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Earlier, Ukraine paid less attention in terms of strategic communications and information politics to the countries of the Balkan region, i.e., Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia, Albania, as well as the partially recognized Kosovo, as compared to the countries of Western Europe and the USA. However, the events after February 24, 2022, especially the European integration of the Western Balkans and the acceleration of the European integration of Ukraine, made Balkan topics relevant for Ukrainian media. The Balkan region is where Russian propaganda has been operating since the time of the Russian Empire in the 19th century (read more about the current level of informational influence of Russia in the Balkans in the NATO Center of Excellence for Strategic Communications report).
The key factor of Russian influence in the Balkans is the Orthodox Church. In reality, the Russian Orthodox Church is not separated from the state, remaining an element of the hybrid war against Ukraine and Europe. It is especially noticeable in the Balkans: researchers from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the German Marshall Fund note the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Serbian Church (SOC), which in turn influences other countries. For example, in Montenegro, which is under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the SOC directly supported a more pro-Russian prime minister in the elections. In North Macedonia, where the SOC also has a significant influence, Russian propaganda constantly uses the thesis of oppositional "Slavic-Orthodox" unity as opposed to the West with its "non-traditional" values. Bulgaria was even forced to expel priests of the Russian Orthodox Church from the country because of a threat to national security. Its authorities believe that through the priests of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russia is trying to incite a beneficial conflict inside the country. Respectively, the close relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church help promote pro-Russian and anti-Western sentiments in Serbia itself.
In addition to the Orthodox Church, Russia uses history as another element of political influence abroad. In particular, through the narrative about Russia, which "liberated" the Balkan people from the oppression of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. In this narrative, Russia acts as a liberator, while the West seems to have constantly played covert games, not taking into account the interests of the Balkan people. Moscow is mainly manipulating this topic regarding the wars in the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s. For example, when NATO bombed Belgrade in March 1999, it was Russia (and not Ukraine) that supported Serbia. This narrative further inflames anti-Western sentiment in a region where countries are moving towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
According to a review analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations, Russia has spent decades investing in influencing the Balkans. Last but not least, propaganda was spread through the media — both local and Russian foreign media in the form of RT and Sputnik. When the broadcasting of the two media above was banned at the EU level in March 2022, Russia only increased its informational influence in Serbia by announcing the opening of RT Balkan in Belgrade.
Candidate of historical sciences, head of the Analytical Center for Balkan Studies, and co-founder of the Balkans Ukraine Cooperation Platform, Kateryna Shymkevych, spoke to Detector Media about the influence of Russian propaganda in the Balkans, the peculiarities of the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian war and Ukraine in the Balkan media, as well as the prospects of Kyiv's informational strengthening in the Balkan region.
She singles out four leading actors of Russian influence in the Balkans: "First of all, it is the church. It is primarily relevant for Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and North Macedonia, where Orthodox churches carry Russian propaganda to the masses. The second is various cultural and educational organizations. The media is in the third place. The fourth is Russian diplomats who act as spies in the Balkans. Of course, there is also the Russian diaspora, which also plays a dangerous game that very few people pay attention to.
Russian influence in the Balkans is more significant in some countries and less in others, but its instruments of influence are the same.
Read also: 330 shades of Russian disinformation: investigating the information space of Eastern Europe
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine led to the beginning of a reinterpretation of history and culture from the point of view of decolonization in some Balkan countries. On December 12, 2023, the monument to the soldiers of the Red Army in Sofia was dismantled. Actions in support of Ukraine took place near the monument, and there were demands for its dismantling by Bulgarians and Ukrainians in Bulgaria.
In May 2022, the Minister of Digital Management of Bulgaria, Bozhidar Bojanov, proposed to the European Commission to develop a mechanism for controlling social network algorithms. Such a statement was caused by the increase in the number of pro-Russian articles in the Bulgarian media and the information space in general. Thus, according to research by the Foundation for Humanitarian and Social Research, there were 39 texts of Kremlin propaganda from January to February 2022 and 397 news pieces from February 24 to April 17, 2022.
The Bulgarian media (Novini247, NewsFront, pogled.info, informiran.net) promoted narratives of Russian propaganda and conspiracy theories about the global "hegemon-puppet master" (the USA), who controls the puppets ("salable liberal elites" in the EU and NATO states). Europe is dying because it is a victim of a world conspiracy. Only Russia is fighting for actual values because it is reviving despite the West's attempts to impose its will [on it]. In 2023, the Minister of Defense of Bulgaria said that Russian propaganda is trying to reduce the country's military capability and destabilize the situation in the country, in particular by organizing farmers' protests regarding Ukrainian grain transit.
Propaganda is also trying to promote its desired history versions in the Balkans. Moscow creates a narrative where only the liberation of the Balkan peoples from enslavement was an important event, and the rest [of the history] is irrelevant. The link connecting Russia and the Balkans is Orthodoxy.
Kateryna Shymkevych explained the role of history in Russian propaganda in the Balkans: "Russia constantly reminds us of historical connections through Orthodoxy, showing historical and religious unity. According to it, only Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and partly North Macedonia have preserved stable religious institutions, despite the "oppression" of the Ottomans and the West, and have endured and preserved its Orthodox values. In its propaganda, Russia appeals to the 19-20th century, especially the Second World War, reminding the Balkan peoples of the significant role of Moscow in the so-called liberation from the Nazis.
The fight against Russian disinformation, which began to be discussed as a challenge and threat to national security after 2014, also produced specific results. More research pieces have been conducted on Russian informational influences, especially in Serbia and Bulgaria. The threat of disinformation as a component of Russia's hybrid war began to be discussed at the official level of the EU and NATO.
In April 2020, NATO's Center of Excellence for Strategic Communications released a report on the central narratives of Russian disinformation in the Western Balkans. The report analyzed how news from Serbian websites is published in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. According to NATO analysts, the primary source of Russian propaganda is the Serbian publication Srbin.info.
Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro distribute news from Serbian media. Source.
In June 2020, the European Parliament created a commission on foreign interference in all EU democratic processes. Representatives of the commission studied the impact of Russian disinformation on the European Union, particularly on the Balkans. A report published in March 2022 stated the following: "Russia is engaging in disinformation on an unprecedented scale in both traditional media and social media platforms to mislead its citizens at home and the international community in the run-up to and during its war of aggression against Ukraine, which was launched by Russia on February 24, 2022, proving that even information can be used as a weapon.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced in June 2022 that two military specialists would work in Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter disinformation and carry out defense reforms. It became part of the NATO mission in the Balkan state. Further, we will discuss Russia's media influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Read also: The US special representative said that the Balkans were "poisoned" by Russian disinformation
In April 2023, during his visit to the North Macedonian capital of Skopje, the head of the Center for Global Engagement at the US State Department, James Rubin, said: "The main source of threat in this part of the world is disinformation created by Russia, which is often repeated and operated through Serbian media platforms and then repeated and is published here in the Western Balkans. I would say that this region is quite seriously poisoned mainly by Russian disinformation."
Therefore, representatives of Western institutions are aware of Russian propaganda in the Balkans. However, to fight it, it is not enough to identify the threat — it is necessary to counter Russia's attempts to effectively influence the information space of NATO countries.
Russian propaganda in Serbia
Serbia is the key country for Russia to spread its propaganda, given Moscow's political, informational, economic, and cultural influence on Belgrade. Russia financed the construction of monuments to the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II in front of the State Presidium of Serbia and to Stefan I Nemanja (great governor of Raška in 1166-1196, founder of the Nemanjić Dynasty) in Belgrade.
Putin donated frescoes and mosaics to the Orthodox Cathedral of St. Sava in Belgrade. It is through the Orthodox Church that Russia influences the Serbs, showing the exceptional unity and friendship of the two nations.
Serbia has not joined the sanctions against Russia after February 24, 2022. The political leadership, led by President Aleksandar Vučić, positions its foreign policy as independent, in the sense that it is not under the control of the West, while at the same time considering Russia as its ally.
All this is a consequence of long-term Russian propaganda, which magnified the role of Moscow during the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. According to Russian propaganda, only Russia supported the Serbs when they were bombed by NATO in 1999.
The leading worldwide spokespeople of the Kremlin's propaganda — RT and Sputnik — still operate in Serbia; they were created after Russia seized Crimea in 2014-2015. At the same time, Russia launched the propaganda resource Russia Beyond. In November 2022, it was announced that RT Balkan would launch in Serbia — the start of broadcasting is expected in 2024.
At the beginning of December 2023, the Balkan Free Media Initiative published a study showing the role of global brands in advertising in the media of Bulgaria and Serbia. According to this study, Russian propaganda uses advertising to spread its narratives. The two largest Serbian television companies (TV Pink and TV Happy) call out in their publications that Russia was apparently "forced" to start the so-called SVO in February 2022 due to the "anti-Russian crusaders from NATO".
According to Vox Ukraine, the Serbian media spread the main messages of Russian propaganda about Ukraine: "civil war", "Nazism in Ukraine", "Ukraine itself is to blame for the war", "bad NATO, which is fighting against Russia using Ukrainians’ hands". Through such messages, these theses seep into the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, and North Macedonia.
In March 2022, the Atlantic Initiative of the Center for Security and Justice Research published a study about a targeted campaign in Serbian media against Ukraine. It analyzed five leading pro-government publications: Politika, Večernje Novosti, Informer, Srpski Telegraf, and Alo. The research identifies the fundamental narrative of Russian propaganda directed against NATO: the Alliance bombed Belgrade in March 1999, not because of the politics of Slobodan Milosevic and his entourage but to destroy the Serbs.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the formation of a negative image of NATO or the West by the Russians in Serbia and partly in other countries directly affects the perception of Ukraine and Ukrainians in the state and the region. Allegedly, only Russia supported Serbia in the 1990s, so it makes no sense to provide aid to Ukraine and even more so to stand in solidarity with the West regarding its position in the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Kateryna Shymkevych says that the political position of the Serbian leadership affects media coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian war and Ukraine as a whole: "Croatian media use the terms "aggression" and "Russian-Ukrainian war". In contrast to the Croatian media, Serbian media call it the "conflict " and the "Ukrainian crisis ". Pro-Russian propagandists spread their narratives in the media through the appropriate terminology.
Read also: "Schemes": A branch of Medvedchuk's movement "Different Ukraine" (Другая Украина), headed by a pro-Russian politician, has appeared in Serbia
According to Kateryna Shymkevych, despite pro-Russian widely disseminated narratives in Serbia, there are also opposition media publishing reports from the front and about events in Ukraine.
We have seen reports from Ukraine by NovaS, Danas, N1 Serbia, and Nin magazine. These resources are oppositional to Vuchich's regime and, therefore, are pro-Ukrainian. Only opposition media, such as Danas, published my text about the position of Ukraine in 1999 when NATO forces bombed Belgrade (there is also a separate analytical study). Serbia does not want to hear such a truth. It is profitable for them to be on Russia’s side," — believes Kateryna Shymkevych.
Russian information influence in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo
Croatia has officially supported Ukraine, although there is a difference of opinion between President Zoran Milanović and Prime Minister Andrej Plenković. In January 2023, Milanović condemned providing military aid to Ukraine because, in his opinion, it would only prolong the war. In May 2023, Milanović condemned the slogan "Glory to Ukraine!" comparing it to the motto of the Ustashi (a Croatian nationalist organization of the 1920s-1940s).
At the same time, Croatia provides humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration of Croatia, the total amount of assistance as of August 2023 is 160 million euros.
As Kateryna Shymkevych explained to Detector Media, after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Croatian media actively wrote about Ukraine: "Croatian media (Dalmatinski portal, Dubrovački vjesnik, Večernji list) in the first half of 2022 paid great attention on covering the full-scale Russia's war against Ukraine. Regular reports were showing Ukrainian cities being bombed, showing Zelenskyy's addresses. Half a year later (since July 2022), the Ukrainian topic did not become number one in the Croatian media, especially on television. It is the most popular type of media for Croatians."
The situation is more complicated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which ethnically consists of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a federal state (the Republika Srpska, where mostly Serbs live, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with mostly Croats and Bosniaks).
Map of the Balkans. Source.
Russia must maintain its influence in Republika Srpska, where its leader, Milorad Dodik, heads the Bosnian-Serb Union of Independent Social Democrats party. According to a study by the Clingendael think tank on Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, published in August 2023, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the second most influenced country in the region by Russia after Serbia.
In December 2020, a scandal broke out: Dodik gifted the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov a church icon that was illegally taken from the occupied part of the Luhansk region. The publication Istraga published data indicating the involvement of Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev in the theft of the Ukrainian icon. Malofeyev is close to Dodik. The story also mentions the Russian soldier Igor Girkin, who fought on the side of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s.
The peculiarity of the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that it takes most of its content from Serbian media. That is why pro-Russian narratives, which have already found an audience in a neighboring country, are spreading in another country.
According to the research of the non-governmental organization Support4partnership, part of the Bosnian media covered the war from a pro-Russian position since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine: Radio Television of the Republika Srpska (RS), Alternative Television, Nezavisnih Novina, Glas Srpsk. They called the war a "special military operation in Donbas." Radio Television of the Republika Srpska published daily reports from the Russian-occupied Donetsk region in the first months of the great war.
At the beginning of March 2022, Glas Srpska published a text by the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Igor Kalabukhov, entitled "Truth about the situation in Ukraine", voicing clear Russian propaganda messages about "Nazism in Ukraine", etc.
Kateryna Shymkevych says that Serbian media in Bosnia remain a source of Russian propaganda: "Bosnians in the media do not pay attention to the issue of Crimea at all. They do not see that Russian annexation was not only territorial but that Russia attacked representatives of Muslim civilization. The Serbian media in Republika Srpska is a speaker of Russian propaganda. Ukrainians are to blame for everything happening, and journalists cover the "crimes" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine against the "people of Donbas" and express support for the Serbs who went to fight "for their Orthodox brothers" (Russians).
Russia is on the Serbian side regarding the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Russian politicians and diplomats do not use the term "genocide" to refer to the crime against Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s.
Separately, it is worth mentioning Kosovo as another topic of Russian propaganda. Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. Currently, its independence is recognized by more than a hundred countries worldwide. Ukraine, like Russia, did not recognize Kosovo's independence.
As Kateryna Shymkevych says, Russian propaganda uses the precedent of Kosovo to legitimize the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014: "Ukraine should explain both to the Ukrainian society and in the Serbian media the differences between Kosovo in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Despite Russia's non-recognition of Kosovo's independence, Putin pursues his policy there. When necessary, Putin cited the advisory opinion of the UN International Court of Justice, which states that the independence of Kosovo is not a mistake and does not contradict international humanitarian law. Even though Russia has not recognized Kosovo, it has its consulate office there.
There were occasional exacerbations of the situation in Kosovo in August 2022 and 2023. Kateryna Shymkevych says that Russia seeks to fuel the frozen conflict: "Ukrainians should understand that this is an informational diversion of attention from Russia's war against Ukraine. Russia benefits from the constant escalation between Serbia and Kosovo. It is part of Belgrade's hybrid war against Pristina to keep the EU, NATO, and the USA in constant tension."
According to a study by NATO's Center of Excellence in Strategic Communications, TV Most is the leading media in Kosovo that spreads Russian propaganda.
Russian propaganda in Albania and North Macedonia
Albania, which was a bunkers' territory during the communist dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, began reforms in the 1990s and managed to become a member of NATO in 2009.
At the official level, Tirana expressed its support for Ukraine after February 24 last year. In January 2023, Albanian Defense Minister Niko Pelesi said that Albania would provide humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine.
The Balkan Investigative Journalism Network in Albania researched Russian disinformation narratives from January to August 2022. The main narratives turned out to be the following: the concealment of the facts of the atrocities of the Russian military against the Ukrainian civilian population and repeated disinformation that justified the Russian invasion of Ukraine. NATO and the USA seem to be a threat to Russia, which removes responsibility for the food crisis due to the supposedly populist economic policies of the West and not Russia. The media also spread other theses: "The West is destroying attempts to establish peace in Ukraine", posts about the presence of American and German biolaboratories in Ukraine, the takeover of Ukraine by neo-Nazis, the Polish imperial ambitions to annex the western regions of Ukraine, and the fact that the militant and Russophobic West seeks to encircle Russia, etc.
North Macedonia, which has historical disputes with Greece, Bulgaria. and Serbia, has also become a place for the spread of Russian propaganda. Its situation is very similar to the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the republications of texts from the Serbian media spread Russian disinformation.
According to a joint investigation by investigative journalists from OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project), NOVA TV, and KRIK (Crime and Corruption Reporting Network), which was released in June 2017, Russia was behind the protests against the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkan states, particularly, the former Macedonia and Montenegro— Russian special services spied on Macedonian politicians. The journalists also provide data that shows that 30 Russian-Macedonian cultural organizations were created to strengthen Russia's influence in Macedonia.
Read also: Montenegro, NATO, and the powerlessness of international journalism in Ukraine
In 2016-2017, Russia planned to ignite an ethnic conflict between Albanians and Macedonians, accusing the North Atlantic Alliance of destabilizing the situation in Macedonia. On March 2, 2017, the Russian propaganda resource Sputnik published an article entitled "NATO wants to see blood on the streets of Macedonia for the sake of the Greater Albania project".
In 2020, Macedonia changed its name to North Macedonia, complying with the demands of Greece, which also claims the historical heritage of the neighboring state. In the same year, North Macedonia became the thirtieth NATO state.
In July 2023, the civil association MOST presented a study on the main messages of Russian propaganda in North Macedonia during the first year of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. The general narratives are as follows: Ukraine is an existential threat to Russia, Kosovo is Serbia (just as Donbas is Russia), sanctions hurt the West more than Russia and are, therefore, ineffective, the West seeks to destroy Russia through an Orthodox worldview, need for more support for the Slavic-Orthodox brotherhood with further anti-Western rhetoric.
European integration
Russian propaganda especially manipulates the topic of the Western Balkans European integration. Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovenia are members of the EU and NATO. Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro are the only members of NATO. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo are not part of either the EU or NATO. Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia received EU candidate status in the 2000s and have been waiting for negotiations on joining the European Union for 20 years.
Ukraine applied to join the EU on February 28, 2022, and received (together with the Republic of Moldova) candidate status in June 2022. On December 14, the European Council decided to start negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU.
"The Croatia and Serbian media mixedly perceived the granting of candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022 and Ukraine’s European integration. The media wrote that Ukraine is not worthy of receiving a European perspective bypassing Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina," says Kateryna Shymkevych, explaining how Russia uses the topic of European integration in its disinformation. An example is the RT Balkan article with the headline "The EU gave a new slap to the Balkan countries", where a Serbian pro-Russian political scientist says that "hypocritical Brussels" ignores all the concessions made by the "Balkan countries" (i.e., Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and starts negotiations with a "corrupt, dysfunctional country without clearly defined borders" for the sake of Washington's geopolitical interests. He repeats theses of Russian propaganda, which he actually gives comments on.
On December 14, at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was noted that accession negotiations will begin after the implementation of specific recommendations, the progress of which will be analyzed by the European Commission in the spring of 2024. The EU is ready to start negotiations with North Macedonia only after the implementation of constitutional reform. The Austrian ambassador to Ukraine, Arad Benkö, in a video message on December 14, welcomed the decision to start negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU. In this way, the Austrian side supported the further European integration of Ukraine. However, even before the meeting of the European Council on December 12, Chancellor of Austria Karl Nehammer spoke against the accelerated accession of Ukraine to the EU when there is also Bosnia and Herzegovina, which also expects further European integration.
Ukrainian refugees
Russian propaganda also uses the topic of Ukrainian refugees to sow discord among the Balkan societies. It spreads the thesis that Ukrainians immediately received special status and assistance while Africans waited for years to receive the status of asylum seekers. The thesis that Ukrainians are somehow better than illegal migrants from the Middle East or Africa is used throughout Europe, not only in the Balkans.
Kateryna Shymkevych commented on these narratives as follows: "When Ukrainians [refugees] started arriving, they came to different countries: Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and Croatia. There was an interesting thesis of Russian propaganda that Ukrainians are not like refugees because it is unclear what they are running away from; they drive costly cars, are well dressed, and know several languages."
Russia not only humiliates Ukrainian refugees, forming a negative image of them against the background of migrants from other parts of the world, but also forms an image of Russians as "victims of Putin's regime" who fled from the evil Putin, and they also need help.
Russia is also using culture as a weapon, using Putin's loyal friends to show the unity of the Balkans and Russia. We must mention the Serbian film director Emil Kusturica, who, in February 2022, became the chief director of the Central Academic Theater of the Russian Army.
Ukraine’s information strengthening in the Balkans
An adequate response to the activities of Russian propaganda in the Balkans can be the formation of Ukraine’s systematic information policy in this region. After February 24, 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities, and public organizations began to pay more attention to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America due to their particular "neutral" position in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The Balkans appear in Ukrainian media news during the following topics: escalation in Kosovo, European integration of the Western Balkans, and scandals surrounding the Russian secret service officers in the Balkans.
According to Kateryna Shymkevych, who studies the Balkans and comments on Ukrainian issues in the Balkan media, Ukraine must form its strategic vision of information policy in the region.
"To build a respective information policy, Ukraine must understand why we need the Balkans. Understanding the Balkan region will depend on how we present the information. In my opinion, it is necessary to create a special agency or institute that will work with the constant support of the Balkan media space with information about Ukraine", said Kateryna Shymkevych.
The basis of information policy should clarify the circumstances of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Without it, it is difficult to imagine effective communication between Ukraine and the Balkans. At the same time, it is worth remembering that Russian propaganda has been manipulating public opinion in the Balkan states about the West and Ukraine for years.
Today, we have a situation where the very approach to communication must be changed — from reactive to proactive. After having done a lot of research on Russia's agents of influence in the Balkans and the media spreading Russian narratives — now is the time to build a strategy on how to communicate with a region that has long been in the grip of Russian disinformation. In our opinion, it is worth paying more attention to people’s stories — the Balkans living in Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Balkans. There is also a great need to analyze public opinion about Ukraine on the Balkan peninsula and vice versa to understand what Ukraine thinks about the Balkans. The emphasis of this research should be on the influence of Russian disinformation on the perception of Ukraine in the Balkans.
Infographics by Natalia Lobach
