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For the last ten years, the Kremlin has been subtly hinting at the possibility of resorting to nuclear weapons, but it was in the summer of 2022 that Moscow began discussing it more openly and frequently. In September 2022, Putin warned that any “threat” to Russia’s territories would compel the Kremlin to use every defensive mechanism at its disposal. It was at this time that Russia increased its pressure on Ukraine and the rest of the world by mining the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, a strategy it is still using to this day. Russia’s highest authorities have expressly stated their readiness to “attack Berlin and Britain” and that Russia’s legal and doctrinal frameworks, inclusive of its nuclear doctrine, would extend to Ukraine’s occupied territories. But what prompts Russia to employ nuclear blackmail, and which instruments does it utilize?

In 1964, Stanley Kubrick’s dark comedy, Dr. Strangelove, or How I Stopped Worrying and Started Loving the Bomb, was unveiled to the public. Kubrick artistically toyed with the concept of nuclear blackmail and its potential ramifications. The movie provides a satirical commentary on the absurdity of nuclear warfare, and effectively encapsulates the climate of the Cold War, featuring international relations polarized between two giants, the multi-pronged confrontation between these superpowers, nuclear paranoia, and loud displays of strength.

The world experienced a protracted and tense nuclear standoff between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought the world dangerously close to direct nuclear conflict. The strategy of nuclear deterrence played a pivotal role, with both superpowers striving to prevent attacks by showcasing their nuclear capabilities and readiness to retaliate. The only real instance of nuclear weapon usage took place during World War II when the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two cities in Japan, that was already on the brink of capitulation. This event swiftly concluded the war in Asia. However, the nuclear arms race during the Cold War seldom involved explicit threats. Panic wasn’t incited verbally, as the escalation of nuclear arms was sufficiently alarming. Fast forward to today, the situation has changed dramatically.

Russia, once a part of the Soviet Union, is striving to reinstate the geopolitical landscape reminiscent of the Cold War era. As such, propaganda depicts the world as polarized between two powerhouses, the United States and the Soviet Union, with the entirety of international relations hinged upon their confrontation. Nuclear weapons emerge as one of the battlegrounds. During that period, nuclear weapons were never deployed, the military campaign in the Fulda Gap never eventuated, and the apocalypse was thankfully averted. Now, we’ll delve into how Russia is currently manipulating the nuclear narrative and the implications this holds for Ukraine.

Intimidation tactics: “A nuclear power cannot lose a war”

Propagandists exploit several intimidation tactics to instill fear and manipulate their targeted audience. Nuclear intimidation hinges on deterrence theory principles, which purport that the prospect of severe, inevitable retaliation can dissuade an adversary from initiating certain actions. Propaganda underlines the notion that any actions they deem hostile will invoke catastrophic countermeasures with devastating consequences.

“Nuclear powers have not been defeated in major conflicts upon which their fate hinges,” stated Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, in January 2023, just before the Ramstein Contact Group’s meeting concerning Ukraine’s defense. Pro-Kremlin “political scientist” Sergei Karaganov acknowledged the difficulty in deciding to deploy nuclear weapons yet argued that their usage could potentially “shield humanity from a global catastrophe.”

Medvedev’s assertion of the constant victories of nuclear powers is manipulative, given that nuclear Russia lost the Afghan War (1979-1989), the U.S. lost the Vietnam War (1959-1975), Britain lost the Suez Crisis (1956), and France suffered defeat in the Algerian War and lost its territories (1954-1962). The current war against Ukraine is an invasion and not an attack on Russia (as it postulates), on which its future fate depends.

Following the UK’s declaration to supply Ukraine with depleted uranium shells, Putin threatened to station nuclear weapons in Belarus. Labeling this supply to the Ukrainian forces as a nuclear escalation is misguided, as depleted uranium’s radioactivity is minimal, and the material is commonly employed in weaponry. Industry experts stated that depleted uranium is utilized in the manufacturing of certain shell types due to its remarkable density and hardness, which improves its armor-piercing capabilities. The radioactive risk to a tank crew is almost negligible when such a projectile’s core is fully encased. Therefore, Moscow’s response to London’s announcement is disproportionate. This incident illustrates how Russia plays the “nuclear” card to intimidate Ukraine’s allies, with the aim of halting their weapon supplies.

Through such methods, propagandists seek to manipulate perceptions and project an image of overwhelming military strength. They might overstate their nuclear capabilities and employ language and visuals emphasizing the destructive power of nuclear arms. The objective behind these actions remains consistent: to intimidate the target audience and deter them from taking actions against the propagandist’s interests.

Nuclear blackmail frequently targets not just political leaders (who directly decide on supporting Ukraine) but also ordinary citizens, with the anticipation that they’ll pressure their political leaders out of fear to cease arms supply to Ukraine.

Mirroring tactics: “Ukraine may use a ‘dirty nuclear bomb’”

Mirroring is a standard method employed by Russian propaganda, serving to deflect attention among other things. This tactic involves launching similar accusations against adversaries (like Ukraine or the West) as those directed at Russia. However, Russian agitprop typically hinges on fabricated justifications for these accusations.

Mirroring involves diverting attention by bringing up other (often unrelated) issues. It frequently creates false equivalences by attempting to equate unrelated or incomparable situations, suggesting that they hold the same moral weight. Additionally, the mirroring strategy often tries to portray the user as a victim of potential aggression. Propagandists might underscore past or current injustices against themselves to deflect focus from their own deeds or to elicit sympathy and support.

Putin asserts that the U.S. initially converted Ukraine into a “military-biological research ground” and supplied it with heavy weaponry, and in the fall of 2022, Russia purportedly discovered Ukraine’s plans to use a “dirty bomb” as a provocation. Russian propagandists allege that Kyiv aims to use radioactive substance stockpiles from running nuclear power plants (South Ukraine, Khmelnytskyi, and Rivne NPPs) and detonate a “dirty bomb” under the guise of an “abnormal activation of a low-yield Russian nuclear weapon utilizing highly enriched uranium as a charge.” The Kremlin has “warned” of possible Ukrainian sabotage, demanding an immediate reaction: “What the United States of America, Britain, and France should do now is put aside all their affairs, sit down with the materials shared by the Russian side during phone conversations, and publicly analyze them.”

In response, President Zelenskyy remarked: “If Russia claims Ukraine is supposedly preparing something, it means only one thing: Russia has already prepared all of this... I believe that the world should now respond as sternly as possible.” Ukraine subsequently invited inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to scrutinize the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kyiv, the Eastern Mining and Processing Plant in Zhovti Vody, and the Pivdenmash in Dnipro. As expected, no evidence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials was discovered in Ukraine, contrary to the Kremlin’s assertions.

After the September 11 attacks in the United States, there have been concerns that various terrorists might try to set off explosions using devices containing radioactive materials. No successful “dirty bomb” attacks have been executed globally, although attempts have been made. For instance, in 1996, Chechen rebels placed but didn’t detonate a radioactive dispersal device in a Moscow park. The bomb, composed of dynamite and cesium-137 extracted from cancer treatment equipment, was eventually defused after its location was reported to journalists. In 2002, José Padilla, a U.S. citizen associated with al-Qaeda, was arrested in Chicago on suspicion of planning a dirty bomb attack. Russia, aware of the West’s sensitivity to such subjects, deliberately exploits the topic of a “dirty bomb” to foster mistrust in Ukraine and force the world to expend resources refuting the propagandists’ accusations.

Russia routinely breaches peaceful nuclear energy usage rules by commandeering Ukrainian nuclear facilities and turning them into a battlefield. Ukraine has never resorted to such tactics. In 1994, Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum, receiving security and sovereignty guarantees from Moscow, London, and Washington in return. Ukraine is a devoted party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, therefore, cannot produce any “dirty bombs.” Thus, such allegations represent a classic mirroring tactic, projecting one’s own actions on the opponent.

The tactics of “retro-propaganda”: the former glory of the USSR

Retro-propaganda” refers to propagandists’ attempt to invoke sentiment about the past, fostering nostalgia tied to a bygone era. By highlighting or glorifying aspects of the past, propagandists aim to depict Russia as still “powerful” and formidable, much like how the USSR was regarded during the Cold War.

In March 2014, Russian propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov claimed that “Russia is the only country in the world capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash. [...] Even if all the people in our command centers are silent after an enemy nuclear attack, the invulnerable system will automatically send our strategic missiles from silos and submarines in the right direction.”

“Russian nuclear weapons would annihilate NATO forces. Its missiles can be launched from the sea, air, and land, and some of them are fitted with separable individual guidance warheads. In the event of a nuclear war, the alliance’s forces would be obliterated within half an hour,” another piece of propaganda claimed.

These propaganda messages are laden with manipulative clichés designed to stir up nostalgia: “one state”, “radioactive ash”, “invulnerable system”, and “destruction of NATO forces in half an hour”.

At the conclusion of World War II, the United States was the sole nuclear power, and the Soviet Union conducted its first atomic bomb test in 1949. Over the next thirty years, the nuclear race accelerated, with the world’s largest number of nuclear weapons amassed by 1984. It was only in 1985 that the US and the USSR agreed on the Reagan-Gorbachev Principle, according to which “a nuclear war cannot be won.”

Today, Russia is striving to revert the world to the pre-Gorbachev era, one that is not multipolar but bipolar — an era where Russia is a world hegemon, not a geopolitical pariah. An era where nuclear superpowers dictate the future, and the voice of non-nuclear states is weak. Furthermore, Russia should remember that much of its nuclear arsenal consists of the 1970s and 1980s developments by designers of the Ukrainian Yuzhmash (now Pivdenmash, a state-owned aerospace manufacturer), whose experts played a significant role in the program to extend the lifespan of these missiles prior to the annexation of Crimea.

So how do you stop worrying about the bomb?

British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly assures that nuclear powers pose no threat to Russia, and nobody in the international community is suggesting that nuclear weapons should be used against Russia. Also, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stated in a BBC interview that Putin “will talk about using nuclear weapons, (but) I don’t think he is ready for that because he fears for his life, he loves it very much.” In June 2023, the head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, Kyrylo Budanov, assured that there would be no nuclear strike on Ukraine: “As the head of the intelligence service, I am telling you directly, this will not happen. For all my dislike of Russia, there are few idiots among those running the country.” This reaction demonstrates that Ukraine is not falling for this blackmail, and no amount of intimidation will stand in the way of victory.

American historian Timothy Snyder has noted that during the coverage of the full-scale Russian invasion, a common issue was that “the media attracted readers’ attention with stories about escalation and nuclear threats. [...] There is a profit motive at work here, which Russian propagandists exploit with their references to nuclear weapons.” However, the situation is in Ukraine’s favor: Moscow has resorted to blackmail so frequently that its nuclear threats no longer resonate the way they once did. If Ukraine’s partners were previously apprehensive about providing Ukraine with heavy weapons to prevent Putin from opening his nuclear briefcase, now this “red line” has been nearly erased.

And what about Russia’s rhetoric on Zaporizhzhia NPP?

The situation with Russia’s rhetoric on the Zaporizhzhia NPP has now escalated. The invaders have mined four of the six power units at the ZNPP, and the Main Intelligence Directorate asserts that the plan for the terrorist attack has already been agreed upon. The seizure of the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs represents the world’s first occupation of nuclear power plants. The Russians believe that no one would dare attack the nuclear power plant since active hostilities could lead to damage and leakage of radioactive materials, enabling them to feel confident and secure.

Why is Russia resorting to this form of blackmail against Ukraine? The preparations for an artificial man-made disaster are another attempt to exert harsh pressure. The potential attack on the Zaporizhzhia NPP is viewed as a “preventive measure” to halt Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Budanov suggests. After the world’s relatively inert reaction to the destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, and the global media quoting mutual accusations from both sides equally, there are concerns about a potentially sluggish reaction following a possible disaster at the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

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