Українською читайте тут.
The topics that Russian propaganda manipulated on Telegram in 2024
As 2024 comes to a close, we summarize the year with traditional reviews of key events and trends in the media world. You can find coverage of the 2022 media landscape under this tag, while reflections on 2023 are available under this one.
The results of this media year are gathered under the tag #2024 Year in Review.
Previously, we published an analysis of changes in the TV advertising market in 2024 compared to 2023, examined the main narratives promoted by Russian propaganda throughout 2024, and looked into how CTV and global trends are transforming the advertising market. An interview with Maria Berlinska on the year’s volunteer efforts can be read here. The Detector Media review of the top ten media market events of 2024 is available here, and a summary of 15 notable developments in networks and technology is here. For insights into the major events in Ukrainian cinema in 2024, see this overview.
In this article, we analyze the key manipulative messages that hostile propagandists disseminated on Telegram in 2024.
Social media remain the leading source of news for the majority of Ukrainians. This conclusion is supported by the findings of the study “Media Consumption of Ukrainians: The Third Year of the Full-Scale War”, conducted in May-June 2024 on behalf of the Civil Network Opora. Nearly three-quarters of respondents (73.6%) reported reading news primarily through social media and messaging platforms daily. Another media consumption study by USAID-Internews confirmed these findings, with 73% of respondents citing Telegram as their main source of daily news. Other messengers and social media were also noted as common sources of information.
On November 7, during the presentation of the annual nationwide survey by USAID-Internews on Ukrainians’ attitudes toward media and media literacy, Internews Network Director Gillian McCormack highlighted a concerning trend:
“Compared to last year, a greater number of Ukrainians have been inclined to believe narratives amplified by Russia to undermine morale in Ukraine, despite more than a third of respondents being aware of various fact-checking services.”
According to the same survey, the number of users who chose Telegram for communication rose by 6% over the past year (81% in 2024 compared to 75% in 2023). The share of those using Telegram specifically for news consumption increased slightly (73% in 2024 versus 72% the previous year). Half of the respondents stated that the government should not interfere with Telegram’s operations, while one in three agreed on the need to establish rules for its functioning. At the same time, 47% of respondents acknowledged that false information is a pressing issue, marking an increase from previous years.
As Telegram continues to be both the main platform for news consumption during the war and a primary source of Russian propaganda dissemination, Detector Media has been systematically studying its narratives. In 2024, the Russian propaganda machine built on trends established in 2023, aiming to divide and pit various segments of Ukrainian society against one another — military and civilians, citizens and the government — while focusing on the issues and anxieties of a society weary, traumatized, and exhausted by war. This text highlights five key themes exploited by Russian propaganda on Telegram this year.
Events on the Frontline
One of the primary topics for Russian propagandists, as expected, was the situation on the frontline. Propaganda efforts sought to exaggerate the achievements of the Russian army, downplay the successes of Ukraine’s Defense Forces — particularly during the operation near Kursk — and demoralize Ukrainians by perpetuating the belief that the front would “collapse” if not “today,” then certainly “tomorrow.”
These narratives were pushed on Telegram from the very beginning of the year. For instance, in January 2024, pro-Russian anonymous Telegram channels posing as Ukrainian claimed that “our air defense is overwhelmed and unable to cope with enemy missile strikes… The efficiency of air defense has fallen below 50%, so the trend is clear.” Some went so far as to predict that “by spring 2024, the Russians will achieve full air superiority.”
However, both in spring and even in December 2024, Ukraine’s air defense systems continued to operate effectively, countering almost daily waves of drone attacks and massive missile strikes. (True “full air superiority” would imply that Russian aircraft could bomb Ukrainian cities and military positions unimpeded, which has not been the case.)
Exaggerations of Russian military successes extended not only to the air domain but also to ground operations throughout the year. A notable example was the occupation of Avdiivka in February. Propagandists seized the opportunity to amplify the significance of the city’s capture, manipulating facts and spreading falsehoods.
Anonymous Telegram channels claimed that Avdiivka “was lost in less than a week.” In reality, a large-scale, concentrated assault on the city began back in October 2023, and even then, propagandists were writing about the “fall of Avdiivka in mere weeks.” In truth, the battle for Avdiivka has been ongoing since the start of the full-scale invasion.
The Russian propaganda machine also sought to emphasize Ukrainian losses while minimizing Russian casualties. The battles for Avdiivka were consistently referred to as the “Avdiivka meat grinder,” with claims that “Zelenskyy and Syrskyi are flooding the city with reserves, which are being obliterated by Russian KABs [guided bombs].” Anonymous Telegram channels even circulated stories alleging that “a thousand Ukrainian soldiers were captured,” attributing the claim to The New York Times. Later, no evidence was found to substantiate the claim of “hundreds” of captured Ukrainian soldiers in Avdiivka.
In general, pro-Russian Telegram channels openly condoned war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war, “didn’t see a problem” with the mistreatment of prisoners, mocked victims, and disseminated evidence of these crimes.
Propagandists also had to address less favorable events for Russia, such as operations by Ukraine’s Defense Forces on Russian soil. In March, Russian propaganda “provided informational coverage” of a raid by the Russian Volunteer Corps and other pro-Ukrainian units into the Belgorod and Kursk regions. Initially, Russian propaganda outright denied the raid, claiming that “all sabotage groups were destroyed,” while pro-Russian Telegram channels with a Ukrainian guise dismissed the raid as “a mere PR stunt by the President’s Office.”
In August, propagandists faced a far more challenging task — spinning Ukraine’s offensive in the Kursk region, during which part of the territory, including the district center of Sudzha, was captured. Anonymous Telegram channels claimed that the attack in the Kursk region was “suicidal” and “an [act of] agony that will lead to irreversible fatal consequences.” Predictably, they emphasized losses among “Ukrainian elite units that were diverted from the Donbas to Kursk to [enhance] the media image,” while scarcely mentioning the hundreds of captured Russian soldiers with real video evidence.
They also alleged that Ukraine’s actions disrupted “behind-the-scenes peace negotiations.” Additionally, propagandists used their usual tactic of attributing unrealistic goals to their opponent’s actions, only to then declare them a failure. In this case, Ukrainian forces were accused of allegedly aiming to capture Kursk or at least the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, but failing to achieve either objective.
Russian propagandists also paid significant attention to the widespread use of guided aerial bombs (KABs), which became another factor in Russian advances and tactical successes on the frontline. Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn, spokesperson for the Operational Strategic Group Tavria, commented on the United News telethon that in the summer of 2024, the Russians introduced modifications to their guided bombs, extending their range and improving their effectiveness. However, propagandists sought to amplify the emotional impact of this weaponry, claiming that even a “large city under attack wouldn’t hold out for long.” The example of Avdiivka, which withstood sustained KAB strikes for nearly six months, did not deter such narratives.
Regarding defenses against KABs and Russian aviation, their propaganda also aimed to crush any hope by spreading messages such as: “Air defenses are nearly gone, the air force is depleted, no new aircraft are being supplied, and defensive structures no longer stop the Russians.” This reflects a continuation of trends from 2023, when propaganda sought to discredit the effectiveness of Western weapons used by Ukraine’s Defense Forces.
Reactions of propaganda Telegram channels to the arrival of F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine ranged from triumphant declarations that the jets would have no impact on the battlefield and would be swiftly destroyed, to despair that Ukraine now possesses nearly every type of Western weaponry except nuclear arms. Simultaneously, propagandists downplayed the significance of the Biden administration’s decision to lift restrictions on supplying arms to the Azov unit, dismissing it as a “formality.”
Mobilization Discreditation and Fostering Military-Political “Conflict”
Alongside manipulating battlefield narratives, our study of Russian narratives on Telegram identified a campaign to discredit Ukraine’s mobilization efforts that was active throughout the year. The year 2023 ended with a public and political discussion about updating the mobilization law, the fairness of service terms, and demobilization conditions for Ukrainian soldiers. Russian propagandists also paid attention to the topic, putting persistent efforts into undermining it, ridiculing the initiative to mobilize half a million people as unrealistic, highlighting errors in the work of the military enlistment offices, misleading Ukrainians about new mobilization norms, and sowing fear of deportation of Ukrainian men from European countries. This discreditation campaign included several key narratives aimed at disrupting recruitment and depleting the Defense Forces’ reserves.
Firstly, Russian propaganda promoted hostility toward mobilization and normalizes draft evasion, suggesting that joining the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) equates to certain death. The propagandists aim to create a lasting association that defending the homeland is a punishment rather than a constitutional duty.
The second narrative involves manipulating the idea that mobilized soldiers, without receiving adequate training, are sent directly to the frontline almost straight from enlistment offices and die in large numbers.
This is complemented by a third set of messages highlighting inefficiencies and imbalances in the work of the enlistment offices, which are then extrapolated to criticize the entire military-political leadership of the country.
The Russian propaganda machine wrote tirelessly about a supposed conflict between the military and political leadership of the country, using this to manipulate and discredit Ukrainian state institutions responsible for defense and mobilization processes. Narratives about a rift between Ukraine’s political and military leadership have been present in Russian propaganda since the beginning of the full-scale invasion but intensified in the winter of 2023–2024. Commenting on Valeriy Zaluzhnyi’s resignation as Commander-in-Chief of the AFU on February 8, 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the army “needs urgent changes.” The following day, the President awarded the former commander the title of Hero of Ukraine. Propaganda exploited the tension between Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi to sow distrust in the decisions of the military-political leadership and undermine confidence in key institutions during a critical phase of combat operations.
Propagandists sought to demoralize and discredit the Defense Forces by leveraging the topic of unauthorized absence from military units. Through narratives about “demoralized AFU fleeing positions,” they attempted to portray the Russian offensive as easy for the invaders rather than a series of grueling, bloody “meat-grinder assaults.” Stories of desertions from training bases were also disseminated to explain alleged decreases in training for Ukrainian soldiers in Western countries. The main emphasis in connection with frontline events was placed on the “complete demoralization” of soldiers and officers of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.
“The issue isn’t even a shortage of ammunition. The problem is that the leadership has abandoned the military… It’s not about increased pressure from the Russian Armed Forces but about the loss of hope among AFU soldiers,” wrote an anonymous Telegram channel with over 400,000 subscribers, frequently cited in false information monitoring reports. They referred to the absence of a provision for demobilization in the new law.
The exclusion of a demobilization clause from the final version of the law was a painful issue for some civilians and military personnel, as volunteers and mobilized individuals were left without prospects of being rotated out of the AFU until the end of a war that could last for years. Currently, no law regulating demobilization has been enacted, giving propaganda a continued opportunity to exploit this topic to divide society and provoke conflicts.
Toward the end of the year, pro-Russian Telegram channels also responded to corruption scandals involving medical and social expert commissions (MSECs) and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decree on their reform. Commenting on an investigation by Censor.net editor Yurii Butusov into MSEC corruption, pro-Russian Telegram channels accused the government of inaction. Propagandists sought to portray the Ukrainian government as chronically corrupt, suggesting that law enforcement had never genuinely tackled corruption.
“Tell me, please, was nothing known about the work of the MSECs before? Were the schemes and kickbacks created solely by these Soviet-style ladies? No one ever paid bribes anywhere? None of the authorities knew or even suspected anything? Right? So what’s the point of this circus?” wrote the Telegram channel Borodataia Babushka, which has 22,900 subscribers.
The Russian propaganda machine also spread the narrative of “tightening the screws,” supplementing it with speculations about a lack of people left to mobilize. Propagandists expressed hope that the attempt to reform the MSECs would “likely become an additional stimulus” for resistance from local officials. Propagandist Tetiana Montian wrote that “none of the radical reforms initiated after Euromaidan brought any good.”
Enemy propaganda aims to pit all parts of Ukrainian society against each other, even exploiting investigations by Ukrainian journalists. By launching informational attacks on those same investigators, whom anonymous Telegram channels are willing to support situationally to discredit Ukrainian authorities, they sow discord to undermine societal unity.
The “Illegitimacy” of Ukraine’s President
In 2024, Russian propaganda exploited the narrative of the “illegitimacy” of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to undermine trust in Ukraine’s military and political leadership. The closer the timeline drew to the five-year mark since Zelenskyy’s election, the more intense these manipulations became. These efforts also intensified whenever Russia sought to send signals to the international community about its “readiness for negotiations.”
Russian agitprop constructed a system of internally contradictory portrayals of Zelenskyy, sending varying messages about the Ukrainian leader to different audiences — both within Russia and abroad. Since the fall of 2023, propaganda channels on Telegram have presented Zelenskyy’s “legitimacy vacuum” as a period during which “only bad things” could happen to Ukraine — even going so far as to suggest the possible return of former politicians from the era of the “still legitimate” Viktor Yanukovych. These attacks targeted not only Zelenskyy personally but also the institution of the Ukrainian presidency that he represents.
Detector Media analyzed numerous messages aimed at discrediting the current Ukrainian president, identifying several typical portrayals of Zelenskyy used by propaganda: “an amateur and clown whom no one takes seriously,” “just like Poroshenko,” “a persecutor of the opposition and political competitors,” “a Nazi Jew,” and “an expired president.” Detector Media also reported on a group organizing protests against Zelenskyy on May 21 at Kyiv’s Independence Square through Telegram. Ukrainian law enforcement uncovered an information operation aimed at staging protests under the slogan of Zelenskyy’s “illegitimacy.”
However, the narrative about the expiration of authority extended beyond Zelenskyy. Propagandists also found opportunities to manipulate perceptions of the illegitimacy of other state institutions, including the Verkhovna Rada, particularly regarding changes to legislation on religious organizations in Ukraine. For example, in discussing Bill No. 8371, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova described it as the “destruction of canonical Orthodoxy in Ukraine,” and Russian propaganda pushed the idea that a “time-expired parliament had no right to ban the Church.”
Cabinet of Ministers reshuffles in September were similarly framed by pro-Russian Telegram channels as part of an alleged “power grab” by the “illegitimate Zelenskyy.” These propagandists characterized the personnel changes as a supposed PR campaign by the government in response to Zelenskyy’s “declining ratings.” The overall effort to cast doubt on Ukraine’s democracy and convince audiences of the emergence of an authoritarian regime under Zelenskyy was aimed at eroding trust in Ukrainian authorities.
However, these claims about the illegitimacy of Ukraine’s government do not reflect reality. According to Article 83 of the Ukrainian Constitution, “if the term of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine expires during martial law, its powers shall be extended until the day of the first session of the first convocation of the Rada elected after the termination of martial law.”
Similarly, under Article 108 of the Constitution, the President of Ukraine continues to exercise their powers until the inauguration of a newly elected president, and Article 19 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” prohibits presidential and parliamentary elections during martial law. From a legal standpoint, Ukraine’s government is legitimate, and there is no “legitimacy vacuum” as described by pro-Russian Telegram channels.
Detector Media has repeatedly explained why conducting elections during wartime in Ukraine is, if not impossible, then extraordinarily difficult — legally, logistically, and in light of the risks of Russian interference in the electoral process.
Missile and Drone Attacks Against Ukraine
Another prominent topic for Russian propagandists on Telegram was the terrorist missile attacks of Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, they portrayed these attacks in any way but as acts of terror. “A response to Ukrainian attacks,” “the inability of the President’s Office to ensure Ukrainians’ safety,” “a consequence of Zelenskyy’s refusal to engage in peace negotiations,” or merely an unnamed series of events where no one was at fault but which inevitably led Ukraine to an energy, economic, and social catastrophe. All these interpretations served a primary purpose: to deflect responsibility for war crimes from Russian military and leadership, shift Ukrainians’ negative feelings onto their own government, or at least dilute Russia’s accountability for the attacks.
Russian agitprop consistently covered the massive missile and drone attacks against Ukraine throughout the year, from the first week of 2024 in January to Putin’s new favorite toy, the Oreshnik missile, in November and December. In January, propagandists justified a wave of missile strikes on Ukraine before and immediately after New Year’s by claiming that Ukrainian forces had allegedly shelled the center of Belgorod on December 29, 2023 (Russia’s Ministry of Defense reported its own air defense activity). The main flaw in this narrative was that the wave of large-scale strikes had begun earlier, in the early morning of December 29. Nonetheless, Ukrainian authorities were squarely blamed.
“According to our data, the President’s Office ordered an escalation of strikes on Russia to provoke a response,” one anonymous Telegram channel claimed.
On July 8, Russian forces launched another attack on Ukrainian territory. Among the targets was Kyiv, where one missile struck the building of the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital. Russian propagandists scrambled to minimize the emotional impact of this strike, as the missile was captured on camera and identified as a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile. Anonymous pro-Russian Telegram channels pushed the version that the footage showed not a Russian cruise missile but an air defense missile from Ukraine’s NASAMS system. The attack was also framed as being “beneficial to Bankova Street” [the President’s Office] because it “distracts attention from daily government abuses, corruption, rising tariffs, higher prices, and growing public discontent.”
“This tragedy is overall a win for Zelenskyy, who clings to it as a lifeline,” one purportedly “Ukrainian” pro-Russian anonymous Telegram channel commented on the strike on Okhmatdyt.
The task performed by Russian propagandists in covering the attacks on Ukrainian territory was to instill fear in Ukrainian society. This objective in 2024 was served by yet another round of apocalyptic predictions of a dark and freezing winter and the Kremlin’s now-familiar nuclear threats. However, in late autumn, a new phase of fearmongering began with Russia’s “superweapon” — the Oreshnik missile.
The ballistic missile, identified by experts at Defense Express as part of the RS-26 Rubezh complex, struck the territory of the Pivdenmash plant on November 21. Following this, both official Russian propaganda and anonymous Telegram channels presented the Oreshnik as a “new game-changing weapon,” which, according to Putin’s widely broadcast claims, “minimizes the need to use nuclear weapons” due to its allegedly unprecedented power.
In connection with the “Oreshnik,” propagandists on Telegram promoted two familiar narratives: first, that “Ukraine is headed for total collapse,” and second, that this is “advantageous for Zelenskyy and the West.” According to them, the Ukrainian government supposedly “needs catastrophe and more civilian casualties to capitalize on them for PR,” while the West, particularly American Democrats and “globalists,” wants to ensure “Trump doesn’t expose their schemes. Even a radiation-contaminated territory suits them better than reconciliation.”
Discrediting Western Aid
Russian propaganda manipulated the topic of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, focusing on several key aspects. First, the nearly six-month delay in Congress voting on funding was portrayed as a “decline in support for Ukraine” among American politicians. Propagandists highlighted internal disagreements between Republicans and Democrats, presenting them as evidence of U.S. “fatigue” with the “Ukrainian issue.” They drew attention to the positions of certain Republican Party representatives who criticized the scale of aid or demanded detailed reports on its use. Delays in decisions to supply certain types of weapons or authorize their use were attributed to pressure from the “militarist lobby,” allegedly seeking to prolong the war for the benefit of the American military-industrial complex.
When, on April 20, the House of Representatives voted to allocate $60 billion to Ukraine, the Russian propaganda machine concentrated its efforts on framing this decision as the “last aid package,” claiming it contradicted the “needs of ordinary Americans” and insisting that even this package would be “a loan that will have to be repaid.”
In general, propaganda messaging about Western aid can be divided into two groups: on one hand, to convince the audience of the inability of Ukraine’s partners to continue supporting it due to economic and other constraints; on the other hand, to discredit Ukraine as a recipient of aid by emphasizing corruption and internal problems.
On Telegram channels, propagandists assessed Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the U.S. in the fall of 2024 similarly. Propagandist channels claimed the visit was a complete failure because the “Ukrainian dictator” allegedly failed to “sell the sponsors” on the idea of holding a second Peace Summit and his Victory Plan — thereby failing to secure guarantees of aid for the following year.
Negative coverage also extended to the postponement of the Ramstein format meeting and U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to Germany in October. In reality, Biden’s administration announced a $7.9 billion support package under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, along with an expanded program to train Ukrainian F-16 pilots and discussions about new sanctions against Russia.
In early December, Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko stated that without U.S. assistance, Ukraine would still be able to sustain its military efforts at least through the first half of 2025. However, Ukraine will continue receiving aid from other countries next year. For example, G7 leaders agreed in late October on the details of providing $50 billion to Ukraine, which, along with amendments to the Tax Code, will adequately finance the needs of the Defense Forces in 2025.
Throughout 2024, Russian propaganda on Telegram manipulated these narratives. False information about events on the frontline created an image of Russian military success aimed at demoralizing Ukrainians. Topics such as mobilization and conflict between the military and politicians were exploited to stir internal divisions in Ukraine. Claims about the “illegitimacy” of President Zelenskyy were aimed at undermining trust in Ukraine’s leadership. Attacks on Ukraine were framed as “revenge” for actions by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, thereby justifying Russia’s war crimes. Discrediting Western aid was accompanied by accusations of its ineffective use and corruption.
In 2025, the team of Detector Media will continue monitoring and investigating propaganda on Telegram channels to debunk enemy propaganda’s fakes, manipulations, and disinformation.
Main page illustration by Nataliya Lobach
