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Pro-Russian Telegram channels exploit the subject of Ukrainian utility costs and global economic turbulence to boost the morale of their followers. Detector Media has studied close to 12.2 thousand messages across pro-Russian Telegram channels from February 24, 2022, to May 31, 2023, to shed light on the propaganda tactics Russia employs to manipulate narratives surrounding the economy, tariffs, and energy costs.
Debates regarding utility costs or allegations of the International Monetary Fund coercing Ukraine to auction off its fertile lands were recurrent themes in talk shows leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion. However, following the events of February 24, 2022, and extending to early March 2023, discussions about the “impoverishment” of Ukrainians all but evaporated from Ukrainian media. Politicians and commentators who had previously claimed to be trying to change the lives of Ukrainians for the better fled to Russia.
In pro-Russian traditional and social media, the propaganda continued to urge Ukrainians to surrender to Russia to avoid an economic downfall. Between February 24, 2022, and May 31, 2023, a keyword search using the TeleZip/Mantis Analytics tool identified 12.2 thousand posts across 253 of the 311 propaganda Telegram channels cited in our research report ‘Kremlin Hydra’: 300 Telegram Channels That Poison Ukrainian Media Space. This suggests that the pro-Russian Telegram channel network generates an average of 26 posts discussing utilities daily. Our search terms included variants of Ukrainian and Russian words for electricity, water, heat, gas, light, waste, and utilities, coupled with words indicative of payment for these services: tariff, price, cost, and rate.
The Status of the Ukrainian Economy and Utility Sector
Before the full-scale Russian invasion, nearly half of the goods produced and exported from Ukraine were not finished products but rather their components requiring further processing, such as ore and grain. Following the full-scale Russian invasion, the blockade of Ukraine’s seaports, the destruction of oil refineries, the bombardment of power plants and transmission lines, and the forced displacement of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian economy shrank by 29.1% in 2022. This is affirmed by data on shifts in Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product from the State Statistics Service.
If we juxtapose prices in 2022 with those in 2021, they increased by 26.6%, according to the State Statistics Service, while annual inflation has not surpassed 15% since 2016.
In its April 2023 Inflation Report, the National Bank of Ukraine estimated that real wages in Ukraine fell by an average of 11.4% in the previous year. This signifies a decline in Ukrainians’ wealth over that period.
In 2022, according to the State Statistics Service, transportation saw the most significant price surge — 42.9%, followed by food — 34.4%, and household items and appliances — 26.5%. Utilities experienced only a 6% price hike during this period, and the cost of electricity, gas, and hot water remained largely unaltered. In August 2022, the parliament and government prohibited gas distribution, heat, and supply rate increases and promised to compensate producers for the tariff discrepancy from the state budget.
The rise in prices for other services and goods has led to a 12-24% increase in the cost of renting housing, repairing it, and supplying water and sewage over the past year. However, housing rental prices are set by those who own it, while the prices of water, sewage, and garbage collection are set by local authorities or those companies that provide these services to residents of cooperatively owned apartment buildings. It is incorrect to blame the state for the increase.
The cost of gas and electricity, on the other hand, is dictated by the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities (NCER) and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. From October 2021 onwards, households consuming up to 250 kWh per month were billed UAH 1.44 per kilowatt for electricity. For higher consumption, the tariff was UAH 1.68 per kilowatt.
In late April 2023, NCER Chairman Kostiantyn Ushchapovskyi proposed that tariffs for electricity needed to increase to guarantee a reliable supply and phase out emergency electricity supply measures. In his words, “the economic rationale for consumer electricity prices (including households) is significantly higher than the fixed prices for domestic consumers and currently exceeds UAH 6 per kWh (inclusive of value-added tax).” On May 31, the Cabinet of Ministers determined that from June 1, 2024, electricity for the population will cost UAH 2.64 per kWh.
Meanwhile, electricity tariffs for non-household consumers were already rising. Between January 1 and July 1, 2023, the cost for the industrial sector was slated to rise by over a quarter: from UAH 3.80 per kWh to UAH 4.85 per kWh. Yuriy Korolchuk, an expert at the Institute for Energy Strategies, justified the need for an electricity price hike by pointing out that enterprises, the traditional sponsors of affordable electricity for the population, cannot shoulder such tariffs. After all, the hostilities have reduced industrial production, and the profits of electricity producers — state-owned companies Energoatom and Ukrhydroenergo — have fallen while some thermal power plants have either been destroyed or require repairs.
According to the World Bank, in 2022, global prices rose by 8.3%. This was the highest inflation rate since 2008, when the global economic crisis hit. According to Philip Barrett, an economist at the International Monetary Fund, the rise in prices in the world was most affected by the increase in the cost of food, transportation, and energy. Russia is one of the largest exporters of gas and oil, and Ukraine is a major exporter of food. Sanctions against Russia definitely have an impact on the global economy, just as the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports has an impact on food prices. However, Russian propagandists exaggerate Russia’s influence on the global economy.
Understanding Propagandist Telegram Channels’ Take on Utilities
Propaganda Telegram channels are trying to create the impression that the situation in Ukraine and the world is much worse than it is due to Russian aggression and the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to achieve this, the authors of the posts bombard their readers with messages that “prove” that without Russian gas, oil, concessions to Russians on the battlefield, and the lifting of sanctions against Russian businessmen, the global economy will collapse.
The use of the “false dilemma” propaganda strategy is particularly effective on pro-Russian users isolated from alternative information sources. Repetition of this narrative reinforces preconceived notions. For those residing in the locations depicted by propagandists who aren’t supportive of Russia, such news can incite fear. Propagandists seek to channel this fear into disapproval of the government, supposedly neglectful of the “common people.”
As 2022 showed, both the Ukrainian and global economies demonstrated greater resilience than what pro-Russian Telegram channels prophesied. However, the Russian economy, too, has adjusted to the sanctions by legitimizing smuggling (”parallel imports”), selling Russian commodities to “unfriendly countries” via companies from “friendly” countries, or exploiting sanction loopholes.
Contrasting the foreboding global scenario, propagandists paint life in Russia and the occupied territories as a “piece of paradise” where price hikes, if any, are “gradual over a decade” or merely “by 1 ruble.” They assert that utilities have become more affordable post-occupation, loans owed to Ukrainian financial establishments are waived, patients from Nova Kakhovka are transported to safe locations for complimentary medical care twice daily, and more. These messages exemplify the propaganda strategy of “love bombing,” designed to craft an impression of Russia’s actions as purely humanitarian. The credibility of such news is impossible without accepting the “big lie” about “Ukrainian Nazis” as truth — the typical excuse provided when Russia violates international law yet again to occupy another country’s territory.
In the propaganda-imbued Telegram channels we analyzed, posts concerning utilities and the economy started surfacing only around early March 2022, once the “Kyiv in three days” slogan was proven false by the steadfast resistance of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The Russians found themselves obliged to justify the delay in military action, respond to sanctions consistently imposed on their businesses and citizens, and communicate the advantages of the occupation regime to inhabitants of the captured communities. Notably, among the twenty most frequently mentioned organizations, territories, and individuals in pro-Russian Telegram channels, three are Ukrainian place names occupied by Russia: Donbas, Donetsk, and Mariupol, along with the Russian-invented “DPR” and “LPR”. By repeatedly using the example of these temporarily occupied territories, propagandists attempt to reinforce the notion that supporting Russia is beneficial, allegedly bringing order and reducing prices.
When propagandist Telegram channels discuss territories the Russians have failed to occupy, they resort to intimidation and speculate on the calamities that supposedly await Ukraine. For instance, in July 2022, a pro-Russian news channel published a message stating, “Financial problems in Ukraine suggest that the economy is on a trajectory towards steep decline and default in the fall.”
Comparable narratives were disseminated by propaganda Telegram channels regarding other countries, painting local authorities as corrupt, inconsistent, and uncaring towards their people. In the late summer and autumn of 2022, for example, reports about Moldova alleged the onset of rallies and that “protesters in Chisinau brought a bunch of compost to the presidential palace. According to the protesters, they are used to heat houses in Moldovan villages. The protesters are chanting ‘Maya Sandu — for compost’.” The propagandists claimed that only friendship with Russia and Russian gas could guarantee peace in Moldova, promoting a “false dilemma” that Moldova’s EU membership candidacy and sanctions against Russia were mistakes, consequently resulting in market-based gas prices for Moldova. Propagandists often appealed to ordinary people, whose wages remain “distinctly Moldovan” rather than European.
Similar messages expressing the futility of levying sanctions against Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine were echoed by demonstrations across nations such as Italy, Portugal, France, South Africa, Libya, Sri Lanka, and others — with a majority situated within the European Union.
As 2022 drew to a close, propagandists were steering their audience towards notions of cost-saving measures amidst escalating energy prices in European countries. Occasionally, they deployed commentators highlighting the potential advantages of cooperation with Russia. An instance from March 2022 features Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić expressing regret over having to forego a gas contract with Russia priced at $400 per 1000 cubic meters. This aligns with the “third-party” propaganda technique, where the propagandists’ viewpoint is expressed through an ostensibly independent source. Moreover, a significant proportion of posts addressing the surge in utility costs were formulated in an alarmist tone: predictions like “gas prices will soon hit $4000, and oil will reach $200” or more ambiguous forecasts like “in the coming days, the price of gas in Europe will be very interesting”.
When discussions turned towards additional constraints on the Russian economy, propagandists opted for a less diplomatic tone, resorting instead to overt scare tactics. In 2022, when deliberations over a price cap on Russian oil and gas were ongoing, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, said that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida “blurted out that the upper limit of the price of Russian oil would be half of its current price.” In December 2022, Medvedev condemned restrictions on pricing for Russian energy resources as indicative of a “zoological hatred of Russia.”
The Russians equate such economic pressures with an orchestrated attempt to annihilate them — a notion explored by Detector Media analysts in their study titled “Ethnocide of Hungarians and Jewish Conspiracy. Russian Disinformation on Ethnic Groups on Social Media,” released in late May 2023. By employing such rhetoric, propagandists aim to portray Russians as victims, thereby shifting attention away from Russia’s military aggression and war crimes.
For pro-Russian audiences, the propagandists champion claims that “Putin is triumphing in the energy markets war” and “The energy crisis in Europe will test the mettle of Western governments in reducing their reliance on Russian oil and gas.”
The winter of 2022-2023 has receded into the past, proving the propagandists wrong in their June 2022 assertions that “Europeans are at risk of freezing” and “Russia is immune to sanctions.” The Russian edition of Forbes revealed that sanctions had slashed the Russian budget’s gas export earnings by half in the first five months of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022.
