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Pro-Russian Telegram channel authors skillfully employ stories of uprisings, demonstrations, pickets, and revolutions from other nations to assert Russia’s chosen path as the ideal one. A comprehensive review by Detector Media of 29,000 messages from these channels over the past year sheds light on Russia’s intricate tactics of manipulating protest narratives.
Protests are pivotal in drawing attention to societal issues and voicing the concerns of marginalized groups. In democracies, these demonstrations underscore the public’s call for change. Amnesty International’s report on global protest rights suggests that only in autocratic systems are these voices of dissent viewed as threats. Such regimes prioritize their stability and security over democratic progress.
Russia is notable for its stance on protests, where participation can lead to legal repercussions. Media outlets loyal to the Russian administration often depict unsanctioned protests as threats to national stability.
To delve deeper into agitprop’s techniques for influencing public opinion, we examined messages from pro-Russian and occupation-focused Telegram channels previously identified in our Kremlin Hydra study. Our monitoring period spanned 365 days, from August 6, 2022, to August 6, 2023. Of the 311 channels scrutinized, 240 produced 29,087 messages bearing key terms like viche, protest, unrest, uprising, coup, march, revolution, Maidan, demonstration, rally, and picket. The data on publications in these Telegram channels was sourced from the TeleZip/Pravdorub Team.
“Protests Are Bad for Russia”, “Protests Are Organized From Abroad”
Propagandists often push the narrative that democratic protests are exclusively orchestrated and financed by foreign powers. Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, the West, particularly entities like the United States, NATO, or the EU, are portrayed as the puppeteers behind these movements. For instance, recalling the Hungarian uprising of October 1956, a pro-Russian Sevastopol Telegram channel stated that it began “precisely 66 years ago with thousands protesting in Budapest, calling for the Soviet troops’ exit from Hungary and the removal of communists from power.” A November 2022 piece by a pro-Russian blogger regarding Iranian protests claimed, “The US denies the restoration of Iran’s nuclear facilities, hoping that ‘peaceful protesters’ rallied by US intelligence will eventually seize power in Iran.” Meanwhile, protests and clashes with the military and police in Serbia and Kosovo in May 2023 were allegedly due to “the West’s ‘anger’ over the independent policy of [Serbian President] Vučić,” according to another pro-Russian Crimean channel.
On July 13, 2023, a pro-Russian Telegram channel reported, “Kenya is on the brink of another ‘Orange Revolution’ with justice marches, tire burnings, and chants of ‘if you don’t jump, you support William Ruto’. The pro-American opposition leader Odinga, who claims to be a relative of Barack Obama, is doing his utmost to create instability.”
In each of these cases, as well as in the descriptions of other protests for democratic change and against dictatorships that propagandists wrote about during the analyzed period, the root causes of the protests are often oversimplified, and the aftermath is twisted to suit their agenda.
When discussing protests in budding democracies, propagandists frequently stress the West’s alleged plans for orchestrating a “Maidan coup” or initiating “color” and “orange” revolutions. The term “color revolutions” is often used by Russians to describe the uprisings that toppled pro-Russian and undemocratic governments in countries like Ukraine and Georgia. According to this narrative, these protests paved the way for individuals purportedly serving the interests of the U.S. and “transnational corporations,” Nazi sympathizers, and those who hate Russia and its supporters. These individuals are typically painted in a negative light by Russia’s state-controlled media. Leveraging this dichotomy of “good versus evil,” they craft arguments supporting Russia’s undemocratic regime and justifying the repression of Russians participating in demonstrations.
There’s a prevalent notion in Russia, bordering on fixation, that protests against the government are orchestrated by external forces. For instance, on September 25, a Russian “military correspondent” shared three screenshots from Telegram. These posts, made by different Telegram users, encouraged people to bring tents and protest against mobilization in Russia. While the messages all shared the theme of protesting with tents, they didn’t seem to originate from a single author. Yet, to Russian propagandists, these posts served as evidence that the anti-mobilization demonstrations were externally coordinated, implying they weren’t genuine and shouldn’t be heeded. However, it’s worth noting that effective protests often require organization and public notification. Ensuring maximum participation in any demonstration often necessitates leveraging media and social platforms to spread the word.
“The Motherland May Forgive, but a Frenzied Mob…”
Russian propagandists often depict protests as menacing events, cautioning that they can spiral into unpredictable outcomes, including coups. This narrative was evident in their portrayal of the Georgian demonstrations in the fall of 2022. A pro-Russian Telegram channel post contended that demonstrators aimed to liberate a portion of Georgia, occupied by Russia in 2008. The author warned of missile strikes on Georgia if such an attempt was made, urging Russians who had fled to Georgia—due to fears of persecution or conscription—to return. The message ominously read, “The motherland may forgive, but a frenzied mob might not. And the bombs won’t check your passport.” Exactly a week after this post, Russia started its regular attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
In March 2023, Georgia witnessed another wave of protests. This time, they were against the Georgian government’s proposal to enact the “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” law. This law, similar to Russia’s “foreign agents” law, would stifle opposition activities and impede international monitoring missions in Russia. Passed on March 7, 2023, this law mandates a register of “foreign influence agents.” Entities with foreign contributions exceeding 20% of their operations would be cataloged in a public database. Russian sources branded the demonstrations following this law as externally orchestrated, forecasting an imminent armed conflict and a “color revolution.”
Russian propagandists consistently frame the outcomes of peaceful protests as a threat. For instance, the Revolution of Dignity that took place in Ukraine from November 2023 to February 2024 is depicted as the catalyst for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, military interventions in Ukraine, and subsequent war crimes.
A post from a pro-Russian Telegram channel on February 20, 2023, stated, “The Russian narrative, ‘Eight years ago, we were deceitfully betrayed by those we deemed kin, lured by Western cookies and tchotchkes.’ This sentiment was never truly acknowledged, or even noticed by the sharovary-wearing Judas.”
Such generalizations enable propagandists to attribute everything that happened after the Revolution of Dignity to those who ousted the “somewhat unconventional, yet amenable Yanukovych, with whom Moscow could negotiate.” In 2014, comparable narratives were circulated by Ukrainian media outlets either owned by Russians or affiliates of Yanukovych, like the Vesti newspaper, reportedly owned by former Revenue and Duties Minister Oleksandr Klymenko.
“Protests Good for Russia”, “Russian Spring: After the Darkness of the Night, the Morning of the New World”
The term “Russian Spring” is used by Russians to describe the occupation of Crimea in late February 2014 and their establishment of control over parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. They demonize the Revolution of Dignity, labeling it as “the first act of a hybrid, subsequently overt, warfare against Russia by the collective West, led by the United States.” Concurrently, they glorify the demonstrations by pro-Russian groups in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, painting a picture of widespread local support for Russia.
The narrative then evolves, with events like the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, framed as Russia’s relentless defense against “Ukrainian Nazis who kill Donbas children.” To this end, the myth of the “Russian Spring” and its accompanying propaganda are weaponized to rationalize Russian transgressions and breaches of international norms.
In August-September of 2022, propagandist Telegram channels targeting areas of Ukraine temporarily under Russian control disseminated reports of pro-Russian rallies and flyer distributions. The underlying message was clear: Russia has a robust support base within these territories, and the local populace must reconcile with the notion that “Russia is here forever.”
Another category of demonstrations orchestrated by Russian propagandists are those sponsored by the Russian state and pro-Russian activists abroad. A case in point is the concert rally held in Moscow on September 30, 2022. This event saw the mandatory attendance of employees from state-run institutions and students. It was at this gathering that Russian actor Ivan Okhlobystin issued a rallying cry of “Goida!” [Let’s (maim and kill)]. Such events are presented by propagandists as proof that Russian society allegedly supports the government.
Rallies commemorating pivotal moments from the Soviet Union’s or Russian Empire’s past are perceived as “harmless” by Russian authorities. Over time, the government has institutionalized celebratory practices for these anniversaries, infusing them with non-threatening interpretations. This sanitization of history is achieved by selectively editing past events, sidestepping controversial topics, and kindling a sense of Soviet-era nostalgia. For instance, while May 9 in Russia is marked with military displays and Soviet anthems, there’s a conspicuous silence around topics like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the tactics employed by Soviet military leaders.
“The French Are No Longer Just Demanding the Resignation of the Government and Macron, but Are Literally Calling for a Revolution”
Propagandists exploit demonstrations in developed countries across Europe and the Americas, pointing to them as proof that countries imposing sanctions on Russia are allegedly suffering without its energy supplies. Such intimidation narratives, which hint at the looming dominance of Russia, were also circulated outside its borders and showcased as “evidence of an inevitable victory” by pro-Russian media during late 2022 and early 2023.
There was a concerted effort by Russian propagandists, officials, and diplomats to perpetuate the illusion that Russian energy resources are irreplaceable. Yet, Europeans managed to adapt to escalated gas prices, navigating the winter months without major upheavals or protests.
Another frequent narrative employed by Russian propagandists concerning protests in sanction-imposing countries is the alleged financial strain these nations face in supporting Ukraine. According to this narrative, these financial burdens are primary catalysts for civil unrest. When covering Western protests, Russian propaganda messages on the economic, political, or other reasons for the protests invariably weave in stereotypical Russian propaganda themes—LGBTQ+ issues, racism, conspiracy theories, and the supposed ineffectiveness of European military forces, among others. Typically, these assertions are presented as self-evident, lacking any substantial evidence or rationale. For instance, a message from March 2023, responding to French protests against retirement age hikes, stated:
“Such disturbances are merely the fallout from the policies many European nations have embraced; transitioning from intense multiculturalism to something even more radical – sanctioning ghettos. Failing to assimilate these populations, they’ve chosen to cede territory, naively thinking these zones can be managed externally. As these ghettos multiply and the birth rates of their inhabitants outpace that of traditional Europeans, the ‘white man’s burden’ will soon shift to a circular defense of these enclaves.”
This message, from a pro-Russian Telegram channel that allegedly publishes news, offered no further insight into the actual reasons propelling the French protests.
Another instance from mid-December 2022 concerns German law enforcement unearthing a coup plot. A pro-Russian news Telegram channel briefly touched upon the core facts before swiftly pivoting to defend the Alternative for Germany party. It then made a dubious analogy between current German authorities and the Nazis, sans any historical context:
“We would like to remind you that in Germany today, against the backdrop of the socio-economic crisis, a political crisis is also unfolding, but the authorities are unwilling to change the course that has led the country into a dead end, ignoring the discontent of the people, business and regional elites. And what happened gives the authorities an excellent excuse to ‘neutralize’ some of their main opponents from the Alternative for Germany party... A similar provocation has already taken place in German history — the arson attack on the Reichstag in 1933. It allowed the Nazis to eliminate the opposition and reinforce their power.”
By employing such fact-twisting tactics, Russian propagandists aim to convince their audience that politicians in democratic countries are indifferent to their citizens. They insinuate that, mirroring Russia, these leaders use security forces to stay in power.
“Smells Like the Time of Troubles”
According to the Russian language dictionary, the word смута means rebellion, unrest, discord, and disorder. These are elements that the Russian administration, under Vladimir Putin’s reign spanning nearly a quarter-century, has vehemently opposed. Until June 24, in pro-Russian Telegram channels, the term смута retained an overwhelmingly negative connotation, up until the moment when Yevgeny Prigozhin, identified as a terrorist, along with the Wagner PMC terrorist group, commenced their “march on Moscow.”
This pivotal moment on June 24 saw propagandists adeptly pivot, transforming the dread associated with смута into a rallying cry for national unity. As articulated by a pro-Russian Telegram channel, “Russia has gazed deeply into the civil war’s abyss, yet has recoiled, teetering on the precipice of disaster.” The propagandists appended a layer of meaning to Prigozhin’s address, suggesting that the Wagner group had enough patriotism or foresight to stop. They framed Prigozhin as the archetype, urging fellow “Russian patriots” to refrain from insurgence against the regime, arguing that only external enemies would gain from such internal strife. The underlying message was clear: “Without internal upheaval, enemies stand no chance against Russia. A cмута is the only main condition for the enemy’s success.” Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko expressed his apprehensions regarding Prigozhin’s rhetoric in almost medical terms, stating, “Should this cмута spread across Russia, and the conditions for it were excellent, we would have been next.”
In a matter of days, Russian propagandists adeptly converted the looming threat to the state’s stability and potential erosion of Putin’s authority into a boon for the regime they represent. This is their modus operandi, manipulating any potential threats to their careers. Yet, their constant reiterations make their narratives more discernible and, consequently, more readily refutable.
