Monitoring of the United News Marathon and Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel broadcasts on September 14–15, 2026 — summary

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Coverage of the week’s main topics; representation of parliamentary factions and groups in guest studios; instances of political PR, as well as Russian narratives and toxic media figures in the telethon; and violations of the core standards of information journalism—in brief.

The United News telethon was launched on February 24, 2022. Detector Media began monitoring it on March 21 of the same year using this methodology. In January this year, Detector Media refined and expanded this methodology in response to comments and suggestions from the editorial teams participating in the telethon. The author of the monitoring is Ihor Kulyas, a media trainer and the creator of Detector Media’s core monitoring methodology. 

From March 2022 to September 2024, the monitoring focused on recording and analyzing broadcast schedules of different channels, the main content produced by editorial teams (reports, live feeds, studio discussions), violations of journalism standards, instances of political PR, representation of parliamentary factions and groups, Russian narratives and toxic media figures, and topics ignored by the telethon.

On May 21, 2024, Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel left the telethon and began independent 24/7 broadcasting. This change is not fundamental for monitoring purposes. The work of Suspilne’s news editorial team continues to be evaluated as before, using the same methodology as before the telethon. 

Since October 2024, the monitoring format has changed. It now focuses on analyzing coverage of major socially significant topics in the telethon and — for comparison — on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel. It tracks how key daily and weekly topics are covered, representation of MPs from different factions, instances of political PR, and the presence of toxic media figures and Russian narratives. Read more about the new monitoring format here.

Starting in 2026, the Rada channel is no longer broadcasting as part of the national telethon.

On September 14–15, the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka directions were the most active, along with the South Slobozhanskyi and Huliaipole directions. The Lyman direction also deserved particular attention, as the Ukrainian Armed Forces were conducting successful counterattacks there. During the reporting period, the telethon channels devoted the most attention to the Lyman direction, as well as the Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and Sloviansk directions. On Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, the Pokrovsk and Lyman directions received the most attention during the reporting period. Other active directions received little coverage.

The main domestic political topic during the reporting period — Prosecutor General Kravchenko’s trip abroad, his announcement of suspicion against the head of NABU, and his resignation approved by parliament — was covered differently by the various channels in the telethon. The most detailed coverage came from 1+1 and ICTV and STB, although they limited themselves to short formats. There was minimal discussion. Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel covered the topic much more extensively, independently seeking comments from all the institutions and individuals involved. The channel’s talk shows examined the issue in depth with experts, representatives of anti-corruption NGOs, and members of parliament from different political camps.

In the telethon, the Russian aerial attack on Pryluky in Chernihiv region, which killed three people, was covered with original short news packages featuring sound bites only on ICTV and STB. Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel aired two live reports by its correspondent from the impact site and broadcast her report.

The main foreign policy topic — the “energy truce” between Ukraine and Russia announced by US President Trump — was analyzed in greater detail with experts on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel. By contrast, Russia’s new provocations against NATO countries — a Russian drone shot down over Lithuania and a Russian ship firing on a Danish military helicopter — were discussed with experts only on the telethon.

One of the main foreign policy topics during these days was US President Trump’s statement that Ukraine and Russia had allegedly agreed not to strike each other’s energy infrastructure, along with the parties’ reactions to the statement. In the telethon, the “energy truce” was discussed in greater detail with experts on We Are Ukraine and 1+1. Meanwhile, Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel devoted considerably more attention to expert discussion of the issue than all the telethon participants combined. On September 15, Russia carried out two more provocations against NATO countries: a Russian drone was destroyed on Lithuanian territory, and a Russian ship fired on a Danish military helicopter. Both the telethon and Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel covered these events in the same way, using short news packages with sound bites of official statements. However, expert discussion of the issue took place only on the telethon.

During the reporting period, the telethon featured the most serious violations of the standards of reliability and separation of facts from opinions. There were also violations of the timeliness standard. On Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, the most serious violations during the reporting period concerned the standards of reliability, completeness, and accessibility of information.

Over the two weeks from September 7 to 20, representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction overwhelmingly dominated the “MP” guest segments on the telethon. Only one MP from an opposition faction was invited. On Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, representation of MPs from the ruling and opposition factions in discussion programs was balanced during these weeks. At the same time, the balance was disrupted on four occasions, when MPs from opposition factions were interviewed separately on controversial topics.

On September 2–3, there were four instances of political promotion across broadcasts on two telethon channels. There were no instances of political promotion on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel on those days.

THE SITUATION ON DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE FRONT:

During the reporting period, the Pokrovsk direction (26 and 43 combat engagements per day) and the Kostiantynivka direction (20 and 18) were once again the most active. On one of the reporting days, there were 17 combat engagements in the South Slobozhanskyi direction and 10 in the Huliaipole direction. On all other directions, the number of combat engagements did not exceed 10 per day during these days. At the same time, on September 14, DeepState reported Russian advances in four directions in Donetsk region. By contrast, on September 15, Andrii Biletskyi, commander of the 3rd Army Corps, confirmed a successful Ukrainian offensive near Lyman.

During the reporting period, the telethon channels collectively devoted the most attention to the Lyman direction, which was discussed with six guests. The situation there was examined professionally with an expert and a military officer on 1+1 in the “Duty Officer” segment. The second-most-covered direction was Kupiansk, which was not among the most active directions (one report and four discussions). Considerable attention was also devoted to the most active Pokrovsk direction (one report and three discussions) and the Sloviansk direction (four discussions). Among the active directions, the Kostiantynivka direction was the only one that received notably insufficient attention, with just one discussion. The frontline situation during the reporting period was most frequently discussed with military personnel serving at the front (13 times). Spokespeople for various military units were invited five times, and experts three times. The war correspondents from ICTV and STB were particularly active on these days, producing five report-style segments and one live broadcast. Another frontline report aired on 1+1. No frontline reports were produced by the other channels during these days.

On Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, the frontline was barely mentioned in news bulletins. In the guest studios, the most attention was devoted to the Pokrovsk direction (four discussions); the Lyman direction was discussed with two guests, and an overview report was produced. The situation in the Kostiantynivka direction was discussed with two guests, while other directions received minimal attention. The South Slobozhanskyi direction was mentioned only in brief updates. Military personnel serving at the front, military unit spokespeople, and experts were invited to the guest studios to discuss the frontline four times each. One frontline report was produced.

DOMESTIC POLITICS:

The main domestic political topics during the two reporting days were a series of interrelated developments. (I have nevertheless divided them into two subtopics below, although a substantial portion of the information on both was presented in the same reports, and guests usually discussed both together.) These included the trip abroad by suspended Prosecutor General Kravchenko and his video statement announcing suspicion against NABU Director Kryvonos and a “person close to the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office,” Klymenko; the responses from NABU and SAPO; and, ultimately, Kravchenko’s resignation, approved by the Verkhovna Rada.

On the telethon, these events were covered differently by the various channels. On September 14, Inter limited its coverage to a brief announcement of the upcoming parliamentary vote, and on September 15 it completely overlooked what was clearly a top news story. During its daytime broadcast on September 15, We Are Ukraine covered the issue concisely through short news reports, although it did air brief sound bites from Kryvonos and Klymenko. The channel discussed the matter only with Yevheniia Kravchuk, a representative of the Servant of the People faction. 1+1 and ICTV and STB provided more detailed report-style coverage, although they too relied on short reports featuring sound bites. Nevertheless, their broadcasts covered all the main aspects of the story. On 1+1, the topic was discussed with political scientist Andrii Tkachuk and also with Andrii Osadchuk, a representative of the opposition Holos faction (!). During the talk show on ICTV and STB, political scientist Ihor Reiterovych raised the issue of the European Commission’s reminder that the Prosecutor General must be selected through a competitive process, and the host developed the discussion around this important aspect of the broader issue. In addition, the host reported, citing Suspilne, that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) had denied that Kravchenko was participating in its session.

Despite this unusual level of completeness in the coverage of a politically sensitive topic by certain telethon channels — unusual, in my view, based on previous observations — Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel provided far more detailed coverage. Over the two days, the channel covered the story through high-quality reporting, delivering each new development promptly. Unlike the telethon, the channel actively and independently sought comments from every institution connected to the issue, including the Prosecutor General’s Office, NABU, SAPO, the Office of the President, and the State Border Guard Service, as well as directly from Kravchenko and Kryvonos. The European Commission’s response, delivered by its spokespersons, came in answers to questions from Suspilne correspondents. Suspilne also contacted PACE’s press service to establish whether Kravchenko had been scheduled to participate in an Assembly session. The channel also broadcast Kryvonos and Klymenko’s entire briefing live, whereas the telethon aired only short sound bites from it. In the talk shows on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel, the issue was analyzed in depth on both days with a range of experts, representatives of anti-corruption civil society organizations, and members of parliament from different political camps. In conclusion, I can state with confidence that viewers of Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel received a much more comprehensive and in-depth picture of the top news story of the reporting period than viewers of the telethon.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENEMY SHELLING AND BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS:

The most devastating attack during the reporting period was the Russian aerial attack on Pryluky in Chernihiv region, which killed three people and injured another eight. On the telethon, original footage from the scene and sound bites from eyewitnesses who lived nearby were shown only on ICTV and STB, and even then, coverage was limited to a short format. Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel aired two live reports by its correspondent from the impact site and broadcast her report.

UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD POLITICS:

One of the main foreign policy topics during these days was US President Trump’s statement that Ukraine and Russia had allegedly agreed not to strike each other’s energy infrastructure, along with the parties’ reactions to the statement. In the telethon, the “energy truce” was discussed in greater detail with experts on We Are Ukraine and 1+1. Meanwhile, Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel devoted considerably more attention to expert discussion of the issue than all the telethon participants combined.

On September 15, Russia carried out two more provocations against NATO countries: a Russian drone was destroyed on Lithuanian territory, and a Russian ship fired on a Danish military helicopter. Both the telethon and Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel covered these events in the same way, using short news packages with sound bites of official statements. However, expert discussion of the issue took place only on the telethon.

Topics and events not mentioned on the telethon but covered by Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel:

Not reported either on the telethon or on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel:

The telethon:

On 1+1, the most frequent serious violations of the accuracy standard were purely abstract pseudo-attributions. Many facts were also presented without references to sources. All serious violations of the precision standard involved discrepancies between images and text. The most frequent serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions standard were journalists’ emotional assessments in news reports. The most frequent violations of the completeness of information standard involved insufficient presentation of experts’ qualifications. The most frequent serious violations of the accessibility of information standard were related to the use of words and abbreviations that were incomprehensible to a significant part of the audience.

On ICTV and STB, the most frequent serious violations of the accuracy standard were vague, generalized pseudo-attributions of subjective opinions. Many facts were also presented without references to sources. The most frequent serious violations of the precision standard involved discrepancies between images and text. The most frequent (and, overall, exceptionally numerous) serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions standard were journalists’ emotional assessments in news reports. All serious violations of the accessibility of information standard involved the use of words and abbreviations that were incomprehensible to a significant part of the audience. There was also a serious violation of the timeliness standard when a report about an event that had taken place two days earlier was presented as news.

On Inter, the most frequent serious violations of the accuracy standard were purely abstract pseudo-attributions. The most frequent serious violations of the precision standard involved discrepancies between images and text. The most frequent serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions standard were journalists’ emotional assessments in news reports and in news segments during guest studio programs. All serious violations of the completeness of information standard involved insufficient presentation of experts’ qualifications. The most frequent serious violations of the accessibility of information standard involved the use of words and abbreviations that were incomprehensible to a significant part of the audience (there were an exceptionally large number of abbreviations this time).

On We Are Ukraine, the most frequent serious violations of the accuracy standard were purely abstract pseudo-attributions. Many facts were also presented without any references to sources. The most frequent serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions standard were journalists’ emotional assessments in news reports. The most frequent serious violations of the completeness of information standard involved the absence of natural sound in the footage.

Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel

The most frequent serious violations of the accuracy standard (and, overall, there were very many) were purely abstract pseudo-attributions. There were also numerous pseudo-attributions to the abstract internet. All serious violations of the precision standard involved inappropriate use of footage to “illustrate” conversations with guests. The most frequent serious violations of the separation of facts from opinions standard were journalists’ emotional assessments in news reports. All serious violations of the completeness of information standard involved insufficient introductions of guests and speakers in sound bites. The most frequent serious violations of the accessibility of information standard involved the use of abbreviations and words that were incomprehensible to a significant part of the audience.

MPs on the telethon:

Over the two reporting weeks, MPs were invited onto the telethon 16 times (compared with 12 invitations during the previous two weeks). During the reporting period, representatives of the ruling Servant of the People faction appeared on the telethon 15 times (almost 94% of all MP appearances in studio programs). On one occasion, 1+1 invited a representative of the opposition, Andrii Osadchuk of Holos. MPs from the two other opposition factions, Batkivshchyna and European Solidarity, were not invited as guests.

During the reporting weeks, Oleksii Leonov of Servant of the People appeared on the telethon three times, on three different channels. His faction colleagues Yehor Cherniev, Lesia Zaburanna, Roksolana Pidlasa, and Serhii Ionushas appeared twice each. All other MPs appeared on the telethon once.

The Office of the President was represented on the telethon four times during these two weeks by its adviser Serhii Leshchenko (twice on Inter and twice on We Are Ukraine, for a total of 42 minutes of airtime). Presidential adviser Serhii Bezkrеstnov appeared three times (twice on Inter and once on We Are Ukraine, for a total of 38 minutes of airtime). Overall, the Office of the President received a relatively “small” amount of airtime on the telethon over the two weeks — 1 hour and 20 minutes. In addition, on September 10 and 12, 1+1 repeatedly rebroadcast a lengthy interview by Nataliia Moseichuk with the head of the Office of the President, Kyrylo Budanov, which had originally aired on August 28, during its overnight slots.

MPs on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel:

Note: On September 10, the provider failed to record some of Suspilne’s broadcasts. A total of 1 hour and 18 minutes of airtime was missed between 7 a.m. and noon. Therefore, if MPs appeared as guests during those missing segments, they are not included in this report.

Over the two reporting weeks, MPs appeared on the public broadcaster 67 times (compared with 57 MP guest appearances during the previous two weeks). MPs from the ruling Servant of the People faction appeared on the channel 28 times. Representatives of the three opposition factions appeared a total of 35 times: 14 appearances by representatives of European Solidarity, 13 by MPs from Holos, and eight by MPs from Batkivshchyna. In addition, representatives of two parliamentary groups, For the Future and Trust, each appeared once during these weeks. An MP who was genuinely unaffiliated with any faction, Oksana Savchuk, also appeared twice.

During these two weeks, the balance between the government and the opposition was disrupted several times in the channel’s morning and daytime broadcasts when clearly controversial domestic political issues were discussed. For example, on September 8, the channel interviewed Yuliia Sirko of Holos about NABU and SAPO’s “Carthage” operation. On the same day, it discussed the same topic with Serhii Soboliev of Batkivshchyna. Soboliev was also interviewed about another issue that required balanced coverage: consideration of draft laws on which Ukraine’s financial support from the EU depended. On September 15, the channel discussed the same issue with Yaroslav Yurchyshyn of Holos, and on September 16 with Oleh Syniutka of European Solidarity. All these cases required balanced representation, ideally by inviting representatives of the ruling faction to appear at the same time.

During the reporting period, the most frequently invited MP on the channel was Yuliia Sirko of Holos, with five appearances. Servant of the People representatives Bohdan Kytsak and Serhii Kozyr each appeared four times. A considerable number of MPs appeared on the channel two or three times.

Over the two days analyzed, there were four instances of political promotion on the telethon: three on ICTV and STB and one on Inter. There were no instances of political promotion on the other channels. Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi and businessman Viktor Pinchuk were each featured in positive political promotion twice. There was no negative political promotion.

There were no instances of political promotion on Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel during the reporting period.

There were no Russian propaganda narratives or toxic media figures on the telethon or Suspilne’s Pershyi Channel during the reporting period.