Media Literacy Index of Ukrainians: 2020–2025 (Sixth Wave)

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The Detector Media NGO conducted a quantitative study to determine the Media Literacy Index of Ukrainians, that is, the level of people’s ability to consciously perceive and critically interpret information, as well as to use a variety of media sources. 

You can view the results of previous waves of the study here (for 2020), here (for 2021), here (for 2022), here (for 2023), and here (for 2024). The research is implemented within the UNDP project “Supporting Inclusive Recovery for the Resilience and Security of People in Ukraine”, funded by the Government of Japan.

The model of the Media Literacy Index is based on the concept developed by Len Masterman and on the results of the qualitative stage of the study “Ukrainians’ Media Consumption Practices: Conceptual Development of the Media Literacy Index for Audiences”, prepared at the request of the NGO Detector Media (January 2020). The updated model of media competence / conscious media consumption includes five categories and 49 indicators.

Purpose of the study: to determine the Media Literacy Index of the Ukrainian audience and track its dynamics (2020–2025).

You can download the PDF version of the report here.  

KEY FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The level of the overall Media Literacy Index changed significantly with the start of the full-scale war. From 2021 to 2022, the share of the audience with an above-average level of the indicator increased by 26% (from 55% to 81%). Accordingly, the number of Ukrainians with low and below-average levels of media competence decreased (from 45% to 19%).

■ Throughout all four years of the full-scale war, the index has remained high and has not fallen to the pre-war level. The decrease in the share of the audience with a high level of media literacy in 2025 compared with 2022 (from 31% to 9%) is largely related to adjustments in the calculation methodology. The addition of indicators measuring the perception and use of artificial intelligence in the fifth and sixth waves lowered the digital competence sub-index and the overall Media Literacy Index. It is also linked to a certain adaptation of the audience to the current media landscape, accumulated experience in verifying content credibility, and a degree of emotional fatigue from difficult information related to the war and possible developments at the front.

■ Over the past year, the overall Media Literacy Index has not changed significantly. However, this does not apply to individual sub-indices of media competence.

A high level of media literacy among the 18–35 age group is quite predictable (largely due to the digital competence sub-index), while it is significantly lower among the older age group 56–65.

The lower the level of education, the lower the level of media literacy. Among respondents with general secondary education, the share of those with low and below-average scores reaches 46%, while among those with complete or incomplete higher education this share is only 17%.

Significant differences in media literacy levels are also observed among people with different financial statuses. The higher the level of well-being, the higher the index score. Among those who report that their income is enough only for food (low level of well-being), 46% have low or below-average index scores. Meanwhile, among respondents who say they can afford everything they need and are able to save money (above-average well-being), this share is only 17%.

■ Over the past year, there have been no significant shifts in the ranking of media’s roles in society. The largest share of the audience still believes that the main mission of media is to inform citizens about socially important events. However, this year the share stands at 55%, compared with 70% in previous waves.

■ Several trends are worth noting:

■ The share of respondents who note the impact of media on their emotional state has significantly decreased and is approaching the pre-war level: 40% in 2025 vs 47% in 2024.

A certain adaptation to life during wartime, under conditions of critical threats to life, is also reflected in the increased share of the audience that reports the influence of media on consumer choices (19%).

The fact that, compared with the previous wave, Ukrainians more often mention the influence of media on:

is likely related to the topic of upcoming elections, which is being actively discussed in the country’s information space.

■ The largest share of the audience (43%) believes that media in Ukraine operate in the interests of the authorities. Another 32% think they work in the interests of their owners and investors, while 29% believe media primarily serve their own interests. Only 19% say that media work for the benefit of society as a whole, and 14% believe they operate in the interests of their audiences.

■ Only a quarter of the audience (25%) believe that media report on events that are most socially significant. This share has decreased by 17% compared with last year. About one third of Ukrainians believe that media content is primarily aimed at attracting audience attention and creating hype (33%), informing about the most current events (30%), or covering issues that interest political authorities and state institutions (28%).

■ Nearly every second Ukrainian (43%) supports criticism of the authorities in the media. This group is dominated by men and people with higher levels of education. At the same time, 15% do not support public criticism of the state.

■ The share of the audience who believe that public service media operate in Ukraine is 48%. This figure has decreased compared with last year (58%), but remains higher than in the pre-war period (33%). Every fifth respondent (22%) believes that there are no independent broadcasters in the country, while 30% could not give a clear answer.

■ An overwhelming majority (76%) emphasize the importance of public service media. According to respondents, they are important because they serve the interests of society as a whole rather than those of an owner (52%), cover topics that are not of interest to commercial media — such as social issues, culture, and science (10%), and are less likely to engage in manipulation (14%).

■ The share of the audience that paid for access to at least one type of content (video, audio, or online media) over the past year remains 30%, the same as last year. Specifically:

The share of people who made charitable donations to support media outlets increased from 17% to 21% over the past year. In addition, 7% of the audience paid for artificial intelligence services.

■ Compared to 2024, the share of consumers of socio-political content in messaging apps increased in 2025 (62% vs 71%). Thirty percent of Ukrainians turn to broadcasts of the national TV marathon “United News”, which is a slight increase compared to last year (26% in 2024), while 18% watch TV channels that do not participate in the marathon.

■ One in five Ukrainians (22%) turn to content from national online media outlets (“Ukrainska Pravda”, “Censor”, “Obozrevatel”, etc.) across different platforms; 19% use news services (ukr.net, Unian.ua, “RBC-Ukraine”, etc.); 14% listen to commercial radio stations; and 11% consume content produced by the Public Broadcaster.

■ 37% of the audience always pay attention to who the author of the material is — a journalist or a blogger / commentator; 30% do not attach importance to the authorship of the content, and an equal share (31%) say it depends on the circumstances.

■ The main advantage of journalists compared to bloggers is their responsible approach to the accuracy of statements and the reliability of information. This view is held by 34% and 30% of respondents respectively. According to the audience, bloggers/commentators, compared to journalists, present information in a more vivid and emotional way (48% think so), publish non-public (insider) information (45%), and are more independent in choosing topics and ways of presenting material (44%). In addition, they present their own personal views on events (52%). At the same time, both journalists and bloggers provide information as quickly as possible, analyze events, explain their causes and consequences, and may present manipulative information. However, journalists inspire slightly more trust than bloggers: 25% versus 22%.

■ Only 3% of Ukrainians do not use the internet. Meanwhile, 92% are intensive internet users — they go online every day or almost every day. This share has not changed over the past year.

■ Three out of four Ukrainians (76%) use the internet to search for necessary information. For 60%, it is a platform for communication. A similar share of users follow socio-political news online (58%) and watch videos or films (59%). Compared to 2024, in 2025 the number of users who use the internet for shopping (39% vs 45%) and online payments (39% vs 44%) increased, as did the share of those who watch internet television.

■ The most popular social media platforms that Ukrainians use to obtain socio-political news in 2025 remain Telegram and YouTube: 54% and 39% of the audience respectively. Only 15% of the audience do not use Telegram and 11% do not use YouTube. To obtain useful, educational, or informative content, users most often turn to YouTube and Facebook (50% and 25% respectively).

■ The number of AI users in Ukraine increased over the past year from 28% (in 2024) to 49%. 23% use it for work, 17% for learning, and 28% for other purposes. Meanwhile, 51% do not use artificial intelligence. Among them, 26% say they have no need for it, 12% do not know how to use it, 13% do not trust AI systems, and 5% of internet users surveyed have never heard of it.

DISINFORMATION

■ The significance of the disinformation problem is emphasized by 55% of the audience (compared to 62% in 2024 — a statistically significant difference). Meanwhile, 19% say they can always identify fake news and ignore it.

■ It can be stated that Ukrainians demonstrate a high level of sensitivity to distorted content. The audience is becoming more competent at identifying fake information. This trend has continued for the past four years — since the beginning of the full-scale war. The share of Ukrainians who detect disinformation by looking for source references in the material is 44% (compared to 30% in 2021). Meanwhile, 37% rely on video or photo evidence (22% in 2021), and 31% pay attention to whether different points of view are presented in the material (27% in 2021).

■ The share of Ukrainians who verify information for accuracy is 44%, remaining at roughly the same level as last year (42%). At the same time, the share of those who never verify media content for accuracy has decreased from 37% to 30%.

MANIPULATION

■ The problem of manipulation in the media remains relevant for more than half of the Ukrainian audience (56%). Meanwhile, 16% consider it irrelevant because they believe they can identify such content; 17% say they are hearing about media manipulation for the first time; and 7% could not decide. No significant changes have occurred over the past year.

■ 38% suspect manipulation when only one side of an event is presented in a news item. For 36%, an important marker is the lack of arguments and the presence of clichés or stereotypical judgments. About one-third point to the absence of a source reference (34%) and incomplete or inaccurate information (32%). For a quarter of the audience (25%), excessive emotional tone in a message raises suspicion that the authors are trying to manipulate the audience. Another 25% identify manipulative content intuitively.

■ According to half of the audience (50%), media content is most often distorted by Russia in order to indoctrinate Ukrainians. 47% believe that false content is spread in the interests of politicians and political forces to create a positive image of themselves, while 35% think it is done by influence groups or oligarchs to promote their own interests. Over the past year, the share of those who believe that information distortion is driven by media owners seeking to increase their audience and by ordinary individuals seeking attention or trying to cause harm has increased significantly (from 15% to 30% and from 14% to 23%, respectively).

■ The problem of paid-for content in the media remains relevant for more than half of the audience (52%; 54% in 2024). Meanwhile, 19% say they can identify such content and therefore do not pay attention to the problem (19% in 2024). Another 18% consider the issue irrelevant because they are hearing about paid-for materials for the first time (16% in 2024).

■ For 51%, an important marker of paid-for content is that the material may help increase the recognition of a person, organization, or product. 49% suspect paid-for content when a story presents only positive or only negative aspects of a person, group, or product. Respondents also pay attention to the presence of explicit value judgments — either positive or negative (15%). Meanwhile, 25% of the audience identify paid-for content intuitively.

■ Ukrainians tend to treat most media outlets with caution and trust them only partially. Interestingly, among the sources that the audience trusts the most (fully or partially) are original content created by well-known bloggers on social media and messaging platforms (78%); websites and social media or messaging channels of official institutions and organizations (such as the Office of the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, city administrations, etc.); and international media outlets (such as the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, CNN, etc.). Anonymous information channels, particularly on Telegram or Viber, are fully or partially trusted by 47% of the audience.

Methodology: quantitative study; face-to-face interviews using tablets and a standardized questionnaire (CAPI).

Geography: nationwide survey.

Sample size: 1,612 respondents.

Target audience: adult population of Ukraine (aged 18–65).

Sampling type: representative by age, gender, settlement size, and region. The study was not conducted in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, or in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Fieldwork: December 15–29, 2025, conducted by the company New Image Marketing Group.

The report, based on the data of the quantitative study conducted by the research agency New Image Marketing Group at the request of the NGO Detector Media, was prepared by sociologist Marta Naumova, PhD in Sociology.