‘Advantages of Burialisation of the Whole Country.’ Overview of the Russian Media Environment in October 2022

Even pro-government, but not ultra-Putinist Russian media outlets publish materials openly criticising the government's plans and actions. The theory of the ‘good tsar’ and the ‘bad boyars’ has been disproven.

Following the announcement of ‘partial mobilisation’ and the occupation of parts of four Ukrainian regions, the media situation in Russia has become even more confusing. In September, there were signs that the Kremlin relied on intimidation of Russians to maintain control over the situation in the country. However, in October, mobilisation setbacks and military failures threatened to undermine Putin's approval rating.

For the third time, after the sanctions shock in March and the Ukrainian strikes on Crimea in August, Russian censorship and propaganda lost to reality and alternative, grassroots sources of information, not having time to frame and cover events the way the Kremlin wanted to see them.

For us in Ukraine, the most obvious was the striking gap between the military virtual reality of the Russian media and the Russian army’s real failures on the battlefield. Even in the highly brainwashed minds of Russians, doubts about the ‘might’ and ‘wisdom’ of the army emerged after the unexpected, and thus especially humiliating defeats near Izium, Lyman, and in the Kherson region.

However, the chaos and the consequences of the mobilisation hit the hearts of Russians the most: they began to realize that the government considers them solely as cannon fodder while disregarding the promises and laws they had made earlier.

This observation is based on the analysis of regional media operating in the 14 largest cities of Russia (Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, Ufa, Voronezh, Perm, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Volgograd, Khabarovsk). Throughout October, regional press and local online media spread the news about various ways of evading mobilisation. There were many publications about how to avoid the army, particularly with the help of lawyers. There were also many materials with blatant facts of violations and managerial failures, namely:

Mobilisation of people either unfit for service or not subject to conscription: people with sight impairments, reduced mobility, and those with many children:

‘In Khabarovsk, they tried to mobilise a man with -7 vision three times. The Khabarovsk resident arrived for the first time on September 26, he was taken to Bikin for military training. From there he was sent home, as he had no experience of military service, but had a -7 vision. The next day after the mobilisation training, the resident of Khabarovsk came to the military registration and enlistment office to pick up his military ticket, but they refused to give it to him. They forced him to sign a new summons for October 12. According to the activists, the man arrived at the military registration and enlistment office and was sent to a military unit in Knyaze-Volkonskoe. There they checked his documents and returned him to Khabarovsk. All-Russia People's Front stated that at the military registration and enlistment office of the Industrialnyi District, the man received the third summons for October 20. In addition, they demanded an explanation. The man wrote a statement to the military prosecutor's office because, after the first time, he should have been declared unfit for military service.’ (Baikal 24, 18 October 2022)

‘Bashkir women are asking en masse to bring home mobilised fathers with many children. We are talking about men who are raising three children.’ (News of Ufa and Bashkiria, 17 October 2022)

mobilised people on the run

‘A mobilised man who escaped from a bus in Gorodets was returned to his military unit.’ ("Nizhegorodskaya Pravda", 28 October 2022)

‘The military commandant of the commandant's office in Ulan-Ude opened a criminal case on the desertion of a resident of Yakutia, who was drafted as part of partial mobilisation and arbitrarily left the military unit in Buryatia, where he was taken from the military commissariat.’ (Baikal 24, 27 October 2022)

Forcing the mobilised to purchase everything they need without compensation:

‘The Telegram channel “Circles in the Fields”, which is allegedly managed by a Kazan reservist, tells about the course of mobilisation in Tatarstan... A Kazan resident, who calls himself Nagai, tells how much the mobilisation cost him personally: Jacket - 5,700 [RUB]; Trousers - 3,750; Tactical gloves 2 pairs - 1,200; Tactical backpack for 30 litres - 2,700; Thermal underwear one set - 900; Fleece underwear - 1,400; Two balaclavas - 1,200; First aid kit bag - 1,700; “That’s already 20,350, and I haven't bought winter boots yet, and I want a VKPO uniform (4,500), because our uniform is incredibly uncomfortable,” says the author of the blog. “And this is not counting the cost of medicines..." As you know, the Russian Defense Ministry insists that the soldiers have everything they need in stocks." (Kazan Reporter, 09 October 2022)

Lack of the most necessary household items for those mobilised in the rear and on the front line:

‘From the Vladimir region, we sent food, telephones, radios, quadcopters, thermal imagers, diesel [heat] cannons, clothes, underwear, and personal hygiene items to the mobilised residents of the region. They were purchased at the expense of entrepreneurs.’ (Vladimir region, 33 live, 18 October 2022)

The indifferent attitude of the officials towards the relatives of servicemen killed in action only increased the fears of the remaining mobilised, who fear what lies ahead. After all, it is one thing to declare having nothing to do with what is happening and putting up with the regime, but seeing how the authorities abuse those who believed in them and paid with their lives for the slogans about the ‘holy war’, and to experience this yourself is an entirely different, very unpleasant experience. Like in Volgograd:

‘Svetlana Ivchenko, a resident of Kamyshin, Volgograd Region, who lost her son Maxim during the military conflict in Ukraine, went to Moscow. The woman has lost hope of getting help from the local authorities and wanted to reach the President. According to Svetlana, the reason for this was the callousness and inattention of Kamyshin officials regarding the arrangement of a military funeral... During the funeral, representatives of the Kamyshin administration spoke about the final resting place of our soldiers as the Alley of Glory. Nobody can find this alley... A place is allocated in the depth of the cemetery, near the ravine and sewage. The only thing setting it apart is the Russian flags on each grave put there by the relatives of the deceased... Officials do not hear us, only after publications in the media of our region, they do a little bit, and again find excuses and reasons to neglect this important site.’ (Volgogradskaya Pravda, 31 October 2022)

However, the best ‘social advertising’ for mobilisation was invented in Kazan – cages for newly arrived mobilised servicemen who were found to be excessively inebriated. Indeed, ‘in the army, people live according to military rules, not human ones’:

‘Images from the social media groups Typical Chistopol and Yelabuga Online, where, according to the authors, a cage for mobilised in Kazan was photographed... The authors of the post in the social media group of the city reported that a cage for reservists who arrived in a state of intoxication was installed at the assembly point for mobilised Tatarstanis at the Kazan Expo: ‘Guys, if you came to Kazan Expo drunk, welcome to the cage for a day,’ the message read. At least two men can be seen behind bars. But there are more mattresses on the floor of the “cell”...’ (Kazan Reporter, 31 October 2022)

And the reports about the sudden death of the newly mobilised (from two weeks to a month after September 23!), who were immediately thrown into the frontline grinder, made a depressing impression. Or about the deaths of 19-21-year-olds who had just completed their military service. This completely contradicted the promises of the Russian authorities. It can be assumed that the spread of such news began to fuel protest moods in temporary camps of mobilised people throughout Russia.

‘In Satka we said goodbye to a 23-year-old soldier who died in Ukraine. His body was delivered to his native town a week ago. A farewell ceremony for 23-year-old Andrey Shibayev was held in the Stroitel recreation centre in Satka. The young man went to the frontline on September 27. Unfortunately, he died not long after he became a participant in the special operation.’ (ChelyabinskSegodnya.rf, 31 October 2022)

‘A 40-year-old mobilised soldier from the Sverdlovsk region was killed during the special operation in Ukraine. Andrei Shilyaev is survived by a son and a widow. According to the local media, the man was mobilised on September 28 to participate in the special operation in Ukraine. The soldier was killed on October 7 near Kherson. The funeral took place on October 16 in Severouralsk.’ (Ural Meridian, 25 October 2022)

All these examples only emphasize the disconnect between the Kremlin and everyday life. Mobilisation in the regions resulted in the collapse of the governance system and the decline of militaristic sentiments. Many of those who did not have time to flee abroad could only think of evading service and delaying being sent to the frontline at any cost.

The communication crisis turned out to be so serious that the Russian authorities had to take extreme measures: to partially admit the existence of problems in order to somehow ‘let off steam’ of popular discontent. At the same time, it was necessary to do this so as not to show Putin as the main cause of the problems and not to become scapegoats themselves. To do this, a number of propaganda techniques were used to bring down the wave of anger over the conditions of ‘partial mobilisation’.

Acceptance of ‘eyewitness testimony’. For example, some governors ‘inspected’ the camps of the mobilised and reported that ‘everything was going according to plan’.

‘Governor Alexander Burkov spoke about today's send-off of the mobilised guys at the 242nd Airborne Troops Training Center to the places of combat missions as part of the North Caucasus Military District. We see that the training in our newly formed units is not for show, the reservists receive the necessary combat skills before they go to the zone of the special military operation. This is what the President spoke about; all mobilised people must undergo compulsory training. This issue will be taken under special control on the instructions of the head of state.’ (BK55.ru, Omsk, 15 October 2022).

Instilling secrecy. Officials urged relatives not to disseminate videos or news about the conditions and living conditions of the mobilised so that ‘the enemy wouldn't know'.

“Please, relatives and friends of the mobilised Vladimir residents, do not post information about the whereabouts of our guys on the Internet. This information will play a critical role,” the governor of the Vladimir region wrote on the Telegram channel’ (33 live.ru, 16 October 2022)

Substitution of concepts and context of events. They try to hide the lack of the most necessary things with the help of calls for ‘volunteering’, ‘volunteer movement’, and ‘collection of humanitarian aid’. The fundamental difference from Ukrainian volunteering is that all such initiatives are launched top-down, through the governor and party vertical. Even announcements about ‘volunteering’ in most cases are written on behalf of the authorities.

‘The Culture Committee of Kursk region appealed to the entrepreneurs of the region with a proposal to organize a charity collection of personal belongings and food for the participants of the Eastern Partnership. Cheshskiy Lev sent snacks, baked goods, and lemonades to the military. The Oboyanskiy Konservnyy Zavod sent a batch of jam to the frontline, and the chairman of the Farm Group cooperative, Alexander Volkov, sent parcels of condensed milk. In addition, humanitarian aid was provided by the uniform shop Voentorg No.1, they sent 480 pairs of warm socks for the guys on the frontline. The total weight of the humanitarian cargo was more than 1 ton.’ (Nizhnegorodskaya Pravda, 18 October 2022)

Spreading promises of benefits for the mobilised and their families as a fait accompli. In fact, instead of reporting on what has already been done, officials talk about the future. 

‘Monthly allowance – at least 195 thousand rubles – for ordinary mobilised persons from the day of enrollment in the lists of personnel of the military unit. One-time payment of 50 thousand rubles to those mobilised in the Samara region.’ (Samarskaya Gazeta, 28 October 2022)

‘Tomsk Region will pay 1 million rubles to the families of the killed participants of the special operation in Ukraine. Compensation is provided for the wounded in the course of the special operation. Also, all participants in the special operation will be paid 100 thousand rubles.’ (Continent Siberia, 27 October 2022)

And here several problems arise at once: whether the assistance will be preserved if the mobilised person dies because it is about the care of the families of those who serve; whether there will be enough money because most Russian regions are subsidized and are forced to carry out mobilisation at their own expense; finally, whether other privileged categories will not suffer from such redistribution. Russian officials avoid answering these questions as much as possible. As well as explanations of why the amount and scope of benefits in different regions are different. For example, in Perm, there was an article on this with an eloquent headline, hinting at a social explosion: ‘Do We Not Want a Civil War?’ The Regions Gave the mobilised Different Booster Payments. 

Half-truths became a common technique to block the further spread of negative information and reduce social tensions: governors and local politicians did not shy away from ‘revealing embarrassing details’ about ‘bad conditions’ and support for the mobilised.

At the same time, they blamed either anonymous officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense or their political rivals, as did Evgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the Wagner PMC. However, these ‘sincere’ concerns for the fate of the mobilised were immediately used to, firstly, justify the war, and secondly, to condemn all those who decided to avoid mobilisation and flee from Russia abroad.

‘The level of cynicism is off the scale. The mobilisation backpack that the governor handed over is as crooked as ‘Beglov's shovel’. If you look at the photos of this backpack, you can see a cheap sleeping bag, a large rug to take up as much space as possible inside and create the effect of fullness, unusable shoes, and diarrhoea pills, which, by the way, would be nice to leave in St. Petersburg for officials with poop stains and diarrhoea-prone schoolchildren,’ said Evgeny Prigozhin. According to the businessman, all the backpacks were bought at the expense of the city budget. ‘At the same time, as everyone knows, all this was bought at the expense of the city budget, through dubious companies of yet another associates, assistants and friends.’ (Vladimir region, 33 live.ru, 20 October 2022)

At times, the authorities had to find scapegoats allegedly responsible for the failure of mobilisation in order to quell viral media scandals. This is reminiscent of Stalin's manoeuvres during industrialization and repression when instead of acknowledging large-scale mistakes and changing the way the country was governed, attention was diverted by deliberately exaggerated gestures of ‘justice’ and punishment of officials for ‘local excesses’. Such exceptions, when interventions occurred only after permission at the highest level, only emphasize the intransigence and rigidity of the authorities. This is gradually becoming apparent to people.

Finally, let us touch upon a seemingly mundane topic, the criminal chronicles of the Russian hinterland. It was in October that Evgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the Wagner PMC began to openly talk about the need for mass recruitment of prisoners to the Russian army to participate in the war in Ukraine. At the same time, regional authorities and the management of prisons and penal colonies stubbornly deny that anyone is being recruited. For example, you can find out how penal recruitment and its concealment took place in September-October in the Urals. In the future, this will sharply raise the issue of legality, justice, and security of victims of former criminals who will manage to return from the war and continue to live as if they had never been incarcerated. Also, the Russian media are already talking about the impudent and dangerous behaviour of people who return from the war in Ukraine and continue to behave as if they were still in the occupied territories: using threats and weapons in everyday situations.

Thus, in October, the media landscape in Russia, despite the expectations of the central government, became even more unpredictable. On the one hand, everyone is obliged to repeat the Kremlin's messages about the ‘holy war’ with the West and the ‘inevitable victory over the Ukrainian Nazis’.

At the same time, in regional Russian media (outside Moscow and St. Petersburg) the topic of war and occupation of Ukrainian lands is most often mentioned in the context of new problems:

Even pro-government, but not ultra-Putinist Russian media outlets publish materials openly criticising the government's plans and actions. The theory of the ‘good tsar’ and the ‘bad boyars’ has been disproven: the pluralism and openness not seen there for a long time began to undermine the most important pillar of Putin's regime – the infallibility of the decision to start the war.

Against the backdrop of such serious political and communication problems caused by the mobilisation, it is to be expected that the Russian authorities will start imposing severe restrictions even on those they consider to be loyal audiences. This confirms our observation in September that the Kremlin will deliberately foster an atmosphere of fear and anxiety in order to keep the Russian people in complete submission.