Recipe for Rashism. Overview of the Russian media environment in October – November 2022

When it failed to implement the ‘we can repeat’ slogan with a new ‘Battle of Stalingrad’ near Kherson, the Kremlin decided to openly experiment with fascism, genocide, and ‘Browncoats’.

The ‘Kremlin chef’ and leader of the terrorist group Wagner Yevgeny Prigozhin knows how to concoct sweet lies for Putin and fascist opium for the ‘deep people’ [a concept that is antithetical to the ‘deep state’ of Western democracies] from General Surovikin's military defeats. The heat of the dish, derived from the failures of the Russian army, is enhanced by the frankness of Alexander Dugin. And the ‘Crimean’ tweets of Elon Musk are used as an imported sweetener. As a result, we get the following:

These observations are based on the analysis of regional media operating in the 14 largest cities of Russia (Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, Ufa, Voronezh, Perm, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Volgograd, Khabarovsk). 

After the defeat near Lyman (October 1), which forced the Russian army to retreat from the occupied territories proclaimed ‘new Russia’, and the bombing of the Crimean bridge (October 8), the Kremlin urgently needed to invent a new, if temporarily, symbol of the ‘greatness of the Russian spirit’ and ‘Russian victories’. It had to become the core of a new propaganda campaign and deflect attention from the series of alleged betrayals and defeats that had shaken and haunted Russian society since August. There were enough candidates for the role of victory and its designated fathers to launch several campaigns simultaneously:

Despite the diversity of messages and manipulation techniques, the goal of all these efforts was to convince the society that all the sacrifices and losses made and to be made as a result of the war were a guarantee of Russia’s survival and triumph.

Prigozhin wouldn’t hurt a convict

Let’s start with the easiest, i.e. the cheapest direction for the Kremlin – the Prigozhin publicity startup. There is nothing new in the attempt to mould the Wagner PMC into a new, popular military pro-regime faction among the people. Along with the secret FSB and the ‘second army of the world’, a force that is open and untainted by defeat must appear, ready to accept all Russians who are reliable and able to serve.

It’s all for the sake of creating widespread enthusiasm, which Surkov’s ‘Nashi’ and ‘All-Russian People’s Front’ movements tried to imitate earlier. Only now, it is done with the romanticisation of crime, common people’s brutal thirst for easy money, and the legal distribution of automatic weapons instead of posters.

In fact, it is yet another Russian experiment with the non-ideological creation of ‘stormtroopers’, ready to carry out any order of the authorities and not subject to any formal laws. This did not happen in the USSR, but the closest historical analogy for the Wagnerites is the SA/SS units of the Third Reich.

I cannot agree with my Western colleagues from the Institute for the Study of War, who, for some reason,n decided to mould him into almost the main favourite rival of Putin himself based on Telegram messages of the Kepka Prigozhina channel. A broad, all-Russian advertising campaign of the ‘Orchestra’ as the Wagner PMC troops are colloquially referred to, both on Telegram channels of ‘military experts’ and in external media, and the promotion of the ‘chef’ Prigozhin himself in the regional media, is not about an aged St. Petersburg gangster, but about teaching Russians to live in a new Russia, surrounded by external enemies and vulnerable to internal traitors. This is another social elevator for all those who were not lucky enough to get into the army or the FSB but who want to become the ‘masters’ of their lives in the new reality of their country. The only way to accomplish this is to go to the battlefield. As in Nazi Germany, ‘Wagner’s stormtroopers’ will be involved in implementing internal tasks to fight against all those ‘who are trying to humiliate the Motherland’.

The allegedly objective Russan ‘military correspondents’, who in reality are just military propagandists, portray the Wagner PMC as an elite force on the battlefield. The ‘victories’ and ‘feats’ of the SS units were presented using the same ‘eyewitness accounts’ during the Third Reich.

‘The fighters of the Wagner PMC are conducting active combat operations on a wide front near Bakhmut. Thus, they are pulling back the reserves and restraining the enemy’s actions in the North, military correspondent Dmitry Astrakhan told Channel One. Acting in this way, ‘Wagner’s men’ could neutralise the enemy's superior numbers. The attackers conduct simultaneous assaults on the entire battle line and force the Ukrainian Armed Forces to stretch their personnel and equipment. This approach leads to a slow but sure expulsion of the enemy from the occupied positions’ (21 October 2022).

Meanwhile, the Kremlin uses the image of Prigozhin to intimidate and mobilise all the lower levels of the administrative and party elite, to maintain the impression of its power despite the obvious defeats in Ukraine and the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Russia:

‘I urge members of the “talker’s club” to get together and lead units like the Wagner PMC,” urged Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Concord company. ‘And those who do not have the organisational skills to take up rifles or at least entrenching tools. This is what really means being useful. This is true service to the Fatherland’ (Company press service, 11 October 2022)

Along with this, the public image of Prigozhin himself is being revised. A ‘noble’ descendant of a war veteran, a scientist and a Lenin Prize laureate appears in place of the St. Petersburg urchin, who started out selling hotdogs. In short, everything is done as per Soviet traditions: Prigozhin has to be a ‘Komsomol member’, an ‘athlete’, and ‘just a nice guy’ to be believed by the ‘intelligent’ part of the ‘deep people’.

’Soviet and Ukrainian scientist Yefim Prigozhin, who was in charge of uranium extraction in Ukraine, turned out to be a great-uncle of Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin. The businessman himself confirmed the kinship with the famous scientist, commenting on a journalist’s inquiry. “Yefim Ilyich Prigozhin is my grandfather’s brother. Since I lost my father at an early age, I spent most of my life with my grandfather, who taught me how to do good,” the press service of the Concord company quoted Prigozhin saying. (25 October 2022)

The Russian propaganda also portrays Prigozhin as a Soviet and Slavic patriot whose actions demonstrate his dedication to Putin's policies and war goals. Even his attitude toward Ukrainians is emphatically ‘unbiased’, Soviet: they say that Ukrainians are our brothers and together with them, Russians will defeat the collective West. It has to be noted that the propaganda of the new attractive Russian fascism nourished by Prigozhin is beginning to bear unexpected fruit. There are self-organised groups led by former military and priests of the Russian Orthodox Church appearing in various Russian regions, calling on citizens to unite in military training groups and be ready for total mobilisation. It is possible that all such initiatives will be quickly merged under Wagner's umbrella in order to carry out operations both inside and outside Russia.

‘Courses of pre-mobilization military training have been organised on the basis of the Russian classical school at the Church of the Holy Martyr Sylvester of Omsk. This was reported by the rector of the parish of the Church of the Holy Martyr Sylvester of Omsk, priest Alexander Lemeshko. Tactics of combat, medical training, basics of artillery, theory, practice, field trips, and everything else needed in a real battle,’ Alexander Lemeshko wrote on his Telegram channel’ (14 October 2022, SuperOmsk.ru).

Let’s close the Kremlin’s Prigozhin topic with a few observations about the execution of an ex-prisoner fighter with the ‘Wagner hammer’. This video was hardly surprising to those following the crimes of the Prigozhin bandits in Syria. This is usually done to intimidate the target audience and demonstrate that they are willing to execute orders from superiors.

This time, the execution video was deliberately left without comment so that everyone could put themselves in the place of the executed and wonder if Prigozhin’s executioners would come for them too. However, the audience is primarily Russian, including new recruits of the private military company and Putin’s officials who began contemplating escape, voluntary captivity, or life after Putin.

One thing is clear: it is no coincidence that the Kremlin and Russian special services authorised both the execution and the viral spread of this story across the country after the Russian army fled Kherson. Fear is becoming the primary tool of Putin’s regime and a safeguard against open opposition to the government, including those who are ultra-nationalists.

Unwittingly Musking the genocide

I think the Kremlin reacted enthusiastically to the ‘peace plan for Russia and Ukraine’, which American billionaire Elon Musk tweeted on October 3. Moreover, Musk repeated almost verbatim the old stamp of Russian propaganda that the West is pushing Ukraine to the brink of nuclear conflict with Russia.

The Russian authorities were no less enthusiastic about another tweet of Musk’s on October 17, stating that Crimea is as valuable to Russia as Hawaii and Pearl Harbor are to the United States. And that Russia will defend  Crimea with nuclear weapons, eventually leading to the ‘end of civilisation’. The media resonance and scandal caused by Musk’s tweets were used by Russia just as it unleashed a campaign of methodical missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy sector, designed to plunge the country into darkness and cold. Musk’s popularity provided Russia with a perfect platform to convey the message to the West that Ukraine’s suffering was nothing compared to a nuclear war. Meanwhile, inside Russia, there was marked public approval of the missile strikes and destruction of critical infrastructure in Ukraine. In early November, Russian military and politicians made no secret of the genocidal aims of such attacks:

‘Lieutenant-General of the Reserve, Russian State Duma deputy Andrey Gurulyov: “As for the missiles, we have enough of them to bring Ukraine to its knees, de-energise, freeze and immobilise it. And as for the strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities, they were not spontaneous. All these strikes were planned, and not only by the military. I suspect that serious experts in the field of energy were involved in the development of the plan... We are achieving our goals despite all the complaints. Denazification and demilitarisation will be carried out to the end throughout Ukraine. We will achieve it in any case, no matter what it takes” (Tsargrad TV, 02 November 2022). 

The situation when the civilised world turns a blind eye to the genocide of Ukrainians as a result of Russian attacks, without imposing new sanctions against Russia and without providing enough weapons to liberate the occupied territories, can be considered a significant political advantage of the Kremlin.

Post-Kherson descent into fascism

However, neither the Prigozhin promotion campaigns nor the methodical missile attacks on the Ukrainian energy sector had such massive coverage or underwent such steep semantic reinterpretations as the topic of the ‘defence’ of the occupied Kherson by Russian troops.

Throughout October and through November 9, Russian media persuaded its audience that Ukraine would never be able to liberate Kherson. There was hardly anyone who didn’t have something to say about this, and there was hardly anything that Russian ‘politicians’, ‘experts’, and ‘military commanders’ weren’t ready to swear by. At the same time, Russians were convinced that the appointment of Sergey Surovikin as the head of the occupation forces in Ukraine would undoubtedly lead to resounding victories, a real ‘turning point’ in the war.

Here is a very brief retrospective review of how Russian media persistently shaped public opinion about the ‘inviolability’ of Kherson’s defence:

‘Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko has spoken about the conditions for stopping further military actions in the course of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine… She stressed that the issue of four new Russian regions is excluded from possible negotiations with Kyiv: DPR, LPR, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, as they are already part of Russia’ (RT in Russian, 06 October 2022)

‘All attempts to counterattack Ukrainian troops in Kherson region have failed’, said the acting governor of Kherson region Vladimir Saldo’ (RT in Russian, 11 October 2022).

It is possible to cautiously assess the consequences of such intensive propaganda with the help of official Russian statistics. Already on October 12, the pro-government polling institution Public Opinion Foundation reported that 78% of Russians surveyed support the seizure of four Ukrainian regions, including the Kherson region. Thus, the Kremlin tried to demonstrate a high level of popular support for its aggressive policy.

On the other hand, this figure speaks not only about the conformism of Russians but also about the scale of mandatory daily information activities. Because while ‘everything goes according to plan’, 78% passively consume news. However, when trouble arises, Russian propagandists need to quickly reach this large audience and make sure that they don't ask unnecessary questions, as well as find plausible versions to suit all audiences.

The first wake-up call occurred on October 18, when Surovikin spoke about ‘difficult decisions’. After that, the Russian propaganda machine deliberately and with even greater zeal began broadcasting messages about a ‘victory’ on the Kherson axis. 

‘The Defense Ministry reported a disorderly flight of Ukrainian troops near Kherson’ (Izvestiya, 20 October 2022).

‘A unit of the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV) destroyed a battalion of Ukrainian armed formations equipped with tanks from Macedonia and Slovenia, RIA Novosti reported on Saturday, October 22’ (Izvestiya, 22 October 2022).

But of particular note are the notions introduced inside Russia by various ‘reputable experts’:

1. There will no longer be a gap between official statements and reality. Official statements of the Russian Ministry of Defense can be trusted.

2. ‘Evacuation’ of civilians guarantees that Russian troops will not surrender Kherson.

3. In December, the Russian army will launch an offensive on the Kherson axis.

4. The Russian army is preparing for a decisive battle and is not going to leave Kherson.

The philosopher Alexander Dugin was also trusted to explain what ‘difficult decisions’ really mean. In his opinion, Surovikin’s words mark another ‘beginning’ of the final battle of Russia against the collective West for a new ‘multipolar world’. Moreover, this battle has a significant domestic political dimension because it gives the go-ahead for Russia to rid itself of everything Western and West-oriented personalities. First of all, in the Russian government. 

On October 27, the situation became more interesting: Putin stated that the war's goals remained unchanged and that he had no choice but to annex newly occupied territories, including Kherson. It seems that this signal from the Kremlin was taken as an order ‘not to take a step back’. Therefore, on October 27, messages about preparing for a fierce battle for Kherson began to spread.

‘Medvedev noted that the decision to incorporate the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions into Russia was made on the basis of the will of the residents of these regions, and it is permanent. We will never allow anyone to tear away the mentioned territories and will use all available opportunities to protect the people living there,’ the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council stressed’ (RT in Russian, 01 November 2022).

‘In the “Tsargrad. Glavnoye” programme, the channel’s economic commentator Yuriy Pronko discussed the situation in this area with military expert Konstantin Sivkov. The latter drew attention to the illustrative data of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, it is noted by the enemy that about a thousand more of our servicemen arrived on Kherson's soil. This confirms that there is a build-up, not a withdrawal of Russian troops. That is, we are not going to surrender the city. Moreover, from this bridgehead, with the arrival of a real, as opposed to calendar, winter, the Russian army may launch a large offensive in the direction of Mykolaiv and Odesa’ (Tsargrad TV, 28 October 2022).

In late October – early November, the Russian media started spreading the notion about the threat of destruction of the Kakhovka dam as a result of Ukrainian strikes and the beginning of the ‘evacuation’ of civilians from Kherson. The news about the Russian military's dangerous situation was mainly used to emphasise their resilience and heroism. There was more to come. In November, Russian media began to spread versions of Surovikin’s ‘cunning plan’, which was supposed to lead to a sudden Russian breakthrough in Ukraine.

‘Rustem Klupov, a veteran of military intelligence and Hero of Russia, explained that the right bank of the Dnipro is strategically important for us. It must be held so that we do not have to force the river. Otherwise, we will have to cross the river from the low-lying bank to the high bank, suffering heavy losses. Like the Germans in 1943, Ukrainians will defend the left bank with all their might. There is no question of leaving Kherson without a fight. Klupov did not rule out that Russia was preparing a ‘hidden attack’ but on a different axis. For example, on Sumy. Or Chernihiv.’ (Tsargrad TV, 03 November 2022).

‘The battle for Kherson may become the collapse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Kherson may become for the Ukrainian Armed Forces what Stalingrad was for the German Wehrmacht. By the way, as you may know, the officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces love the Wehrmacht, so they should suffer the same fate as the Wehrmacht,’ Markov said. He asserts that Western journalists believe the battle for Kherson will start today or tomorrow. This may well happen because the media have their own sources. Perhaps, the Ukrainian Armed Forces intend to give Biden a gift for the election. “That is, everything may start tonight,” the political analyst speculated (Tsargrad TV, 03 November 2022).

When the much-touted ‘General Armageddon’ [Sergey Surovikin] explained on November 9 that the ‘difficult decision’, ‘new Stalingrad’, and ‘military trick’ were actually a retreat from Kherson, the propagandists started falling apart along with the entire narrative of ‘heroic defence’. In light of these circumstances, the refusal of Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov to comment on the defeat looks like a reasonable decision.

However, most of the in-house propagandists, such as the much-advertised in the West as ‘independent’ Kadyrov and Prigozhin, quickly made a U-turn in their attitudes without batting an eye:

And from November 11, Alexander Dugin, who saw the battle for Kherson as a harbinger of a global Russian victory, used the withdrawal of Russian troops from the city to openly call for the introduction of an official and enforceable Russian fascist ideology, for an entire ‘people’s mobilisation’ in the name of defence of Russia.

‘Alexander Dugin: Kherson is the last line of defence. 

A Russian city, the capital of one of the Russian regions – the same as Belgorod, Kursk, Donetsk or Simferopol – has been surrendered... What is the best course of action? To immediately move from a sovereign dictatorship to a commissarial dictatorship, that is, to introduce an ideology... Enough fooling around: The Russian Idea. Only this. It is stupid to go into the total destruction of humanity purely out of fear of the Russian Idea, our ideology. There is no other way. Power in Russia cannot give up anything else. The limit has been reached. And there are not enough purely technical means to achieve victory. The war must become a people’s war to the fullest extent possible. But the state must also become a people’s state – a Russian one! As opposed to what it is now.’ (Tsargrad TV, 11 November 22).

When it failed to implement the ‘we can repeat’ slogan with a new ‘Battle of Stalingrad’ near Kherson, the Kremlin decided to openly experiment with fascism, genocide, and ‘Browncoats’. This is the only outcome of nine months of the full-scale war for them.