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The term “fascist” is employed in a variety of settings, typically as a ploy to capture attention and sway public sentiment in a specific direction.
The practice of labeling Russia’s adversaries as “Nazis” or “fascists” appears to be part of the job description of Russian propagandists. The Detector Media team documented instances of Russians characterizing “Kazakhs” as “Kazakhscists” in late June. This terminology, used to refer to populations or ethnic groups, suggests a potential dehumanization process that can lead to a justification for military aggression against them. Notably, this practice is not exclusive to Russian propaganda; various politicians and activists use similar tactics to spotlight issues or illustrate the infeasibility of certain viewpoints.
Detector Media demystifies the political and propagandistic use of the “Nazi” or “fascist” comparison.
On June 19, 2023, Ukrainian Telegram channels circulated a video featuring a Russian man voicing his displeasure over the cancellation of a concert by Russian singer Grigory Leps in Kazakhstan. Just days prior, Leps, along with a few other Russian artists, offered a reward of a million rubles to anyone who would take possession of a tank supplied by allies of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The Russian man in the video, in response to the concert cancellation, voiced his indignation, “If I understand correctly, the Kazakhs like it when German, British, and American tanks drive through Russia. They cancel concerts of people, including Leps and Baskov, on their illegal territory... Doesn’t the government of this illegal Russian territory, headed by Tokayev, realize that they are exacerbating interethnic conflict and hostility?”
In his address, the man resorted to a tactic known as “labeling” propaganda, painting Kazakh citizens as fascists due to their efforts to cancel the concert of a Russian artist supportive of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Such “labeling” sets a dangerous precedent. The initial deployment of fascist comparisons functions as a derogatory term, but over time these labels can become routine or slang terms for populations that Russians take for granted. A case in point is the demonization of Ukrainians, propagated by Russian media since 2014. This campaign started with movies and electoral strategies to establish an image of Ukrainians as Nazi supporters and was later extended to those opposing Viktor Yanukovych in 2013. In the spring of 2014, Russia, under the guise of shielding Crimeans from supposed Nazis, annexed Crimea and used the same premise to justify its occupation of portions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
During the full-scale war, Russian propagandists routinely equate Ukrainians to the “standard of evil,” typically represented by Germany during 1934-1945. To bolster this stereotype, propagandists search for proof of Ukrainian military and political figures purportedly displaying Nazi symbols. In 2022, they even portrayed Russian schoolchildren arranged in the shape of two 5’s as Ukrainian children forming a swastika.
Although Russian propagandists often use “fascists” and “Nazis” interchangeably, these terms represent distinct states and social movements. Fascism relates to the dictatorial regime of Italy from 1922 to 1943, while Nazism refers to the ideology that governed Germany from 1934 until the end of World War II. Both are totalitarian, nationalistic ideologies, with the key distinction being that fascists place the state at the core, whereas Nazis prioritize racial purity.
For those who have been consistently subjected to Russian propaganda and support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, drawing parallels between Ukrainians and fascists or Nazis provides an explanatory framework for why they should align themselves with Russia against Ukraine. A testament to the effectiveness of this imagery is Serbian nationalist Bratislav Živković, who mimics Russian propaganda’s “fascist Ukrainians” narrative. According to the Center for Strategic Communications, Živković was involved in the occupation of Crimea and renounced his Serbian citizenship for a Russian one. In early February 2022, Živković stated, “It was my duty to take up arms when the fascists came to my land again.”
According to historian Timothy Snyder, invading nations often label adversaries as fascists to sow confusion and distract from their own actions. This misdirection is a component of the “big lie” propaganda tactic: presenting an audience with an incredible story that cannot be logically refuted or confirmed, compelling them to accept it based on faith alone. The “big lie” thrives in societies where a dominant regime controls the media, repeating its preferred narrative until skepticism ceases.
The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda — where the Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills mixed propaganda and hate speech with entertainment underscore the ease with which any social group can be dehumanized given control of popular media.
The use of the term “fascists” is not exclusive to Russian propaganda; politicians worldwide employ this term. In May 2023, for instance, during an escalation of conflict between Albanians and Serbs that left UN peacekeepers injured, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti referred to his Serbian adversaries as “fascist gangs.” Notably, dialogue between the opponents continued, demonstrating that the use of the term “fascists” in this context served as an emotional label rather than a cessation of communication. Russian propagandists utilize comparisons to “fascists” or “Nazis” as a tool to prepare for mass demonstrations, military operations or to justify aggression.
Ukrainian activists have also used “fascists” to describe Russians, aiming to draw attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. During the May 9, 2022, celebration, for instance, Ukrainian activist Iryna Zemliana referred to Russian Ambassador to Poland Sergey Andreev as a fascist. This comparison and a subsequent paint-spraying incident served as a stark reminder of Russian aggression.
In Ukraine, the term “Rashists” has become commonplace, particularly since the full-scale Russian invasion. The term, a journalistic descriptor for Russians, likely originated in 2010 but saw increased use after 2014. As Borys Bakhteyev, a Detector Media columnist, points out, “Rashism” is a journalistic term. However, it might be more apt to label Russians as “fascists,” given the distinct fascist traits of the Russian political regime. These characteristics encompass Russia having an ideology that is promoted by the state through mass culture, religion, and education. This ideology regulates all spheres of life. There is also the cult of the leader, whose stay in power is presented by propagandists as a guarantee of the state’s existence. In Russia, power in the state is held by one political party, which fully controls the executive branch. There are no free elections, and expressing dissent and opposition activity leads to repression. From this perspective, the Russians’ attempts to portray Ukrainians as fascists fit into the propaganda tactic of “mirroring” when the negative features of the regime for which Russian propagandists work are projected onto its opponents.
There have also been efforts in Ukraine to incorporate the term “Rashist” into legislation. In May 2023, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine backed a resolution titled “On the Use of the Ideology of Rashism by the Russian Political Regime, Condemnation of the Principles and Practices of Rashism As Totalitarian and Hateful.” The resolution outlines the crimes committed by the Russian regime and calls upon the international community to sever ties with Russia and unite against the threats to peace it poses.
While shared terminology simplifies communication, caution should be exercised to avoid excessive ideologization and overuse of sensationalist terms. Their vividness and apparent clarity can mislead, risking an oversimplification of events. There is a risk that no one will want to delve into the details of the events, instead perceiving the situation as a special case of a brightly named phenomenon.
For example, any news about a war crime committed by the Russians may start to look like: “Rashists have committed another crime”. And the reaction to it will be: “What’s so surprising? They’re Rashists, what else can you expect from them?” When this stereotype is solidified, the news about Russian war crimes in Ukraine may cease to attract attention, and the victims will be perceived as a natural byproduct. For example, some Russians and social media users who support them take the bombing of civilians in Ukraine for granted. For them, the bombing fits into the picture of the world painted by propagandists and is “the revenge on the Ukrofascists for bombing the Donbas” or “punishment for the Nazis who seized power in Kyiv.”
By calling its opponents fascists and Nazis, Russia dehumanizes them and, at the same time, tries to project its own crimes on others. Such comparisons also serve a justifying function for Russia because if Ukrainians or anyone else are fascists and Nazis, they must be stopped, destroyed, and prevented from doing evil. Russia needs this rhetoric to blur reality and to reinforce the idea that others are the aggressors, not Russia itself.
