Detector Media analysed the content of 700 Telegram channels in the Ukrainian segment of this social network and compiled a list of 311 pro-Russian and occupation Telegram channels.
While investigating Russian disinformation on Ukrainian social media, Detector Media has recorded an increase in the number of Telegram channels spreading Russian propaganda and generally promoting the Kremlin's agenda to the Ukrainian audience during the full-scale invasion. Detector Media has already written that the network of pro-Russian Telegram channels in the Ukrainian segment of the social network is much more extensive than the network of Russian intelligence channels exposed by the SBU. In addition to pro-Russian channels that mimic Ukrainian Telegram channels, there are also several occupation channels in Ukraine that target the audience from the occupied territories. Detector Media analysed the Ukrainian segment of Telegram to expand the list of pro-Russian and occupation Telegram channels that spread Kremlin disinformation and manipulation among Ukrainians.
Ira Riaboshtan, Oleksiy Pivtorak, Viktoriya Namestnik, and Olha Bilousenko worked on the research.
According to the Internews survey, 60% of respondents prefer Telegram as a news source. According to Telemetrio, which provides analytics on Telegram channels, almost 6 thousand channels are targeted at the Ukrainian audience. Another company that works in the same niche, TGStat, estimated that 51 thousand channels on Telegram are targeted at the Ukrainian audience. According to the data of these services, the number of followers on the 100 biggest channels in the Ukrainian segment of Telegram today ranges from 200 thousand to 2.7 million readers.
Detector Media has already written that Telemetrio and especially TGStat do not publish the methodology of how they classify Telegram channels into different segments. Nevertheless, even these data illustrate the popularity of Telegram in Ukraine as a news source, which became the primary source of information for most Ukrainians after the full-scale Russian invasion.
The unwillingness of Telegram's founders to respond to the disinformation circulating in the messenger they created has led to the migration of pro-Russian and Russian propagandists to Telegram after their ability to spread false information has been restricted by the administrations of Twitter, Facebook or YouTube.
Both governmental and non-governmental Ukrainian and foreign initiatives have repeatedly drawn attention to Telegram channels that spread Russian propaganda. For example, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy has published a list of 100 channels designed to mimic Ukrainian channels. Often such Telegram channels are regarded as being part of the Russian disinformation network.
In this study, based on the existing information on pro-Russian Telegram channels, Detector Media has researched and expanded the list of pro-Russian and occupation Telegram channels. This and similar lists will enable the monitoring of the creation of new Telegram channels with pro-Russian content over time and counteract their negative impact on the Ukrainian media environment.
This study focuses on the Ukrainian segment of Telegram.
By the Ukrainian Telegram segment, we mean Telegram channels that distribute content targeted at the Ukrainian audience, including content aimed at the territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia. The content of these channels is mainly in Russian.
This study examines pro-Russian and occupation Telegram channels.
By pro-Russian Telegram channels, we mean those targeted at the Ukrainian audience but spread disinformation messages and narratives in line with Russian propaganda.
By occupation Telegram channels, we mean those that are focused on the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, in particular, in the name or description of which there is a mention of a specific city or region of Ukraine which has been or is still under occupation since 2014; as well as settlements that Russia plans/planned to capture.
For the study of pro-Russian Telegram channels, the channels whose geolocation is Ukraine were included in the analysis. The channels whose geolocation is Russia were also included in the analysis to study the occupation channels, but their target audience is the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. Additionally, the network of occupation Telegram channels whose names indicated non-occupied Ukrainian cities was also analysed,.
Read more about the research methodology here.
Detector Media analyses text and quantitative data using libraries for statistical analysis, natural language processing, and machine learning based on the Python programming language.
At the initial stage, Detector Media analysts used the results of previous studies of the Ukrainian segment of Telegram channels, which can be found here, here, and here, as well as a list of Telegram channels curated by Russian intelligence. Based on these data, we compiled a list of previously reported Telegram channels that spread Russian propaganda disinformation narratives. Then, using the TGStat service, we checked the references to and mentions of the content of these Telegram channels. Thus, we received an extended list of almost 1,700 channels for further analysis. In the first stage, the channels were disaggregated by their geolocation, and the channels of the Russian segment of Telegram were discarded. To check their pro-Russian nature, these channels were subjected to several steps of content analysis.
The data from the previous study by Detector Media was also used to form the list of occupation channels. This list includes Telegram channels whose geolocation is identified as both Ukraine and Russia. In terms of content, they are focused on the occupied territories of Ukraine.
Using natural language processing (NLP) tools, Telegram channels' content was checked for marker vocabulary. By marker vocabulary, we mean words and phrases used by Russian propaganda, such as ‘Kyiv regime’, ‘Banderites’, ‘junta’, and ‘Ukrainian Nazis’. Posts containing typical pro-Russian propaganda phrases served as the basis for further investigation. The verification is based on the content that the Telegram channels distributed during the fall of 2022. If necessary, analysts covered a broader period to check the content of a particular channel.
Pro-Russian and occupation Telegram channels often use toxic words in their posts aimed at humiliating Ukraine, accusing the Ukrainian authorities of criminal actions, and legitimising the actions of Russia and the occupation authorities. For example, several Telegram channels rarely use the word ‘government’ when referring to Ukrainian politicians and officials. Instead, they use the word ‘regime’ — ‘Kyiv regime’, ‘Ukrainian regime’, ‘Zelenskyy’s regime’, etc. A similar situation occurs with the word ‘war’, which is often replaced with the Russian term ‘special operation’; pro-Russian Telegram channels also use the words ‘Ukrainian crisis’ or ‘Ukrainian conflict’.
While checking the content, the analysts also identified fakes (previously refuted ones can be found here) and Russian propaganda messages spread by the Telegram channels. A good understanding of the agenda promoted by Telegram channels is one of the main criteria for classifying any media and channel on Telegram as pro-Russian.
Using machine learning, we generated an array of posts from the content of the Telegram channels containing links to Russian or pro-Russian resources. We checked them for Russian propaganda and disinformation messages.
The channels were checked for mutual mentions. We employed several approaches to further analyze the content in order to identify the maximum number of pro-Russian channels, even with only a small number of subscribers. In total, Detector Media analysed the content of almost 700 Telegram channels.
Using artificial intelligence services, researchers have established specific networks between pro-Russian and occupation Telegram channels. Detector Media has already talked about the Russian picture of the world. The narratives and messages of Russian propaganda spread by the studied channels include the following:
Ukraine is a puppet in the hands of its allies;
Ukraine is losing economically and militarily in the direct conflict with Russia;
Ukrainians welcome the Russian army;
Nazis and corrupt officials seized power in Ukraine;
Neighbouring countries will soon take over the western regions of Ukraine;
Russian crimes in Bucha (and other previously occupied settlements) were staged;
Ukraine is using weapons against Russian civilians in the Russian border regions;
Ukrainians steal and sell weapons provided by the West on the black market.
Various versions of these propaganda messages are continuously repeated. If they appear in the Telegram channel you just joined, then you are being drawn into the Russian agenda.
More interesting for Russians than Ukrainians: Pro-Russian Telegram channels are among the top hundred in the Ukrainian segment
In early September, Detector Media reported that among the top 100 most popular Telegram channels in Ukraine, there are 11 openly pro-Russian ones that spread or launched manipulations beneficial to the invaders or openly supported Russia. Despite regular reports about the pro-Russian nature of these channels, popularity doesn't seem to diminish. For example, since the end of summer, the Telegram channels ‘Anatoliy Shariy’ (Анатолий Шарий, 948 thousand subscribers), ‘Legitimate’ (Легитимный, 864 thousand subscribers), ‘Resident’ (Резидент, 754 thousand subscribers), ‘Dmitriy Vasilets’ (Дмитрий Василец, 481 thousand subscribers) have gained a hundred thousand or more subscribers. ‘Sheikh Tamir’ (Шейх Тамир, 389 thousand subscribers) and ‘ZeRada’ (ЗеРада, 323 thousand subscribers) each attracted about 40 thousand subscribers more. And ‘#Montian!’ (#МОНТЯН!, 518 thousand subscribers) and ‘First War News’ (First Новости Войны, 635 thousand subscribers) have increased their viewership by about 10 thousand. However, there are three out of 11 Telegram channels that have lost from ten to hundreds of thousands of readers: ‘New Edition’ (Новое издание, 362 thousand subscribers), ‘Ukrainian Politics’ (Политика Украины, 285 thousand subscribers) and ‘Politics of the Country’ (Политика Страны, 263 thousand subscribers).
The growth of the audience of pro-Russian Telegram bloggers can be explained by the fact that more and more Russians read them. However, the increase in subscribers does not always indicate an increase in the audience's interest in the channel. Sometimes owners of Telegram channels resort to using a bot farms, even though this violates Telegram's rules. In general, pro-Russian bloggers reinforce the Russian state propaganda's picture of the world to their followers. This is evident from the statistics on mentions of these channels. For example, half of the links to Anatoliy Shariy's channel were generated by Russians. In contrast, the share of Ukrainians was 41% — the same with the channel ‘Legitimate’ and other mentioned channels. Russians were the ones to quote the Telegram channel ‘#Montian!’ in 82% of cases, while Ukrainians in 9%.
Detector Media refers to a large group of occupation channels aimed at the occupied territories of Ukraine as pro-Russian Telegram channels. Of course, that is not always the case. This spring, Detector Media talked about a network of occupation Telegram channels, including those that targeted communities that were not under occupation (for example, Vasylkiv or Bila Tserkva in the Kyiv region). The Russians probably planned to occupy them and tried to conduct a preparatory informational operation. Detector Media generally divides the occupation Telegram channels into two groups: those created before February 24, 2022, and those created after the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
The occupation Telegram channels created before 24 February 2022 are closely interconnected and systematically disseminate each other's content. Telegram channels directly or indirectly associated with the occupied territories of the Donetsk region have a more extensive network and closer ties with Russian Telegram channels. On the other hand, channels associated with the occupied areas of the Luhansk region mainly spread messages within the ‘bubble’ cultivated by the occupation authorities of Luhansk. Telegram channels created to spread Russian messages in the occupied Crimea are also less integrated into the overall network of occupation channels. This can be attributed to the fact that Crimean pro-Russian groups are more integrated into the Russian media environment.
The occupation Telegram channels created after February 24 and aimed at the newly occupied Ukrainian territories (including the channels of the settlements already liberated from the Russian invaders by the Ukrainian army) are more isolated. For example, the network of Telegram channels created for Mariupol does not share the content of channels popular in other occupied territories of the Donetsk region. The same applies to most of the Telegram channels from the network that targets the Zaporizhzhia region. The network of channels targeting the Kherson region also exists separately from other occupation Telegram channels. These are both Telegram channels of the occupation authorities and channels that mimic local chats or media. These connections, as well as the difference in content between the occupation Telegram channels created before and after February 24, show the difference in Russia's approaches to the ‘media integration’ of the occupied Ukrainian territories. In other words, the set of tools for exerting influence on the territories occupied since 2014 differs from the tools used for the newly occupied territories of Ukraine. In particular, as the example of several Telegram channels in Kherson shows, Russia creates the illusion of choice between dozens of Telegram channels that disseminate a mix of Russian messages and information about news in the locality/region. At the same time, the content only partially immerses the audience of these channels in the Russian agenda, unlike the Telegram channels created before February 24.
The launch or termination of the occupation Telegram channels is not always connected with the hostilities, failures or successes of the invading army. These channels, when they are part of a more extensive network, stop operating as simultaneously as they were created. Most of the occupation channels that were created in the first weeks of March 2022 stopped updating on July 9 and October 20. At least eight channels focused on the Kharkiv region fell in the first wave. Taking this into account, we should point out that Russians were expelled from the occupied part of the Kharkiv region two months after July 9. Alternatively, in the Kherson region, there is another network of Telegram channels that did not stop working even after the retreat of Russians from the right-bank part of the region. They continue to repost each other and various Russian sources, creating the appearance of a happy life in the occupied territories for their readers.
Channels that were created before February 24
Due to bans on other social networks and popular messengers, the invaders use Telegram to report on the work of their administrations in the occupied territories. Channels of this type often have the words ‘Administration of ... (city/district/region)’ in their titles. Also, the channels of the same network mostly use the same picture as the main photo (profile picture).
For example we found about 10 Telegram channels with the name ‘OD ('Public Movement’. - ‘DM’) ...’ and a profile picture typical of these channels.
After February 24, Russians and occupation authorities continued to create similar Telegram channels for new temporarily occupied settlements. In particular, such pseudo-official channels appeared in the occupied Nova Kakhovka, Chaplynka, and Oleshky in the Kherson region. The content of these channels may differ in essence, but not in form. Telegram channels of the occupation authorities report on Russian holidays and events or publish news about the work of Russian officials and collaborators.
Occupation Telegram channels are usually not very popular. They have from several hundred to several thousand subscribers. Although there are exceptions: the Telegram channel of the collaborator from Donetsk region Denis Pushilin ‘Pushilin D.V.’ has almost 74 thousand subscribers. The channel of Crimean collaborator Sergey Aksyonov ‘Aksyonov Z 82’ has a little over 94 thousand subscribers, and the most popular was the channel of Zaporizhzhia media worker and collaborator Volodymyr Rohov ‘Vladimir Rogov’ with over 109 thousand subscribers. The smallest audience belonged to the so-called ‘head of the LPR’ Leonid Pasechnik’s eponymous channel ‘Leonid Pasechnik’ with a little less than 17 thousand subscribers.
Telegram channels that mimic the media
A large number of Telegram channels mimicking media have been created in the occupied territories. Some channels spread international news, particularly ‘Republican Z Activists’ (Республиканский Z Актив, almost 5 thousand subscribers). These Telegram channels differ from legitimate media outlets in that they are extremely biased and pro-Russian. Even if the channels' language and the phrasing of their posts are generally more or less neutral, the content is saturated with pro-Russian disinformation narratives. In particular, about the ‘Kyiv Nazi regime’, ‘Donbas has been bombed for eight years’, ‘external governance of Ukraine by the collective West’, etc.
A separate niche on Telegram is occupied by channels that disseminate information about the course of the war. Most of these channels also mimic news resources, such as ‘PraVda DPR’ (ПраVда ДНР, 1,472 subscribers) and ‘Inside Z Donetsk’ (58 thousand subscribers). However, there are also personal channels of pseudo-journalists and local activists — ‘Makarenko Z Donetsk’ (14 thousand subscribers). It is quite acceptable for such channels to distribute videos with scenes of cruelty, use of weapons, interrogation of prisoners, executions, etc.
Often, occupation channels glorify ‘people's activists’ who allegedly save the residents of the occupied territories from ‘mediocre officials’, post videos of ‘struggle for justice’, etc. For example, the channel ‘People’s Militia’ (Народная Дружина), which has a little over a thousand subscribers, is full of such content. However, these videos and stories about the struggle of ‘people's activists for justice’ mostly resemble the behaviour of criminal authorities of the 1990s, who were guided by the rule ‘might makes right’.
'Boom’ of new Telegram channels in the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson regions
By February 24, 2022, at least 62 channels reported on events in the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were created on Telegram. They had different formats. Some reported ‘official news’ of the occupation authorities. Others mimicked the media, entertainment or local chats of individual cities or communities. There was a new wave of such channels launched after the full-scale invasion with more than 40 new Telegram channels appearing, targeting the occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions exclusively. The number of these channels has increased by more than 65% over the past six months.
Some of these channels were launched by the occupation authorities in the newly occupied cities. At the same time, the invaders have created Telegram channels that mimic media outlets and spread Russian messages about the life of the regions more generally. Some of them have a watermark attached to all their photos and videos. They often repost statements by Russian and Russian-controlled politicians and local collaborators, reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense or their own occupation authorities, as well as links to Russian media. As these channels are in the Russian media environment, they broadcast most of the Russian propaganda narratives, most often related to the alleged ‘crimes of the Ukrainian army’.
An example of another approach to maintaining the occupation Telegram channel is ‘Group Z: DPR, LPR, Russia. War’ (Группа Z: ДНР, ЛНР, Россия. Война, 17,141 subscribers). As can be seen from the channel's name, it is clear who the channel supports. However, administrators attempt to create the illusion that the channel represents an opposition publication, from time to time criticising the actions of Russia, Russian politicians, the occupation authorities of Donetsk, and the standard of living in the region in general. Regarding Ukraine, the rhetoric of this Telegram channel fully corresponds to the Russian agenda.
Telegram channels targeting cities in the Kherson region or the region in general work according to a similar scheme as in other occupied regions: they often quote Russian proxies in the region, repost information from the occupation authorities, news from Russian agencies and media. The disinformation campaign is based on the demonisation of the Ukrainian military and criticism of the Ukrainian authorities. Among other Russian tactics, these Telegram channels resort to name-calling. For example, after the liberation of Kherson, they began to call Ukrainians who welcomed the defenders ‘Zhduns’. At the same time, they promoted messages about alleged ‘betrayal’ by Kherson residents who were waiting to be rescued by the Ukrainian military.
The Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions are overlooked
Occupation Telegram channels targeting the Zaporizhzhia region make up only 10% of all newly created Telegram channels in the occupied territories. Most of them are the network of occupation channels ‘_ru, _rus’, which will be discussed below. The situation is similar with Telegram channels targeting the Kharkiv region. In total, these channels account for 8.8% of all occupation channels created in 2022. At the same time, only one Telegram channel does not belong to the network and is filled with original content — ‘First Kharkiv’ (Первый Харьковский, 39,859 subscribers). This is a local group that mainly broadcasts accusations against the Ukrainian authorities and the army in addition to information about the Kharkiv region.
The number of Telegram channels that write about the Crimea is much smaller. There were few before 2022, and the trend has not changed after the full-scale invasion. Even those that do exist primarily do not target the occupied peninsula separately but instead write about the general situation and the course of the war, which Russia calls a ‘special military operation’.
In a similar vein, there are the occupation Telegram channels targeting the Zaporizhzhia region. They make up only 10% of all newly created Telegram channels in the occupied territories.
The names of this type of channels usually includes the name of a Ukrainian settlement, region or historical territory, such as Tavria, and the channel name ends with the prefix _ru. The profile picture of some of these channels often displays a Russian flag. In spring and summer, such local channels with Russian flags on their profile pictures had several thousand subscribers. However, in the fall, the number of their readers decreased to several hundred.
Channels from the ‘_ru, _rus’ network worked not only in the occupied territories. There are channels, for example, about Nikopol in the Dnipropetrovsk region or Brovary in the Kyiv region, which were not occupied. The content of such channels for non-occupied cities and villages usually consisted of reposts from other channels of this network mixed with news about the work of the Russian authorities.
Additional proof that these Telegram channels are part of the network is that the contact person in most of them is the Telegram user @rrzde.
Most of these channels were created almost simultaneously in the first half of March 2022. Now, most of them are no longer updated — it also happened simultaneously two times. Some of them stopped their activity on July 9, and others — on October 20. While they were active, channels of this type reposted each other and talked about Russia's successes in the war or peaceful life in the communities occupied by the troops of the terrorist state.
Even though these channels are now inactive, they remain on Telegram, so nothing prevents those behind the @rrzde Telegram user from reanimating them and promoting them for new needs once again.
Within local Telegram channels whose nicknames end in _ru or _rus, there is a notable network with the following channel names: ‘Main in ...’ (Главное в …), with a settlement name put in place of the ellipsis. In particular, we are talking about the cities and villages of the temporarily occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region. For example, Tokmak, Enerhodar or Berdiansk. These channels also appeared in early March 2022 and are still active.
Conclusions
The study results show that Russian propaganda is dynamic and adapts well to new conditions. In particular, it tries to use modern digital methods of mass communication to its advantage. The Russian propaganda machine focuses on the masses, targets emotions, sows doubt, promotes a simplified picture of the world, etc. This is what makes Russian propaganda dangerous. At the same time, a standard set of methods, tactics, and key topics allows for identifying disinformation influences and counteracting them.
The founder of Telegram, Pavel Durov, urges the authors of Telegram channels not to disseminate information that contradicts the rules of Telegram or application stores. However, this is dependent on the willingness of the authors of Telegram channels. Telegram itself resorts to blocking anonymous Telegram channels exceptionally rarely, and this policy facilitates the promotion of Russian agenda virtually without repercussions. In the context of the war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine, Telegram gives propagandists nearly unlimited opportunities for the mass spread of Russian propaganda and disinformation. At the same time, it is precisely this policy of Telegram that helps to fight censorship in the media environment, to tell about the Russian crimes committed in Ukraine, to quickly inform a broad audience, etc.
The list of pro-Russian and occupation Telegram channels identified during the research will help users check their information sources and discard unreliable ones. However, this list is not exhaustive, as propagandists can create such channels and groups on a continual basis. However, it is challenging to produce exclusive content for each Telegram channel. That is why administrators of Telegram channel networks resort to the tactics of reposts and mutual endorsements. They also use a rather stable ‘glossary’ to describe the Russian-Ukrainian war (which they don’t call a war), the Ukrainian government, and internal political processes, a similar set of topics and approaches to their coverage. Therefore, the analysis of information sources should be approached comprehensively: focusing not only on the general list of pro-Russian Telegram channels or groups but also on the methods used by Russian propagandists on social media.
Visualisations: Ira Riaboshtan and Oleksiy Pivtorak
Illustrations: Nataliya Lobach
This publication has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of Detector Media and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
