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We explain how North Korea’s propaganda machine and the information forces of Ukraine’s new adversary are structured.
Reports of the first skirmishes between Ukrainian and North Korean troops in Russia’s Kursk region surfaced in early November, with media outlets such as the Financial Times citing Ukrainian intelligence sources. On November 24, Anatoliy Barhylevych, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, confirmed these events during a television marathon. Earlier, in mid-October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged North Korea’s de facto involvement in the war after credible reports emerged about North Korean soldiers preparing for combat against Ukraine.
While Belarus provided its territory for Russia’s attacks and Iran supplied military equipment, for the first time, another country’s regular army joined Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. This turned out to be a country from another hemisphehre, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Previously, since the summer of 2023, North Korea began supplying weapons to Russia to bolster its war capabilities against Ukraine. In late October, Bloomberg, citing South Korean intelligence documents shared with allies, reported that North Korea had supplied approximately 8 million artillery shells of 122 mm and 152 mm caliber to Russia. According to these documents and corroborating Ukrainian intelligence, over 60% of Russia’s recent large-caliber ammunition came from North Korea, 30% from Russian sources, and about 10% from Iran.
In November, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate confirmed the transfer of more than 5 million large-caliber munitions and 100 KN-23/24 short-range ballistic missiles from North Korea to Russia. The shipment also included over 100 artillery systems, notably 170-mm M-1989 Koksan self-propelled guns and 240-mm M-1991 multiple launch rocket systems. Before even deploying its own troops, North Korea had become a crucial factor in sustaining Russia’s offensive operations this year.
On December 4, a treaty establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and North Korea came into effect after the exchange of ratification documents. This agreement effectively formalizes a military alliance between the two nations: in the event of an armed attack on one, the other is obligated to provide immediate assistance.
North Korea’s participation in the war against Ukraine also entails its integration into the information component of the conflict. Below, we examine how North Korea’s information forces operate and the resources Pyongyang employs.
North Korea’s information efforts can be broadly categorized into three components. These include ideological influence through transnational propaganda of North Korea’s Juche state ideology and promotion of loyalty to the party and the Supreme Leader domestically. State media, including those aimed at international audiences, are used to exert information influence. In addition, covert operations of North Korean cybercriminals and the work of a similar Russian “troll factory” are part of the work of the North Korean information troops.
Department of Propaganda and Agitation
The individual who effectively oversees North Korea’s information policy is Kim Yo Jong, the younger sister of the country’s current leader, Kim Jong Un. According to South Korean intelligence, as reported by The Wall Street Journal, Kim Yo Jong is considered the second most powerful person in the DPRK. In 2020, amid rumors about her brother’s health, experts even speculated that Kim Yo Jong could be his potential successor.
In 2014, Kim Yo Jong was appointed Vice Director of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. However, she has de facto managed the country’s information and cultural policies since then, with Ri Il-hwan serving as a director in name only. According to BBC assessments, Kim Yo Jong is particularly focused on shaping her brother’s public image.
Under Kim Yo Jong’s leadership, the Department of Propaganda and Agitation handles daily ideological indoctrination of the North Korean population and also targets foreign audiences. The department controls personnel policies in the information and artistic sectors, oversees news and report censorship, and manages political education and regular ideological events.
According to North Korea’s Dictionary of Political Terms, agitation “plays an important role in gathering the masses to the attention of the Party and the leader and powerfully motivating them to implement Party policies.” Such agitation includes lectures, studying the Leader’s works, and viewing films produced by the Workers’ Party of Korea. Ideological rituals also involve daily oaths of loyalty to the Supreme Leader at workplaces and “political Saturdays,” where ideological materials are reviewed.
The DPRK’s state ideology, Juche, an ancient Far Eastern philosophical term that can be translated as “self-reliance” or “autonomy,” was introduced by the DPRK’s first leader, Kim Il-sung (1948–1994). Initially considered an offshoot of Marxism-Leninism, Juche evolved after Kim Il-sung supported China’s Mao Zedong in criticizing the Soviet Union for deviating from Stalinism. However, Kim later criticized Mao for the Cultural Revolution. Amid ideological disputes with Moscow and Beijing, Juche briefly leaned toward Stalinism but from the 1970s onward was presented as a self-contained system independent of Marxism-Leninism or Chinese Maoism. Over time, Juche started placing more emphasis on nationalistic and anti-colonial elements, which still remain central to its narrative, especially in North Korea’s propaganda framing of the Russia-Ukraine war. Kim Yo Jong flexibly integrates anti-American, anti-South Korean, and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.
In October, responding to accusations about North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, she remarked:
“If you look at what they do, Seoul and Kyiv are very similar. They go around begging for help in different places, recklessly spouting nonsensical remarks against nuclear powers… It should be said that this is a common characteristic of all ill-mannered dogs raised in the United States.”
Thus, North Korean ideology is eclectic, drawing from various writings of past and present DPRK leaders. A core component of Juche is cultivating complete loyalty to the leader, effectively enabling the establishment of a personality cult.
North Korea also uses Juche for transnational propaganda through societies that promote the ideology in other countries. For instance, in 2024, a youth society for studying Juche ideas was established at School No. 80 in Khabarovsk, Russia, as reported by TASS. The society’s founder, Vladislav Kushnirenko, a history teacher and deputy director for educational activities, expressed hopes for other local schools to join.
“I am striving to make the greatest possible contribution to strengthening the ties between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. I am confident that the stronger the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance, the closer we are to the downfall of American imperialism,” the teacher was quoted by TASS.
Similar events promoting the ideology and legacy of DPRK leaders reportedly took place in Sergiyev Posad, near Moscow, where students from a local social-economic college were involved, according to the Ostorozhno, Novosti publication.
Official Media of North Korea
North Korea operates several media outlets aimed at foreign audiences. These include online versions of print publications such as Rodong Sinmun, the central newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Pyongyang Sinmun (with its English version, The Pyongyang Times), published by the capital’s city party committee. Additionally, the radio station Voice of Korea broadcasts in multiple languages, including English, Chinese, Japanese, French, Spanish, German, Arabic, and Russian.
The content of these outlets largely conforms to stereotypes about North Korean propaganda. A significant portion of the news focuses on the “revolutionary activities of General Secretary Kim Jong Un.” Examples include visits to factories and farms, sending congratulatory messages and flower baskets to the president of Laos, and meetings with Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov (for some reason referred to in English-language North Korean publications as “Beloussov,” with two ‘s’). Rodong Sinmun exclusively refers to the DPRK leader as the “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un.”
Voice of Korea radio station includes an entertainment segment that discusses North Korean tourist attractions, offers advice on consuming North Korean tea, and broadcasts Korean language lessons. Its news segment frequently covers improvements in living conditions across North Korea with characteristic headlines such as “The Leader is Grateful to the People, and the People to Him” and “Great Changes in the Countryside.”
Every piece underscores Kim Jong Un’s personal contribution to the nation’s “prosperity.” For instance, a report on his visit to the “model socialist cultural city” of Samjiyon claims:
“The Leader loves the people, and the people are loyal to him. This is the defining feature of the DPRK’s unity and cohesion.”
In a story about building new housing for rural residents, it is stated:
“Under Kim Jong Un’s wise leadership, the country’s villages are transforming into an ideal socialist paradise.”
The media also features distinctly ideological news items, such as visits by DPRK officials to “revolutionary and combat glory sites near Mount Paektu,” under the headline “Deepening Their Understanding of Their Mission and Duties.” Similarly, the release of a new volume of Kim Il-sung’s collected works was highlighted on the Voice of Korea website under the “Important News” section.
Photo from the Voice of Korea radio website
North Korea’s international news coverage is traditionally heavily focused on its primary adversaries, the United States and South Korea — referred to as the “South Korean puppet regime.” Washington is accused of being the root cause of global crises and labeled the world’s main aggressor, allegedly preparing to attack Pyongyang. According to state media, what prevents such an attack is the “wise policies” of the Kim family leadership.
One Voice of Korea article, titled “Saying Two Different Things,” contrasts North Korea’s “prosperity” in housing construction with the destruction in Gaza. The author attributes North Korea’s avoidance of Gaza’s fate to its military strength and Comrade Kim Jong Un’s leadership:
“In 2012, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the DPRK Armed Forces Kim Jong Un said that unity and cohesion, unshakable military power plus the industrial revolution of the new century are the powerful socialist state... Two different things in the world testify that strong military power guarantees peace, dignity of the country and nation, and happiness of the people.”
In recent months, North Korean media has also paid increasing attention to Russia. The growing rapprochement between Pyongyang and Moscow is reflected in a surge of news about diplomatic events involving the Kremlin. Demonstrating North Korea’s influence in global politics is a key goal of its propaganda, which is why even exchanges of greetings with leaders of Laos and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad are highlighted. Visits by foreign delegations, a rare success in North Korea’s diplomatic activity, are enthusiastically reported. At the same time, state media promotes the idea of U.S. “international isolation,” citing Washington’s use of its veto power on a UN Security Council resolution regarding Gaza.
Photo from the Voice of Korea radio website
Given the close ties between North Korea and Russia and their shared enmity with the United States, it is unsurprising that Pyongyang’s and Moscow’s positions on international events have recently converged to a significant degree. The war in Ukraine is no exception. In North Korean media, it is referred to as the “Ukrainian conflict” or “Ukrainian situation,” with the term “invasion” only appearing in quotation marks. Russia’s actions are portrayed as “self-defense and a counteroffensive against the aggressive actions of Zelenskyy’s puppet regime and its American handlers.”
North Korean propaganda regularly accuses Ukraine of “terrorist attacks,” often relying on statements from Russian officials. Articles frequently cite alleged Ukrainian shelling of Donetsk, Shebekino in Russia, and other border towns, with Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova often serving as the primary source.
For instance, in August 2024, Rodong Sinmun published a lengthy article titled “Those Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity Will Surely Be Punished by History.” The article addressed a missile strike near a beach in Sevastopol, which, according to Russia’s Ministry of Defense, resulted from Ukrainian rockets intercepted by Russian air defenses. Despite this, North Korean propagandists claimed it was a deliberate attack on civilians in “Russian Sevastopol,” allegedly carried out under “direct orders from the United States.”
“The inhuman murderers and destroyers of peace will never escape the harsh judgment of history,” the article declared with characteristic literary flourish.
North Korean media also criticizes international support for Ukraine. In April 2024, Rodong Sinmun, quoting Vice Foreign Minister Im Chon Il, responsible for relations with Russia, condemned the U.S. Congress’s decision to fund aid for Ukraine:
“The U.S. is giving the Zelenskyy regime a blood transfusion to prolong its existence, but this will never alter the dreadful fate awaiting puppets on their deathbed,” the article stated.
North Korean propagandists even attributed the recent protests in South Korea, which were related to the domestic political crisis, to the alleged support of Ukraine by President Yun Suk Yol, who allegedly “interfered in the Ukrainian war.” In another article about Seoul’s intentions to deepen cooperation with NATO, South Korea was accused of supplying ammunition to Ukraine, claiming that “the puppet forces have offered Ukraine much more... than all European countries have given it in the framework of cooperation with NATO.”
In reality, South Korea refuses to supply Ukraine with weapons directly, citing domestic legislation that prohibits the supply of weapons to combat zones. According to the South Korean TV channel SBS, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov received yet another refusal to purchase air defense systems during his visit to Seoul on November 27. However, in the spring of 2023, Wall Street Journal reported, citing sources, that hundreds of thousands of South Korean shells were indirectly reaching the Ukrainian army through US mediation.
North Korea’s Cyber Forces
North Korea is recognized as one of the world’s most formidable hacking powers. While only about 1% of the country’s population has limited and heavily controlled internet access, the DPRK has cultivated a cyber army of approximately 7,000 hackers. According to the Financial Times, the training of these hackers begins in school, followed by advanced education in elite government institutions. Some receive additional training and practical experience in countries like China and others.
“They train people who show early indications of being strong in cyber and they send them to other places around the world and embed them into organisations, embed them into the society and culture. You have these hacking cells based all around the Asia-Pacific region merging in with the rest of the tech community,” Erin Plante, vice-president of investigations at Chainalysis, to the Financial Times.
North Korea’s cyber capabilities program began in parallel with its nuclear weapons development in the late 1980s, says the article.
The distinctive feature of North Korea’s cyber forces is their tendency to systematically commit economic crimes. For instance, according to United Nations estimates, North Korean hackers stole approximately $3 billion in cryptocurrency between 2017 and 2023, with the intensity of such operations increasing, notes Microsoft’s 2024 cybersecurity report. In 2023 alone, cryptocurrency thefts attributed to North Korea ranged from $600 million to $1 billion. UN experts cited in the report estimate that these stolen funds cover over half of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program expenses.
In addition to financial theft, Microsoft has observed new North Korean hacker groups that are increasingly engaging in ransomware attacks to extort money for stolen information. Alongside Russia, China, and Iran, North Korea ranks among the most active global players in the cyber threat landscape. According to the report, most of their North Korean hacking attacks target the United States. However, in 2023, according to technical data verified by Reuters and analyzed by security researchers, North Korean hackers breached the computer networks of Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia, a corporation specializing in ballistic and cruise missile production.
Since 2013, South Korean media, including The Chosun Daily, citing analytical centers, have reported on the activities of North Korea’s army of bots. These reports described over 200 operatives who, since at least 2011, have used stolen accounts of South Korean users to spread propaganda, posting tens of thousands of comments annually on South Korean platforms. For comparison, similar operations by Russia’s troll factory were also revealed in 2013. Overall, this type of malicious activity began gaining traction worldwide around that time.
The main hub for such activities is the United Front Department of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party, according to a 2022 report by the cybersecurity organization Mandiant. However, most of North Korea’s cyber operations — including espionage, destructive actions, and financial crimes — are conducted by elements of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, Mandiant states. Analysts estimate that between 2020 and 2021, the United Front Department produced approximately 68,000 propaganda posts on web forums and comment sections. This work primarily aims to cultivate loyal groups within South Korea, the report notes.
In addition to anonymous bots, North Korea’s propaganda efforts have increasingly leveraged personalized social media channels on YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram. Ukrainian researchers Iryna and Petro Sukhorolsky write that North Korea seeks to employ soft power tools, enhancing its cultural appeal and building a positive image among international audiences. To this end, the regime creates seemingly personal social media accounts that share videos portraying “beautiful and happy” lives in North Korea. One example was the YouTube channel Echo of Truth, which initially featured stories about Kim Il-sung. Later, it shifted to a series of videos in which a young woman, Un A, narrated her “wonderful life.” YouTube eventually blocked the channel.
On another YouTube channel, an 11-year-old girl, Song A, spoke in English with a British accent about her “happy childhood” in North Korea. It was later revealed that Song A is the daughter of a diplomat and the great-granddaughter of one of North Korea’s leading military commanders. The propagandistic nature of such channels is evident, given that most North Korean citizens lack access to the global internet. Instead, they use a domestic intranet called Kwangmyong, which is physically isolated from the worldwide web. Moreover, all communications with the outside world are strictly controlled by North Korean intelligence services. Moreover, the quality and style of the videos on these “personal” channels often resemble professional broadcast material.
11-year-old Song A promotes life in Pyongyang on YouTube. Source: NK News
North Korean propaganda primarily focuses on regional objectives, such as strengthening the regime domestically, launching informational attacks on South Korea, and gaining supportive groups in neighboring countries of the region. This is where its key informational resources are concentrated.
On December 3 at 11:00 PM local time, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law, which included banning political, party, and parliamentary activities, placing state media under government control, and allowing arrests without warrants. The president justified this drastic measure by citing the malicious influence of North Korea:
“I declare martial law to protect the free Republic of Korea from the threat of North Korean communist forces, to eradicate the despicable pro-North Korean anti-state forces that are plundering the freedom and happiness of our people, and to protect the free constitutional order.”
Yoon Suk Yeol did not provide specific evidence to substantiate claims that Pyongyang’s influence had reached a level warranting such severe restrictions on freedoms in South Korea. The move faced opposition not only from opposition parties but also from his own political faction. As a result, parliament overturned the declaration, and martial law was revoked just hours after its announcement. Nevertheless, the president’s statement reflects a certain apprehension about North Korean propaganda among conservative circles in South Korea, the primary audience Yoon aimed to address in his speech.
Furthermore, Pyongyang’s focus on the Far East region in today’s globalized world could have diplomatic implications for Kyiv. Ukraine might become a target for North Korea’s cyber forces as well.
Main page illustration: Natalia Lobach
