A History of Contempt: How Russia Has Struggled to Accept Ukraine’s Independence for 33 Years

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Let us take a look at how Russia has been challenging Ukrainian statehood by disregarding borders, undermining sovereignty, and denying autonomy.

In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, giving rise to fifteen independent nations, with Ukraine reclaiming its lost statehood. However, as British-Ukrainian political scientist Taras Kuzio wrote in a 2002 blog post, Russian authorities continued to view the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a reincarnation of the USSR.

“Russia has always, since the creation of the CIS in 1991, viewed it as a free commonwealth or confederation, controlled and led by Russia. From Russia’s point of view, the other CIS member states have only partial sovereignty as ‘near abroad’, a region that is no longer part of the USSR, but still not as absolutely sovereign as the ‘far abroad’ countries,” Kuzio wrote.

Consequently, Russia sent ambassadors to the newly independent former Soviet republics who acted more like “governors.” One such figure was Viktor Chernomyrdin, who served as ambassador to Ukraine from 2001 to 2009. Chernomyrdin believed in the concept of the “triune nation”—the reunification of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia—stating that “when Ukrainian society matures to this level, it will be ready for such a step.” Kuzio quoted these words from Chernomyrdin’s interview with the Russian newspaper Trud in January 2002.

Chernomyrdin remained a prominent “authority” on Ukrainian issues in Russia even after his death in 2010. For example, in April 2014, Rossiyskaya Gazeta published a collection of Chernomyrdin’s statements titled The Ukraine We Don’t Know, where he expressed disdain for Ukraine’s “disease—the Orange Revolution,” lamented a Ukraine “seduced by the West,” and refused to acknowledge Crimea as Ukrainian. Even a decade later, in February 2024, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s Deputy Chairman of the Security Council and former president, referenced a Chernomyrdin joke to argue that Ukraine would never join the EU, “Ukraine will join the EU after Turkey, and Turkey never [will].”

One of the earliest manifestations of Russia’s encroachment on Ukrainian sovereignty and its refusal to recognize Ukraine’s full control over its own territory was the “Crimean Crisis,” or the “Cold War over Crimea,” which took place between 1992 and 1994. Russia continuously obstructed the transfer of part of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukrainian control. In April 1992, a “war of decrees” erupted between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk over which country would have jurisdiction over the fleet.

At that time, parts of the Black Sea Fleet began swearing allegiance to Ukraine, initiating a process of transferring ships and units to Ukrainian control. The initially equal distribution of ships ended with the signing of the Massandra Accords, which outlined a phased resolution to the Black Sea Fleet dispute. Ultimately, in 1995, negotiations between Yeltsin and Kravchuk led to the following division: 18.3% of the fleet’s ships were allocated to the Ukrainian Navy, while 81.7% went to the Russian Navy. Ukraine retained naval bases in Izmail, Odesa, Ochakiv, Kerch, Donuzlav, and Balaklava. In return, Russia agreed to limit its military presence at its Sevastopol naval base to no more than 25,000 personnel.

In January 1994, Yuriy Meshkov, who at the time held the position of President of Crimea, called for the peninsula’s inclusion into Russia. This was one of the first “official” calls from a formally Ukrainian official with such a proposal. However, the Ukrainian Security Service’s Alpha unit intervened, preventing Meshkov from further spreading Russian influence in Crimea and stopping the peninsula’s separation from Ukraine. In March 1995, the Ukrainian parliament annulled Crimea’s 1992 constitution, abolishing the position of the president of Crimea. While Crimea retained its status as an autonomous republic, the office of the president was replaced with that of the Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Russia continued to exploit the problem of Crimea’s separation from Ukraine. In the spring of 2014, Russia went as far as accusing Ukraine of “annexing” Crimea first, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then-Speaker of the Russian Duma, Sergey Naryshkin, made this claim to justify both earlier attempts to seize the peninsula in the early 1990s and the preparation for the so-called “referendum” that was used to legitimize the military annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the newly independent states agreed to the borders that existed at the time of their separation. A significant step in Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s borders was the signing of the Belovezha Accords, which formalized the independence of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, and defined their borders. These agreements laid the groundwork for international recognition of the new nations, allowing them to take their place on the global political stage.

Between 1992 and 1997, Ukraine signed agreements recognizing borders with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Belarus. However, the process of recognizing borders with Moldova, Romania, and Russia dragged on. Ukraine and Russia agreed on their borders with Moldova in 1999, beginning the process of demarcation on the ground in 2002.

Ukraine and Romania reached an agreement on their land borders in 2003, but a dispute over maritime boundaries, inherited from the Soviet Union, remained unresolved. In 2004, Romania asked the International Court of Justice to settle the dispute. The key issue was Snake Island and control over the oil and gas extraction in the adjacent economic zone. The Romanians considered Snake Island a rock, while the Ukrainians claimed it was an island. If recognized as an island, Ukraine would have been entitled under international law to expand its maritime boundaries into waters Romania claimed as its own. On February 3, 2009, the International Court of Justice ruled that Snake Island was indeed an island, but this did not grant Ukraine the right to expand its exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea.

The issue of demarcating the Ukraine-Russia border persisted throughout the 1990s and 2000s. While Russia officially recognized Ukraine’s land borders, they were not marked on the ground. Disputes over maritime borders continued until 2012. One example of these problems was the conflict surrounding Tuzla Island. On September 29, 2003, the Russians began constructing a dam from Russia’s Taman Peninsula to Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait. The Russians justified their claim on Tuzla by citing the “need to prevent erosion of the Taman Peninsula” and argued that “the sea level in ancient times was 4 meters lower than it is today,” thus Tuzla was “historically” part of Taman. Russia’s attempt to seize Tuzla was averted by attracting international attention and through negotiations. In 2003, Ukraine and Russia signed the Treaty on the Russian-Ukrainian border. The agreement on the demarcation of the border on the ground was signed only in 2010, and the first border marker on the Russia-Ukraine border was installed in 2012. In November 2014, Ukraine’s president and cabinet decided to install border markers in accordance with the previously signed agreements but without Russian participation in the process, to which Russia objected.

For years, Russia attempted to portray the fact that different parts of Ukraine had historically been part of various states as proof of an alleged inability of Ukrainians to form a common identity and live together as a single nation. A textbook example of these arguments can be found in the “articles” and speeches of Vladimir Putin leading up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2024. One of the most prominent attempts to stoke division within Ukrainian society occurred during the 2004 presidential campaign. Political technologists working for then-Prime Minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych released a leaflet mimicking the visual style of his opponent, Viktor Yushchenko’s, campaign. The leaflet divided Ukraine into categories: several western regions (excluding Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi) were labeled as “first-class,” some central regions as “second-class,” and eastern and southern regions as “third-class.” This was an attempt by Yanukovych’s campaign to convince voters that if Yushchenko became president, he would ignore the needs of eastern Ukrainians while promoting fear of “western nationalism.”

The image of this fake flyer, allegedly by Yushchenko’s Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) party, which divided Ukrainians into “classes,” became an infamous example. Source: Chesno Movement

During the 2004–2005 presidential campaign, pro-Russian politicians and officials attempted to create “republics” for people of the same “class.” On November 28, 2004, in Sievierodonetsk, Luhansk region, a congress of deputies took place under the aegis of the Party of Regions, which supported Yanukovych. At this congress, the issue of Ukraine’s “federalization” was discussed, particularly the creation of the South-Eastern Ukrainian Autonomous Republic (Pivdenno-Skhidna Ukrayinska Avtonomna Respublika, PiSUAR). These political projects, spearheaded by members of the Party of Regions after Yanukovych’s defeat in the 2004 presidential elections, provided both Russians and Ukrainians, who followed Russian or pro-Russian news sources, with “evidence” that a divide within Ukrainian society truly existed, rather than being a fabrication or manipulation by Russian political technologists.The image of this fake flyer, allegedly by Yushchenko’s Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) party, which divided Ukrainians into “classes,” became an infamous example. Source: Chesno Movement

In 2004, the term “Novorossiya” (New Russia) began to surface, a term the Russians would employ a decade later during their occupation of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. After Yanukovych’s defeat in the repeat second round of the 2004 elections, a resolution demanding the creation of a “Novorossiyan Krai” within Odesa and its surrounding areas was adopted at a meeting initiated by the mayor of Odessa, Ruslan Bodelan.

Propaganda about a “three-class Ukraine” and the attempts to establish yet another PiSUAR or “Novorossiya” served as the basis for Russian narratives that claimed the Ukrainian state was inherently incapable of existing due to its “internal contradictions.” This coincided with the end of Vladimir Putin’s second term as president of Russia and the development of a vision for Russians of a struggle against US attempts to “establish hegemony” by “financing coups” in Russia’s “zone of influence.” At the time, the Russians referred to protests in Georgia and Ukraine, which had led to changes in leadership and the declaration by these post-Soviet republics of their intent to pursue reforms and integrate with the EU and NATO, as “coups.”

Following the change of leadership in Georgia and Ukraine, Vladimir Putin, during his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, complained about the West’s lectures on Russia’s lack of democracy and criticized the “weakness and cynicism” of NATO, led by the U.S. This image continues to be used to justify Russia’s dictatorship and military aggression. In this confrontation, Ukraine is portrayed as a “puppet” of the U.S.

That was also the time when the Kremlin’s “revisionist” arguments regarding the “artificial nature” of the Ukrainian nation began to take shape. During NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the possibility of offering Ukraine and Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP), a roadmap towards full NATO membership, was discussed. Among Western allies, there was no consensus, and Putin, a month before the end of his presidential term, attempted to intimidate Western leaders with undesirable consequences should Ukraine and Georgia be granted membership. It was during this summit that Putin first raised the idea of Ukraine’s “unnatural and incomplete” statehood:

“Ukraine, in the form it currently exists, was created in the Soviet times, it received its territories from Poland – after the Second World war, from Czechoslovakia, from Romania – and at present not all the problems have been solved as yet in the border region with Romania in the Black Sea. Then, it received huge territories from Russia in the east and south of the country. It is a complicated state formation,”  reads the transcript of Putin’s speech to Western leaders at that summit.

Behind the scenes, Putin’s rhetoric at that summit was even harsher, according to witnesses. In private conversations with leaders, Putin did not hesitate to refer to Ukraine’s “artificial nature.” Former Latvian President Valdis Zatlers, a participant in the summit, recalled that “everyone thought these were just political talks without serious consequences.” Russian media, including the newspaper Kommersant, confirmed this dismissive rhetoric towards Ukraine, quoting Putin’s conversation with U.S. President George Bush. “When it came to Ukraine, Putin was furious. Addressing Bush, he said, ‘You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state!’” This moment marks the clear emergence of the propaganda cliché regarding the “artificial nature” of the Ukrainian state. This narrative would later become central to Moscow’s justification for its aggression and signal the beginning of a rhetorical chill in Russia’s relations with the West.

A turning point for Russian propaganda came with the events of the Revolution of Dignity. The Ukrainian opposition to Yanukovych’s authoritarian regime was labeled as “rebels” and “fascists,” while protestors were portrayed by Russian propagandists as a “mob” supposedly controlled by a few “nationalist groups.” This framing of a “fascist coup in Kyiv” laid the groundwork for the next Russian propaganda narrative: “the events on Euromaidan will lead to Ukraine’s split.”

“The flames of chaos have broken out in Ternopil, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Cherkasy, Ivano-Frankivsk. Nationalist mobs are seizing city and regional administrations. But the east and south do not support the extremist moods of the country’s west,” a Russian TV presenter on the TV Centre channel reported in a January 2014 broadcast.

The change of power after Euromaidan shattered the illusion of Russia’s influence over Ukraine. As a result, Russia began seizing Ukrainian territories, starting with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, accompanied by a massive campaign to “deny the legitimacy” of newly elected President Poroshenko. Instead of referring to the Ukrainian government, Russia introduced the term “Kyiv regime.” The Ukrainian Armed Forces were rebranded as “Kyiv militants” and “terrorists.” However, the most aggressive attempt to delegitimize Ukraine’s government, sovereignty, and statehood came after the full-scale invasion by Russia on February 24, 2022. Since then, Russia has persistently attempted to “cancel” Ukrainian statehood by force.

In two speeches in the run-up to the invasion, on February 21 and 24, Putin denied Ukraine’s statehood and sovereignty. Notably, in the speech that directly preceded the invasion, there were fewer of these references, with Ukraine only being mentioned closer to the middle of the address. Instead, Putin focused on the threats posed by the U.S. and NATO countries. Ukraine was referred to only as an “anti-Russia... under complete external control,” which was “created on our historical territories.”

Putin’s justification for invading Ukraine aligns with the popular Russian propaganda narrative of the so-called “country 404.” This term refers to Ukraine in relation to the HTTP error code 404, which signifies that a webpage could not be found. The implication is that “Ukraine no longer exists,” its state institutions are collapsing, and its complete defeat and loss of statehood are merely a matter of time. This meme emerged during the first phase of Russia’s armed aggression in 2014, suggesting that after the 2014 revolution, Ukraine had ceased to exist as a nation. However, the longer Ukraine resists Russian military aggression, the more it becomes viewed as a “serious enemy” by Russian propaganda. Meanwhile, interest in this narrative is waning, as seen by the decreasing readership in the Telegram channels of Russian propagandists and officials.

Russian state propaganda and actions by Kremlin leaders have gradually reshaped the perceptions of Russian society regarding Ukraine. Despite the limitations of opinion polls in an authoritarian state, these surveys can still offer a limited but useful picture of general societal trends. For instance, in early 2000s surveys, Ukraine (49%) was only a few points behind Belarus (54%) among “near abroad” countries with which Russia should prioritize friendly relations. In 2001, many Russians expressed support for the restoration of some form of union among the former “Slavic” republics of the USSR.

But Russia’s state propaganda and its actions against Ukraine are having a growing negative impact on the mass perceptions of Russian society. In an increasingly authoritarian environment, especially after 2022, conducting social research in Russia has become more challenging. Despite this, opinion polls still provide insights into broader societal trends. While fear of responding truthfully may affect absolute numbers, relative changes over time can be revealing. According to the Russian Levada Center (detailed methodology available here), Russians’ attitudes toward Ukraine shifted from friendly to hostile over time. Up until Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, between 60% and 80% of Russians had a positive view of Ukraine, although this trend was worsening. After Viktor Yanukovych came to power, attitudes briefly improved, but they deteriorated again after 2014. In 2019 and 2021, according to Levada, Russian opinions of Ukraine improved once more. For the first time since 2014, those who viewed Ukraine positively outnumbered those with negative opinions. This shift may be linked to the temporary stepping up of negotiations and hopes for peace in the Donbas, but in 2022, amidst the initial nationalist euphoria following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the trend reversed, hitting its lowest point on record.

Results of public opinion polls on attitudes toward Ukraine, 1998-2024. Source: Levada Center

According to Levada Center, by 2022, Ukraine consistently ranked second among the countries Russians considered “most hostile.” This was the response of 10% of respondents in 2013 (the lowest level, though Ukraine was still ranked second in “hostility”) to 50% (the highest indicators from 2016–2018). However, in 2022, following the full-scale invasion, Ukraine fell behind the UK, Germany, and Poland in the “hostility rating”. This can be explained by the fact that Russian propaganda had fully denied Ukraine’s independence and statehood, with many Russians perceiving the conflict not as a war with Ukraine, but with the “collective West.”

Results of opinion polls on Russians’ attitudes toward other countries. Source: Levada Center

Observing the dynamics of Russian propaganda and Putin’s rhetoric on Ukraine’s independence, one can see that the public and diplomatic language became progressively more aggressive and uncompromising. The most intense efforts to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty coincided with periods of heightened tensions between Russia and Ukraine, from the first Maidan to Russia’s initial invasion of Crimea and the full-scale war.

This radicalization of Kremlin rhetoric and actions concerning Ukrainian independence also aligns with another trend—the approval rating of Vladimir Putin. According to data from Levada Center, while the absolute figures may be questioned, the trend dynamics are likely quite real.

Results of opinion polls on Russians’ approval of Vladimir Putin. Source: Levada Center

Based on this data, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 occurred during moments of declining support for Putin. This point is supported in the analysis of Russia’s influence in Ukraine in 2024 in the publication of the Center for Russian Federation Studies of the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine Putin’s Regime: Reset-2018:

“Putin himself is acutely aware of the need to construct a supranational identity, having ‘experienced the collapse of an imagined historically formed community as the greatest drama of his life’. Putin and his circle see the main guarantee that such a scenario will not happen to the Russian Federation in the future in the patriotic mobilization carried out in the wake of the ‘Russian Spring’ - a movement that gained momentum after the annexation of Crimea and ensured a significant increase in the presidential rating.”  

From this, we can conclude that the current aggression against Ukraine, along with previous escalations, serves as a means for the Kremlin to redirect internal dissatisfaction outward. Putin, whose regime’s survival is equated by pro-Kremlin political technologists with Russian statehood itself, seeks to affirm his authority by undermining Ukrainian independence.

Thus, the derogatory slogan labeling Ukraine as a “404 country,” implying a dysfunctional state lacking sovereignty, can be more accurately applied to Russia itself. After all, it is her regime that is forced to attack other states for self-preservation and to nurture the image of a besieged fortress to maintain hatred for neighbors and imaginary “enemies.”

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Contributors: Oleksiy Pivtorak, Andriy Pylypenko, Arseniy Subarion, Artur Koldomasov, Kostiantyn Zadyraka, Lesya Bidochko, Oleksandr Siedin

Main page illustration credits: Natalia Lobach