Is Poland going the right(-wing) direction? Presidential elections 2025: main characters, attitudes towards Ukraine, and the impact of disinformation

Authors: Artur Koldomasov, Nikola Lewicka

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The first round of the presidential election in Poland took place on May 18. As a result, Rafał Trzaskowski, a candidate from the government's “Civic Platform” (“Platforma Obywatelska”), and Karol Nawrocki, a candidate from the opposition “Law and Justice” party (“Prawo i Sprawiedliwość”), advanced to the second round. During the campaign, topics related to Ukraine became the primary focus.

Disinformation added even more tension to the campaign and deepened the existing social divide. Some Polish and foreign experts believe that Polish politics has begun to take on right-wing tendencies.

Detector Media spoke to a number of Polish and Ukrainian experts about this, as well as the importance of the first round results, the candidates' positions on Ukraine, and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and disinformation. We also analyzed Telegram channels from the sample used by the Research Center to monitor Russian propaganda regularly and tried to illustrate a complete information picture of these elections.

According to the State Election Commission of Poland (PKW), 19,603,784 valid ballots were registered in the first round. Of these:

Only one candidate, apart from the two leaders of the race, received more than ten percent of the vote - Slawomir Mentzen, who received 14.81%. All ten other candidates received between 0.09% and 6.34% of the vote.

The voter turnout was 67.31%, which is more than three percent higher than in the first round of the last presidential election in 2020. The success associated with the high turnout in the first round may have been due to ubiquitous pro-frequency campaigns such as “Girls for Elections” (Dziewczyny na wybory). These had a significant impact on the huge increase in the number of women participating in Poland's last parliamentary elections in 2023, according to the Batory Foundation research. As a result, two years ago, it was more women than men who went to the polls, and the turnout was as high as 72.9%. It is also likely that, as in the last four presidential elections, more people will go to the polls in the second round than in the first. As Dr. Mateusz Zaremba of SWPS University explains, there is a psychological mechanism behind this - voters have the conviction that the second round is the final outcome and there will not be another runoff, which motivates them to be more active voters.

The New York Times and The Economist called this presidential election the most important in Polish history because it is a test for Polish society after the victory of Donald Tusk's party in the 2023 parliamentary elections. At the time, Poles who voted for the current prime minister hoped for quick changes that were contrary to the postulates of the PiS government. However, many of the new government's decisions disappointed voters, as they overlapped with PiS's ideas in some ways. Another reason for disappointment is that the pace of change is too slow, according to some voters. In particular, polls conducted by United Surveys for Dziennik Gazety Prawnej and RMF FM show that a year after the election, the largest percentage of Poles (30.5%) were disappointed in the current Prime Minister, Donald Tusk compared to other politicians. According to the Rzeczpospolita newspaper's article about the survey, the same sentiments are expressed about the ruling coalition.

Analysts from the Brookings Institution classify both leading candidates as right-wing with different inclinations towards centrism or populism, which is considered an indicator of the movement of Polish politics to the right.

Also, this election has no obvious leader. This is confirmed by the results of opinion polls. In a poll by Opinia24 for the private TV channel TVN, conducted immediately after the first round, 46% of the votes in the second round on June 1 were predicted to go to Trzaskowski, and 44% to Nawrocki. In contrast, the most recent polls by the same service for May 22 show 47% for Nawrocki and 45% for Trzaskowski.

Olha Popovych, a member of the editorial board of the Polish media Nasz Wybir and editor of the Ukrainian Almanac (a journal published by the Association of Ukrainians in Poland), explains that Ukrainians should pay attention to the actions and rhetoric of those candidates who did not make it to the second round of the election, as Trzaskowski and Nawrocki will be fighting for the votes of their electorate to win.

Given the aforementioned “right-wing tendencies” in Polish politics, Popovych expressed concern about Trzaskowski's rhetoric on cutting benefits for Ukrainian refugees and believes that the candidate's flirtation with right-wing and populist rhetoric is a dangerous signal:

“If we take the example of Ukrainian refugees, they are mostly women with children. And very often, these women did not have the opportunity to work. If the allowance for two children reached a total of 1,600 zlotys, it was quite a tangible financial assistance for these families, for these women... Therefore, by entering this discourse of right-wing populists, Trzaskowski, as we can see, touched upon topics that will not contribute to good relations between Poland and Ukraine, and ultimately to the very situation of Ukrainians in Poland. And it is dangerous that a candidate from a liberal party has started flirting with the right-wing electorate with such theses.”

The observer points out: Trzaskowski should instead focus on voters who voted for Magdalena Biejat, a candidate from Lewica, and Szymon Hołownia, the Speaker of the Sejm and a candidate of the Trzecia droga/Polska 2050 coalition, who did not use anti-Ukrainian rhetoric during the campaign and, on the contrary, called for increased aid.

Below are the programs of only those candidates who made it to the second round or, in the opinion of the interviewed experts, are important for the results of the second round, as well as those who were known for their anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.

Rafał Trzaskowski (Civic Platform coalition)

The current mayor of Warsaw. In his election program, he emphasizes increasing state budget spending on defense to 5% of GDP, reformatting the National Security Council with the inclusion of faction leaders, and creating “the Second Mission Center” to engage veterans in military training. His economic program includes support and protection of national producers, including farmers, reducing dependence on external suppliers, simplifying business conditions, and developing green energy. In the social sphere, Trzaskowski proposes to liberalize abortion and increase financial support for families, as well as investments in healthcare and education. He also proposes to limit social benefits for refugees.

Actively supports Ukraine. He firmly opposes Russia and promotes the unity of the West's positions, emphasizing that Poland and its allies must prove to the aggressor that “Putin will not win this war.” He also stated that Poland should promote Ukraine's membership in NATO, as it is a guarantee of Poland's security.

Karol Nawrocki (Law and Justice)

Director of the Institute of National Remembrance in Poland. Many of the economic initiatives in the candidate's program are aimed at reducing taxes, supporting families and businesses: in particular, Nawrocki proposes to reduce VAT to 22%, introduce a zero personal income tax rate for families with two or more children, increase the minimum pension by PLN 150, reduce electricity prices, and launch a nationwide investment program in each gmina (urban territorial unit). The candidate also advocates “ending the influence” of migration agreements (withdrawal from the Global Compact on Migration) and promises to adopt a “Security Constitution” with an increase in the army to 300,000 troops, modernization of the armed forces, a new military training program, and clear powers of the president as commander-in-chief. In social policy, he insists on prioritizing Poles in public services and limiting aid to foreigners.

When discussing social benefits, he explicitly said that in hospital queues and schools, “our Poles should go first,” and that benefits (including care and pensions) should not go to “Ukrainian and other” citizens. He openly promotes the idea of Poland First, i.e., taking care of the needs of Polish citizens first. Regarding the war in Ukraine, Nawrocki said that “Ukraine still has a lot to do for Poland” and assured that he would never allow Polish soldiers to be sent to fight in Ukraine.

After the first round, Nawrocki signed the declaration of the leader of the nationalist “Confederation” Slawomir Mentzen, thus gaining the support of his voters. Among other things, the document contains a clause against Ukraine's accession to NATO, as discussed in more detail below.

Magdalena Biejat (Leftists; 4.23% of the vote in the first round)

Advocates a secular state: a clear separation of church and government, legal abortion, and other freedoms. She offers support for vulnerable groups, equal rights for LGBT+ people, and the strengthening of workers' rights. In economic terms, she proposes more investment in healthcare, education, and assistance to the poor. The politician also advocated for the accelerated implementation of the EU's Green Deal in Poland. In security policy, she prioritizes diplomacy and European integration, promoting closer ties with the EU and NATO while maintaining Poland's role as an active ally.

She believes that political and financial support for Ukraine is necessary. In the debates, she insisted that Ukraine “should at least be in NATO” and is a guarantor of Polish security. She criticized the position of her rivals in this election, who oppose Ukraine's accelerated accession to NATO and the EU. In her interview for the Fakty po Faktach program, Biejat said that Ukraine is “ready to fight to have a just peace on its terms” and that Europe and the United States should be more active in promoting a Ukrainian peaceful settlement, not just pressuring Kyiv to end the war for Russian interests. She accused US President Trump of trying to end the war “at any cost”, even “at the cost of Ukraine”, and called on the EU to maintain its efforts to achieve a just peace.

Szymon Hołownia (Third Way/Poland 2050 coalition; 4.99% of the vote in the first round)

The speaker of the Polish Sejm and former TV presenter proposes deeper integration with the EU, namely, the transition from the zloty to the euro, deepening ties with Germany and France, and continuation of the energy “green course.” In the economy, he proposes to reform the tax system, support small businesses, and increase social benefits. In social policy, he supports the right to legalize abortion through a referendum and other social freedoms, and encourages active participation of citizens in government decision-making. In the security dimension, he sees an increase in Poland's defense capabilities in cooperation with its allies.

Hołownia has been a vocal critic of pro-Russian narratives and supports assistance to Ukraine. In public speeches, he has criticized “vivid dislike of Ukraine” as a marker of falling into the Kremlin's sphere of influence. According to him, Ukraine's suspension from NATO and the EU due to unresolved historical disputes is unacceptable, and Poland's position should be determined by supporting Ukraine's sovereignty. In his election program, the politician declares an “open door” for refugees, including the preservation of the right to asylum and benefits for Ukrainian refugees in Poland. He also promises “maximum assistance to Ukraine” and calls for continued military and economic support.

Sławomir Mentzen (Confederation)

The candidate of the most prominent right-wing radical party in Poland advocates a minimal role of the state in the economy. The basis of his election program is the proposal of a radical tax reform: a single “income tax” of 1% instead of VAT/PIT, abolition of social charges, and simplification of taxation of small businesses. He calls for the restoration of the right to bear arms, the creation of a market-based health insurance system (as in Germany, with private funds), and the abolition of free higher education. In social policy, he is categorically against abortion and has conservative views: “to protect life and family, to prevent ‘deviants’ from educating children.” In the field of security, he advocates for enhanced border protection, the growth of the defense industry, including the implementation of the nuclear program, and the maximum defense capability of Poland.

He harshly criticizes the migration policy for supporting Ukrainians. In his speeches and interviews, he claims that Poland “spends more on social benefits for Ukrainians than they pay in taxes”. He questioned “800+” payments to refugees and the provision of educational or medical services to Ukrainian children from the Polish budget. He also says that Ukrainians treat Poland “like suckers.” He criticized the EU's Green Deal for allegedly putting Polish farmers in an unequal “unfair competition” with Ukraine, as Ukrainian farmers have fewer restrictions on exporting their products to the EU. In the field of military policy, Mencen opposes Poland's participation in the war, saying that only neutral states should participate in peacekeeping missions, and “Poland should stay in the rear and [deal with] logistics.”

Grzegorz Braun (Confederation of the Polish Crown; 6.34% of the vote in the first round)

A right-wing radical ex-MP from the Confederation, who was expelled from the Sejm for an incident involving the extinguishing of a menorah in its hall. He has also been involved in other scandals, for example, burning the EU flag during his term in the European Parliament. He promotes the idea of “Poland for Poles,” namely, he advocates a tough anti-immigration policy and active resistance to liberal reforms. He insists on Poland's rapid withdrawal from the EU (informally called Polexit), the abolition of the EU's Green Deal, and the “full restoration of Poland's sovereignty.” He is a homophobe who advocates a strict ban on abortion for the sake of, in his words, “protecting life and Catholic values.” In economic terms, he proposes a sharp tax cut, the abolition of most fees, including VAT, and the most liberal conditions for small businesses.

Brown opposes any further aid to Ukraine and proposes a “new breath” in relations with Russia. He said that Poland should not provide military aid for other people's wars and opposes the involvement of the Polish military in a possible peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. He also rejects the idea of creating a pan-European army. The politician argued that normalization of Poland's relations with Russia is “the cornerstone of Polish security.” He proposes to restore the Polish military-industrial complex with a “national command”.

Maciej Maciak (Movement for Welfare and Peace; 0.19% of the vote in the first round)

He positions himself as an opponent of big business, advocating limiting its influence by raising taxes on large corporations. He also supports the expansion of pensions and social programs. In foreign policy, Maciak declares pacifism, expressing admiration for China's policy, considering it “ideal,” and positively assesses Russia and especially Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orban, which he considers a model to follow. Maciak also expresses sympathy for Russian President Vladimir Putin, although he denies accusations of Russophilia.

Maciak has repeatedly expressed pro-Russian views, which have drawn criticism from the Polish media and the public. For example, during the campaign, during an interview on the YouTube channel Kanal Zero, when another presidential candidate, vlogger and politician Krzysztof Stanowski, asked him about his admiration for Putin, Maciak replied: “How can you not admire someone who shows exceptional resistance?” After saying this, the host stopped broadcasting, which caused a stir in the Polish media. In particular, Maciak's supporters accused the host of censorship and talked about a “repressive Europe” that allegedly “silences” candidates for peaceful initiatives against Russia, according to Demagog. His participation in the election drew attention to the existence of such sentiments in Polish society, although his influence on the country's overall political course is limited.

The results of the first round of elections show that the candidates of parties positioned on the right-wing side of the political scene received the majority of votes. Only Karol Nawrocki, Slawomir Mentzen, and Grzegorz Braun together won nearly 51% of the vote, not counting less popular candidates such as Marek Jakubiak. Moreover, the Confederation's candidate, Slawomir Mentzen, scored about 10 percentage points higher than the leftist candidate of the Together party, Adrian Zandberg. Consequently, it is the votes of Mentzen's supporters that the second-round candidates will now be vying for, which may result in an increasingly pronounced shift of Rafal Trzaskowski's narrative to the right as well. As a result, Rafal Trzaskowski met Slawomir Mentzen in a debate on May 24, and even drank beer with him.

Both Trzaskowski and Nawrocki are using the administrative resources in these elections that they have gained from their positions in state institutions. According to Popovych, the mayor of Warsaw is using not only his status in the capital, but also the administrative resources of the entire government party. As she says, in particular, despite the positive changes in the status of Poland's public broadcaster TVP, certain trends in favor of Trzaskowski can still be traced in his broadcasting during the election campaign. This is confirmed by the monitoring of news programs conducted by the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting (KRRiT) during the campaign.

Similarly, Nawrocki, although his resources within the Institute of National Remembrance are more limited, still uses them, in particular through the Institute's branches. According to numerous Gazeta Wyborcza stories and other investigations by Polish media, Nawrocki uses his affiliation with the Institute in a variety of ways, from personal branding of its projects to traveling to election rallies in a limousine owned by the INP. According to Popovych, this is a continuation of the tradition of the Institute fully supporting the PiS candidate.

Michał Wenzel, a disinformation expert and lecturer at SWPS University, recalls how the Volyn tragedy was used in the campaigns of a number of candidates. For example, as Popovych also says, Nawrocki, as the head of the INP, tried to sabotage the exhumation of Polish victims of those events in Ukraine. The politician has repeatedly claimed that this will never happen because Ukraine is slowing down the process.

According to the observer, this is an alarming signal, as both Braun and Mentzen have resorted to anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, which continued after the results of the first round were announced. Popovych also explains that another point of convergence in the rhetoric of these three politicians is the explanation of the historical trauma surrounding the Volyn tragedy with an openly anti-Ukrainian character. The hints at that and other signs of alignment with Mentzen and Braun were evident in the lead-up to the second round, too. Karol Nawrocki, invited by Slawomir Mentzen to discuss key political issues, held his meeting on May 22. During the hour-and-a-half-long broadcast on the Confederation politician's YouTube channel, the president of the Institute of National Remembrance signed an eight-point declaration prepared by Mentzen. Among its demands were opposition to the ratification of Ukraine's accession to NATO and criticism of the current state of Ukraine, which Nawrocki assessed as a country that does not meet many of the European Union's basic standards, pointing in particular to high levels of corruption. These statements provoked strong reactions - Prime Minister Donald Tusk commented that “if a presidential candidate in Poland, who just to please Slawomir Mentzen in one broadcast says that Poland will never agree to Ukraine in NATO, there is no better term for what he has done than high treason”.  

Moreover, Nawrocki's comments mark a departure from the previous policy of support for Ukraine, which has been promoted in the past by, among others, President Lech Kaczynski. During the conversation, Nawrocki also repeatedly distanced himself from the policies pursued by the Law and Justice Party, that supports him, stressing that he has no party legitimacy and criticizing its various policies, including the lockdown during the pandemic. Experts estimate that during the meeting Nawrocki tried to be “more Mentzen than Mentzen himself,” in an attempt to convince Confederation voters of his persona ahead of the second round of elections. This explains why as Poland's third political force, Mentzen sets conditions and has a real influence on policy-making, as evidenced by his invitation of candidates to talks and his attempt to force the signing of a program declaration, as part of his promise to “transfer the votes” of his voters to one of the second-round candidates.

Popovych also classifies Braun as a politician who is “a prime example of ties with Russians, who traveled to Moscow, took pictures with a Russian journalist who was expelled from Poland and accused of spying for Russia,” and so on. She also mentions another candidate who did not receive enough votes in the first round, Maciej Maciak, who openly admired Vladimir Putin during the election campaign. At the same time, other Polish experts say there is no evidence of his direct connection to Russia.

Popovych adds that a few years ago, such pro-Putin views were atypical for Polish politics, and such a concentration of presidential candidates using pro-Russian rhetoric should be alarming. Michał Wenzel has a similar opinion: “In previous years, we have not actually seen such pro-Russian narratives in the context of presidential elections. There were fewer of them before the last parliamentary elections.” He explains this, in particular, by the data of opinion polls, according to which Poles' support for Ukrainians is declining. The Miroszewski Center's research shows that not only has the attitude of Poles toward Ukrainians deteriorated, but also support for Poland's continued participation in Ukraine's reconstruction and even further assistance to Ukraine.

Describing the campaign in general, Wenzel also highlighted one important trend, in his opinion, which is the absence of answers to the topic of Polish-Ukrainian economic relations in the rhetoric of the candidates in this election, which was a common theme in the 2023 parliamentary elections due to farmers' protests. “In this campaign, this topic does not appear at all. Sporadically, occasionally, but it does not cause much resonance.” Instead, the main topic of this election campaign, according to the expert, is the vision of Poland's security policy:

“They (the candidates) position Poland differently in this security system and look for support for this security elsewhere. Some say: “Let's act together with Europe”. These are the centers and the left. Others say: “Let's act together with the United States”. Still others say: “Let's arm ourselves, because we can't rely on anyone.” And this, of course, is connected to the war, because this is the theme of the campaign, which is caused by the fact that there is a war on the other side of the eastern border. But neither Russia nor Ukraine are the central figures in this campaign. That is, no one, except for one of the candidates, actually questions the role of Russia as an aggressor and Ukraine as a victim.”

This is why the expert advises to distinguish between the rhetoric of Braun and Maciak, since, in his opinion, while Maciak repeats Kremlin narratives, Braun has anti-Ukrainian rhetoric that is not always synchronized with Russia: “He simply treats Russia as the elephant in the room, as an element that cannot be removed from the discussion. Maciak's candidacy differs from the others in that his narrative is in line with what the Russian authorities are spreading on their channels, and this is, in my opinion, a rather interesting difference.”

In Poland, disinformation plays an important role in the context of the campaign. Such a conclusion can be made based on the activity of Polish public institutions in that context. For instance, NASK have detected organized disinformation campaigns conducted by hundreds of fake social media accounts that spread coordinated messages in line with Russian propaganda. It includes, among other things, spreading false information on topics that polarize society, such as security, foreign policy, migration or the economic situation. In addition, there have been mass SMS mailings containing false information aimed at creating anxiety and confusion among voters. The Polish government alerts that attempts at Russian interference are unprecedented and include not only disinformation, but also hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure, such as cyberattacks on energy, water and administrative systems aimed at paralyzing the normal functioning of the state. 

In the face of these threats, the Polish government is working with big tech companies such as Meta, Alphabet and Microsoft to counter manipulation and secure the electoral process. Against the backdrop of Russian aggression against Ukraine and Poland's role as a key ally and support hub for Ukraine, such campaigns aim to undermine social unity and destabilize the country politically. Therefore, fighting disinformation becomes one of the most important challenges for Polish democracy during these elections. This requires not only the actions of state services and institutions, but also an increase in public awareness and a critical approach to information among citizens.

According to Katarzyna Bąkowicz, a Polish communication and media scholar who teaches at SWPS University and previously worked at the state Commission for the Study of Russian and Belarusian Influences in Poland, the entire presidential campaign this time is a very emotional spectacle, which creates a fertile ground for the introduction of disinformation narratives.

“Poland is not the only country where such narratives are being created, as the creators of disinformation are most interested in creating information chaos, the long-term consequence of which could be the disintegration of the EU... What Russia is most interested in is to weaken the EU and make it a partner that is not ready to negotiate with the leaders of countries such as Russia, China or the United States... Therefore, the topic of disinformation should be considered in a broader context, and not reduced to the Poland-Russia-Ukraine relations only, as this web of influence has many layers and is much more complex,” the expert said.

According to the “Poland: Country Election Risk Assessment 2025” report by the FIMI Response Team, Poland is one of the three EU countries that are under constant attack from Russian disinformation, along with France and Germany. According to the authors of the document, geopolitical tensions, the activity of domestic radical groups, and the split in Polish society create ideal conditions for information manipulation. According to analysts, a number of separate disinformation campaigns were conducted to sabotage this year's presidential election.

As part of the Ghostwriter campaign, which ran from 2020 to 2023, various Belarusian and Russian actors (hackers and other people involved in the process) hacked Polish politicians' social media accounts and leaked secret government documents through platforms like Poufna Rozmowa, which is a website, Telegram channel, VK page, and Yandex chat that are still active. These fused materials were used by some politicians in the election campaign, increasing internal polarization.

The Doppelganger campaign, launched in 2024, created fake pages imitating well-known media outlets - in the Polish case, Polityka, PAP or Polskie Radio. These fake pages promote messages favorable to the Kremlin. Moreover, it is not just websites, but also social media profiles. According to the report, the key topics of materials on such pages aimed at the Polish audience are anti-EU information, as well as anti-Ukrainian, anti-government, and anti-American posts. In particular, they criticize the EU's Green Deal, portray Ukraine as a parasite on Poland's money and resources, manipulate the shortcomings of the Tusk government's economic and social policies, and further promote the idea of Poland's neutrality and its refusal to provide further assistance to Ukraine. The campaign also involves the massive creation of fake social media accounts disguised as residents of the country to simulate high activity on fake media pages for further promotion by social media algorithms.

Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka, uses the massive spread of fake news with fictitious sources or using fake pages of well-known media outlets to force journalists and fact-checkers to spend resources on checking fakes, slowing down their work. Journalists can be tagged in social media posts or written to in personal messages with similar requests. In addition, the authors of the report write that Russian curators offer payments of four thousand euros via the darknet for spreading Russian narratives among Polish voters.

As a result, according to the researchers, Russian disinformation in Poland is high-tech and hybrid, combining online and offline means, adapting to the local Polish context, manipulating historical grievances, and using anonymity and “local faces” to legitimize its ideas.

While the FIMI Response Team report describes the more general tools used by Russian propaganda to disrupt these Polish elections, the weekly monitoring of Polish fact-checkers from the NGO Demagog shows examples of candidates using disinformation in the campaign and trends in Russian disinformation in Poland related to the elections.

In the midst of the campaign, pro-Russian actors, according to this monitoring, regularly spread anti-Ukrainian disinformation with fakes and manipulations, often to reinforce similar rhetoric of the candidates, as in the case of the hashtag #StopUkrainizacjiPolski (#StopTheUkrainizationofPoland), which was created by Braun and later picked up by pro-Russian accounts. For example, one of the fakes spread on social network X was a letter allegedly indicating that Poland was sending soldiers to Ukraine. However, these reports were denied by the Operational Command of the Polish Armed Forces, which said that it was about several Polish army soldiers who had been in Ukraine for years to guard the Embassy and visits by Polish authorities.

The accounts, which are classified by Demagog as pro-Russian, also regularly spread insults towards Ukrainians, disparagingly referring to Ukrainian refugees in Poland as “Ukrainian chumps” who pose a danger to the country. They call Zelenskyy a “Banderite terrorist”. These accounts also scare that Ukraine will cause the disintegration of Poland because Poland allegedly wants to make Ukrainian the state language. Conspiracy theories were also used, such as the “Jewish global conspiracy” of which Ukraine is allegedly a part. These accounts also spread theories that Ukraine is the aggressor in the war. According to the monitoring results, these posts received more than 500 thousand views in X.

Telegram is not as popular in Poland as it is in Ukraine, but as previous studies by DM have shown, the messenger attracts supporters of conspiracy theories and certain fringe movements that are part of the electorate of candidates favorable to Russia. However, experts are divided on the issue of influence through Telegram in Poland.

Michał Wenzel says that Telegram is not popular, and the narratives spread there are not widely present in more popular Polish-language media. This is especially true of the narrative about these elections already being unfair, which is promoted by the Telegram channels analyzed by DM. But in reality, Polish society has no complaints about the integrity of the electoral process.

“The general feeling is that there is a wide range of candidates representing different moods, views, and political groupings. And voters can choose among them according to a fair procedure, and the rest is the election campaign, who better meets the needs of specific groups of voters,” says Wenzel.

Olha Popovych agrees that Telegram is not that widespread in Poland and advises to pay attention to Tiktok, YouTube, Facebook and X, as well as certain websites that, according to her, regularly spread anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. However, she does not rule out the possibility that the influence of this messenger in Poland may increase:

“With so many Ukrainians in Poland who use Telegram, who are in contact with their Polish counterparts (I'm talking primarily about young people who actively use Telegram and who can encourage their Polish friends to use this resource), there is a danger that Polish-language content [in this messenger] will be more spread to Polish-speaking readers.”

In the Telegram channels of its regular sample for monitoring Russian propaganda on the messenger, DM found messages that not only discredit all the main candidates, except for those who express pro-Russian rhetoric, but also generally aim to discredit the electoral process in Poland.

The Siostry Jasnowidzki (Psychic Sisters) channel, with an audience of more than 13,000 subscribers, posted a video after the first round of the election stating that Trzaskowski and Tusk allegedly want to establish a dictatorship in Poland if the former wins the second round, with the following caption: “So far, the lemmings have been laughing, but soon they will be crying because it will be too late to evacuate.”

The day before the election, the Niezależny dziennik polityczny (Independent Political Daily) channel, with an audience of more than 12,000 subscribers, spread information that Trzaskowski's personal correspondence had been made public, in which he allegedly asked for drugs. A month before the election, the same channel published a long article titled “Trzaskowski comes, gender comes,” which scares with the usual right-wing populist talking points. In March, the same channel also disseminated anti-Semitic posts, including those from tiktok, which stated that the mayor of Warsaw was allegedly a candidate supported by the “global Jewish conspiracy” and whose goal allegedly was to expand the rights of the Jewish community in the country, leaving Poles behind.

Relevant channels also portrayed Magdalena Biejat and Szymon Hołownia as candidates opposed to the “Polish national idea” and condemned voters who voted for these politicians in the first round of elections. For example, in a post after the results, Niezależny dziennik polityczny referenced a television commentary by Andrzej Zybertowicz, an adviser to the current Polish President Andrzej Duda, in which he claimed that those who voted for Trzaskowski, Biejat, and Hołownia “abandoned their Polishness.” The authors of these channels also try to create the impression that these candidates do not care about Polish security, contrasting them with right-wing politicians, despite a number of statements on security policy by Biejat, Hołownia and Trzaskowski.

Instead, the same Telegram channels in the sample portray Nawrocki as a successful candidate - they selectively mention him either in posts against Trzaskowski or in comments by political scientists and experts who say that the PiS candidate's campaign is more thoughtful, using framing techniques. In April, one of them even featured two candidates - a video was used in the relevant post, where on one side of it a report was shown with the demolition of Soviet monuments as part of Nawrocki's initiative as head of the PiS, and on the other side, a sign “Kaczyńskiego Street” was removed from a street in Warsaw and a sign “Armia Ludowa Street” was hung. The authors of the post added: “Every day until the election I will remind you of this. Nawrocki is fighting communism, and Trzaskowski is a child of communism. One knocks down Katsap monuments, and the other restores the memory of Katsaps (Katsaps - the slur for Russians, DM). On May 18, we all go to the polls!” However, in March, the same channel ridiculed Nawrocki's interview, where the candidate said that Poland should break off diplomatic relations with Russia.

The Polish-language Telegram channels in the sample portrayed Mentzen and Braun even more positively, presenting their words or actions as correct and the politicians themselves as victims of “Ukrainian propaganda.” For example, a few days before the first round of the election, a video was posted in which unknown “Ukrainians” allegedly threatened Mentzen with a lawsuit for “insulting words about Ukrainian history and Ukrainian heroes” and, according to the authors of the post, boasted that there were hundreds of thousands of them in Poland and they would do everything to prevent him from becoming president. “Mentzen himself says that he has already informed the relevant services that he is receiving threats, but their authors have not yet been found. He also has a message to Ukrainians with threats against him: “Instead of threatening children, go to the front,” the post reads.

In April, the administrators of these channels claimed that Mentzen's election rallies allegedly attracted more people than other candidates' events, and that the current president of the country had allegedly begun to support him (Andrzej Duda did not publicly support any candidate in this election, but attended a rally of his fellow party member Nawrocki).

The same channels are actively disseminating Brown's YouTube videos and words, and the Ocalić życie (Save a life) channel with an audience of more than 40 thousand subscribers regularly published posts in support of Braun, creating the impression of his mass popularity and a conspiracy against him. For example, one of the channel's posts reads as follows:

“As in all online polls, Braun is winning. Whereas in all TV polls commissioned by the party and their private television, the one who orders these polls wins. For me, all polls should be banned, it's just manipulation. Let's say 5 million people are undecided just because the polls say their candidate has no chance. In this way, several million Poles choose a candidate other than their own, and choose the lesser of two evils. In the face of such blindness, I warn people not to be held hostage by polls, because polls at this point do not exist to show real support, but to create a certain point of view. You cannot be guided by polls here!”

Instead, these channels mentioned Maciej Maciak much less, only rarely disseminating his interviews to various Polish media.

Telegram channels paid much more attention to the idea that the elections in Poland are being manipulated and the country has turned into a failed state, as all candidates are allegedly bad, Poles have no one to choose from, and the government is allegedly reducing prices for key consumer products as part of the election campaign. Propagandists in the Polish-speaking segment are trying to prove that these elections are a farce, and the results are predetermined. Niezależny dziennik polityczny even published information about the procedure of “electoral protest” in Polish law, which is used as a sign of disagreement with the election result, with a detailed description of all the steps. As if, if anything, there is such an option.

Russian-language Telegram channels that spread pro-Russian rhetoric were not silent on the topic of these elections either. In particular, a channel with an audience of more than 150,000 subscribers wrote after the first round of the election that although there are “quite a few differences between Trzaskowski and Nawrocki, they are very similar in terms of Russophobia. Throughout the campaign, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki tried to prove to voters that each was a greater enemy of Russia than the other.” In addition, other Telegram channels in the sample present the political situation in Poland as dramatic for Ukraine and bilateral Ukrainian-Polish relations, taking out of context the candidates' words about or against Ukrainians. The propagandists state that even Trzaskowski's position is tough on Ukraine.

This is only a part of what Russian propaganda wrote about this election, but these examples show how this propaganda can combine contradictory narratives and target radically different political camps.

Olga Popovych says that it is difficult to answer the question of what share of Polish society does not like Russian influences and what share pays attention to them:

“But when we read the Polish media, when we pay attention to the media discourse, it still says that Russia is trying to use the political scene in Poland and has influence or direct ties with Polish politicians. That it is using its information war on the territory of Poland, using the means of this war - disinformation, propaganda... It uses its direct agents to spread them.”

According to the expert, the main changes occurred after 2014 - it was from that time that more materials about the possible Russian influence on Polish politics began to appear in the Polish media space. That was also when many civil society organizations emerged in Poland that deal with countering disinformation. Therefore, to claim that this goes unnoticed in Poland, she says, would not be entirely true.

However, there is still a certain dissonance among experts on this issue. Popovych provides several examples of this, particularly the expert discourse surrounding the "Confederation" party and Sławomir Mentzen:

"If you analyze their discourse, you’ll find many narratives that, to put it diplomatically, reflect the Russian point of view. And there is also a large number of Polish experts who speak about Russian influence, while at the same time saying that 'Confederation' is still a typically Polish party. That it’s merely a coincidence of narratives, because they appeal to the right-wing electorate. At the same time, for example, during the farmers’ protests, followed by the hauliers’ protests and the blockade of the Ukrainian border, 'Confederation' was at the forefront politically and supported the blockade. At that time, many Polish experts said that one could trace some Russian influences, Russian connections with the party - not even with its key leaders, but with local members who were involved in those protests. Some had business ties with Russian colleagues among the hauliers, for example, and were therefore interested, and accordingly could have had not only business but also contacts with Russian services that would be interested in organizing the protests."

Such caution in wording has its reasons, says Popovych. “Proving these connections is not always easy, and it’s not always possible to do so in accordance with the law and in a responsible manner. That’s why loud statements and direct accusations are often avoided here - to prevent legal action that a particular individual or political force might win, because, I repeat, sometimes it’s very difficult to prove these connections in court,” she explains.

Polish experts working on disinformation advise making a clear distinction about its origins. As Bąkowicz says, disinformation surrounding the elections cannot be attributed solely to Russia or Belarus, though these are the countries whose narratives are often shared by other creators of disinformation. Wenzel also argues that he would avoid using the term “Russian disinformation” in this context altogether, and would instead speak of certain pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian narratives.

“In reality, we’re not in a position right now to say which of the candidates running in the elections is some kind of agent spreading information provided, for instance, by the Russian side. And to what extent their statements reflect their own position... There are such accusations, but we don’t have evidence of it.”

Bąkowicz adds that Poland is quite well prepared institutionally and operationally to counter disinformation, but not all elements of this network are always utilized effectively or function as they should. “We have research centers, fact-checking organizations, NGOs, and institutions that counter disinformation within their communication work. However, we need much more cooperation and coordination in this area to make the impact more visible,” she says.

Michał Wenzel states that Poland’s civil society institutions and the public in general are ready to resist disinformation, especially from Russia, because they simply do not believe it:

“Even when such content appears in the public space, it doesn’t gain popularity, it doesn’t spread. People don’t believe it. The best proof of this is that the candidate who directly repeats Kremlin rhetoric received less than 1% of the vote. In effect, he basically doesn’t exist. This is different from the situation in neighboring countries. Polls show that such pro-Russian content is much more popular, for example, in Hungary or Slovakia. Their publics are more willing to agree with it, believe it, and consider it legitimate. But the situation in Poland is different.”

Wenzel explains this by pointing to different historical preconditions, which mean that pro-Russian content is, by default, viewed as an expression of Russian propaganda. “Polish society has a different personal experience - first-hand, second-hand, from the second generation, the third generation - which means that this kind of disinformation simply works much less effectively in Poland than in other countries in the region.” However, in his opinion, this does not mean that anti-Ukrainian narratives do not work, because this is a separate type of disinformation that draws not only from what Russia says but also from Poles’ personal experiences and attitudes toward Ukrainians - both now and in the past.

The first round of the 2025 presidential election in Poland revealed clear social and political divisions, strongly influenced by issues related to the war in Ukraine and disinformation, which intensified the campaign and highlighted trends shifting Poland’s political scene to the right. Advancing to the second round, scheduled for June 1, are candidates from Poland’s two major parties (the same scenario as over the past 20 years): Rafał Trzaskowski from the Civic Coalition and Karol Nawrocki from Law and Justice (PiS), who differ significantly in their approaches to domestic policy, the economy, and relations with Ukraine.

These elections are particularly significant because they will determine whether the rule of law can be restored and whether Poland will maintain its credibility as a partner within the European Union - as reported by Bloomberg. Additionally, more and more members of the Central and Eastern European bloc - including Hungary and Slovakia - are succumbing to populist, authoritarian governments. A victory for Karol Nawrocki could prolong the current political deadlock, as he would likely veto legislation proposed by the ruling coalition, just as the current president, Andrzej Duda, has done. This would likely pave the way for PiS to return to power.

The outcome of this election will affect the future of Poland, its policy toward Ukraine, its internal political balance, and will serve as a test of society’s resilience to disinformation and attempts to sabotage the democratic process. In the context of the current geopolitical situation and social tensions, this presidential election is a crucial moment that will determine the direction of the country’s - and Europe’s - development.