1000 Days of Talking About Peace. How International Media See the Path to Peace in Ukraine

Українською читайте тут. 

The Detector Media Research Center analyzed the vision of “peace in Ukraine” based on publications in the English-language media.

A thousand days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine also marks a thousand days of discussions about peace. On the fifth day of the large-scale invasion, February 28, direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations took place in Gomel, Belarus, as reported by the Belarusian news agency Belta. After several rounds of negotiations in Belarus, the last in-person attempts to reach an agreement were held in Istanbul on March 29, 2022. In April, talks continued for a few weeks remotely, after which they ceased entirely, at least publicly.

By then, Russian troops had withdrawn from northern Ukraine, including from around Kyiv, revealing evidence of numerous war crimes committed by the Russian army in liberated territories. On September 30, 2022, the day Russia annexed occupied Ukrainian territories, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy enacted a National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) resolution “regarding the impossibility of holding negotiations with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin.” Since then, Kyiv and Moscow have not officially engaged in peace talks. However, discussions about their potential resumption and the conditions for peace have persisted daily across Ukrainian, Russian, and global media.

Moreover, the prevailing view among Western political elites and media remains that the war will end through negotiations rather than the capitulation of one side. Official Kyiv echoes this sentiment. “Ukraine clearly understands that the war will end with negotiations,” stated Oleksandr Lytvynenko, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, in his address to the participants of the Baltic Sea Region Forum in May 2024.

Thus, the timing and conditions for starting negotiations are becoming critical in these discussions, as they will significantly impact the resulting agreement. Such an agreement could either restore violated international law and indirectly hold the aggressor accountable or reward the aggressor, undermining the foundations of global security.

In recent months, talk of potential peace terms has intensified, particularly due to the U.S. presidential election and newly elected President Donald Trump’s promises to end the war quickly. 

On November 6, The Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed sources close to Trump, reported on a proposed peace plan. The plan allegedly includes a 20-year freeze on Ukraine’s NATO accession, a cessation of hostilities, and the creation of a demilitarized zone along the front line, likely monitored by European allies of the U.S.

Bloomberg, citing its own sources, reported that a similar proposal would be introduced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, coinciding with the 1000th day of the full-scale invasion. This plan also envisions a freeze on the war and, this time, only a 10-year delay in Ukraine’s NATO membership. However, it proposes securing peace through international troops stationed in a demilitarized zone along the contact lines and strengthening Kyiv militarily. Russian spokesperson Dmitry Peskov commented on these reports, rejecting the idea of freezing the frontline as a condition for peace talks and insisting that Russia will demand the surrender of all territories in the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

On October 5, The Financial Times reported, citing its sources, that Western diplomats and increasingly Ukrainian officials privately consider a compromise that allows the Kremlin to retain control over occupied Ukrainian territories. In this scenario, Kyiv would receive Western security guarantees, including NATO membership, resembling the division of Germany during the Cold War. The New York Times similarly reported on November 13 that Ukraine’s current priority is security guarantees rather than reclaiming occupied territories, citing its own sources.

According to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in early October 2024, a majority of respondents — 58% — oppose any territorial concessions, while 32% are willing to make territorial compromises to achieve peace more swiftly. The survey interviewed 2,004 respondents aged 18 and over in Ukraine-controlled territories between September 20 and October 3, 2024, asking them to choose between these two statements. The sociological data also indicate a growing trend of respondents open to territorial concessions.

KIIS survey. Question: Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with more?

As part of its information operations, Russia shifts the blame for the war onto Ukraine and the West. Moscow accuses Kyiv, Washington, London, Paris, or Brussels of refusing negotiations and thus rejecting peace. Russia disseminates these narratives in Western countries, the Global South, through propaganda media targeting Ukraine and, of course, to its domestic audience. In response, Ukraine counters this propaganda with its own peace initiatives, which include adherence to international law.

This study analyzes proposed peace terms in the Russian-Ukrainian war suggested by various state agents, experts, or media outlets. 

This study focuses on examining prevailing views on peace in Ukraine through an analysis of publications in English-language information outlets and media that concentrate on international security issues.

On February 24, 2022, during the announcement of its invasion (termed a “Special Military Operation” by Russia), Vladimir Putin declared the war’s goals to be the “protection” of residents in occupied eastern Ukrainian territories, the “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine, and the “prosecution of those responsible for numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including citizens of the Russian Federation.” Simultaneously, he claimed there were no plans to occupy additional Ukrainian territories.

According to The Washington Post, on the first day of the invasion, Russia made two proposals of capitulation to Kyiv. The first came via a phone call between Andriy Yermak, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, and Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Head of Russia’s Presidential Administration. The second was conveyed by the Ukrainian then-Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov via Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin from Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

Subsequent Kremlin “peace proposals” came during official negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow. Both the initial proposals presented on March 7, 2022, in Belarus and the final draft proposals following the Istanbul talks on April 15 resembled a classic capitulation agreement. Until the end, Moscow maintained demands for Ukraine’s unilateral disarmament without any real security guarantees, acknowledgment of territorial losses, restrictions on foreign and domestic policy, and renunciation of legal and economic claims against the aggressor, including the lifting of sanctions on Russia. Any changes to these demands during negotiations were largely cosmetic, with the strategic goal remaining the same: to weaken Ukraine’s defense capabilities and increase Russia’s leverage over its external and internal affairs.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly referred to the “Istanbul Agreements,” presenting them as a lost opportunity for peace, allegedly rejected by Ukraine and its allies. De facto, Moscow is shifting the responsibility for the war to Ukraine because it refused to accept the destruction of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty without resistance.

Another recurring rhetorical device in Russian propaganda employed since 2022 has been the claim of negotiations “taking into account the situation on the ground.” This wording can be interpreted as a desire to preserve the occupied territories of Ukraine and a “peaceful proposal” to halt the war along the current front line. Until June 2024, this ambiguous messaging was largely interpreted as such in Western media.

However, on June 14, just before Ukraine’s Global Peace Summit, Putin unveiled what he called a “real peace proposal.” For the first time, he explicitly demanded Ukraine surrender the entirety of the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, including areas not under Russian occupation, such as the cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Moreover, in Putin’s view, the demands for the surrender of territories and Ukraine’s refusal to join NATO are only a starting “precondition” for further negotiations, “the beginning of a dialogue on which the future existence of Ukraine depends.”

While employing such ultimatums, the Kremlin simultaneously portrays itself as receptive to peace initiatives from the Global South, such as the Brazil-China proposal for a ceasefire along the current line of contact. This inconsistency generally fits into the Kremlin’s flexible play of good cop and bad cop with international audiences, with peaceful statements alternating with nuclear threats. Pro-war Russian Telegram channels typically reject such ceasefire initiatives as treasonous, advocating instead for maximalist goals, including the subjugation of all Ukraine and even more than just Ukraine.

Following the same logic, the Russian-controlled media are full of contradictory historical scenarios for the end of the war, which are allegedly alternatives to escalation. In particular, this includes the “Korean scenario,” which precisely envisages freezing the war along the current front line without signing a peace treaty. Or the plan to “Finlandize” Ukraine, which means refusing to join NATO and legitimizing territorial losses. Or a reference to a kind of “Yalta-2,” by which propagandists mean negotiations with Washington on the distribution of spheres of influence in Europe. All of these contradictory proposals act as a media cover for Russia’s aggression, which jeopardizes the global order. Therefore, the discrediting of any peace initiatives that take into account the position of respect for international law, territorial integrity of states, and the UN Charter remains demonstrably unchanged for the Moscow-controlled media.

The first negotiations following the full-scale invasion between Ukraine and Russia took place in Belarus, spanning three rounds: February 28, March 3, and March 7. Prior to the first round, the Office of the President of Ukraine announced that the negotiations were being held without preconditions. A participant from the Ukrainian side, Davyd Arakhamia, the head of the Servant of the People faction in parliament, stated before the March 3 round that the “minimum program” was the establishment of humanitarian corridors. After the Belarus talks, Mykhailo Podolyak, an advisor to the Office of the President and a member of the negotiation team, reported progress in organizing logistics for humanitarian corridors. He also mentioned that “intensive consultations continued on the basic political block of settlement, along with a ceasefire and security guarantees.”

Subsequent stages of the negotiation process occurred in Turkey. On March 10, 2022, the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Russia, Dmytro Kuleba and Sergey Lavrov, met. According to Kuleba, the main task, as in previous rounds, was to agree on humanitarian corridors, particularly for Mariupol, and to secure a 24-hour ceasefire to address humanitarian issues. On broader peace issues, Kuleba stated that “Russia’s list of demands amounts to a call for surrender.”

Further negotiations between delegations took place on March 14–15. According to Mykhailo Podolyak, the Ukrainian side planned to prioritize discussions on “positions related to ending the war itself.” These talks also aimed to address the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, the conclusion of a peace agreement, and “the key issue around which everything revolves — security guarantees for Ukraine to ensure such situations do not recur.”

Subsequent negotiation rounds occurred on March 21 and March 29–30. During a briefing on March 29, Mykhailo Podolyak announced that Ukraine proposed bilateral negotiations on the status of Crimea and Sevastopol over the next 15 years, with a suspension of hostilities on the matter for that period. Regarding the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine, negotiations were proposed to take place between Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin. Davyd Arakhamia also stated that Ukraine sought security guarantees “where the guarantor countries will act in a manner similar to NATO Article 5, but even more stringently.” Proposed guarantor countries included UN Security Council members (the UK, China, Russia, the US, and France) as well as Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, and Israel. The guarantees would not apply to territories occupied before February 2022. Moreover, according to Arakhamia, the signing of an international security guarantee treaty would only be possible following a nationwide referendum.

However, no agreements were reached during the negotiations. Drafts of the so-called “Istanbul Agreements” later surfaced, revealing significant discrepancies between the points announced by the Ukrainian side and the demands of the Russian side. Additionally, the “agreements” required the consent of third parties to provide Ukraine with security guarantees, which was not obtained.

No official meetings between Ukrainian and Russian representatives occurred after March 30. The situation with the negotiations became more complicated after evidence of Russian war crimes in the suburbs of Kyiv, particularly in Bucha, came to light. Despite this, President Zelenskyy acknowledged that while “even the possibility of negotiations” was a challenge after Bucha, “when you pull yourself together, which we have to do, I think we have no other choice.” He stated, “Each tragedy like this, each Bucha like this, will slap you on the wrist regarding some negotiations. But we need to find opportunities for such steps.”

On September 30, 2022, Russia announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, none of which it fully occupied. In response, on the same day, President Zelenskyy enacted a National Security and Defense Council decision titled “Regarding the Actions of Ukraine in Response to Russia’s Attempt To Annex the Territories of Our State, With the Aim of Guaranteeing the Security of the Euro-Atlantic Space, Ukraine, and Restoring Its Territorial Integrity.” Among other issues, this decision explicitly ruled out the possibility of negotiations with Russian President Putin.

On November 15 of that year, during the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Indonesia, President Zelenskyy announced the so-called “peace formula” as Ukraine’s vision for achieving peace. The “formula” consists of ten points: nuclear and radiation safety, food security, energy security, the release of all prisoners and deported persons, adherence to the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and global order, withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, justice (establishment of a special tribunal for war crimes and reparations by Russia), combating ecocide, preventing escalation, and formalizing the end of the war.

To discuss and endorse the “peace formula,” a series of international meetings were held, including in Jeddah on August 5–6, 2023, with the participation of 42 countries, including Western nations and BRICS countries (excluding Russia), and in Malta on October 28–29, 2023, with 66 countries from the West and the Global South.

In June 2024, the Global Summit on Peace in Ukraine took place in Switzerland, jointly organized by Switzerland and Ukraine. Invitations were sent to over 160 delegations, with representatives from 93 countries and several international organizations attending. Following the summit, a “Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework” was published, where participants agreed on the wording of the first three points of the “peace formula”: nuclear safety, food security, and the release of prisoners and unlawfully detained civilians. According to the communiqué, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant must operate under Ukraine’s sovereign control with IAEA oversight, free and safe navigation must be ensured in the Black and Azov Seas, all prisoners of war must be exchanged, and deported Ukrainian children and other unlawfully detained individuals must be returned to Ukraine. Not all summit participants signed the communiqué. Of the 93 attending delegations, 80 countries and 4 international organizations had signed it by the summit’s conclusion. Subsequently, some states, including Jordan, Iraq, and Rwanda, withdrew their signatures, while others, along with additional international organizations, joined the communiqué. As of September 10, 2024, the communiqué had 94 signatories, comprising both states and international organizations.

Following the first peace summit, plans for a second summit were announced, with an invitation extended to Russia.

“We have stated that we are ready to see Russia at the second summit because all our allies, including the closest ones who stand by us and consistently oppose Russian aggression, have said that Russia must be present at the second summit,” commented Zelenskyy.

However, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that Russia would not participate in the second peace summit. In October 2024, Zelenskyy explained in an interview that the anticipated outcome of the summit was “the end of the war, at least its ‘hot’ phase.”

1. Mediation Efforts by Turkey, Led by President Erdoğan (July 2022 – July 2023): The Proposal for an "Istanbul Peace Summit"

Turkey, as a NATO member with a longstanding relationship with Russia, leveraged its strategic location and control over the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean to focus on localized ceasefires and trust-building measures, such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

The agreement was concluded on July 27, 2022, and, after two extensions, expired on July 17, 2023. Through Turkey’s mediation, a framework emerged in which Russia and Ukraine avoided signing agreements directly with each other, instead entering parallel agreements with a mediator. In the case of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the UN also served as a mediator alongside Turkey.

Istanbul Summit 2.0. In March 2024, following discussions with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced Turkey’s readiness to host a summit between Ukraine and Russia for negotiations to end the war. Previously, Turkey had repeatedly called for a resumption of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine, similar to those held in Istanbul in spring 2022, advocating for a “leaders’ summit.

2. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's Peace Formula (November 2022)

President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula, unveiled in November 2022, outlines ten points addressing various stages and aspects of achieving sustainable peace in Ukraine. These include nuclear, food, and energy security; exchange of prisoners; preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity; withdrawal of Russian troops; establishment of a tribunal to address Russian war crimes, among other measures. On February 23, 2023, ahead of the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the Peace Formula. The resolution, titled “Principles of the Charter of the United Nations Underlying a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine,” was supported by 141 states, with 32 abstaining and 7 voting against: Russia, Belarus, Syria, North Korea, Eritrea, Mali, and Nicaragua.

Subsequently, following the First Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (June 15–16, 2024), 94 states and international organizations (as of September 10, 2024) backed a communiqué focusing on three aspects of the Peace Formula: nuclear security, food security, and the exchange of prisoners of war.

3. China's Peace Initiative (February 2023)

In February 2023, China published a document titled “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis” on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website. The 12-point plan emphasizes that Ukraine’s security should not come at the expense of other countries and that “regional security should not rely on strengthening or expanding military blocs” (which can be interpreted as China’s disagreement with Ukraine’s movement towards NATO). It advocates that the security interests of all nations must be taken seriously.

Regarding the path to peace talks, the document states, “All parties should support Russia and Ukraine in resuming direct dialogue as soon as possible in order to gradually de-escalate the situation and achieve a comprehensive ceasefire.” That is, this initiative provides for an immediate or as soon as possible cessation of hostilities. And leaving the territories occupied by Russia under its control, as Russian leader Vladimir Putin occasionally puts it, “taking into account the realities on the ground.”

Other points include addressing the humanitarian crisis, protecting civilians and prisoners of war, safeguarding nuclear power plants, and reducing strategic risks (e.g., nuclear weapon use).

Criticism of the Chinese plan argues that it is aimed at Beijing’s desire to show itself as a leader and peacemaker for the Global South, serves the purpose of a future “reset” of China’s relations with European countries, and is an attempt by China to promote its business interests in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

4. Visits of African Leaders to Kyiv and St. Petersburg (June 2023)

In June 2023, leaders of seven African countries held separate meetings with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv and later with Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg during the so-called St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The delegation, informally led by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, included representatives from Egypt, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Comoros, Zambia, and Uganda. During their visit to Ukraine, the Russian military launched a major missile attack on Kyiv. 

No official documents were published following these visits. According to Reuters, a preliminary draft proposal by the African leaders included the following points: withdrawal of Russian troops, removal of Russian tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus, suspension of the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Putin, lifting of Western sanctions on Russia, and an “unconditional agreement on grain and fertilizer.”

According to Vitaliy Portnikov, an observer for Radio Liberty, the African leaders’ visit allowed Moscow to “absurdize” the concept of peace negotiations while effectively derailing the process by insisting on the “security interests” of the aggressor state: “When Beijing, Johannesburg, Brasília, or Jakarta call to ‘hear Russia,’ the leaders of these countries are legitimizing the use of force to justify occupation, annexation, and violations of international law.”

5. Vatican’s Initiative for Immediate End to the War (March 2024)

On March 9, 2024, Pope Francis, in an interview with the Swiss broadcaster RSI, suggested that Ukraine should take the initiative he called the “courage of the ‘white flag’” and begin negotiating with Russia to end the war. Ukraine reacted negatively to this proposal. Then-Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba responded, saying that Ukraine would “never raise any flags other than the blue-and-yellow one.”

A few days later, the Vatican sought to mitigate the impact of Pope Francis’s remarks. Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican’s Secretary of State and the second-ranking figure in the Church hierarchy, stated in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera on March 12 that Russia was “the aggressor” and must “first and foremost cease fire,” characterizing the war in Ukraine as “unjust.”

6. Brazil-China "Friends of Peace" Initiative

In September 2024, representatives of 17 Global South countries convened on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York to form a new group called Friends of Peace, co-led by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, and the chief adviser to Brazil’s President, Celso Amorim. Ukraine and Russia were not present at the meeting. Earlier, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, addressing the UN General Assembly, urged all nations to join the Brazil-China “six-point peace plan.”

This plan calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, de-escalation, and peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow without requiring Russia to withdraw its forces from occupied Ukrainian territories. The joint Brazil-China initiative, detailing a “six-point consensus on resolving the Ukraine conflict,” emerged in late May 2024 following a visit by Celso Amorim to Beijing. The plan also emphasizes the inadmissibility of using weapons of mass destruction and nuclear arms and opposes “dividing the world into isolated political or economic groups.”

Representatives of Switzerland, which hosted the First Global Peace Summit in June 2024, commented positively on the Brazil-China initiative: “We participated in this meeting as observers and support this momentum,” said Nicolas Bideau, the chief spokesperson for Switzerland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on September 28, 2024.

In contrast, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded negatively to this meeting “on the sidelines” of the UN General Assembly, reaffirming the country’s adherence to the principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” and emphasizing that any peace proposals must be based on the UN Charter, respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders.

7. Other Mediation Efforts and Attempts to Initiate Peace Talks (Orbán's “Peace Mission")

During the “Shangri-La Dialogue” security summit in Singapore in the summer of 2023, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, who became the country’s president in 2024, presented his vision for ending the war in Ukraine. He proposed creating a “demilitarized zone” and conducting a referendum under UN auspices on the territories he referred to as “disputed.” Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Oleh Nikolenko responded, stating that Ukraine has no “disputed territories” where such a referendum could be held. He urged Indonesia to support Ukraine’s position and call on Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian soil.

Indonesian analyst Deka Anwar, a research fellow at the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict in Jakarta, criticized the Indonesian president’s proposal, stating it rewarded Russia’s aggression and contradicted principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty: “This effectively legitimizes the annexation of new territories acquired through military means. Establishing a demilitarized zone is meaningless for Ukraine but advantageous for Russia.” Indonesia declined to sign or diplomatically support the final communiqué of the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland in June 2024, citing the need for an “inclusive” dialogue that included all interested parties, including Russia.

Several countries have continued to offer mediation between Ukraine and Russia, advocating for the earliest possible start of negotiations. Austria and Hungary have proposed their territories as venues for potential talks. On September 5, 2024, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer suggested Vienna — a city hosting the headquarters of the OSCE — as a possible site for direct peace negotiations “without preconditions.”

Prior to that, the most notable media efforts to present himself as the main mediator between “West and East,” or “the dove of peace,” were made by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán when he visited Kyiv, Moscow, and Beijing in July 2024, describing this as a “peace mission for Ukraine.” On November 7, at the European Political Community Summit in Budapest, Orbán remarked — following news of Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election — that Trump would end support for Ukraine. Quoted by AP, Orbán said, “The situation on the front is obvious, there’s been a military defeat. The Americans are going to pull out of this war.” The Hungarian leader has consistently blocked or delayed EU support for Ukraine, including efforts to provide arms and financial aid and extend sanctions against Russia.

Most of the proposed mediation initiatives and “peace plans” frame the Russia-Ukraine war as a bilateral conflict or a “Ukrainian crisis,” avoiding direct identification of Russia as the aggressor. This framing risks undermining international law and legitimizing the unlawful annexation of Ukrainian territories seized by force.

Brazilian-Chinese and other initiatives advocating immediate de-escalation and a ceasefire along the current line of contact, followed by negotiations (direct or mediated), effectively recreate the Minsk Agreements model, with the added danger of legitimizing Russian control over temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. This “normalization” of international law violations aligns with Russia’s strategy and interests.

Ahead of the U.S. presidential election, over 100 current and former officials from Western countries issued an open letter urging European states to prepare for all potential election outcomes and to prevent a “Munich Agreement” for Ukraine. The signatories called for a coalition of willing NATO member states to commit to increasing military and financial support for Kyiv, thereby ensuring Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign state and securing Russia’s defeat.

Analysts at Detector Media examined 931 articles from 79 publications featuring the phrase “peace in Ukraine,” published in English during September and October 2024. The study focused on the publications identified by the News API service as the most popular. According to the News API website, the service provides access to news from 150,000 sources across approximately 90 countries. The dataset was cleaned of duplicate and deleted articles and included content from both leading global online media outlets and niche publications or news aggregators specializing in international security.

The News API selection includes publications from Russian state-funded outlets RT and Sputnik, as well as Breitbart News, a U.S.-based conservative media outlet known for spreading misinformation and fake news. These propaganda sources also appear in Google News. Overall, News API’s results align with publications retrieved for the same query via the globally accessible Google News service.

The availability of Russian propaganda sites to users of Google and News API services among publications that adhere to journalistic standards and value their reputation once again puts into question the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia. However, it also allows us to analyze the views on peace in Ukraine promoted by Russian propagandists.

The analyzed collection of publications included a wide variety of sources. A significant portion (267 publications, or 28%) originated from Russian state-funded propaganda outlets such as RT and Sputnik. Publications from reputable media outlets (e.g., BBC News, Forbes, Deutsche Welle English, EurActiv) comprised 22% of the dataset (205 publications). Meanwhile, articles from news aggregators focused on international security or online discussion platforms claiming to represent a “collective opinion of the expert community” (such as globalresearch.ca, globalsecurity.org, and nakedcapitalism.com) accounted for nearly 8% of the messages. The remaining 21.8% consisted of publications from other sources, with no single source contributing more than 10 publications to the analyzed dataset.

In categorizing the publications, analysts from Detector Media applied a set of markers, including:

Publications falling under the “globalization” or global impact marker included reports about North Korean troops appearing in Ukraine or the effect of Russia’s invasion on investor opportunities in Europe’s arms manufacturing sector. The publications that described Russian war crimes in Ukraine, in particular, were marked as relevant markers for the coverage of certain aspects of the war, such as the support of the ‘peace formula’ by certain countries. 

During the first stage of analysis, researchers assigned a score of “1” to any publication containing at least one marker. Some publications fell under two or even three markers simultaneously. Notably, 113 publications (12% of the dataset) were not categorized under any marker. These often dealt with global events where Ukraine was mentioned only in passing.

Authors of 29% of publications (273 entries) supported continued financial and military aid to Ukraine and upheld Ukraine’s right to defend itself against Russian aggression. Conversely, nearly 23% of the reports promoted narratives portraying Ukraine and Russia as “equal participants in the conflict” who should engage in negotiations. In some cases, responsibility for the war was shifted onto Kyiv and the West, with suggestions to use reduced or withdrawn support as leverage to force negotiations.

Some publications touched upon aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war that were not related to peace or negotiations or referred to wars and conflicts in different parts of the world (Israel, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, etc.), comprising 35% of all reports in the analyzed dataset. This is not surprising, given the global nature of the topic and the selection of media. 

In the second phase, researchers summarized trends and narratives within each category, grouping publications with similar markers to identify prevailing themes and patterns.

Throughout September 2024, the following news hooks shaped the discourse on “peace in Ukraine”: discussions about the slowdown in the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ advance in the Kursk region, preparations for the second Global Peace Summit, the United Nations General Assembly session and meetings of Ukrainian officials in the U.S. during the visit to the UN General Assembly, announcements regarding the development of Ukraine’s victory plan, the Chinese-Brazilian “Friends of Peace” initiative, and new tranches of aid provided to Ukraine by its partners.

The infographic above highlights several peaks in publications during September–October 2024. During the peak media activity on September 11–12 (46 publications from the analyzed dataset), there was no singular newsworthy event for the articles. A noticeable trend was the discussion about the potential approval of long-range missile strikes on Russian territory. This topic emerged in the context of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Kyiv. It was speculated that during this visit, Blinken might announce approval for American missiles to target military facilities within Russia.

Pro-Russian outlets focused on the theme of Russia’s counteroffensive in the Kursk region and its relations with Global South countries. Propaganda narratives about the Russian advance in the Kursk region aimed to project an image of the inevitable victory of Russian forces on the battlefield.

Reports during this time about “deepening ties with India” and positioning Russia and China as “defenders of democracy worldwide” were likely designed to bolster Russia’s international standing. Such narratives coincided with a security forum in Beijing attended by a Russian delegation. Against the backdrop of potential Ukraine-Russia negotiations, this active diplomacy and rhetoric about Russian friendship with Global South countries sought to strengthen Russia’s position in future negotiations.

Another peak in activity occurred at the end of September, with 78 publications from the analyzed dataset. These were sparked by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s remarks on China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war. During a press conference on September 27, Blinken criticized China, saying that “Beijing says that, on the one hand, it wants peace, it wants to see an end to the conflict, but on the other hand, is allowing its companies to take actions that are actually helping Putin continue the aggression.” Russian propaganda outlets covered Blinken’s accusations, focusing more on China’s response, which accused the U.S. of discrediting Beijing and imposing “indiscriminate sanctions.” However, this event did not receive broad coverage among pro-Russian outlets, which instead published materials emphasizing China’s readiness to mediate in Russia-Ukraine negotiations and its intentions to peacefully resolve the “conflict.”

The dominant theme for discussions about “peace in Ukraine” during the first twenty days of October was Ukraine’s “victory plan.” Newsworthy events included discussions about its development, details, presentations to Ukraine’s partners, and public discourse in Ukrainian society. In the final ten days of October, media discussions about peace in Ukraine were tied to statements from Russian leaders and participants at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.

Throughout the month, the peace discourse also intersected with commentary and programs from U.S. presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Donald Trump, in particular, had a significant impact on the discussions. In mid-October, he stated that Volodymyr Zelenskyy “should never have let that war start.” During his campaign, Trump said that within 24 hours of being elected, he would call both Zelenskyy and Putin to negotiate a peace deal.

Discussions during the last ten days of October also intensified around the roles of North Korea and Iran in supporting Russian aggression.

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Japanese anti-nuclear organization Nihon Hidankyo triggered the largest peak in media activity in October. Nearly half of all analyzed publications on October 11 (29 in total) focused on this event. The Nobel Committee’s central message during the ceremony emphasized the unacceptable nature of nuclear weapon use due to its catastrophic consequences. In this context, Ukraine was mentioned as one of the potential theaters of war, alongside the Middle East, where the risk of nuclear weapon use exists.

The media covering the Nobel Peace Prize event predominantly included outlets where pro-Ukrainian markers were identified in the analyzed articles. These markers suggest that the materials largely align with Ukraine’s position. Conversely, pro-Russian media devoted less attention to this topic. However, the propagandist outlet RT published an article distorting the Nobel Committee’s statements to accuse the West of pushing the world toward nuclear conflict.

On October 16, the “Victory Plan” was presented in Ukraine’s Parliament. This event sparked heightened media activity across all segments, resulting in 68 publications in the analyzed dataset. Western media primarily focused on the plan’s essence, largely presenting it in a news format. Some analytical articles included markers indicating support for continued and enhanced assistance to Ukraine for its defense against Russian aggression. 

On the other hand, pro-Russian outlets reacted with sharp criticism and mockery of the Ukrainian President’s initiative. Propaganda narratives reused familiar tropes about a “war to the last Ukrainian” and Ukraine’s alleged dependence on the U.S. government.

Simultaneously, pro-Russian media published materials highlighting the alleged willingness of certain European leaders to negotiate with Russia. For instance, RT released an article titled “10 Facts the West Must Understand Before Talking to Putin”. Thus, we can observe the opposite messages in the Western and pro-Russian media: while the Victory Plan provides for increased assistance to Ukraine, pro-Russian media reports that negotiations are inevitable.

The main topic of late October, which caused a surge in media activity, was the BRICS summit in Russia. From October 22-24, the bulk of the publications were devoted to analyzing the public comments of the world leaders who took part in the event.  A shared narrative across media segments was the notion of a new power bloc emerging as a challenge to the West. Western media highlighted potential avenues for resolving the geopolitical situation. Meanwhile, pro-Russian propagandist outlets emphasized themes of “global fatigue with Western leadership” and the “beginning of a multipolar world.” These narratives align with the broader messaging of Russian propaganda and diplomacy, targeting BRICS member states and countries of the Global South.

Most propaganda claims, such as the “ineffectiveness of sanctions against Russia” or the “readiness of European leaders to engage in dialogue with Russia,” disseminated by Russian state-funded outlets like RT and Sputnik, have been discussed above. However, there are clear examples of manipulation in publications targeting international audiences. For instance, in a report on German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Kazakhstan, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s words were featured in the headline but attributed to the German leader. The RT website headline read: “German Chancellor stated that ‘Russia is invincible militarily.’” Yet, in the article, the quote was attributed to the Kazakh president: “During a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Monday, Tokayev stated that ‘it is a fact that Russia is militarily invincible.’” During this conversation, Tokayev expressed support for the Brazil-China initiative on resolving the situation in Ukraine. Through such manipulations, RT seeks to create an impression of broad international support for alternatives to Ukraine’s Peace Formula, emphasizing the supposed military invincibility of Russia and claiming recognition of this strength by Western leaders.

An example of RT’s manipulation when the words of one politician in the headline of a publication were presented as a quote from another

This category also includes publications on other platforms where authors distort content and present misleading headlines that conflict with the speaker’s position. For instance, the website Natural News, which brands itself as a nonprofit organization advocating for environmental protection, published an interview with former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland conducted by Russian opposition journalist Mikhail Zygar. The publication’s headline pushed a narrative aligned with Russian propaganda, claiming Ukraine “derailed the peace talks in Istanbul in April 2022 at the behest of the U.S. and its allies.” However, in the interview itself, Nuland discussed how the American public would not allow Donald Trump — if he were to become president (the interview was published in September 2024) — to turn away from Ukraine.

The study identified instances where forums and discussion platforms for the “expert community” (e.g., globalresearch.ca, globalsecurity.org, and nakedcapitalism.com) emerged as “super-spreaders of disinformation.” For example, Yves Smith, the editor of nakedcapitalism.com, promotes the idea that the conflict in Ukraine is a “proxy war” primarily driven by “American imperialism.” Smith writes in one of her articles: “If we choose war, or allow our leaders and their foreign friends to choose it for us, we must be ready, as military experts tell us, to once more send tens of thousands of young Americans to their deaths, while also risking escalation to a nuclear war that would kill us all.”

A separate category comprises articles and authors blaming the U.S. for escalation. Pieces from this category advance the narrative that “the U.S. and its allies continuously provoke Russia through military aid to Ukraine,” and Ukrainian attacks on military facilities in Russian territory hinder the peace process. For example, the abovementioned nakedcapitalism.com website published a discussion with American economist and Marxism advocate Richard Wolff, who argued for the “decline of the American empire.” According to Wolff, “aggressive U.S. foreign policy” and economic sanctions have strengthened alliances between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which now challenge U.S. dominance on the global stage. Regarding Ukraine, Wolff claims that the U.S. miscalculated Russia’s military and economic power, resulting in a protracted and costly war. Ukrinform fact-checker Andrii Olenin has documented numerous instances where Professor Wolff either supported or was quoted by Russian propaganda. In his speeches, Wolff frequently echoed Russian narratives, including the alleged ineffectiveness of U.S. sanctions on Russia, the leadership of BRICS nations compared to the G7, and the supposed inferiority of U.S. weapons compared to Russian ones.

Another category includes articles describing a “stalemate in Ukraine,” meaning an impasse on the field of battle. Such publications are more common in outlets with established reputations and adherence to journalistic standards. For example, New York Magazine columnist Benjamin Hart, in an article titled “Why Russia is in More Trouble Than It Looks,” outlines the current battlefield situation for Western audiences. According to Hart, Russia is slowly but steadily gaining ground in the Donetsk region. Despite Ukraine’s efforts, including a recent incursion into the Kursk region, Russia’s larger resources and tactics give it a significant advantage at this stage of the war.

Publications from reputable outlets have also included calls for the U.S. to renew commitments to allies, strengthen sanctions against Russia, and enhance their enforcement and administration. Other articles reported on the readiness of certain European states, including France, to support the idea of an immediate invitation of Ukraine to NATO. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot expressed this position during a visit to Kyiv in September 2024.

Perspectives on a viable peace in Ukraine must necessarily include provisions for restoring territorial integrity and preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty. This stands in stark contrast to the proposals from Russia and representatives of certain other nations, particularly those from the Global South.

Russia exploits peace proposals to legitimize annexations and solidify its imperialist ambitions. Throughout the period analyzed in online media publications, Russian spokespersons have exhibited fluctuating attitudes toward peace discussions, alternately rejecting and embracing the idea of negotiations. However, Russia’s fundamental demand remains the recognition of occupied territories and the restriction of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Discussions of a “peace plan for Ukraine” have prompted Russian statements indicating that the only realistic end to the war would involve adhering to the so-called “Istanbul Agreements” — Russia’s interpretation of these includes demands not agreed upon by Ukraine during the spring 2022 negotiations, such as unilateral Ukrainian disarmament without tangible security guarantees.

Russia also continues to intimidate the international community with nuclear threats while simultaneously accusing the West of provoking a “nuclear apocalypse.” Its informational strategy oscillates between advocating for peace talks and rejecting any ideas inconsistent with its imperialist interests.

Against the backdrop of such actions, certain international initiatives, such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, have demonstrated limited effectiveness. This framework revealed Russia’s propensity to breach agreements that contradict its interests. In this context, Ukraine had to force open the “grain corridor” to ensure food security for the Global South while simultaneously diminishing Russia’s dominance in the Black Sea.

Some international leaders, such as Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, have shown an insufficient understanding of the nature of Russian aggression and Ukraine’s political geography by asserting that there are “disputed territories” in Ukraine. This may indicate the significant influence of Russian propaganda beyond Europe. An additional obstacle to assigning peacekeeping roles to representatives of emerging powers, such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, lies in their advocacy for freezing the conflict to stabilize trade relations with Russia. Such an approach not only fails to advance peace but also creates a dangerous precedent for allowing aggressors to evade accountability.

Russia has repeatedly complicated the prospect of negotiations, pushing the status quo further away from international law. For instance, it annexed newly occupied Ukrainian territories on September 30, 2022, and issued territorial ultimatums in June 2024, demanding Ukraine surrender new areas. These actions suggest that one of Moscow’s strategic goals is the demonstrative subversion of the international legal order. Consequently, the aggression in Ukraine is merely a stepping stone toward a world where Russia can continue to assert its dominance through nuclear ultimatums. Kyiv can emphasize this in communication with international stakeholders, especially those geographically distant from Russia’s borders, but not from the strategic consequences of its actions undermining international law.

Ukraine’s peace initiatives are firmly rooted in adherence to international law, serving not only Kyiv’s interests but also those of the global community. However, a key weakness of these initiatives lies in their disconnect from the realities on the ground, especially in the face of the Russian army’s creeping advance over the past year. The gap between Kyiv’s entirely legitimate demands and the realities of the front line leads to frustration and detachment from Ukraine’s positions. Instead, the Ukrainian state could, in its communication, differentiate between long-term strategic goals of restoring international law and short-term compromise tactics better suited to the realities of the current historical moment. This approach would enable Ukraine to implement realistic and effective communication with international players to counter Russian aggression while laying the groundwork for the eventual restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

On November 5, Presidential Advisor on Communications Dmytro Lytvyn held a closed meeting with organizations working in the field of countering disinformation and information security, convened by the NGO Detector Media. As a result of this meeting, experts in information security developed recommendations for Ukraine’s internal Victory Plan.

Contributors: Andriy Pylypenko, Arseniy Subarion, Kostiantyn Zadyraka, Oleksandr Siedin, Oleksiy Pivtorak.

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Main page illustration and infographic by Nataliya Lobach