On August 20, 265 MPs of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted Bill No. 8371, “On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine”. Here’s how pro-Russian Telegram channels reacted to this event.
Читати українською
The work on the bill began in January 2023. After the first reading, the bill received 1,256 amendments, as noted in the report of the relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada on humanitarian and information policy, prior to the bill’s second reading.
As of August 21, the text of the bill supported by the MPs had not yet been published on the Verkhovna Rada’s website. Such delays in publishing decisions and updating the voting and session databases are not uncommon during wartime. Therefore, it is only possible to discuss the version of the bill considered during the first reading. That version included amendments to other laws. Specifically, in the first reading, the author of the bill, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, proposed adding the following clause to Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations”:
“The activities of religious organizations affiliated with the centers of influence of a religious organization (association) whose governing center (management) is located outside Ukraine in a state that carries out armed aggression against Ukraine are not allowed.”
However, based on the reactions of the MPs to the bill, it appears that a more detailed document was passed on August 20 compared to the earlier one-and-a-half-page version. For example, Volodymyr Viatrovych, a member of the parliamentary committee on humanitarian and information policy, wrote in an op-ed on Liga.net that the bill now includes seven criteria for ties with Russia that were not present in the version approved in the first reading.
On August 20, the MPs supported the ban on the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. The State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience will be responsible for verifying other institutions’ ties with Russia. This authority will come into effect 30 days after the law is signed by the President of Ukraine. Based on this assessment, the State Service will issue orders to religious organizations, requiring them to sever ties with Russia within 30 days.
“If the connection with Moscow is not severed, the government will file a lawsuit to ban such an organization. The legal procedures for the ban will begin nine months after the law is published,” Viatrovych writes.
Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Ministers must develop criteria for assessing whether a religious organization is involved in promoting the “Russian world,” which could also be grounds for a ban.
The religious issue has long been a topic of Russian propaganda. For instance, Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, often seizes the opportunity to talk about the persecution of “canonical” Orthodox believers in Ukraine. Below are the main narratives from pro-Russian Telegram channels in the context of the adoption of Bill 8371.
“Canonical Orthodox Now Outlawed”
Official representatives of Russia reacted to the vote on Bill No. 8371 in the Ukrainian parliament. Among them was Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“The goal here was to completely eradicate canonical, true Orthodoxy and instead replace it with a pseudo, fake church, understandable only in this way. To create a quasi-Orthodox church. That’s exactly how it should be called—this is not a schismatic or a breakaway church; it is a false quasi-church.”
Pro-Russian Telegram channels in Ukraine echoed sentiments similar to Zakharova’s, even before the news of the second reading of the bill was made public. For instance, pro-Russian blogger Myroslava Berdnyk, who has 12.8 thousand subscribers on her Telegram channel, announced the bill’s consideration earlier that morning, stating:
“Officially, MPs say it bans the activities of religious organizations connected with Russia. Unofficially, it’s claimed that it targets the UOC [Ukrainian Orthodox Church].”
In other pro-Russian Telegram channels, the legislative initiative was also referred to as the “bill to ban the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.” This narrative was shared in a channel with 148 thousand subscribers, as well as in one of the largest anonymous Ukrainian Telegram channels, boasting 1.3 million subscribers.
“Over 6 million Ukrainians are now outlawed! The Verkhovna Rada has passed a law banning the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church,” one Telegram channel with 61 thousand subscribers, which spreads Russian propaganda to its audience within Zaporizhzhia region, stated.
The appeal to canonicity is an internal church matter, often incomprehensible to secular individuals. Representatives of various denominations or religious movements tend to justify their existence by asserting their unique canonicity compared to other churches within the same religious tradition.
Alongside temples of other religions, Ukraine is home to various Christian denominations, including Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Protestant churches. Similarly, an unlimited number of Orthodox churches may operate in Ukraine. Article 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees freedom of religion, with the caveat that “the exercise of this right may be restricted by law only in the interests of protecting public order, the health, and morality of the population, or protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons.” Therefore, concerns regarding Bill No. 8371 should be considered within a secular framework and the need for certain restrictions during wartime, rather than within the bounds of a theological dispute.
At the same time, Orthodoxy is the most widely practiced Christian denomination in Ukraine. According to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (from July 6-20, 2022, with a telephone poll of 2,000 respondents and a margin of error not exceeding 2.4%), over 70% of Ukrainians identify as Orthodox. Thus, the recognition of a particular Ukrainian church by the global Orthodox community has become an important internal political factor. Since 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) as the only canonical Orthodox church in Ukraine. Similarly, the Patriarchate of Alexandria, second only to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the diptych of Orthodox autocephalous churches ranked by their historical role, has recognized the OCU.
Meanwhile, the largest local church, the Russian Orthodox Church (fifth in the diptych), along with several other churches, did not recognize the OCU and stopped recognizing the diptych itself. The Russian Church considers only the Ukrainian Orthodox Church canonical in Ukraine, meaning the UOC MP [Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate]. The UOC also insists on its exclusive “canonicity.” However, after Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC publicly distanced itself from the ROC [Russian Orthodox Church]. Consequently, the issue of canonicity remains a subject of debate within global Orthodoxy, and the Kremlin’s labeling of someone as non-canonical is a speculative and propagandistic interference by secular authorities in religious matters.
“An Expired Parliament Had No Right to Vote on the UOC Ban”
Pro-Russian Telegram channels attempted to portray those in favor of Bill No. 8371 as “godless and non-believers” among the members of Ukraine’s parliament. For example, a pro-Russian Telegram channel with 148,000 subscribers commented on a video showing the results of the vote, filmed by one of the people’s deputies:
“The biggest cheerleaders in this video were the blasphemer Mykyta Poturaiev and the Catholic Olena Kondratiuk.”
Propagandist Anatoly Shariy, who has nearly 1.3 million subscribers on Telegram, reacted to the news of the vote on Bill No. 8371 by saying, “The demons have banned the UOC. This is the first time in Ukraine’s history we’ve seen something so extreme.” Shariy, like other pro-Russian commentators, also shared a video of MP Artem Dmytruk, who voted against the bill. In the video, Dmytruk claimed that the State Security Service had allegedly stopped protecting him and his family, which propagandists interpreted as a consequence of his opposition to Bill No. 8371.
“Rumors have started that the President’s Office has ‘put a price on the head’ of Odesa MP Artem Dmytruk. By all indications, this guy could create his own party, get it into the next parliament, and even take the mayoral seat in Odssa for himself and win other cities for his future party members,” another Telegram channel with almost 152,000 subscribers wrote.
A Telegram channel with 23,000 subscribers promised, and later published, a full list of those who voted for and against the bill. “An expired VR [Verkhovna Rada], which has no trust among the population, passed a law banning the UOC,” the channel stated.
According to several public opinion polls, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indeed lags behind institutions like the Armed Forces, the President, the National Police, and local authorities in terms of public trust. However, these surveys do not negate the parliament’s right to fulfill its duties. According to Article 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine, during wartime, the Verkhovna Rada remains empowered until a new parliament is elected. There is no room for alternative interpretations of the Constitution and laws, despite propagandists’ attempts to exploit this issue in the context of extending President Volodymyr Zelensky’s term.
A Telegram channel with 432,000 subscribers cited Article 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which states that no one can be restricted in their right to practice or not practice religious rituals. It also notes that “the exercise of this right may be restricted by law only in the interests of protecting public order, the health, and morality of the population, or protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons.”
In 2022, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine commented on Article 35 of the Constitution in the context of a legislative requirement that religious organizations with centers in Russia include this reference in their names. The court determined that the state has the right to scrutinize the statutes of religious organizations regarding their ties with the aggressor state. The Constitutional Court judges also affirmed that Ukraine, as a victim of Russian military aggression, has the right to restrict access to its military by Russian citizens and clergy from the Russian religious hierarchy:
“The unrestricted access of such clergy to units of the armed forces of a state under aggression creates significant risks, including negative psychological impacts on servicemen, the spread of misinformation among them, obtaining information on the moral condition of military personnel, and the leakage of data regarding the numerical composition of specific units, their location, armament, and military equipment.”
Thus, in the practice of interpreting the Constitution of Ukraine, the prevailing position is that the government has the right to regulate the activities of religious communities to protect public peace during both peacetime and wartime.
“UOC Ban Won’t Happen Sooner Than a Year”
Following the news about Bill No. 8371, the administrator of a Telegram channel with 23,000 subscribers posted a message attempting to calm followers and hinting at a potential change in government in Ukraine:
“The actual ban on any UOC entities won’t happen for at least a year after the law is signed by the president. Plus, every such lawsuit will ultimately have to be decided by the SC [The Supreme Court of Ukraine — DM]. By that time, the U.S. will have a new president, and something tells me that our government will change too. So, they’ve laid some foundation for themselves: they deceived the stupid on the far right and hedged their bets with the remnants of their conscience.”
A Telegram channel with a million subscribers speculated that the Ukrainian authorities don’t know how to implement Bill No. 8371. It suggested that “Zelenskyy has given himself nine months to figure out how to act in this case.”
A channel with 209,000 subscribers proposed three possible scenarios for how the law might be enforced. The first scenario involves transferring all UOC MP [Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the unofficial name of the Russian Orthodox Church’s “daughter” in Ukraine. Hereinafter, we will use this outdated but still common abbreviation to refer to it — DM] parishes to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). Believers who continue to practice their faith at home and remain loyal to the UOC MP would be “hunted down and prosecuted.” The second scenario suggests that parishes might transition to the Constantinople Patriarchate, leading to the continued existence of two major Orthodox denominations in Ukraine, with “minimal” persecution of believers. The third scenario posits that it doesn’t matter where the parishes go; no one will be persecuted, and “in the end, people will just wait for this crazy government to be replaced, and everything will return to normal.”
Another interpretation of how the law might be enforced was mentioned in a Telegram channel with 183,000 subscribers:
“The UOC will need to formally or verbally renounce its ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. The presence of any connections will be verified by the State Service of Ukraine on Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience based on the findings of a religious studies examination.”
Does the UOC Maintain Ties with Moscow?
On February 24, 2022, the UOC MP issued a statement by the Metropolitan Onufriy, which included the following words:
“With great regret, Russia has begun military actions against Ukraine, and in this fateful time, I urge you not to panic, to be courageous, and to show love for your Motherland and for each other... In defending the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, we also appeal to the President of Russia to immediately stop the fratricidal war.”
However, some authors, such as Kateryna Shchotkina, a contributor to Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, do not consider these statements sufficient to claim that the UOC MP has ceased cooperation with or being part of the Russian Orthodox Church. For instance, in August 2023, Kateryna Shchotkina criticized Onufriy’s statement condemning “those who attacked our country and occupied our land,” noting that it did not specifically mention Russia. She also criticized the UOC MP for not daring to declare autocephaly from the Russian Orthodox Church, despite losing its flock in temporarily occupied territories and its reputation in Ukraine because of this.
Some religious scholars in 2022 expected the UOC MP to declare autocephaly from Russian Orthodoxy at a council in the spring of 2022. However, such decisive actions did not occur. At the Council on May 27, 2022, the UOC MP adopted a new statute, which removed references to ties with the Russian Church but retained, in its introductory provisions justifying its independence and autonomy, a reference to the statute issued by Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Rus on October 27, 1990. The UOC representatives used the argument of “autonomy” from Russia at the end of 2022 and the beginning of 2023, when they lost the right to conduct services in the buildings of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra National Preserve.
According to the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine from December 1, 2022, “On Certain Aspects of the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine and the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions),” enacted by the decree of the President of Ukraine on December 1, 2022, the State Service of Ukraine on Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience was tasked within two months to conduct a religious examination of the UOC’s statute to determine whether there was a church-canonical connection with the Moscow Patriarchate (Russian Orthodox Church). The examination concluded that the adoption of the new statute did not lead to a break in the church-canonical connection between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church, and the UOC continues to maintain a relationship of subordination to the ROC.
Stay ahead of the curve. Subscribe now to get the latest Detector Media Research Centre insights delivered to your inbox every two weeks
The UOC’s claims of separation from the ROC also contradict the latter’s statute, which the UOC cannot directly influence. The statute of the ROC states, “The jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church extends to persons of the Orthodox confession residing on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church: in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Estonia, as well as those who voluntarily join it, Orthodox people residing in other countries.” Although, according to the same statute, the UOC MP has had autonomy since 1990, its leader remains one of the seven permanent members of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Does Bill No. 8371 Allow the Ban of the UOC MP?
In October 2023, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia contributor Kateryna Shchotkina warned that the bill No. 8371, passed in the first reading, was too lenient. She noted that it would require court rulings for each parish of the UOC MP if someone wanted to ban it. She reiterated this concern regarding the version of the bill that the MPs supported on August 20 of this year:
“Well, here you go: Ukrainian lawmakers have banned the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. However, they have not resolved the issue of the UOC MP and have inadvertently opened ‘friendly fire’ at other Ukrainian churches,” wrote Kateryna Shchotkina.
She explained that in the final version of the bill, the MPs banned the activities of the ROC, which operates in Ukraine only in temporarily occupied territories. The ROC will leave these territories along with Russian troops during their liberation. Meanwhile, proving the connection between the UOC MP and Russia will have to be done in court for each parish. Moreover, those who attempt to prove the “affiliation” of parishes with Russia will need to demonstrate this affiliation through multiple levels, which goes beyond the scope of the law.
“This legal term is intended to compensate for the absence of direct indications of a connection between the UOC and its center in Moscow, connections that were meticulously removed from the Kyiv Metropolitanate’s documents after the start of the full-scale war. At the same time, ‘affiliation’ can be multi-layered: a religious organization affiliated with a governing center, which in turn is affiliated with another governing center, and so on, until we finally reach the core — the connection with the ROC,” writes Shchotkina.
In summary, the adoption of Bill 8371 has become a compromise solution to the complex puzzle the state has faced regarding religious issues since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which was the largest in terms of the number of parishes, priests, and monasteries up until 2022, was a structural unit of the Russian Church, which, in turn, is controlled by Kremlin policies. The UOC’s leaders publicly condemned Russia’s aggression from the very beginning on February 24, 2022, supported the Ukrainian military, and later in the spring of 2022, removed references to ties with the Russian Church from its statute. However, Russia continues to exert informal influence on the church, and the Russian Church remains the source of the UOC’s canonical legitimacy.
This situation posed security risks for Ukraine. At the same time, a complete ban on the church could have led to alienation of part of the faithful from official Kyiv, misunderstandings with international partners, and the potential for increased influence by Moscow. Public figures like boxer Vasyl Lomachenko and pro-Russian representatives of Orthodoxy, such as Bulgarian Patriarch Daniel, contribute to this dynamic.
According to the adopted law, the connection with Moscow will be assessed for individual units rather than the church as a whole. Time will be given to sever these ties, and only after that will decisions on a ban be made through the courts.
Thus, the current version of the law appears to be more of a legal pressure tool on the church, primarily the UOC MP, to sever all ties with Moscow and to cleanse Ukraine’s religious life of both formal and informal Kremlin influence.
Meanwhile, Russian propaganda is using the adoption of this law as an excuse to fuel internal divisions in Ukraine and to discredit the Ukrainian government and statehood within Russia, Ukraine, and among external audiences. The impact on external audiences should not be underestimated. For example, U.S. Republican Party campaigners, such as blogger Tucker Carlson and Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, have mentioned the persecution of Christianity in Ukraine under the influence of Russian propaganda. A well-balanced version of the law and detailed government communication on its enforcement practices will, in the opinion of the authors of this article, act as safeguards against the fulfillment of Moscow’s propaganda goals.
