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Right- and left-wing Euroskeptics echo Kremlin narratives, hiding behind the trope of a “horrible” Europe.
Radical forces are gaining traction across Europe. Nearly every election in the European region since 2022 has been marked by a clash between centrists and ultra-left or ultra-right populists. In France, Emmanuel Macron faced Marine Le Pen; in the Czech Republic, Petr Pavel squared off against pro-Russian Andrej Babiš.
This year, Moldova’s presidential race featured a face-off between pro-European and pro-Russian candidates. Meanwhile, in Romania’s ongoing presidential elections, Euroskeptic Călin Georgescu took the lead in the first round, ahead of liberal and pro-European Elena Lasconi.
According to political scientists interviewed by DW, Euroskeptic politicians and parties have vague demands, but what they have in common is discrediting the current structure of the European Union and advocating for its weakening. However, strategically, right-wing populist parties no longer push for the EU’s dissolution outright. Instead, they promote a narrative of a “true” or “authentic” Europe.
To exert more significant influence in Europe, right-wing populist forces need to grow much stronger than they currently are. As the recent elections in two neighboring countries show, they are actively working toward this goal, gaining substantial votes in the process. Detector Media analyzed the candidates’ rhetoric, comparing it to Kremlin narratives, and uncovered common points.
“Kind of Pro-European and Kind of Not”
In Moldova, presidential elections were held alongside a referendum on the country’s pro-European path on October 20. In the first round of the presidential election, incumbent pro-European President Maia Sandu secured 42.4% of the vote, while Socialist Party candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo came in second with 25.9%. This result necessitated a runoff.
The referendum on European integration, held simultaneously, saw a more contentious battle. Only after the diaspora votes from abroad were tallied did the “yes” votes for EU membership surpass 50%, reaching 50.38%. According to analysts from the Atlantic Council’s International Relations Center, this outcome was influenced by intense disinformation campaigns. Pro-Russian forces urged voters to vote “no” at the referendum, encouraged boycotts, and promoted the narrative that the issue was “untimely,” sowing confusion and discouraging moderate pro-European voters from supporting the “yes” side.
In the second round of the presidential election, approximately 1.7 million citizens voted, including over 320,000 from abroad. Incumbent President Maia Sandu garnered 55.68% of the vote, while pro-Russian Alexandr Stoianoglo received 44.65%.
Stoianoglo, who served as Moldova’s prosecutor general since 2019, was suspended in 2021 amidst allegations of five criminal offenses.
Stoianoglo’s campaign slogan was “Justice for All.” The former Prosecutor General promised to release unjustly imprisoned citizens. His speeches also emphasized “family and traditional values.”
Former pro-Russian President Igor Dodon described him as a “state-builder and family man who respects Christian values and has no political affiliations.” Stoianoglo himself claimed he was raised to “work 24 hours a day.” He also highlighted his Gagauz heritage, stating, “I, a Gagauz, am running for the highest state office.”
Serhiy Sydorenko, editor-in-chief of the European Pravda publication, noted that Stoianoglo deliberately avoided making any concrete statements about the Russian-Ukrainian war. Throughout his campaign, Stoianoglo never used the term “Russian aggression against Ukraine.” Even before his nomination, despite claiming to be “pro-European,” he failed to condemn Russia’s criminal invasion.
Despite this, Stoianoglo asserted he had a clear stance. During the presidential debates, he repeatedly stated, “We support Ukraine in this war.” However, he criticized Ukrainian military actions in Russia’s Kursk region, adding, “We are against any war.”
At the debates, Stoianoglo remarked, “I am confident that our relations with Ukraine will grow stronger. However, I have seen no real initiatives from the current government to achieve peace or a ceasefire. We plan to propose alternative platforms for re-evaluating approaches to the war in Ukraine, which will benefit both countries.”
Maia Sandu responded to this statement, saying that “Kyiv knows perfectly well that you are Moscow’s man.” Indeed, Stoianoglo at least once acted in Moscow’s favor. He previously signed a court petition to suspend a conviction against Moldovan oligarch Veaceslav Platon, who was wanted by Moldovan authorities for his alleged role in a laundromat scheme. This international scheme laundered 22 billion euros of Russian money through Moldova’s banking system via a network of shell companies issuing fictitious loans and court rulings enforcing their repayment.
At the same time, Stoianoglo attempts to balance his political approach, presenting a “multivectoral” policy aimed at maintaining good relations with both the EU and Moscow while avoiding conflicts with Ukraine and Romania.
Russian propaganda usually idealizes him in the eyes of its audiences. In other words, it “bombards with love,” convincing both its domestic and international audiences that Mr. Alexandr Stoianoglo is worthy of their attention.
Certain Russian propaganda Telegram channels were so dissatisfied with Maia Sandu’s victory that they audaciously declared Stoianoglo the “real winner” in Moldova (since diaspora votes player a decisive role in Sandu’s victory).
“The same Alexandr Stoianoglo, who came in second but was the real winner in Moldova, was forced to hold live meetings. I think these elections cannot be considered democratic,” said propagandist Dmitry Soyin, who used to be a “deputy” of the pro-Russian government in Transnistria and an employee of its special services, and now calls himself an “analyst” on the Republic of the Donbas radio station that is controlled by the occupation authorities.
Russian propaganda has been relentless in demonizing Maia Sandu, portraying her as a grave threat to the country. This tactic aligns with a broader Russian strategy of diminishing the significance, effectiveness, or success of certain individuals, events, or policies in both domestic and international information landscapes.
For example, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, cited by Kommersant, commented:
“As far as Ms. Sandu is concerned, you know she is not, as far as we understand, the president of her country because most of the population in the country did not vote for her.”
But let’s return to Stoianoglo. As far as his election campaign goes, he is not an overt Kremlin proxy; on the contrary, he denies any connections to Moscow. However, during pre-election debates, he spoke negatively about the pro-European candidate and the EU as an institution, offering only tepid gratitude for financial aid provided through certain projects or subsidies. He also claimed that his team could better “handle the vector of the country’s development,” implying the inefficiency of Maia Sandu and her pro-European policies. At the same time, he subtly promoted the idea of the EU’s incapacity as an institution. This approach is aimed at creating an image of the EU as an “external enemy” that cannot be trusted.
Such rhetoric incorporates elements of isolationism and fear-mongering about a “foreign threat,” closely resembling Russia’s treatment of its own population. Additionally, in his campaign, Stoianoglo repeatedly emphasized his Gagauz heritage and described himself as a “man of the people.” Highlighting his “uniqueness” and calling for self-sufficiency in opposition to “alien,” “hostile” values are typical tactics of Russian propaganda, though they are adapted to Moldova’s specific context.
“The Romanian Orbán”
In the first round of Romania’s presidential elections, Euroskeptic and pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu led with 22.94% of the vote, ahead of the liberal Elena Lasconi, who supports Ukraine.
On the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Călin Georgescu stated on Romanian television channel Realitatea Plus that “Ukraine is a fictional state.” This assertion is a staple of Russian propaganda and has been reiterated by Putin on numerous occasions. Another typical propagandist claim was Georgescu’s remark that Ukraine is supposedly “manipulated by American military companies.”
At the same time, Georgescu has made flattering comments about Russia’s president, describing Putin as “a man who loves his country, who knows diplomatic aspects very well, is proficient in them and is surrounded by good professionals.” These statements have solidified Georgescu’s image as a pro-Russian figure. This perception was further reinforced by his comments on Romania’s foreign policy, advocating for “better relations with China and Russia.”
Siegfried Mureșan, Vice President of the largest group in the European Parliament, the European People’s Party, and a Romanian MEP, accused Russia of attempting to influence Romania’s elections. He stated on platform X (formerly Twitter) that “Russia’s interference hardly has any limits,” which is why “Romania has an extremist, populist candidate in the second round of presidential elections.” In another post, he noted that “Russia can threaten the democratic process of any country,” pointing out that what happened in Romania has also occurred in Moldova and Georgia.
According to Milan Nič, senior research fellow at German Council on Foreign Relations, Călin Georgescu is “the product of the vacuum [in Romanian politics] and likely Russian money.” This assertion is linked to Georgescu’s successful TikTok PR campaign, reportedly funded by him.
Romanian news outlet HotNews reported that dozens of influencers began urging their audiences to vote for “the ideal presidential candidate” starting in early November. While these content creators did not name a specific candidate, comments under such posts often mentioned Călin Georgescu as the favored figure.
The investigation revealed that influencers were paid for posting such content, with the funds channeled through shell companies. Another outlet, G4Media.ro, uncovered a network of Telegram groups coordinating influencer posts about Georgescu in exchange for payments offered by group administrators.
Călin Georgescu also maintains his own TikTok channel, where his videos garner hundreds of thousands to millions of views. Some of these videos promote anti-Ukrainian narratives. For instance, as reported by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, one of his most popular videos propagated the false claim that Ukrainian refugee children receive more government assistance than Romanian children.
Before the elections, Georgescu was not among the top five contenders in polls conducted by five different Romanian survey organizations. The sudden rise in popularity of the previously little-known Georgescu, attributed to his TikTok PR campaign, has alarmed some European parliamentarians. Valérie Hayer, leader of the liberal parliamentary group Renew Europe, called on TikTok’s CEO to appear before the European Parliament to investigate whether the platform violated the Digital Services Act. Although TikTok’s terms and conditions prohibit political advertising, Georgescu’s case demonstrates how such bans can be circumvented and highlights the social network’s influence on voters’ choices.
Russian media leveraged Georgescu’s lead in the first round as a pretext for their propaganda. For instance, the propagandist outlet Sputnik published an article with the manipulative headline, “Right-Wing Candidate Georgescu Leads in Romania Presidential Election: Why is the West Trembling?” The article highlighted the candidate’s anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric while contrasting it with his flattering remarks about Russia.
For domestic audiences, Russian media portrayed this event as an indicator of the West’s weakening. For example, the Russian newspaper Argumenty i Fakty published an article titled “A Supporter of Dialogue with Russia,” spreading the entrenched propaganda message that the rise of right-wing populists in Europe signifies a “political crisis in the West.” The article also defended Georgescu, claiming that he was “immediately labeled a pro-Russian candidate” after the elections.
On Telegram, propagandists adopted a friendly tone toward the Romanian presidential candidate. For example, the propagandist news channel RT described Călin Georgescu as someone advocating for “an alliance with Russia.” While Georgescu has indeed called for improved relations with Russia and China, he has not explicitly mentioned an alliance with Russia.
Pro-Kremlin journalist Tetiana Montian compared Viktor Orbán to Călin Georgescu, describing the latter as more radical in his criticism of NATO and EU institutions. Montian justified Georgescu’s popularity as part of a “pan-European trend toward strengthening right-wing traditionalists and Euroskeptics, reflecting a deep systemic crisis in the West.” In contrast, she made only negative remarks about pro-Ukrainian candidate Elena Lasconi, accusing her of “aggressiveness toward Russia” and claiming that under her leadership, Romania would “remain a puppet of the EU and the US.” Elena Lasconi, representing the Save Romania Union (USR), opposes concessions of Ukrainian territories in exchange for peace and supports continuing military aid to Ukraine.
By backing anti-Western and pro-Russian political forces in Europe, Russia seeks to destabilize the European Union and NATO, undermining trust in these organizations. The Kremlin aims to reduce the number of nations supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. Romania and Moldova have become targets of this Russian influence. Călin Georgescu and Alexandr Stoianoglo both hold pro-Russian views. However, while Stoianoglo tries to balance his rhetoric, Georgescu takes an overtly anti-Western and pro-Russian stance. The actions and speeches of both politicians are amplified by Russian media and Telegram channels, which are simultaneously trying to discredit their political opponents.
The rise of far-right popularity in Europe, facilitated in part by Russian interference, is portrayed by the Kremlin as a crisis in the West and as heralding the inevitable decline of the EU and NATO. Through these narratives, propagandists aim to create an impression of the West’s and Ukraine’s impending defeat by Russia, provoking capitulatory and anti-war rhetoric in European nations.
However, pro-Russian and Euroskeptic forces sometimes fail to advance their political agendas despite electoral popularity. For example, Austria’s far-right Freedom Party, which secured first place with 29% of the vote in recent elections, was unable to form a government due to the lack of a coalition. Instead, liberal and social-democratic parties are negotiating to form a three-party coalition. Thus, thanks to democratic institutions, European countries have mechanisms to counteract the popularity of far-right or pro-Russian parties, which can partially mitigate Russian influence.
Main page illustration: Natalia Lobach
