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The strategic communications expert talks about how the descendants of the Soviet party leadership are trying to promote the “Russian world” outside of Russia.
Shots of Love is the title of the research conducted by Liubov Tsybulska, founder and former head of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, along with her team, commissioned by the Ukrainian Institute. The research analyzes how the Kremlin uses Russian culture to propagate narratives and perceptions favorable to Russia among foreign audiences. "The empire uses culture as a weapon. First, it conquers hearts, then it subjugates lands," Tsybulska explained while presenting the findings at the International Cultural Diplomacy Forum, which recently took place in Kyiv.
Detector Media spoke with the expert about the strategies and mechanisms of Russia's soft power around the world, the invaders’ elimination of Ukrainian identity in the territories they seize, and how Ukraine should counteract this.
— Liubov, what is the goal of your research?
— We aimed to study and demonstrate how Russia instrumentalizes culture to serve its aggression, using it as a weapon — first winning hearts and then conquering lands. Many people believe this is a natural, spontaneous process that happens on its own, and the world genuinely admires Russian culture, and loves Russian music, literature, and ballet simply because they are so remarkable. But that is not the case. Even if we are talking about extraordinary art, it is art that packages war in appealing cultural wrappings. The Kremlin understands very well how, through cultural initiatives and the promotion of Russian culture, it can whitewash the aggressor’s image on the international stage and influence people's views, particularly regarding Ukraine and the events happening there.
The concept of the "Russian world" has become the cornerstone of Putin's Russia's expansionist foreign policy
The modern doctrine of the "Russian world" as a distinct civilization, a special world grounded in the Russian language, culture, Orthodox faith, church, shared history, and historical memory, was formulated in 2006. Of course, it did not emerge from nowhere. Eurasianism, as Russia's "unique path" as an independent civilization positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, is an old Russian concept, its origins often linked to the ethnographer and historian Lev Gumilev. However, it was in 2006 that the phrase "Russian world" was first uttered by Putin during a meeting with the creative intelligentsia at the Derzhavin House in St. Petersburg, just before the Year of the Russian Language. "The Russian world can and must unite all those who hold the Russian word and Russian culture dear, wherever they may live — whether in Russia or abroad," the Russian dictator said, urging the intelligentsia to use the term more frequently.
Then, in 2007, there was Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, which also touched on this. Many did not give much importance to this "Russian world" at the time, yet it has since become the cornerstone of Putin's Russia's expansionist foreign policy. In 2008, Russia attacked Georgia, and in 2014, Ukraine.
— How can the connection between Putin’s Russia’s external aggression and Russian culture be proven?
— We analyzed the changes made over the last ten years to Russia’s strategic state documents — the constitution of the aggressor state, its national security strategy, military doctrine, and the concepts of foreign, informational, and humanitarian policies, as well as the state cultural policy strategy. At least half of these changes specifically concern the humanitarian sphere and culture.
For example, in Russia's foreign policy concept, one of the ways to achieve its strategic goals is by "enhancing Russia’s significance in the global humanitarian space, strengthening the position of the Russian language in the world, and promoting the preservation of historical truth and memory about Russia’s role in world history abroad." The document also mentions "developing ties with compatriots living abroad and providing them with comprehensive support in exercising their rights, ensuring the protection of their interests, and preserving their all-Russian cultural identity."
The Kremlin views the multi-million Russian diaspora as a partner in expanding and consolidating the space of the Russian language and culture. This is stated explicitly in one of the points of Russia’s main policies regarding international cultural and humanitarian cooperation.
To sum up, in all these documents, Russian culture is presented as an instrument of foreign policy, a lever of influence, of expansion even. First, Russia uses the promotion of its language and culture abroad to influence international politics, creating pro-Russian sentiments and support among compatriots. Second, the concept of the "Russian world" is not a cultural initiative but a political project aimed at creating a civilizational space for Russia and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Third, the Russian state sees its compatriots (sootechestvenniki) abroad as a political resource, using them to form a fifth column and promote its interests globally.
In conclusion, we can assert that the "Russian world" is an export product — a concept that allows Russia to justify its external expansion.
— Are you referring to members of Russian diasporas abroad and residents of other countries with Russian citizenship?
— Not only. This is also about supporters and sympathizers of Russian culture in various parts of the world, regardless of their nationality or citizenship. This circle was clearly described by Konstantin Kosachev, the former head of one of Russia's cultural diplomacy institutions called Rossotrudnichestvo: "Our dream is to initiate a union, a consolidated 'Russian world,' with Russians at its center. Then, moving outward from the center, it will include those who studied in Russia, married Russians, started families, have business interests in Russia, or are connected [to Russia] professionally or personally. Beyond that, there is another layer of people who are simply interested in Russia, its literature, ballet, or space [program]."
— In your opinion, why is it that even after February 24, 2022, despite the genocidal rhetoric of Russian leaders and the criminal actions of the Russian military, the cultural sphere is still viewed by many in the West as "apolitical" and Russian culture has influential advocates in the West among opinion leaders, including politicians, actors, writers, historians, and journalists?
— Because they continue to believe that Putin and Pushkin have nothing in common and that Russian culture and Russian aggression against Ukraine exist in separate realities. Moreover, when Westerners talk about their love for Tchaikovsky, Dostoevsky, or Plisetskaya, they justify their stance by saying that all of this is from the past. They argue that we do not cancel German composers and writers who produced their works before World War II, and thus, they do not see a causal link between the Russian cultural foundation and the war crimes committed by the Russian army.
Liubov Tsybulska explains the reasoning of those who refuse to see the causal link between the Russian cultural foundation and the war crimes of the Russian army
These people do not understand that Russia instrumentalizes its pre-Soviet classical culture. That even Tchaikovsky is a baited hook used by Russia to reel in its supporters.
Because tanks never come first: first come ballet, Pushkin, and Tchaikovsky; then comes the Russian language, and only after that do the tanks roll in. First, Russian ballerinas dance in theaters, and then bombs and missiles follow.
This is why today we say that Russian culture is a Trojan horse — brilliant, beautiful, and alluring on the outside, but inside, it hides tanks, Grads, Kinzhals, kidnappings, torture, murder, and mass looting.
— You mentioned Rossotrudnichestvo. But this is not the only institution the Kremlin uses to spread its influence abroad. What other organizations promoting Russian products worldwide are included in your research?
— Formally, Rossotrudnichestvo was established in 2008, but in reality, it follows the traditions of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, which the Bolsheviks created in 1925 to whitewash the image of the Soviet Union and Bolshevik rule. Rossotrudnichestvo inherited a network of foreign offices from its Soviet predecessor — so-called Russian Houses, which operate in 71 countries worldwide.
For a long time, it continued its activities in Ukraine, even after 2014. It is funded from the state budget and through revenues from permitted activities.
The international network of Russian Houses under Rossotrudnichestvo and the centers of the Russkiy Mir Foundation. Slide from the research
Another similar entity is the Russkiy Mir Foundation. Although it was created as a non-governmental organization, it is almost exclusively financed by the Russian federal budget and is under strict control of the Russian authorities. The leadership of the foundation is appointed by a decree of the Russian president, and its governing bodies include representatives of the Russian power vertical. By early 2022, the foundation supported a network of so-called "centers" and "offices" in more than 50 countries worldwide.
The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was created in 2010 as a "non-governmental organization," but in fact, it is subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A third of the fund's budget comes from federal allocations, while the rest comes from unnamed private sources.
All three entities are fully subordinated to the presidential administration, which highlights the merger of their political and cultural functions. If you look at the people who attempt to define the ideology of the "Russian world," the picture becomes quite telling. For example, Rossotrudnichestvo is headed by Yevgeny Primakov, the grandson and namesake of the former head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service and government, Yevgeny Primakov. The chairman of the board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation is Vyacheslav Nikonov, the grandson of Stalin's foreign minister, Molotov. Until recently, the head of the European programs of this foundation was Alexey Gromyko, the grandson of a Soviet foreign minister, and he is the director of the Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Thus, this clearly demonstrates the continuity between the current so-called Russian elite and the Soviet nomenklatura.
Since July 2022, all three organizations have been included in the EU sanctions list for spreading Kremlin and anti-Ukrainian propaganda.
— Is there any information on the budgets of these cultural diplomacy institutions?
— We understand that they operate with enormous resources, but it has been difficult to find specific figures. The sources of non-state funding are unknown — the foundations do not publish information about their donors. Most likely, these include large businesses and oligarchs who are part of the boards of trustees, many of whom, by the way, were sanctioned by the European Union, the U.S., and other countries after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Liubov Tsybulska explains that all three Russian cultural diplomacy institutions are fully subordinated to the vertical of the Russian presidential administration, emphasizing the merging of their political and cultural functions
After the European sanctions were imposed on these structures, they closed their offices in many countries but opened new ones in others. Currently, they are focusing on countries of the Global South. In other words, the Kremlin spares no money for the active operations of Russian cultural diplomacy institutions.
The scale of their funding can be inferred from some previously disclosed figures. For example, in 2015, the Russian Ministry of Education and Science planned to allocate 3.75 billion rubles for promoting the Russian language abroad. Regarding this, the executive director of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, Vladimir Kochin, famously said: "If we had absorbed such funds, there would already be Russian flags everywhere."
— A significant part of your research focuses on the faces of the "Russian world." Who are these people?
— When you look at all those "stars" who participate in promoting Russian culture outside of Russia and then analyze their relationships with the Russian authorities, you will see that these individuals receive state awards, are appointed as advisors to the Russian president, have access to state programs for the development of their creative groups, and enjoy other preferences from the Kremlin.
For example, the internationally renowned Russian virtuoso pianist Denis Matsuev was a trusted figure for Putin during the 2012 presidential elections. In 2014, he signed an open letter in support of the annexation of Crimea and has since repeatedly spoken favorably about the Kremlin dictator's policies. He was part of the initiative group for nominating Putin as a presidential candidate in 2018 and the working group that prepared amendments to the Russian Constitution, which "reset" Putin's presidential terms. In 2024, he performed in Anapa for the families of participants in the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The Bolshoi Theatre prima ballerina, Svetlana Zakharova, who was born in Lutsk and studied at the Kyiv Choreographic College, also supported Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. She is now a People’s Artist of Russia, a member of the United Russia party, and a member of the Presidential Council for Culture and Art in Russia.
Russian ballet star Svetlana Zakharova, born and raised in Ukraine, receiving an award from Vladimir Putin, 2019. Photo by Moskovskij Komsomolets
This group also includes the general director of the Bolshoi Theatre, Russian conductor Valery Gergiev, opera singer Anna Netrebko, film director Nikita Mikhalkov, and others.
— You also studied how the enemy imposes the "Russian world" on the occupied territories. Could you tell us more about that?
— Yes, in our research we paid significant attention to what the invaders are doing in the field of education and culture in the occupied parts of Ukraine. This is precisely what we need to explain to our international partners. It is primarily about the destruction of Ukraine’s heritage (according to the Ministry of Culture, over 1,000 such monuments have been destroyed or damaged), the restoration of Soviet or Russian cultural monuments, the forced changes to school curricula, and so on.
It is important to understand that the occupiers do not just bring Russian textbooks to the occupied territories — they bring textbooks specifically designed for the children living there. These books instill the idea that their cities and villages are "ancestral Russian lands" that have been returned to Russia. If they have such textbooks for students in Kupiansk, imagine what they would create for students in Kyiv.
What struck me the most was the removal and destruction of Ukrainian archives. In June 2022, the occupation authorities in Kherson stole 15 boxes of documents from the State Archive of the Kherson Region, including voter lists. In early November 2022, Russian invaders stole almost 1,500 archival collections and key records, which they took to Crimea. They even took census documents and books that recorded births and deaths. This is essentially the erasure of memory and, consequently, the destruction of identity.
At the same time, the Russians are establishing their own cultural background in the occupied territories: they are restoring communist place names, investing colossal amounts of money in building new cultural infrastructure — often projects that the average Russian citizen has never seen in their own city or town.
For example, in occupied Melitopol, they built a multimedia historical park called "Russia — My History" in a very short time. Part of the exhibition includes a map of Russia incorporating the occupied territories, as well as descriptions of the port of Berdiansk, the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
The multimedia historical park "Russia — My History," which the Russians built in occupied Melitopol. Photo by Russian media
In Sevastopol, they are finishing the construction of the Chersonesus Taurica archaeological museum reserve. It covers an area of 15,000 square meters and includes an amphitheater with 1,200 seats, museums of "Antiquity, Byzantium, and Christianity," as well as youth and children’s centers.
They call the construction of these cultural centers in the occupied territories "special construction," and they are carried out by the Russian Defence Ministry's Military Construction Complex. In other words, the Russians are literally waging war through museums, educational institutions, and cultural centers. Their goal is to firmly implant the ideas of the "Russian world" in the minds of the residents of the occupied territories, showing that Russia supposedly brings not destruction but civilization. However, in reality, all of this occurs against the backdrop of, and in close connection with, genocidal practices — deportation, forced erasure of identity, and repression against those who resist the invaders.
— In your opinion, why is it so difficult for the world to reassess Russian culture as a tool of Russian imperialism and expansionist policy, even now, when it has become so obvious?
— Because for a long time, many people in various countries have lived under the influence of narratives shaped by our enemy. I do not like making generalizations, and there are many countries, like the Scandinavian countries or the United Kingdom, where there has never been a great fascination with Russia. But then there is Germany, with a strong pro-Russian lobby and clear sympathies for Russia in some of its political circles.
You understand that Russia has spent years, even decades, working with the elites and certain groups in various countries. These are established contacts and connections, as well as ingrained stereotypes. All of this cannot be undone quickly or easily, especially when it comes to art and culture, which few people tend to associate with war and aggression.
We analyzed which European countries, according to Eurobarometer polling data, have the lowest support for sanctions against Russia. It turned out to be countries or parts of countries where either many people speak Russian or where Russia has a significant presence — in politics, economics, and culture. These include Serbia, North Macedonia, Cyprus, Moldova, eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, Slovenia, and Hungary. Now, regarding eastern Germany, we looked at how many people there know the Russian language. It turns out that in western Germany, where 18% of the population does not support anti-Russian sanctions, only 3% of Germans know Russian. But in eastern Germany, where 45% of the population does not support sanctions, 8% speak Russian. This is an illustration [that challenges the argument that] "language does not matter."
Support for sanctions against Russia is lower among residents of eastern Germany compared to those in western Germany. Researchers associate this with the prevalence of the Russian language among them. Slide from the research
— Ukraine should engage in cultural expansion because cultural defense alone is not enough, as Professor Rena Marutian from the Department of Global and National Security at Taras Shevchenko National University once said. What is necessary for this?
— If no one knows about us, if we do not tell our own story, then Russia tells it for us. We need a long-term program, a strategy that does not change with the arrival of new teams in the government entities responsible for this sphere, where each new team starts doing something of its own. The strength of Russian cultural diplomacy lies in its systematic, consistent approach over a long period, constantly repeating the same narratives. If you say "Sevastopol is a Russian city" a million times, people start to believe that Sevastopol is indeed not Ukrainian.
In contrast, Ukraine lacks grand narratives. Who are we? What is our positioning in the world? However, it is not just about defining these narratives but also about having a strategic plan for their promotion. Not for three to six months or just for the term of a particular minister, but for years — despite changes in government offices.
Liubov Tsybulska is convinced that Russian culture is an element of expansion not only of the cultural space; through it, propagandist narratives are spread, undermining national identity and distorting historical memory
Of course, unlike our enemy, we have electoral cycles, we are a democratic nation, but this should be our advantage, not a barrier to success. We must remember that cultural diplomacy is a long-term process and should not be used to achieve short-term political goals. Our task is to convince a wider circle than just our supporters that there is no such thing as Russian culture — only Russian propaganda. That Russian culture is an element of expansion not only in the cultural space. It spreads propagandist narratives that undermine national identity and distort historical memory. It is a part of Russia's hybrid war, aimed at undermining the sovereignty of other countries and paving the way for further military interventions. Who, if not us Ukrainians, who have experienced this firsthand, should be explaining to everyone else how this mechanism works?
— And in the meantime, we are forced to tolerate the presence of Russian publishers at book fairs, as recently happened in Frankfurt?
— This is yet another example of how Russia circumvents sanctions and international isolation. Formally, there was no official Russian government stand, but one of the largest Russian publishing houses, known for its anti-Ukrainian publications, was present. If someone thinks this is a coincidence, they simply do not know Russia and its regime at all. This is a very illustrative example of how Western institutions fail to understand that in Russia, these things cannot exist separately — publishing and the Russian government. In a country where people are imprisoned for social media posts and reposts, can there really be a free publishing business? It is unfortunate that people still do not get this.
Photo by Maksym Polishchuk, Detector Media
