea, Ukraine should pay special attention to the younger generation and the development of Ukrainian identity among its representatives. By working with young people today, Ukraine is making a significant contribution to Crimea's cognitive deoccupation process. The youth of Crimea may be more pro-Ukrainian and have greater potential for resistance.
The key is to develop and encourage a policy of reintegrating the Crimean media space with that of mainland Ukraine, as well as to counter Moscow's attempts to separate the peninsula from Ukraine.
Without the support of Western partners, it would be difficult for Ukraine to resist the invaders and difficult to return Crimea. Supporters of the so-called "realistic" approach to international relations have a vision that the geostrategic role of Crimea is a big challenge, so it should be removed from the negotiating table. Therefore, simultaneously with the cognitive deoccupation, Ukraine should conduct a powerful cultural and diplomatic outreach. The full-scale invasion has only proved once again that Putin will not stop at Crimea. Therefore, it is important that Kyiv's allies have no doubt that, given the conflict of interests of different countries in the Black Sea, it is important to prevent Russia from monopolizing its presence there and gaining control over the security of the region. Otherwise, it will pose serious challenges to NATO's and the EU's interests. Ukraine's return to the peninsula is the only possible way to protect the interests of the region and Western democracies as a whole.
The article was written by Lesia Bidochko, Yehor Brailian, Artur Koldomasov, Oleksiy Pivtorak, Andriy Pylypenko, Oleksandr Siedin, and Orest Slyvenko.
Collage by Nataliya Lobach
