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Detector Media is continuing its special project aimed at dispelling cultural and historical myths long spread among Ukrainians by propaganda. We will unveil the reality behind familiar stories from textbooks and media, revealing them as fabrications or carefully crafted narratives shaped by propagandists over many years.
In our first article, we delved into the core of propaganda—the “myth of one nation”. The myths portraying Ukraine as a “Nazi state” are explored here. Narratives about Crimea and southern Ukraine being fabricated by enemy propaganda can be found here, and discussions on the manipulations surrounding the Pereyaslav Council can be explored here.
It’s hardly a secret now that the Kremlin has a direct and tangible link with the Russian Orthodox Church, effectively functioning as one of the government’s arms and a vehicle for propaganda. This tradition dates back to the Moscow Tsardom and the Russian Empire when local leaders bent Russian Orthodoxy to their political ambitions. A notable example is the excommunication of Ivan Mazepa, driven purely by political motives: the Ukrainian Hetman allied with Swedish King Charles XII against Moscow Tsar Peter I during the Great Northern War.
The incorporation of the Kyiv Metropolitanate into the Moscow Patriarchate in the late 17th and early 18th centuries meant that for over three centuries, Ukrainian Orthodoxy was largely and almost consistently under Russian Orthodoxy’s control. Concurrently, most Ukrainian territories were part of Russian political entities. This created a fertile breeding ground for Russian myth-making, imperialist policies, and justifications for military aggression against Ukraine.
Religious dynamics continue to impact Russian-Ukrainian relations significantly. Despite the Orthodox Church of Ukraine regaining its status as part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and subsequently receiving autocephaly as the Kyiv Metropolitanate’s successor, Russian Orthodoxy still attempts to exert influence over Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
Since the onset of the full-scale war, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, an extension of the Russian Orthodox Church, has not been outlawed in Ukraine. The proposed bill No. 8371, seeking its ban, has only passed its first reading. Yet, if enacted, the organization still retains a substantial following in Ukraine. Some of its members have controversially attributed the war’s initiation to “Jews,” while “His Beatitude” Metropolitan Onufriy (Orest Berezovsky) suggests “fighting the Devil through fasting and prayer”.
Metropolitan Onufriy. Source
The continued presence of the UOC-MP in Ukraine signals that the Russian narrative of Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate persists. Let’s explore its origins, nature, and reasons for its ongoing existence.
Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Kyiv Metropolitanate
To understand the origins of the myth that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is subservient to the Moscow Patriarchate, we need to revisit the late 17th and early 18th centuries. This period, marked by Moscow’s annexation of the Kyiv Metropolitanate, is crucial in understanding how Ukrainian Orthodoxy was positioned in a way that allowed Muscovy to exert control over it.
In 988, Prince Volodymyr I Sviatoslavych initiated the baptism of Kyivan Rus in the Byzantine rite. This move had multiple political objectives: securing a marriage with the Byzantine emperor’s sister, attaining parity with other European Christian rulers, and establishing a uniform religion across the Kyivan Rus to bolster his princely authority. Consequently, the newly established Metropolitanate of Kyiv became an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, then the epicenter of Eastern Christianity, later known as Orthodoxy.
The baptism of Volodymyr. A fragment from the Radziwiłł Chronicle of the late 15th century. Source
A few centuries onward, with both Kyivan Rus and the Byzantine Empire no longer in existence, the Kyiv Metropolitanate found itself without its political (Kyivan prince) and religious (Patriarch of Constantinople) protectors. After 1453 and the fall of Byzantium, the Ecumenical Patriarchs of Constantinople, now residing in the Muslim Ottoman Empire, retained their authority but lacked the political backing of Byzantine emperors, diminishing their direct influence over other Orthodox churches. This weakening of the Constantinople patriarchs would later be exploited by Moscow, particularly against Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
Initially, the primary threat to Ukrainian Orthodoxy appeared to be the Roman Catholic Church. Following the Union of Lublin in 1569, Ukrainian lands became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under Polish rule. This led to the dilution of the Kyivan Rus’ elite and the growing influence of the Catholic Church, notably through the establishment of educational institutions.
This influence became pronounced with the 1596 Union of Brest, forming the Ruthenian Uniate Church, which the Austrian authorities of the Habsburg monarchy would later designate as the Greek Catholic Church for nearly two centuries. This church, while part of the Catholic Church, maintained its traditional Byzantine (Greek, Orthodox) rituals.
The Brest Charter. Source
The Union of Brest resulted in a religious division within Ukrainian society, with some remaining Orthodox and others embracing the Union and Greek Catholicism. This schism significantly influenced subsequent events.
In the mid-18th century, the Ukrainian uprising against Polish rule initially led to the formation of a Ukrainian state. However, challenging circumstances drove its hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, to forge an alliance with Moscow Tsar Alexis I Romanov—an alliance later mythologized by Russian propaganda.
A key factor in this military-political alliance was the shared Orthodox faith, viewed by the Ukrainian Cossacks as a counter to the spread of Greek Catholicism. However, the Cossack autonomy, amidst ongoing conflicts with tsarism for privileges and during the turbulent Ruin era of the late 17th century, struggled to defend the interests of Ukrainian Orthodoxy adequately.
It was within this historical backdrop that the Kyiv Metropolitanate was annexed by Muscovy, giving rise to the enduring myth of Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s “subordination” and “allegiance” to the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Annexation of the Kyiv Metropolitanate by the Moscow Patriarchate
Until the late 18th century, the history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy makes no mention of the Moscow Patriarchate. This absence is understandable, as what would later be known as the Russian Orthodox Church only emerged at the end of the Middle Ages and did not significantly influence the Orthodox world, especially Ukraine, for another 250 years.
Initially, the Moscow Orthodox Church emerged in 1448 as a self-declared entity, splitting from the Kyiv Metropolitanate during a period of military and political strife between the Grand Duchy of Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the latter encompassing most Ukrainian territories. The nascent Moscow Orthodox Church unilaterally cut ties with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
It is crucial to underscore that the Moscow Orthodox Church originated through an unauthorized split from the Kyiv Metropolitanate and lacked official recognition for over a century. It wasn’t until the end of the 16th century that Patriarch Jeremiah II Tranos of Constantinople, under duress from Moscow Tsar Boris Godunov, conceded patriarchal status to the Moscow Metropolitan while being held captive.
This revelation alone could suffice to debunk the Russian myth of the Moscow Patriarchate’s dominion over Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, the story continues.
During this time, Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Kyiv Metropolitanate lacked the shield of powerful political entities, as Ukrainian lands were divided among neighboring powers (Muscovy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Ottoman Empire). Concurrently, the Cossack autonomy was systematically undermined by Moscow’s tsars.
In contrast, the Moscow Patriarchate enjoyed the support of local rulers, who leveraged religion to further their territorial ambitions in Ukraine. This approach finds echoes in contemporary times, with Russian leader Vladimir Putin also utilizing religion as a tool against Ukraine and its people.
The Kyiv Metropolitanate lost its autonomy in 1686 when Ecumenical Patriarch Dionysius IV granted the Moscow Patriarch the right to ordain a Kyivan Metropolitan. Similar to Moscow’s acquisition of the patriarchate, this concession was coerced: Dionysius was influenced by the Ottoman Sultan and subjected to Russian diplomatic pressure, culminating in bribery. The agreement involved 200 gold pieces and 120 sable skins. Notably, Dionysius’ Tomos did not explicitly subordinate the Kyiv Metropolitanate to Moscow; it merely permitted the ordination of the Kyiv Metropolitan in Moscow, maintaining existing privileges and practices, including the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople in liturgical references. The only Greek decree of Dionysius that has survived to this day also does not state that the right of ordination is transferred to Moscow forever, as Russian propaganda now claims.
Nevertheless, the Moscow Patriarch disregarded these stipulations. In 1722, Peter I, then “Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia,” dissolved the Kyiv Metropolitanate, reducing it to a mere diocese.
In essence, the myth of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate is founded on falsities: The Moscow Church unilaterally broke away from the Kyiv Metropolitanate and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, secured its patriarchal status through coercion, annexed the Kyiv Metropolitanate via bribery, and ultimately, under Tsar Peter the Great, reduced it to a mere component of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Mirroring this historical manipulation, Vladimir Putin, likening himself to the first Russian emperor, continues to exploit the church in his attempts to undermine Ukraine.
An exhibition dedicated to the 350th anniversary of Peter the Great. Source
Moscow as the “Third Rome”
The annexation of the Kyiv Metropolitanate by the Moscow Patriarchate and its subsequent mythicization gave rise to a broader myth in the Russian Empire: the idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome.”
This concept persists in Russia and countries with shared historical ties, where many still believe in the notion that Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow rallied under this slogan against the Lithuanians for the “unification of Russian lands” and the “triumph of the Orthodox faith.” However, this is a distortion of history; the phrase “Moscow is the Third Rome” only gained widespread popularity as part of imperial doctrine in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Its origins trace back to the early 16th century, following the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman Turks. Pskov monk Philotheus, in one of his letters, declared Moscow the successor of Rome and Constantinople. He posited that, with Rome and Constantinople having lost their stature, Moscow was their heir and the sole “protector” of “true” Christianity (excluding the Catholic Church, of course). While the phrase “Moscow is the Third Rome” appeared in Early Modern Moscow sources, it wasn’t a mainstream concept for a considerable time. Russian historian Karamzin, for instance, referred to it as a minor idea, significant only in legitimizing the Moscow Patriarchate.
The concept of “Moscow as the Third Rome” gained more socio-political traction in the Russian Empire following Alexander II Romanov’s ascent to the throne in 1855. Several historical Russian sources mentioning this idea were published, transforming the Pskov monk’s largely religious theory into a political myth central to Russian imperial propaganda.
The second half of the nineteenth century saw the appearance of the most popular interpretation of Philotheus’ theory in the historical science of the Russian Empire, which was first presented in 1869 in the doctoral dissertation of the Kyiv historian Volodymyr Ikonnikov.
Volodymyr Ikonnikov. Source
The scholar, deeply rooted in the Ukrainian capital, posited in his work that the “Moscow as the Third Rome” theory should be viewed not as a religious doctrine but as a political and ideological concept. He argued that following Constantinople’s fall, Moscow purportedly claimed the “right” to assume its role in international relations.
The prominence of this myth in the late 19th century is evident in its frequent appearance in historical research, debates, and widely circulated historical reviews and encyclopedias. The “Moscow as the Third Rome” theory was an ideal tool for shaping the perspectives of Russians and other imperial subjects. It promoted the Russian Empire’s unique role as a bridge between Europe and Asia, akin to the Byzantine Empire’s function in the Middle Ages, and positioned Moscow as a religious center.
To date, no medieval historical documents have been found that explicitly refer to Moscow as the Third Rome. There are no known Slavic or Greek texts that contain this phrase.
This myth, while a vestige of history, still holds relevance today. In the contemporary world, Moscow can no longer portray itself as the “savior” of Orthodox peoples from the Ottoman Empire and Catholic nations. However, it remains closely linked to the myth of Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s subjugation to the Moscow Patriarchate and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.
The “Moscow as the Third Rome” ideology serves as a foundational element. It “strengthens” the unfounded claims of the Moscow Patriarchate to dominance in the Orthodox world, including over Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Politically, it “endows” Russia with the supposed right, as the successor of the Romanov Empire and ostensibly Byzantium, to annex neighboring states, with Ukraine being the primary target.
Originally, this myth enabled the Russian imperial authorities to justify the Moscow Patriarchate’s claims. Today, its remnants, coupled with the “triune people” pan-Russian myth, underpin the neo-imperial “Russian world” doctrine.
Regaining Independence
During the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921, an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, still under the Moscow Patriarchate, was established. However, the Soviet regime later transformed it into the Ukrainian Exarchate, a specialized form of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia, which persisted until 1990. Following this, it was succeeded by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), a significant conduit of Russian influence in now-independent Ukraine.
Throughout this period, there was a continuous effort to establish an independent Ukrainian church. Since 1919, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) has existed and even received recognition from the Soviet government, albeit as a strategy to diminish the Russian Orthodox Church’s influence within the USSR.
The UAOC, however, fell victim to the Great Terror of 1937-1938 but was later resurrected as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Diaspora, which endures to this day. The Perestroika era in the Soviet Union saw another revival of the UAOC, declared at a council in Lviv.
In 1992, amidst dramatic events and key figures still prominent today, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) was founded. Notably, when the Moscow Patriarchate terminated its exarchate in 1990, intending to grant more autonomy to the UOC-MP, Kirill Gundyaev (now head of the Russian Orthodox Church) was assigned by then Patriarch Alexy to devise new operational guidelines for this church in Ukraine. Dissatisfaction with these rules led Ukrainian bishops, spearheaded by Filaret (Denysenko), to seek full autocephaly. Only three bishops, including the current UOC-MP head Onufriy, declined to sign this appeal. Subsequently, Filaret established the UOC-Kyiv Patriarchate following contentious events. This church, alongside the UAOC, formed the foundation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which, despite opposition from the UOC-MP, emerged in 2018 at the Unification Council of the Eastern Orthodox Churches of Ukraine. This event marked the restoration of historical justice, establishing the OCU as the sole canonical Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the rightful successor to the Kyiv Metropolitanate.
The myth that Ukrainian Orthodoxy is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate is steeped in deception, threats, and bribery, historically serving imperialistic objectives the same way as, for centuries, the Russian Orthodox Church has been a tool of Russian influence in Ukraine.
Caricature of the Moscow Patriarchate. Source
Today, while Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church advocates violence against Ukrainians, supports the development of nuclear weapons in Russia under “divine protection,” and declares pacifism heretical, the UOC-MP continues to function in Ukraine as part of the Russian Orthodox Church. It increasingly stirs tension within Ukrainian society by propagating the notion that the only “valid” Orthodoxy in Ukraine is the Moscow variant. The “special” Russian faith and the “Russian world” concept have been identified by the Ecumenical Patriarch as the ideological bedrock of the Putin regime. In other words, a heresy that has broken away from true Orthodoxy.
