How Russia interferes with democratic processes in the United States through information campaigns and hybrid aggression.
On November 5, the United States will hold its presidential election, where Donald Trump is the Republican candidate, and Kamala Harris represents the Democrats. The outcome of this electoral race will shape the future of international politics, economics, security, and U.S. support for Ukraine in resisting Russia’s full-scale aggression.
Russian propaganda remains a challenge to U.S. national security. In September 2024, the U.S. Department of State imposed sanctions on individuals connected to Russia Today. Russia attempted to meddle in the 2016 and 2020 elections through bot and troll farms and the actions of Russian intelligence agencies. MediaSapiens explores how Russian propaganda seeks to influence public opinion in the United States.
Sovietology
The roots of modern Russian influence in the U.S. trace back to the Cold War, specifically within academic circles. To better understand its adversary (the USSR), the White House established departments and institutes focused on Eurasian and East European studies. This was a step in the development of Sovietology.
Scholars studied the Russian language and literature, analyzing the Soviet Union primarily from a Russian perspective. This approach often ignored the unique characteristics of the societies under Moscow’s control, resulting in an incomplete and distorted understanding of the USSR’s development. Consequently, even the CIA failed to anticipate the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.
A notable example of this miscalculation is the speech delivered by President George H.W. Bush to Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada in August 1991, famously dubbed the “Chicken Kyiv” speech. In it, he warned Ukrainians against “suicidal nationalism” and urged them to collaborate with Mikhail Gorbachev in reforming the USSR.
The history of modern Russian influence in the United States began during the Cold War within academic circles. Since the White House needed a better understanding of its adversary, the USSR, departments, and institutes focusing on Eurasian and Eastern European studies were established. This development marked the rise of Sovietology.
Scholars studied the Russian language and literature, analyzing the Soviet Union from a Russian perspective without accounting for the unique characteristics of societies under Moscow’s control. Consequently, their understanding of the USSR’s development was incomplete and distorted. This led to the Central Intelligence Agency’s failure to anticipate the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.
An illustrative moment of this misunderstanding was George H.W. Bush’s speech in the Ukrainian parliament in early August 1991, known historically as the “Chicken Kyiv speech.” The U.S. president warned Ukrainians against “suicidal nationalism” and urged them to continue working with Mikhail Gorbachev on reforming the USSR.
U.S. media were cautious in their response to Ukraine’s declaration of independence on August 24, 1991. Detector Media published an article revealing that Western outlets’ coverage in the early 1990s was influenced by a limited understanding of Ukrainian history and culture and a lack of relevant information in English. Many Sovietologists, fascinated by Russian culture, failed to see the emerging Russia as a national security threat to the United States and instead sought to further develop Russian studies.
In the early 1990s, Russia had established intelligence operations in the U.S. and was experienced in conducting information campaigns across the Atlantic. One notable operation in the 1980s involved a disinformation campaign falsely claiming that the AIDS virus had been created in CIA laboratories to exterminate populations worldwide. This campaign was orchestrated by Soviet intelligence and disseminated via an English-language Indian newspaper controlled by the KGB.
Even after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, scholars focusing on Russia continued to study the subject, maintaining approaches that emphasized engagement with Moscow and recognition of Russia’s national interests. These views have influenced the White House’s current perspectives on Russia.
A striking example of how the legacy of Sovietology continues to shape U.S. discourse and the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian war is found in the work of University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer. In his 1993 article, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” published in Foreign Affairs, Mearsheimer argued that pressuring Ukraine to surrender its nuclear arsenal was a mistake. He believed that Ukraine’s possession of nuclear weapons would have guaranteed peace between Kyiv and Moscow.
However, Mearsheimer’s views shifted over time. In his public lecture in 2015 (garnering 28 million views on YouTube), he attributed the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine to “U.S. policy regarding Ukrainian NATO membership.” He argued that the West’s push to bring NATO closer to Russia’s borders provoked Vladimir Putin’s reaction. Framing the war, which he called the “Ukrainian crisis,” through Russian propaganda narratives, Mearsheimer justified Moscow’s imperialistic behavior by suggesting Putin uses nineteenth-century terms to think about the geopolitical balance of power in the world.
The notion that the West bears responsibility for events in Ukraine since 2014 is common among some American analysts, scholars, and journalists. For example, Samuel Charap, a senior fellow specializing in Russia and Eurasian policy at the RAND Corporation, wrote in January 2022 that Washington’s most effective approach would be to promote a diplomatic resolution to the war rather than provide military assistance to Ukraine.
The 2016 Presidential Election
The 2016 U.S. presidential election marked a turning point in recognizing Russian informational and hybrid influence in the United States, coinciding with the rise of populism in American politics and growing societal polarization. Republican candidate Donald Trump expressed support for Julian Assange and his Wikileaks project. Australian hacker Assange had published emails from Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s campaign.
In 2010, Assange released classified Pentagon documents about U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan on Wikileaks.
Former CIA employee Edward Snowden fled to Russia in 2013 after leaking classified information about U.S. surveillance programs. The Snowden case popularized the term “metadata,” referring to information from devices that can track a person’s location and communications.
American journalist Glenn Greenwald, who reported on Snowden, won a Pulitzer Prize for his work. Writing for outlets such as The Guardian and The New York Times, Greenwald criticized “establishment journalism” and opposed government censorship in 2013. It is worth noting that Julian Assange and Edward Snowden also shared similar views, which were exploited by Russian propaganda in an effort to weaken the West, especially the United States.
In October 2024, Assange addressed the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, calling the CIA a tool of transnational repression.
Trolls from the Internet Research Agency (IRA), established by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner PMC, played a central role in Russia’s interference in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. elections. According to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Prigozhin’s information campaigns had an impact on American society.
According to Oxford University’s Computational Propaganda Research Project, between 2015 and 2017, over 30 million users shared posts created by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) on Facebook and Instagram. The analysis revealed that the agency’s social media activity was largely achieved organically, without significant reliance on advertising tools. Furthermore, the project noted that Russia’s goal during its information interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was to sow distrust in American institutions among Hispanic voters and to discourage African Americans from voting. The Oxford study also found that Russia was behind the dissemination of manipulative, sensational news and conspiracy theories in the U.S. during the election period.
The National Review reported that Russia was also responsible for inciting protests in the U.S. in 2016. For instance, a Facebook group named Heart of Texas advocated for the secession and independence of Texas, stirring public unrest.
Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was formally investigated. Emily Harding, now head of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), previously served as deputy staff director for the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee. She led the committee’s investigation into Russian election interference, culminating in the Mueller Report, released in 2019. The report disclosed that units 26165 and 74455 of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff carried out hacking attacks to breach the email accounts of Hillary Clinton’s campaign.
Although parts of the Mueller Report remain classified, the publicly available sections reveal how Russian intelligence agents managed to enter the U.S. under false pretenses. For example, employees of the IRA, Aleksandra Krylova and Anna Bogachova, claimed to have met at a party and decided to travel to the U.S. together. The investigation uncovered that Russia began preparing for election interference as early as 2014, hiring specialists skilled in managing various social media platforms.
A joint report by the CIA, FBI, and NSA, published in January 2017, stated that Vladimir Putin and the Russian government sought to assist Donald Trump’s election campaign. According to U.S. intelligence, when it became apparent in Moscow that Hillary Clinton was likely to win the election, Russian operatives decided to carry out hacking attacks on Clinton’s campaign infrastructure.
Social Polarization
In recent years, socio-political developments in the United States have demonstrated increasing polarization among Americans. This divide encompasses issues such as abortion, taxes, healthcare, illegal immigration, and student loans. The starkly opposing views on these topics are exacerbated by the atomization of media audiences. For instance, those who watch CNN do not consume content from Fox News, and vice versa. This selective exposure leads individuals to seek out only like-minded opinions, creating a landscape of informational bubbles. Politicians capitalize on this segmentation to mobilize their electoral bases.
A 2023 study published in Nature Communications revealed that much of the content driving polarization in American society was sourced from local U.S. media outlets by Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA).
Dina Sadek, a research fellow specializing in Middle Eastern studies at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, has authored and co-authored studies on Russian propaganda targeting Ukraine and interference in U.S. presidential elections. In a comment for Detector Media, Sadek explained how Russia utilizes social media platforms in the U.S.
“Social media is the main tool through which Russian propaganda reaches the American audience. This includes content disseminated by Russian state media accounts and associated journalists on social media. This content is much more understandable because it is clear where it comes from, and that the agenda of those disseminating the content is clearly in line with the Russian government’s position. Russia is also looking for partnerships with media and online influencers through which it can amplify Kremlin-related messaging through domestic channels,” Dina Sadek commented.
Russia utilizes individuals like former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, military figure Scott Ritter, filmmaker Michael Moore, journalist Glenn Greenwald, and other public figures in the United States to serve its interests. Each of them, in their own way, disseminates Russian propaganda narratives about the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S. support for Ukraine, and Washington’s foreign policy. Tucker Carlson has recorded interviews with Vladimir Putin and Pavel Durov. Scott Ritter, through Twitter and YouTube, spreads claims that Ukraine’s National Police allegedly orchestrated the Bucha tragedy, blaming Joe Biden for it. Glenn Greenwald asserts that the U.S. is fueling the war by aiding Ukraine, which he argues cannot defeat Russia. Michael Moore, in his documentaries, promotes conspiracy theories suggesting that U.S. intelligence agencies were likely responsible for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
One of Russia’s primary propaganda resources in the U.S. was RT America, established in 2010. RT America aired programs featuring Larry King, Ed Schultz (a former MSNBC host), and others. It mimicked Western media newsrooms with one key distinction: it spread Moscow’s state propaganda to manipulate public opinion within the United States.
Since 2012, RT America has been led by Mikhail Solodovnikov, a Russian propagandist who previously worked as a special correspondent for the Russia channel. He is also the general manager of T&R Productions, which produced content for RT America.
Solodovnikov covered the Iraq War and lived and worked in the U.S. for an extended period. In March 2022, he was removed from the Board of Directors of the Emmy Awards, where he had previously been a member, and RT ceased operations. Unlike in the European Union, Russian propaganda outlets were not banned in the U.S. and instead shut down by their own decision, despite the Global Engagement Center, a U.S. State Department institution responsible for strategic communications, monitoring and analyzing Russian propaganda.
In June 2024, the publication Texty released a study titled “American Swings” about a network of politicians and journalists who oppose providing aid to Ukraine. This analysis provoked threats to cut donor funding for the editorial office. Senator J.D. Vance and Representative Matt Gaetz called on U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to disclose information about Texty’s funding sources, particularly from American donors.
One of the main social media platforms where Russia spreads disinformation to an American audience is X (formerly Twitter). According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, during the hurricane that struck the southern states in October 2024, Russian accounts on Twitter spread claims that funds allocated to assist Ukraine had been diverted from hurricane relief efforts by Washington.
Olga Lautman, a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (U.S.) and co-founder of the Kremlin File podcast, explained the essence of Russian propaganda in the United States in a comment to Detector Media.
“Russian propaganda in the United States is primarily focused on undermining trust in democratic institutions, promoting social division, supporting anti-Western sentiment, and promoting pro-Kremlin narratives on global events. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter (now X), TikTok, and Instagram are widely used to spread propaganda and disinformation, often through Western propagandists, troll farms, and bots,” explained Olga Lautman.
In September 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on companies and individuals associated with Russia Today. Among them were Yelena Afanasyeva and Konstantin Kalashnikov, who were accused of bribing Tenet Media in Nashville, Tennessee, with $10 million. According to Voice of America, this media outlet propagated Russian narratives, including claims that the U.S. should not support Ukraine while the U.S. itself has numerous domestic problems.
Russia and other countries exploit controversies in the U.S. to manipulate American citizens. A July 9, 2024, Politico article reported that U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland announced that the Department of Justice would combat attempts at foreign interference in the presidential election. These efforts target not only Russia but also China and Iran.
Professor Sarah Oates, Associate Dean for Research at the Philip Merrill College of Journalism, studies Russian propaganda in the U.S. In 2024, she co-authored a book with Professor Gordon Niall Ramsay of the University of Akureyri (Iceland) titled Seeing Red: Russian Propaganda and American News.
“There are two distinct national audiences in the United States. There is the far right, which is probably best defined as Trump’s supporters. Not only do they have certain political views, they are anti-abortion, anti-immigrant, anti-tax, and pro-isolationist, but they also have a particular attitude toward traditional mainstream media. They are particularly distrustful of the most professional media in the United States, such as the Washington Post and the New York Times. They believe that it is more important for the media to support their views than to inform them.
On the other side of the political spectrum, those who hold more liberal and democratic views have a more traditional view of the media, although they also have a certain amount of skepticism that has grown in recent years. In general, this other group values a media system that informs them, not just reinforces their opinions. One of the reasons why liberal people complain about the American media system is the growing number of biased media outlets, such as Fox News, which dominates the cable news market.
There are other differences in the views of US media audiences, such as age, but overall, the biggest divide is between the far right/Trump supporters and the rest of the country. Since Trump has been president for four years and has been attacking free media, this has exacerbated the problem,” said Professor Sarah Oates in a comment for Detector Media.
Matthew Orr, an expert on Eurasia with the U.S. risk analysis platform RANE, elaborated on how polarization in the U.S. is amplified through media and social networks.
“Russian propaganda and information operations in the United States are aimed at exploiting and intensifying the existing political polarization and disagreements in the United States. The latter are a normal phenomenon in any free society, as they relate to controversial or important issues. The main reason for the division is the diversity of American society and our tradition of people having their own opinions on certain topics. However, social media is fundamentally changing the nature of modern information exchange and further polarizing the public’s views on key issues, mainly because people are approaching issues from a much more fragmented set of facts,” commented Matthew Orr.
Dina Sadek highlighted the significant role of media ownership in shaping polarization in American society and its impact on the political landscape.
“The polarization of the media in the United States is to some extent reflected both in the type of media ownership and in the real struggles among Americans over several social and political issues. Media ownership and related political interests determine in many cases, the nature of the coverage and the interests and audience that is expected to be attracted. Whether people have socioeconomic problems plays an important role in determining where they consume information and how they engage in the discussion of important issues.”
A Pew Research Center report before the 2020 U.S. presidential election noted that “Republicans and Democrats trust two almost entirely opposite media environments.” Dina Sadek commented, “There is little reason to believe this has changed during the 2024 election.”
Populism and Conspiracy Theories
Polarization within American society is evidence of populism as one of the political trends in contemporary global politics. Populist leaders often offer simple answers to complex questions. The ongoing presidential campaigns of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump illustrate how political rhetoric can vary in tone, including elements of threats and promises. For example, Harris hinted at Trump’s arrest, referencing her prosecutorial experience in California, while Trump claimed he could resolve the war in Ukraine within a single day. It is important to recognize that much of what presidential candidates say during their campaigns will not necessarily translate into action.
Populism is inextricably linked to conspiracy theories. The U.S. harbors numerous conspiracy theories aimed at portraying the American political system as weak, suggesting that decisions are made behind closed doors by “Freemasons” or other secret organizations rather than by the citizens of the United States.
Social media platform Truth Social plays a significant role in spreading conspiracy theories to American audiences. Olga Lautman provided insight into its influence.
“Truth Social, founded by Donald Trump, has a name reminiscent of the Soviet state propaganda publication Pravda [”Truth”]. The platform plays an important role in spreading anti-establishment narratives and amplifying Russian propaganda while attacking Western institutions. Both Russia and Trump’s MAGA [Make America Great Again] movement share common goals, such as undermining trust in Western institutions that are vital to the functioning of democracy. They also target the media, labeling it ‘fake news’ to undermine public trust in journalism, which is essential to holding officials accountable and maintaining democratic integrity.
Catering to an audience that feels marginalized by mainstream media, Truth Social creates an intimate atmosphere where users are exposed to mostly anti-establishment (government) narratives and polarizing content. This environment fosters populist narratives that question the legitimacy and effectiveness of established political and social institutions. Thus, the platform supports and extends Russian propaganda narratives, including that the US government is allegedly corrupt and weak,” commented Olga Lautman.
Professor Sarah Oates argues that American journalists lack sufficient knowledge of Russian history, which leads to the proliferation of Russian propaganda narratives in U.S. media.
“One of the problems I raise in my book, particularly when American journalists talk about NATO, is that American citizens and reporters are poorly informed about Russian history. For example, they often don’t realize that NATO was a defense alliance, and they seem to have forgotten about the Cold War. Perhaps this is not too surprising, as Americans are generally ignorant of foreign affairs, and also because journalists are quite young, and the Cold War ended over 30 years ago. However, this is no excuse,” commented Professor Sarah Oates.
Iryna Domnenko, a graduate of the Sympodium Strategic Communications Program and visiting research fellow at Stony Brook University (New York) in 2023, shared her observations on Russian informational influence in the U.S.:
“From what I saw during my internship and what is confirmed by analytical reports and investigations, soft power or promotion of Russian through the so-called opposition, opposition media, and opposition artists is very effective. In other words, they are not actually Putin’s supporters, but they promote narratives such as ‘the Russians are not guilty’. They dilute responsibility. And at the same time, they fuel the already present love of Russian culture, of the ‘mysterious Russian soul’ among US citizens.
For example, Elena Kostyuchenko, who published the book I Love Russia and gave presentations at various universities in the United States, is in opposition to Putin. She is perceived almost as a heroine because she articulates her story of suffering very well. But she is playing into the hands of the Russian narrative that ‘people don’t have a choice, they have no agency, yes, they participate in the so-called “SMO,” but not by choice,” explained Iryna Domnenko.
Addressing Russia’s Informational Influence in the U.S.
For decades, Moscow has invested resources into influencing the American audience, exploiting divisions within U.S. society. Russian soft power remains influential in the U.S., where systemic studies of Russian interference in American politics began only after the 2016 elections.
Matthew Orr believes the current state of U.S. media can be improved. He offers the following arguments.
“I believe that traditional media still have to respond to the increasing competition from non-traditional media through the Internet and social media. Traditional media, such as print newspapers and major television networks, have in many ways been unprepared to meet the challenge posed by non-traditional media, both in terms of their business model and, more importantly, their ability to fulfill their critical role in serving as the fourth estate in a democratic society. I also believe that many journalists in the U.S. in recent years continue to receive outdated education and training on how to do good journalism in light of the lessons of the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea, the 2016 U.S. election, and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
But I’m optimistic that the quality of journalism training and education will improve and that there will be a greater expectation that journalists should be true experts in the areas they report on rather than constantly changing assignments. And I’m confident that these developments, along with the continuous improvement of social media content moderation, will make the overall media landscape more conducive to a more informed society in the coming decades than it is now,” said Matthew Orr.
Iryna Domnenko argues for a proactive approach to countering Russian propaganda in the United States.
“I am a supporter of a non-linear and proactive approach. Now, unfortunately, we and the whole world are still reacting to Russian PSYOP and fake news. But we can see that these attacks are almost always timed to coincide with some important events: the NATO Summit in Washington, the European Union elections, and the U.S. elections. So we would have to seize the initiative and take our own steps in advance so that Russia would have to respond to them in the information domain. This way, they will spend resources on this, and fewer resources will be spent on some new attacks.
People in the United States do not fully understand the seriousness of information warfare. They are far from Russia, and Russia will not attack them unnoticed. But thanks to the Internet, Russia can be very close and everywhere in the information environment. And we must explain this. We need to work with liberal and conservative Americans. We need to focus on academics because there are still centers of the ‘Russian world’ there, I’m talking about Slavic studies departments,” explained Iryna Domnenko.
Sarah Oates believes the core problem lies in the lack of expertise among American journalists when covering the Russia-Ukraine war and related topics. She also notes a crisis in U.S. media, where many people are unwilling to pay for content.
“It’s hard to talk about changes in American media because the US media system is quite unique. It is the only major nation that does not have a publicly funded media system. The public funding that goes to the Public Broadcasting Service and National Public Radio is quite small. The United States operates on a commercial media model, in which the media is independent of the government, and users are supposed to fund the media by paying for quality news. This is not working well at the moment, and media outlets, especially local ones, are closing down en masse. It turns out that people don’t really want to pay for news. Because of this desegregated system, it is very difficult to change it,” says Sarah Oates.
She also pointed out that American journalists have fallen victim to Russian propaganda, particularly narratives about Ukraine and NATO.
“That being said, despite the dismal state of the US media system, American journalists are still doing a pretty good job of informing the public. However, due to the fragmentation of the media system through the online sphere, social media, and the growing influence of biased media such as Fox News, the audience has a greater burden of navigating the information landscape. Because of this, a significant number of people are falling prey to disinformation, which opens the door for Russian disinformation to have an easier path to American citizens. One way to change this is to be more vigilant in identifying key Russian propaganda narratives and reporting them to the public. In addition, journalists could be more careful not to broadcast Putin’s narrative, particularly on NATO and Ukraine. Otherwise, they would often have to deny Putin’s disinformation that NATO’s actions allegedly forced Russia to invade Ukraine in self-defense,” summarizes Oates.
In our view, it is currently crucial to maintain bipartisan U.S. support for Ukraine and to implement educational projects about the history of Ukraine, the USSR, and Ukrainian-American relations. While these topics may not reach a large audience, highlighting the humanitarian aspects of the past is essential for making informed decisions about the future. A detailed examination of how Russian propaganda influences the U.S. offers significant opportunities for collaborative research between Ukrainian and American media professionals. The current situation, where social media amplifies polarization in American society, serves as an important lesson for Ukraine. It demonstrates how informational manipulation can exacerbate socio-political tensions to serve Moscow’s interests.
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