“Gas Gangrene” of Kyiv and Moscow: The Informational Component

Українською читайте тут.

For the last three decades, Russia has wielded gas pricing and supply as instruments of political influence. What changed in 2025?

Ukraine abandoned Russian gas in 2015, and the gas relationship between Kyiv and Moscow came to a complete end on January 1, 2025. The transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, Italy, and Moldova has been entirely halted. For years, Ukraine exchanged its sovereignty and security for gas discounts but eventually rejected this strategy. Contrary to the apocalyptic predictions of Russian propaganda, the country did not “collapse.” Here is the story of Moscow’s “gas gangrene” and its gas blackmail.

In 1945, the first-ever international deliveries of natural gas were made from Ukrainian territory, specifically from the Dashava and Oparske gas fields, to Poland. The peak of Ukrainian gas production occurred in the 1970s, with volumes three times higher than current levels. Ukraine inherited the Soviet gas transmission system, making it a key transit hub for Russian gas to Western markets. In the 1990s, the only pipeline from Russia to Europe ran through Ukraine. Seeking to reduce its transit dependence on Ukraine, Moscow launched the Yamal–Europe pipeline through Belarus and Poland in 1999.

The first Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict occurred in February 1993 when Gazprom threatened to halt gas supplies to Ukraine over unpaid debts. In response to Russian government threats, Ukrainian authorities warned they would shut down transit pipelines carrying Russian gas to Western Europe. The conflict was resolved without disruptions. In March 1995, Moscow once again suspended gas supplies to Ukraine over debts. Gazprom demanded the issue be resolved by transferring partial ownership of Ukrainian pipelines and enterprises to Russia.

The “gas issue” also served as a tool for weakening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. In the late 1990s, Ukraine settled gas debts by transferring a dozen aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, along with nearly 600 Kh-55 nuclear-capable missiles and nearly 400 Kh-22 missiles.

The next conflict unfolded in 2005–2006, this time concerning the terms of gas supplies to Ukraine and transit to European consumers. This dispute coincided with Ukraine’s shift in governance under President Viktor Yushchenko, whose policies leaned toward the West rather than Russia. Gazprom demanded that Ukraine pay European-like prices for gas starting in 2006. That year, Ukrainian Naftogaz ceded rights to export Russian gas through Ukraine to RosUkrEnergo, a monopolist company. Half of RosUkrEnergo was owned by Gazprom, while the other half belonged to Centragas Holding AG, whose main owner was Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash (who came under NSDC sanctions in 2021).

The gas war escalated further on January 1, 2009, when the Russian monopoly proposed supplying gas to Ukraine at inflated prices, exacerbating a crisis during a cold winter that threatened public utilities. The European Commission and Czech representatives, who then held the EU presidency, declared the situation utterly unacceptable. Following negotiations, Russian and Ukrainian Prime Ministers Vladimir Putin and Yulia Tymoshenko reached an agreement to resume gas transportation to Ukraine and the EU under terms unfavorable to Kyiv. These included adopting a transit fee close to European averages, but Russian gas prices for Ukraine exceeded those paid by European countries. The deal enshrined Gazprom’s monopoly on gas supplies to Ukraine and introduced the “take-or-pay” principle, penalizing Ukraine for not purchasing the contracted gas volume. Re-export of Russian gas was also prohibited.

Amid recurring gas crises, Ukraine began considering breaking free from Russia’s gas monopoly and aimed to purchase gas from Turkmenistan. However, this plan failed due to Ashgabat’s dependence on Moscow for transit.

Another turning point came in 2010 when gas became a tool of geopolitical leverage in exchange for strategic concessions. Moscow, presenting itself as a “benevolent partner,” offered a gas discount in exchange for Kyiv’s loyalty. Under President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine signed the Kharkiv Pact, extending Russia’s lease on the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea in return for reduced gas prices.

In 2013, Kyiv began purchasing gas from Europe, albeit in small volumes. Following the events of Euromaidan and Ukraine’s pivot toward the EU, Russia canceled its gas discounts and demanded payment of accumulated debts. This spurred Ukraine to reduce its complete dependency on Russian gas and diversify its supplies by importing energy from Europe.

Since November 2015, Ukraine has not purchased gas directly from Russia. The country’s domestic needs are met through its own production and gas imports from Europe. Although the gas likely originated in Siberia, it first traveled to Central European countries before being redirected to Ukraine — a process known as reverse gas flow. Integration with the European gas market became a significant step for Ukraine’s economy, though it presented challenges for major corporate interests. This shift marked a transition from long-term contract pricing to market-determined pricing. A similar shift occurred in the 1980s with oil and at other times with metals, where prices for most metals became market-driven.

As far back as the 1990s, Russia sought to acquire Ukraine’s gas transit system, leading to constant disputes over transit volumes. At one point, the Kremlin began partially paying for transit with gas. By late 2019, this conflict was resolved when Ukraine and Russia signed a new transit agreement for 2020–2024. The deal stipulated the transportation of smaller, though still significant, volumes of gas.

However, as of January 1, 2025, Ukraine, prioritizing national security, ceased the transit of Russian natural gas through its territory.

The gas wars also had a significant informational component. Russian propaganda cultivated an image of Ukraine as a country incapable of managing its gas debts and infrastructure, with the phrase “Ukrainians steal gas” becoming a widespread falsehood not only in political discourse but also in entertainment shows.

“Ukraine is an unreliable transit country.” In the minds of Russians, Ukraine was constantly “stealing” their gas. This accusation first surfaced in the 1990s and gained prominence during the 2008–2009 “gas war,” when Vladimir Putin claimed that Ukrainians “appropriated” 15% of Russian gas destined for the EU. Similar accusations were echoed by Gazprom’s leadership. This propagandist claim was not only voiced by politicians but also turned into punchlines for various television entertainment programs.

The European Commission, however, found no evidence of unauthorized gas siphoning by Ukraine from transit pipelines. Even when Russia failed to meet its contractual obligations to Europe for prepaid gas volumes, Ukraine was not withdrawing transit gas, as stated by Naftogaz. If theft is to be discussed, it was Russia that stole gas from Ukrainian resources, particularly from oil and gas fields on the Black Sea and Azov Sea shelves. This includes the so-called Boyko Rigs, illegally controlled by Russia from 2014 to 2023, as well as the Illegal appropriation of gas production facilities in the occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

According to the propagandists, this “unreliability” also stemmed from Ukraine’s outdated gas transportation system (GTS). In 2021, Pavel Zavalniy, head of the Russian State Duma’s Energy Committee, claimed the EU was allegedly rejecting Ukraine’s transit services due to the system’s “emergency state” and instead turning to alternative routes like the TurkStream and Nord Stream pipelines.

However, according to some estimates, including by energy expert Hennadiy Riabtsev, Ukraine’s GTS has significantly fewer technical incidents and accidents compared to Russia’s. Moreover, these accusations peaked in 2021 during the final stages of Nord Stream 2’s construction, when discrediting Ukraine’s GTS was crucial to advancing the Kremlin’s agenda.

“Ukraine cannot survive without Russian gas.” For decades, Ukraine was depicted as hopelessly dependent on Russian energy. Attempts to diversify supplies were framed as leading to an inevitable “cold apocalypse” for the population and the collapse of Ukrainian industry, which relies heavily on gas. These claims were especially audacious after Kyiv began purchasing gas on the European market. Propagandists questioned the rationale of “overpaying” for “expensive” European gas when “cheaper” Russian gas was supposedly available.

Such manipulative narratives were frequently broadcast on sanctioned channels owned by the traitor Viktor Medvedchuk. These channels showcased Medvedchuk’s trips to Moscow and his negotiations with Putin and Gazprom regarding “discounts” on gas, which Ukraine was to receive in exchange for concessions and loyalty. According to this propaganda, European gas impoverished people, destroyed industry, and served the greedy interests of the IMF, Western partners, and their local “compradors” in the guise of the Ukrainian government.

However, the myth of “cheap gas” lacks substance. According to Naftogaz, from 2010 Ukrainian consumers paid significantly more for gas than European countries. In total, Ukraine overpaid Gazprom $16.8–28.8 billion for gas supplies. Since 2015, however, Ukraine has purchased gas from Europe without being bound by “take-or-pay” contracts and at market prices. The history of relations underscored Russia’s unwillingness to sell gas to Ukraine at market rates.

One of the most cynical claims by pro-Russian commentators was that Ukraine while fighting Moscow with one hand, was buying its gas with the other. This is misleading, as Ukraine stopped direct purchases from Gazprom and only fulfilled existing contractual obligations, which could not be immediately disregarded.

Propagandists also gloated over Ukraine’s supposed inability to boost its domestic gas production. However, in November 2024, Naftogaz CEO Oleksiy Chernyshov announced that Ukraine had been fully meeting its gas needs through domestic production for the second consecutive year. Furthermore, according to estimates by Volodymyr Omelchenko, director of energy programs at the Razumkov Center, Ukraine has the potential to significantly increase natural gas production over the next decade.

Manipulations also targeted the extraction of gas from unconventional sources, particularly shale gas. In 2013, Ukrainian communists and environmental activists organized protests under slogans such as “Shale gas is a second Chernobyl,” claiming that hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, would lead to a man-made disaster. When, in 2021, Ukraine announced plans to develop its first tight gas field on the border of the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, the Kremlin launched yet another disinformation campaign. The narrative painted shale gas as “disastrous,” with claims like “Ukraine is turning the Donbas into a desert.” This was an attempt by the Kremlin to discredit the idea of increasing domestic gas production.

The Burisma case. Manipulations extended not only to methods of extraction but also to the discrediting of gas-producing companies and their owners. One notable example is Burisma, one of Ukraine’s largest companies engaged in natural gas extraction and production. Burisma played a significant role in increasing domestic gas production, a critical step toward achieving energy independence from Russia. According to propagandists, Western figures — most notably Hunter Biden, the son of Joseph Biden — were accused of exploiting Ukraine’s natural resources for personal gain. This narrative sought to portray Kyiv as a victim of Western greed and manipulation. The campaign surrounding Burisma also aimed to reinforce a perception of Ukraine as corrupt and unreliable for conducting business, particularly in the gas extraction sector.

As we can see, Russia has consistently used gas pricing and supply as tools of political and informational influence. However, in 2025, Kyiv successfully neutralized this influence, though not painlessly for the Ukrainian economy. According to an analytical piece by Bloomberg, while Ukraine loses less in absolute terms from the cessation of gas transit, in relative terms, Russia is in a better position (Ukraine will lose 0.5% of its GDP, while Russia will lose 0.2–0.3%).

For Ukraine, which is at war, economic arguments cannot take precedence. Cheap gas transported through Ukraine allowed Russia to lobby its anti-Ukrainian interests in European countries, weakening the unity of the pro-Ukrainian coalition.

Although Russia has lost part of its markets, others remain open. Leaders loyal to Putin in Hungary and Slovakia still frequently refer to Russian gas, and Russia continues to receive payments for gas from countries like France, Spain, and Austria. 

Nevertheless, under Western sanctions, Gazprom reported losses in 2023 for the first time since 2001. Furthermore, the termination of gas transit through Ukraine will reduce Moscow’s annual gas exports by 14 billion cubic meters.

The propaganda outlet RIA Novosti commented on the situation, stating, “Ukraine has once again proven its unreliability and let Europe down.” Russian online platforms spread the narrative that “Ukraine will lose billions” from the halt in transit while “Russia has successfully diversified its supply geography with the help of new reliable partners.” One pro-Russian anonymous Telegram channel, with over a million followers, issued direct threats: “If gas transit is not resumed, the first to suffer will not even be Ukraine’s GTS but its gas fields, which are effectively unprotected.”

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó accused Ukraine of putting the EU in a difficult economic position by halting the transit of Russian gas. He met with his Slovak counterpart Juraj Blanár to “analyze the situation” following the cessation of transit. Szijjártó stated, “We agreed that the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement must be respected by both parties, and this agreement also includes maintaining energy transportation routes.”

Ukraine called Szijjártó’s statements manipulative and part of a politically motivated disinformation campaign, adding, “If strengthening Russia is Hungary’s priority, it should openly admit this. Ukraine is ready to take Hungary’s place in the EU and NATO if it decides to vacate it in favor of joining the CIS or CSTO.”

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, known for his anti-Ukrainian stance, labeled Kyiv’s actions as “sabotage” and threatened to halt electricity supplies and reduce support for Ukrainian citizens in Slovakia. In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, “It seems that Putin has instructed Fico to open a second energy front against Ukraine at the expense of the interests of the Slovak people.”

While Slovakia’s position is more of a demonstrative one (as the transit halt poses no critical threat to the country), the situation in Moldova and Transnistria is more complex. When Ukraine ceased Russian gas transit, Russia simultaneously stopped gas supplies to Moldova, on which Transnistria heavily depends. Moldova, though in a state of emergency, is attempting to address the difficulties, while Transnistria has been plunged into crisis: centralized heating and hot water have been cut off, rolling blackouts have been introduced, and all industrial enterprises have been shut down. The self-proclaimed authorities, citing political reasons, refuse to accept electricity supplies from Moldova.

Rather than laying all the blame on Ukraine, Russian propaganda shifted the narrative to target Moldova, claiming it had caused the catastrophe. According to journalist Serhiy Sydorenko, this is a calculated move by the Kremlin: to portray President Maia Sandu’s administration as unreliable and European gas prices as unaffordable. The intent is to strain Moldovans’ finances, bolster Euroscepticism, and dissuade voters from supporting Sandu and other pro-European politicians, thereby halting Moldova’s EU integration. This strategy also indirectly slows Ukraine’s European integration, as Ukraine and Moldova are part of a joint EU expansion “package.”

In the context of halted transit, economic arguments lose their weight because, for Russia, energy sales are not merely a market service but a tool of political pressure. The Kremlin uses gas to bribe European elites and maintain a belt of countries loyal to Moscow by fostering their dependence on Russian gas. This dependency makes these countries vulnerable to Russia’s informational influence. Displacing Russia from the European gas market effectively means depriving Moscow of its ability to attack (including in the information domain) democratic nations.

According to President Zelenskyy, Russian gas is “the dirtiest in the world due to significant methane emissions during extraction and transportation, as well as corruption, blackmail, and manipulation.” Thus, the termination of gas relations is a long-overdue decision; in this context, European countries should follow Ukraine’s example. The key achievement here is the successful dismantling of the unified gas transmission system in which Russia operated as a monopolist.

Main page illustration by Nataliya Lobach