Russian aggression accelerated Ukraine and Moldova’s decisions to submit official applications for membership in the European Union and increased public approval of the pro-European course. On June 23, 2022, the European Council adopted a decision to grant Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidates for EU membership. According to the sociological department of the Razumkov Center, 92% of Ukrainians support joining the European Union. The indicator of support for Moldova's membership in the EU among the local population reaches 63%. Most citizens of both states support the pro-European course, which means a "final goodbye" to Russia, which it does not want to put up with.
In various ways, Russia is trying to satisfy its own imperial whims and regain its former glory by strengthening Moscow's influence in the post-Soviet territories of Eastern Europe. After virtually destroying the sovereignty of Belarus and starting a war against Ukraine over fears that it wants to join the EU, Putin is doing everything he can to keep Moldova under Russian control. First, the Kremlin tries to influence it through Gagauzia, an autonomous territorial entity in the south of Moldova, and Transnistria, which Russia occupies. If just a few years ago, during the presidency of Igor Dodon, it might have seemed that Moscow and Chisinau were moving towards improving relations, the Russian invasion of Ukraine became the catalyst for Moldova leaving Moscow's orbit.
Of all the post-Soviet countries that are not members of the European Union or Ukraine, Moldova probably has the most strained relationship with Russia. That is why the Kremlin seeks to discredit Chisinau's European integration steps. Watching this, one feels that "this has already happened" - similar rhetoric and propaganda techniques were used by Russian agitational propaganda (agitprop) in Ukraine.
Discrediting as a propaganda tactic undermines individuals, institutions, or ideas' credibility, reputation, or legitimacy. To discredit, propagandists manipulate images and videos, use depreciation, baseless accusations, half-truths, and other false information.
Russia has many instruments of "hard power" (military and economic levers of influence on the behavior or interests of certain political bodies) — both the contingent of Russian troops in occupied Transnistria and the energy sector issues. Moldova still receives 75% of its electricity from sources controlled by Russia (generation takes place on the territory of occupied Transnistria, and the transmission line passes through these territories, complicating the market diversification). The dependence on Russian gas reached 100% in 2021, but in May 2023, the right-bank Moldova renounced it.
In addition, Moscow has many tools of "soft power" in the form of the anti-Western Orthodox Church and Russian-language media. The Kremlin supports Moldova's pro-Russian political forces, such as the recently declared unconstitutional Shor party («Шор»). Trying to influence the upcoming elections in Moldova, Russia can win the support of anti-Western political forces and play on dissatisfaction with the economic situation.
In Ukraine, the situation was quite similar: dependence on Russian energy carriers, the presence of Russian troops in temporarily occupied territories, the influence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on public sentiment, and efforts to influence political life through the financing of pro-Russian political forces.
Against these similarities, we understand how pro-Russian and Eurosceptic narratives in Moldova echo similar narratives in Ukraine.
1. "Rallies for the European integration are "paid for"
On May 21, 2023, a multi-thousand rally, "European Moldova", took place in Chisinau. According to the authorities, more than 75 thousand people participated. "Sputnik Moldova", a Russian propaganda news agency, described the events as "Euroecstasy [...], headlined by President Maia Sandu and President of the European Parliament Roberta Metzola". According to the media, it was "a PR action by the authorities or an attempt to save the political position of the ruling PAS party and President Maia Sandu", and the rally itself was not accurate because the authorities allegedly brought "budget workers" to it, who had no choice but to humbly come by bus to Chisinau. Similar statements were made regarding the Ukrainian Euromaidan — it was said that the United States prepared for these events for almost 40 years, regularly allocated funds for this through the USAID fund, and at the right moment, they directed everything. Participants were paid $150 each for a "Molotov cocktail".
On the eve of the "European Moldova" rally, President Sandu's team launched a communication campaign with a call to join the rally. On that day in May, many more people gathered in the central square of Chisinau than the opposition politicians brought to their own rallies, who, against the background of the acute energy crisis caused by Russian aggression against Ukraine, have been trying to shake up the already difficult situation in the country since September 2022. The protests were organized by pro-Russian forces, particularly the Shor party and its leader, fugitive pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, against whom the European Union imposed sanctions "for destabilizing the situation in Moldova" in May 2023.
Something similar was done by the representatives of the now-banned Ukraine party "OPZZH" («ОПЗЖ»), who in 2021 took advantage of the rise in gas prices and actually subverted a spontaneous protest wave, established their own "Protest Coordination Headquarters" and quietly promoted pro-Russian and anti-government narratives. As for Euromaidan — in November 2013, Ukrainian journalists spread the call to join the protest. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who wanted to determine foreign and domestic policy independently and disagreed with the fugitive president Viktor Yanukovych's attempt to reverse the process of Ukraine's return to the European family deliberately came to the Maidan.
Therefore, such propagandistic criticisms are an attempt to discredit popular support for rapprochement with the EU and undermine the popularity of the ideas of European integration. Depicting the pro-European movements as orchestrated and the participants as paid mercenaries, Russian propaganda seeks to marginalize pro-European sentiments and portray them as a foreign ideology imposed from outside, which is not at all relevant to the "Slavic people".
2. "The fight against the opposition and freedom of speech is anti-European, and Brussels turns a blind eye to it."
In addition to the above-mentioned Ilan Shor, the pool of pro-Russian politicians in Moldova includes one of the leaders of the Socialist Party and former president Igor Dodon. He regularly declares that Moldova has become a colony of the West, Sandu is a Brussels-Washington puppet, and with Russia and Putin, it is necessary to be friends and "not to burn bridges". Until recently, the Socialists and "Shor" had enough support for their parties to overcome the electoral threshold to the parliament in the next elections. But in June 2023, the Constitutional Court outlawed "Shor" and prevented the re-registration of the political party under the same pro-Russian brand. Moldovan Telegram channels, which spread pro-Russian rhetoric, reacted as follows: "For the ruling party, the ban on the opposition is a sign of a healthy democracy." "But for the European integration, it is a dead end, but Brussels turns a blind eye to it," said another anonymous Moldovan Telegram channel.
According to Shor, "Today's Moldova is a captured state. All state administration bodies are under the control of Sandu and PAS, which operate under the clear guidance of the US and the EU." And Dodon noted, "Instead of observing rights and freedoms, we saw the arrests of opposition leaders, the closing of six TV channels, the banning of the Shor party, various sanctions, and the granting of additional powers to the Information Security Service."
Following the adoption of the law on information security, which bans news and analytical content from countries that have not ratified the Convention on Transfrontier Television, in December 2022, Moldova suspended broadcasting licenses of six TV channels Primul în Moldova, RTR Moldova, Accent TV, NTV Moldova, TV6, and Orhei TV. These channels tended to and manipulatively showcased the events in Moldova and the war against Ukraine. Socialist deputy Adelaida Railianu characterized the closure: "The criminal, fascist regime closed the mouths of six TV channels." Pro-Russian forces organized protests near the Moldovan parliament.
We observed similar rhetoric after the blocking of media assets ("112", ZIK, NewsOne, and First Independent) associated with Viktor Medvedchuk and Taras Kozak — "it is a political massacre of objectionable media", "no one dared to ban the channels, not even President Poroshenko" and "Ukraine dutifully executes Washington's cunning plan". Similarly, Yevgeniy Murayev's channel — " NSDC-95 (National Security and Defence Council) banned Ukrainians from watching the NASH TV channel", which "allowed people to form a completely different picture of the world than the one reproduced by the government and its curators, and that's why it [the channel] was closed". We also heard about the alleged oppression of the opposition from various propagandists who say that Zelensky is persecuting the opposition with all kinds of "barbaric methods" and that these are all "signs of a criminal dictatorship introduced by the authorities".
By portraying the opposition as victims of persecution, Russia seeks sympathy and support for its narrative that Moldova and Ukraine are supposedly suppressing dissent and mercilessly fighting the opposition. Violating this topic helps the Kremlin position itself as a defender of ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking population in neighboring countries. Emphasizing the "persecution of the opposition", Russia justifies its interference in the internal affairs of these countries, for example, the annexation of Crimea or the support of separatist movements in Transnistria. Agitprop manipulatively appeals to Western values of freedom and dissent, saying that Chisinau and Kyiv are grossly violating them. However, hybrid responses are the most effective for hybrid threats; you can read more here.
3. "Victory Day is canceled to please Europe"
In May 2023, the Parliament of Moldova registered a draft law on renaming Victory Day on May 9 to Memorial Day, and be celebrated on May 8. The initiative's authors believe this is necessary to move to "interpretation and perception without accompanying ideology of some historical events related to the Second World War in Moldovan society." "To please the West, Maya Sandu's regime is repeating the path of the Kyiv regime: the authorities banned symbols of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, raised the question of postponing the May 9 celebration," said one of the Moldovan anonymous Telegram channels that broadcast pro-Russian rhetoric. "Moldova, declaring European integration, integrates into the radical part of Europe, into its Baltic part," — bitterly noted in the "Komsomolskaya Pravda in Moldova" publication, lamenting that the authorities have stopped allocating funds for the restoration of Soviet monuments and they will soon be destroyed.
In May 2023, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine canceled the Day of Victory over Nazism in the Second World War on May 9 and made May 8 the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939–1945 and a public holiday; the president signed the corresponding law. In 2015, Ukraine changed the format of celebrating this date, rethought the events of the Second World War, and destroyed Soviet historical myths, abandoning the term "Great Patriotic War" at the state level. Moscow reacted to this with toxic attacks: "The holiday was canceled", because "This great holiday has nothing to do with the Bandera government ", and " representatives of the current Ukrainian government are not winners, but those who have always lost".
We wrote in detail about the "exaggerated victorious hysteria" (pobedobesie, побєдобєсіє), the national cult of militarism, and how Russia instrumentalizes fixation on the events of the Great Patriotic War here. A large part of the USSR’s history is the times of war (World War II and Cold War), so the cult of victory was nurtured together with the culture of militarism: the USSR relied on military force to maintain its power and influence, official propaganda emphasized the individual’s sacrifice for the sake of the state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian society inherited a cult of militarism. Currently, Russia appropriates the victory in the Second World War, constantly repeats Russia's thesis about its rightful succession to the USSR, and monopolizes the memory of the victory over Nazism. Celebrating Victory Day and participating in the so-called "Immortal Regiment" (walking with photos of the Soviet military) are the instrumentalized attributes of "Russian peace."
4. "Gas blackmail: European gas is not affordable for an average citizen."
Until 2021, Moldova was utterly dependent on gas imported from Russia at the will of Gazprom and its local subsidiary, Moldovagaz. The Russian lobby in Moldova stopped any discussions about the diversification of markets. Only at the end of 2021, Moldova built the pipe "Iasi - Chisinau" (gas pipeline to Romania), which was not used until 2022. "Shortly, Moldova will not be able to refuse purchases of Russian gas simply because there is no real alternative," — propagandist media mentioned in 2022. Thanks to the help of the EU, Moldova could eliminate its dependence on Russian gas imports, but its prices remained at record highs. Subsequently, Moldova began to purchase gas for its domestic consumption at exchange prices from the EU through Romania. In 2023, the price on the European market turned out to be lower than that of Gazprom.
From May 2023, it was possible to switch to a regime where Russian gas is consumed only by occupied Transnistria, while right-bank Moldova switched to European blue fuel. Even when gas prices were reduced by 38% in early June 2023, propagandist Telegram channels reacted unhappily to this — they said they could have reduced tariffs by 50-70% if they had maintained good relations with Gazprom. Yes, the situation with energy carriers in Moldova is difficult because electricity is generated thanks to Russian gas at TPPs and HPPs located in occupied Transnistria. Initiatives for the systematic development of renewable energy generation were fruitless until recently.
A similar situation happened in Ukraine. On November 25, 2015, Gazprom cut off gas to Ukraine for the last time, and since then, we have stopped buying blue fuel from our hostile neighbor. Although in the recent past, it seemed impossible. For the sake of justice, we note that before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine satisfied two-thirds of its gas market thanks to its own production and purchased 10 billion cubic meters (after February 24, 2022, gas production fell by 6%). Propaganda assured in every possible way that Ukrainian industry and consumers would not survive without Russian gas. "The gas issue" was one of the central topics of Medvedchuk’s TV channels. Viktor Medvedchuk, Vadym Rabinovych, Taras Kozak, and Yuriy Boyko — deputies from "OPZZH" regularly flew to Russia to allegedly agree with Gazprom on lowering gas tariffs for Ukraine in exchange for certain concessions. "If we signed a direct contract at least in 2019, the gas price would be around $175. $175, not what's going on today," — stated Medvedchuk just a few months before the start of a full-scale invasion.
As per an investment banker Serhii Fursa, regional gas companies, which are part of the Regional Gas Company structure of the fugitive oligarch Dmytro Firtash, which does not benefit from the gas market, raised the margin to 40%. At the same time, Firtash's "OPZH" party tried to incite people to protest against the authorities: with one hand, they raised tariffs, and with the other, they brought ordinary citizens to rallies under the slogans of "destroy the market."
How Russia is trying to turn Ukrainians and Moldovans against each other
Russia is using various methods to quarrel with Moldova and Ukraine to harm the coordinated and synchronized movement toward Europe. First, agitprop tries to establish the image of Ukraine as a belligerent and dangerous neighbor that can sneakily attack at any moment. In February 2023, agitprop began to disperse the message that "Zelensky's regime ordered the transfer of troops to the borders of Transnistria. We can say with great probability that Zelensky is preparing to attack Transnistria." Another intensification of propaganda attacks could also be observed during the Second Summit of the European Political Community. Transnistrian Telegram channels wrote about fabricated threats by Ukrainian nationalists who were allegedly going to "use the atmosphere of the summit for provocation; such a provocation can potentially be used as a Casus Belli for Ukraine, especially given Zelensky's arrival in Chisinau."
Secondly, the propagandists try in every possible way to generate hatred for Ukraine on the part of ordinary Moldovans; for this, they use all convenient means. One of the latest vivid examples is the attempt to present the protests of Moldovan farmers demanding the payment of compensation promised by the government as rallies against Ukraine. In particular, this topic was pushed by several local pro-Russian Telegram channels. Russian aggression caused a large-scale food crisis on different continents (we wrote more about how Russian propaganda discredits the Black Sea Grain Initiative here). Moldovan farmers suffered greatly from the disruption of raw material production and sales chains. However, Russian propaganda portrayed rallies demanding support for the agricultural sector as anti-Ukrainian, and the search for compromises by the Moldovan government and farmers as an attempt to please Ukrainians first, not their own citizens.
Thirdly, anonymous Telegram channels spread the thesis that allegedly Moldova received the status of a candidate for joining the European Union only thanks to Ukraine, thereby creating a false sense of its own non-competitiveness and political weakness.
However, the pro-European shift of sympathies in Moldovan society is inevitable. According to Valeriu Pasha, information expert and head of the "WatchDog.MD" community, Russian propaganda still greatly influences the perception of the world by the citizens of Moldova. However, Russia has much less influence on the behavior of Moldovans. Even though Moldovans continue to consume pro-Russian agitprop, they have stopped trusting Putin. We can only hope that in the coming years, Moldova, which is friendly to Ukraine, will neutralize the harmful influence of hostile narratives and strengthen its European future.
